ESS  A,Y  S; 


IN 


MILITARY  BIOGRAPHY 


BY 


CHARLES   CORNWALLIS   CHESNEY 

COLONEL    IN    THE    BRITISH    ARMY  AND 

LIEUTENANT  COLONEL   IN   THE 

ROYAL    ENGINEERS 


UNIVERSITY 
' 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

1874 


PREFACE. 


OF  THE  ESSAYS  here  republished,  the  first  four 
relate  to  the  great  war  in  America,  the  military  excel 
lence  displayed  in  which  has  been  unduly  depreciated 
by  comparison  with  late  events  on  the  Continent. 
There  is  a  disposition  to  regard  the  American  generals, 
and  the  troops  they  led,  as  altogether  inferior  to  regu 
lar  soldiers.  This  prejudice  was  born  out  of  the  blun 
ders  and  want  of  coherence  exhibited  by  undisciplined 
volunteers  at  the  outset, — faults  amply  atoned  for  by 
the  stubborn  courage  displayed  on  both  sides  through 
out  the  rest  of  the  struggle  :  while,  if  a  man's  claims  to 
be  regarded  as  a  veteran  are  to  be  measured  by  the 
amount  of  actual  fighting  he  has  gone  through,  the 
most  seasoned  soldiers  of  Europe  are  but  as  conscripts 
compared  with  the  survivors  of  that  conflict.  The 
conditions  of  war  on  a  grand  scale  were  illustrated  to 
the  full  as  much  in  the  contest  in  America,  as  in  those 
more  recently  waged  on  the  Continent.  In  all  that 
relates  to  the  art  of  feeding  and  supplying  an  army 
in  the  field,  the  Americans  displayed  quite  as  much 
ability  as  any  continental  power  ;  while  if  the  organiza- 


•v  PREFACE. 


tion    and    discipline  of  their  improvised  troops   were 
inferior,  the  actual  fighting  was  in  fact  more  stubborn 
for  no  European   forces  have  experienced  the  amount 
of  resistance  in  combat  which  North  and  South  opposed 
to  each  other.     Neither  was  the  frequently  indecisive 
result  of  the  great  battles  fought  in  America  any  proof 
that  they  formed  exceptions  to  the  ordinary  rules  of 
military  science.     These  actions  were  so  inconclusive, 
first,  from  deficiency  in   cavalry,  and  next  because  the 
beaten  side  would  not  break  up.     The  American  sol 
diery,  in  thus  refusing  to  yield  to   panic  when  losing 
the  day,  retiring  in  good  order,  and  keeping  a  good 
front  to  the  victorious  enemy,  displayed,  let  us  venture 
to  believe,  an  inherited  quality.     In  order  to  pursue, 
there  must  be  some  one  to  run  away,  and,  to  the  credit 
of  the  Americans,  the  ordinary  conditions  of  European 
warfare  in  this  respect  were  usually  absent  from    the 
great  battles  fought  across  the  Atlantic.     Hence  partly 
the  frequent  repetition  of  the  struggle,  almost  on  the 
same  ground,  of  which  the  last  campaign  of  Grant  and 
Lee   is  the  crowning  example.     Nor  have  those  who 
study  the  deeds  wrought  by  Farragut  and  Forter,  with 
improvised  means,  any  reason  to  hold  American  sail 
ors  cheaper  than  our  own,  or  to  think  lightly  of  the 
energy  that  raised  the  fleets  they  led. 

The  essays  on  DE  FEZENSAC  and  VON  BRANDT  bring 
to  notice  memoirs  which  not  only  deal  with  a  most 
interesting  period  of  history,  but  may  be  studied  with 


PREFACE.  v 

special  advantage  at  this  time.  They  will  prove  that 
the  present  fashion  of  depreciating  the  French  military 
character  and  ascribing  German  successes  to  an  innate 
superiority,  though  carried  to  extravagance,  is  more 
reasonable  than  the  belief  in  French  invincibility  which 
was  as  commonly  entertained  in  the  earlier  days  of  the 
first  Empire.  These  memoirs  show  clearly  that  the 
French  victories  of  that  era  were  not  due  to  any  intrin 
sic  superiority  of  a  military  organization  in  which  might 
be  discerned  broad-sown  the  germs  of  the  faults  that 
have  lately  been  manifested  but  to  the  extraordinary 
imbecility  of  the  powers  that  controlled  the  opposing 
forces.  The  military  qualities  of  the  two  races  appear 
to  have  been  then  very  much  what  they  are  now. 

The  essay  on  Lord  CORNWALLIS  is  an  attempt  to 
illustrate  the  life  of  a  man  who,  without  conspicuous 
ability,  effected  by  common-sense,  high-mindedness,  and 
force  of  character  a  complete  revolution  in  the  Indian 
Public  Service,  overcoming  in  doing  this  the  dearest 
prejudices  of  his  employers,  as  well  as  the  self-interest 
of  his  subordinates.  In  his  early  days  Lord  Cornwallis 
had  taken  an  honorable,  if  not  glorious  part  in  the  war 
of  American  independence,  perhaps  the  most  ill-con 
ducted  of  the  many  ill-conducted  wars  in  which  England 
has  ever  been  engaged  ;  and  the  memior  which  follows 
that  on  his  Indian  career  gives  a  curious  picture,  by 
one  of  the  loyalist  militia  he  raised,  of  that  almost 
forgotten  struggle,  when  the  Southern  states  especially 


VI  PREFACE. 

were  divided  almost   man   against    man,   as   personal 
feeling  declared  itself  on  the  side  of  Congress  or  King. 

The  remaining  essays  in  this  volume  are  designed 
to  record  high  work  done  by  two  brother  officers,  name 
sakes,  though  not  related  to  each  other :  one,  a  man 
who  lately  ended  a  life  of  which  heart-whole  devotion 
to  duty  had  been  throughout  to  a  degree  hard  to  paral 
lel,  the  unswerving  guide  ;  the  other,  a  soldier  still 
young,  whose  brilliant  military  genius  has  already 
saved  an  empire  from  ruin,  and  is  still  happily  available 
for  the  service  of  his  country. 


COHSTTE^TS. 


"he  Military  Life  of  General  Grant. 
Memoir  of  General  Lev.         .         .         .Si 

Admirals  Farragut   and   Porter    and  the 

Navy  of  the   Union.     .          .          .          .136 

4  Northern  Raider  in  the  Civil  War.     .    185 

FezensaJs   Recollections    of  the  Grand 
Army.  .         .       '  .         /  I94 

-lenry    Von   Brandt,    #    German    Soldier 

of  the  First  Empire.  .         .          .         .241 

^ornwallis  and  the   Indian  Services.          .293 

4   Carolina  Loyalist  in  the  Revolutionary 

War.    .  .   323 

William    Gordon    of    Gordon's   Bat- 

.  .   34I 


Chinese    Gordon    and    the     Taiping    Re 

bellion.  .         .         .         .         .  350 


ESSAYS 


IN 


MILITARY  BIOGRAPHY. 


THE  MILITARY  LIFE  OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 

IT  is  not  very  many  years  since,  that  a  needy  man 
was  lounging  in  the  streets  of  St.  Louis,  with  scarce  a 
friend  or  a  hope  in  the  world.  He  had  left  an  honor 
able  service  under  a  cloud  ;  and  after  trying  his  hand 
at  the  national  pursuit  of  farming,  which  had  brought 
him  much  toil  and  little  gain,  had  turned  in  vain  to 
other  pursuits.  As  a  dealer  in  wool,  as  agent  for  col 
lecting  debts,  as  auctioneer,  as  house-agent,  he  had 
failed  to  compete  successfully  with  the  sharper  or  bet 
ter  trained  minds  around  him  ;  and  now  what  he  had 
regarded  as  his  last  chance,  his  application  for  a  petty 
local  appointment,  had  been  rejected  curtly,  with  the 
intimation  that  fit  testimonials  were  lacking  in  his  case. 
To  this  ex-captain,  bankrupt  in  fortune,  name,  and 
hope,  some  demon  may  be  imagined  whispering,  "  Why 
struggle  any  more  against  your  fate?  The  world  has 
no  place  for  you  and  such  as  you.  Your  chances  have 
slipped  from  you.  Your  day  of  hope  is  past.  Your 
friends  are  growing  tired  of  your  existence.  Your  ac- 


2  THE  MI  LI  TAR  Y  LIFE 

quaintances  slink  away,  lest  they  should  hear  of  your 
need.  Give  up  the  useless  effort  to  recover  yourself, 
and  cast  yourself  away."  On  the  other  hand,  his  bet 
ter  angel  intervening,  may  have  urged  him  to  good 
courage,  reminding  him  that  he  had  been  known  on 
the  distant  plains  of  Mexico  for  distinguished  gallantry 
and  conduct ;  that  the  name  then  gained  was  not  yet 
wholly  lost ;  and  that  in  the  seemingly  peaceful  money- 
seeking  country  in  which  his  fortune  lay,  there  were 
hid  the  elements  of  a  deadly  strife,  soon  possibly  to 
break  out,  when  the  soldierly  qualities  within  him 
would  shine  forth,  and  place  him  as  high  above  more 
common-place  men  in  fame  and  fortune,  as  now  he 
seemed  hopelessly  beneath  them. 

Whether  thoughts  corresponding  to  these  crossed 
his  mind,  and  the  better  in  the  end  predominated, 
who  can  truly  tell  ?  Certain  it  is  that  the  ex-captain 
Hiram  Ulysses  Grant,*  leaving  St.  Louis  and  its 
temptations  behind  him,  turned  towards  Galena  in 
Illinois,  where  his  father  lived,  and  was  received  into 
his  employment.  Thus  it  came  about  that  the  future 
General-in-Chief  and  President  passed  the  next  two 
years  of  his  life  in  the  humble  capacity  of  assistant  to 
a  leather-dealer,  taking  his  turn  of  rougher  and  harder 
occupations  in  the  winter.  So  passed  his  time  peace 
fully,  but  with  no  recovery  of  his  lost  position,  until 
the  great  events  of  April  1861  brought  Southern  pol 
icy  to  a  decisive  issue  at  Fort  Sumter,  and  electrified 
the  North  with  Lincoln's  sudden  call,  the  first  hint 

*  Sucli  is  the  President's  Christian  name.  He  .was  entered  how 
ever  as  a  cadet  (by  some  unexplained  mistake)  as  Ulysses  Sidney,  and 
has  retained  the  initials  thus  received  ever  since,  calling  himself 
Ulysses  Simpson.  Simpson  was  his  mother's  maiden  name. 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 

the  outer  world  gained  of  the  dimensions  of  the  con 
test,  for  75,000  volunteers. 

In  common  with  all  educated  men  in  the  United 
States,  Grant  had  watched  the  approach  of  the  rup 
ture  with  intense  interest.  A  Western  man  by  birth, 
and  now  a  denizen  of  the  great  free  state  which 
boasted  the  new  President  among  her  sons,  instinct 
and  patriotism  made  him  eager  to  strike  for  the  Union : 
nor  self-interest  less,  since  here  appeared  the  long- 
desired  opening  by  which  to  raise  himself  at  once  to 
the  level  from  which  he  had  fallen.  Like  many 
another  ex-officer  of  the  army  who  held  to  the  North, 
he  wrote  at  once  to  Washington  to  beg  for  a  commis 
sion.  The  War  Office  was  not,  however,  to  be  his 
door  to  fame.  General  Scott,  the  aged  soldier  who 
commanded  for  the  first  few  months  of  the  war,  was 
stern  against  the  offence  of  which  Grant  had  been  once 
accused.  With  Hooker,  and  some  other  less  known 
officers  who  had  left  the  service  under  similar  circum 
stances,  the  ex-captain  found  his  application  totally 
neglected.  He  had  not,  however,  happily,  trusted  to 
it  alone.  Before  making  it,  he  had  begun  to  form  and 
drill  a  company  at  the  town  of  Galena,  and  in  eight 
days  after  Lincoln's  first  proclamation  had  his  little 
charge  in  sufficient  order  to  present  it  to  Governor 
Yates  at  Springfield,  the  state  capital.  Military  men 
of  any  real  training  were  exceedingly  scarce  in  the 
vVest,  while  military  and  patriotic  enthusiasm 
abounded.  The  governor,  less  prejudiced  than  Gen 
eral  Scott,  after  some  conversation  with  Grant,  gladly 
took  him  into  his  own  office  to  assist  in  organizing  the 
volunteers  of  the  state.  His  professional  knowledge 
(for  he  had  served  as  a  quartermaster),  his  energy,  his 


4  THE  MILI TAR  Y  LIFE 

strict  attention  to  details,  here  made  him  a  most  service 
able  assistant;  and  when,  five  weeks  later,  the  Twenty- 
first  Illinois  Regiment  begged    the  governor  to  give 
them  a  colonel  (since  no  one  in  the  battalion  could  pro 
fess  the  least   military  knowledge),  Mr.  Yates  pointed 
to  the  humbly  dressed  individual  who  sat  writing  in  a 
corner  of  his  room,  and  said  to  the  deputation,  "  Gen 
tlemen,  I   cannot   do  better  than   give  you  Captain 
Grant."     The  appointment  was  soon  made  out.     Not 
instantly,   however;    for  Grant,   before   accepting    it, 
twice  visited   Cincinnati,  where    M'Clellan  was  then 
collecting  the  troops  which  soon  after  raised  him  to 
distinction   in  Western  Virginia.     Grant   had   known 
M'Clellan  well  in  former  days,  and  hoped  to  find  a 
place  upon  his  staff;  but  missing  the  general  on  each 
occasion,  returned  finally  to  Illinois  to  receive  charge 
of  his  regiment  of  volunteers.     This  was,  of  course, 
like    all    such    commands,   only    mustered    for    three 
months;  and  hence,  no  doubt,  Grant's  anxiety  to  find 
some  more    permanent,  though    nominally  lower  ap 
pointment.       It  is  a  curious  study   for  the   military 
biographer,  to  conjecture  what  would  have  been  the 
fortunes  of  Grant  had  he  become  attached  to  those  of 
M'Clellan.     It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  his  opportu 
nities  of  separate  personal  distinction  would  have  been 
greatly  missed,  at  least  for  a  time,  and  that  his  disap 
pointment   in  not  meeting  his  old  comrade  was  in 
truth  a  remarkable  piece  of  good  fortune. 

Taking  command  of  the  Twenty-first  Illinois  Vol 
unteers  early  in  June,  1861,  Grant  was  ordered  forth 
with  across  the  border  to  Missouri,  each  district  of 
which  was  at  that  time  rent  by  contests  for  the  pos 
session  of  the  state,  waged  by  the  slaveholding  inter- 


OF  GENERAL   GRANT.  5 

est  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Free-soilers,  aided  by  a 
powerful  contingent  of  German  immigrants,  on  the 
other.  The  first  regular  officer  he  served  under  was 
General  Pope,  who  ordered  him  to  the  town  of  Mexico. 
Here,  meeting  some  other  volunteer  regiments,  the 
colonels  begged  him,  as  the  only  trained  officer  present, 
to  act  as  brigadier  until  some  general  arrived  ;  but  a 
week  later  the  "  Gazette"  contained  his  commission, 
with  those  of  thirty-three  other  officers,  as  brigadier- 
general  of  volunteers.  Mr.  Washburne,  a  well-known 
member  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  a  resi 
dent  of  Galena,  though  he  had  never  noticed  his  hum 
ble  neighbor  during  the  peaceful  days  before  Fort 
Sumter  fell,  had  marked  the  strenuous  exertions  which 
Grant  had  made  to  give  military  cohesion  to  the  vol 
unteers  of  first  the  town  and  then  the  state.  Sup 
ported  by  the  other  representatives  of  Illinois,  he  had 
pressed  the  new  colonel's  name  on  Lincoln  as  one  like 
ly  to  do  well  in  a  higher  command  ;  and  Grant  thus 
came  to  form  one  of  the  first  large  creation  of  generals 
which  the  growing  dimensions  of  the  war  made  need 
ful.  The  promotion  was  altogether  unexpected,  and 
reached  the  acting-brigadier  at  Mexico,  at  first  solely 
through  the  papers,  without  his  even  knowing  who  had 
thus  befriended  him. 

Major-General  Fremont  at  this  time  commanded 
the  so-called  Western  Department,  lately  formed  of 
Illinois  and  the  states  west  of  the  Mississippi.  His 
headquarters  were  naturally  at  St.  Louis  (saved  to  the 
Union  by  the  happy  vigor  of  the  deceased  General 
Lyon),  where  he  had  already  assumed  those  extrava 
gant  airs  of  dictatorship  which  very  soon  after  caused 
his  removal.  He  had  serious  fears  for  the  southern 


6  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

portion  of  Missouri,  which,  though  now  freed  from  the 
imminent  danger  of  secession,  was  still  penetrated  by 
partisans  from  Arkansas,  and  threatened  by  the  large 
forces  known  to  be  assembling  for  the  Confederates 
in  Tennessee.  The  key  to  its  defence  was  naturally 
the  town  of  Cairo,  the  junction  point  of  the  Ohio  with 
the  Mississippi ;  and  hither  General  Grant  (selected 
by  Fremont  for  his  name  for  care  and  order  rather 
than  for  supposed  higher  qualities)  was  sent  at  the 
opening  of  September  with  two  brigades,  to  command 
"  the  district  of  South-east  Missouri,"  which  included 
large  portions  of  the  adjacent  states.  Fremont's  in 
tention  at  this  time  appears  to  have  been  chiefly  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  ;  but  his  lieutenant  was  other 
wise  minded,  and  at  once  looked  around  for  the  oppor 
tunity  of  action. 

This  was  afforded  ready  to  his  hand  by  the  acts  of 
the  Confederates  in  the  vicinity.  They  had  hitherto 
been  separated  on  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi  from 
the  Federal  forces  near  Cairo  by  a  strip  of  Kentucky, 
which  state  had  declared  its  neutrality  in  the  contest, 
Disregarding  this,  Polk,  the  well-known  Southern 
bishop-general,  had  just  entered  the  state  to  seize  and 
fortify  Columbus,  an  important  point  on  the  great 
river.  An  officer  or  his  staff  had  reached  Paducah,  a 
small  town  standing  at  the  point  where  the  river  Ten 
nessee,  ending  with  a  northward  course,  drains  the 
state  of  that  name  and  the  western  end  of  Kentucky 
into  the  Ohio.  It  was  probable  that  the  Confederates 
would,  once  lodged  there,  close  the  Ohio  as  effectually 
as  they  had  already  closed  the  Mississippi,  while  their 
batteries  would  also  guard  the  approach  up  the  Ten 
nessee  into  the  heart  of  the  central  members  of  the  new 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  j 

Confederation.  Grant  resolved  at  once  to  prevent  this. 
The  pretended  neutrality  of  Kentucky  he  had  now  no 
reason  to  respect,  and  could  therefore  strike  boldly  for 
the  threatened  point.  Arriving  on  September  second, 
at  Cairo,  he  heard  on  the  fifth,  of  Folk's  advance,  and 
telegraphing  forthwith  to  Fremont  that  he  should  pro 
ceed  on  his  design,  "  if  not  forbidden,"  he  started  up 
the  Ohio,  and  was  before  Paducah  soon  after  daylight 
the  next  morning.  The  Confederate  recruits  who  were 
being  raised  fled  hastily  from  the  place,  which  Grant 
occupied  with  a  strong  garrison ;  and  he  had  got  back 
to  Cairo  before  he  received  Fremont's  permission  to 
move  "  if  he  felt  strong  enough."  He  incurred  his 
chiefs  rebuke  soon  after  for  having  entered  directly 
into  correspondence  with  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky; 
but  the  latter,  hitherto  led  away  from  the  Northern 
cause  by  their  governor,  now  passed  resolutions  on  the 
Union  side,  and  the  state  neutrality  which  they  at  first 
had  affected  to  maintain,  was  heard  of  no  more.  Small 
as  are  the  details  of  these  events,  the  energy  which 
they  display  in  Grant ;  the  readiness  with  which  he  used 
the  raw  land  and  water  forces  newly  entrusted  to  him ; 
the  decision  with  which  he  moved  into  ground  hither 
to  neutral,  forestalling  a  too  tardy  permission  ;  finally, 
the  clear  strategical  view  which  led  him  to  Paducah,  a 
place  which  was  to  prove  presently  of  the  highest  im 
portance  :  all  testify  to  his  possession  at  that  time  of 
the  very  qualities  of  generalship  for  which  all  the  world 
has  later  given  him  credit.  The  moderation,  tact,  and 
good  sense  of  the  politician  appeared  as  plainly  in  the 
address  he  issued  on  entering  the  town ;  and  as  this 
was  the  first  important  public  document  of  his  life,  it 
is  well  to  read  it  in  the  original  words : 


3  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

"PADUCAH,  Kentucky,  Sept  6,  1861. 
"  To  the  Citizens  of  Paducah, — I  am  coming  among  you 
not  as  an  enemy,  but  as  your  fellow-citizen ;  not  to  mal 
treat  you  nor  annoy  you,  but  to  respect  and  enforce  the 
rights  of  all  loyal  citizens.  An  enemy,  in  rebellion  against 
our  common  government,  has  taken  possession  of,  and 
planted  his  guns  on  the  soil  of  Kentucky,  and  fired  upon 
you.  Columbus  and  Hickman  are  in  his  hands.  He  is 
moving  upon  your  city.  I  am  here  to  defend  you  against 
this  enemy,  to  assist  the  authority  and  sovereignty  of  your 
government.  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  opinions,  and  shall 
deal  only  with  armed  rebellion  and  its  aiders  and  abettors. 
You  can  pursue  your  usual  avocations  without  fear.  The 
strong  arm  of  the  government  is  here  to  protect  its  friends 
and  punish  its  enemies.  Whenever  it  is  manifest  that  you 
are  able  to  defend  yourselves  and  maintain  the  authority  of 
the  government,  and  protect  the  rights  of  loyal  citizens,  I 
shall  withdraw  the  forces  under  my  command. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Brigadier- General  Commanding" 

Having  thus  secured  the  Ohio  to  its  mouth,  with 
Paducah  as  the  key  to  future  operations  up  the  Ten 
nessee,  Grant  next  turned  his  attention  down  the 
Mississippi,  where  Polk  was  converting  Columbus  into 
an  important  post  commanding  the  stream.  "  If  it 
was  discretionary  with  me,"  he  wrote  Fremont,  on  Sep 
tember  tenth,  "with  a  little  addition  to  my  present 
force,  I  would  take  Columbus."  But  his  chief,  who 
looked  on  the  garrison  at  Cairo  as  entirely  subsidiary 
to  his  own  action  in  the  interior  of  Missouri,  made  no 
reply.  Not  until  November  was  Grant  permitted  to 
do  more  than  organize  his  volunteer  battalions  and 
strengthen  his  position :  but  on  the  third  of  that 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  g 

month  came  orders  to  detach  a  force  westward  to  co 
operate  with  Fremont's  movements  on  the  frontier  of 
Arkansas.  This  was  sent  under  Colonel  Oglesby ;  and 
on  the  fifth,  Fremont  telegraphed  to  Cairo  that  Grant 
should  "  make  a  demonstration  "  towards  Columbus  to 
prevent  Polk  from  sending  detachments  over  the  Mis 
sissippi  to  aid  the  Arkansas  Confederates.  Next  day, 
therefore,  he  moved  down  the  stream  with  the  trans 
ports  previously  provided  for  his  command,  taking  all 
his  available  troops,  3,000  men,  of  whom  a  large  part 
had  only  received  their  arms  five  days  before.  So 
rough  was  the  material  in  the  action  which  followed. 

At  two  A.  M.  on  November  seventh,  Grant  learned 
from  friends  on  the  Kentucky  side  that  Polk  had 
crossed  a  large  detachment  the  day  before  to  Bel- 
mont,  a  low  point  lying  opposite  to  and  under  the 
guns  of  Columbus,  with  the  design  of  cutting  off  Ogles 
by  from  Cairo.  He  at  once  resolved  to  turn  the 
"demonstration"  ordered  into  a  real  attack,  and  by 
the  sudden  capture  of  the  Confederate  camp  to  check 
the  proposed  operation.  His  purpose  was  at  first 
fairly  carried  out.  Landing  his  men  on  the  western 
bank  just  out  of  sight  of  Columbus,  he  left  one  battal 
ion  in  reserve  to  cover  his  boats,  and  with  the  rest 
moved  on  the  camp,  three  miles  off,  spreading  out  his 
men  in  skirmishing  order  as  he  approached.  The  Con 
federates  were  soon  met,  and  there  was  much  noise 
and  little  advance  for  a  long  time,  as  might  be  expected 
with  such  untrained  soldiers  :  but  the  gallantry  of 
Grant  and  General  M'Clernand,  a  brigadier  of  volun 
teers  commanding  under  him  (both  of  whom  had  their 
horses  shot  in  the  attack),  carried  their  raw-troops  on 
until  the  camp  was  taken,  and  the  enemy,  2,500  men 


j  o  THE  MI  LIT  A  K  Y  LIFE 

under  General  Pillow,  pushed  to  the  river  bank.  Here 
pursuit  and  success  ended  ;  for,  to  use  the  words  of 
one  northern  account,  the  men  losing  all  attempt  at 
order  "  behaved  like  so  many  school-boys,  while  their 
colonels  took  to  making  stump  speeches  for  the 
Union."  Nor  was  it  until  Grant's  own  staff  had  set  the 
camp  in  flames,  and  brought  on  it  the  fire  of  the  guns 
at  Columbus,  that  any  order  was  restored.  There 
was  no  possibility  of  holding  what  was  gained,  since 
the  site  of  the  camp  was  completely  commanded  by 
the  enemy's  works.  An  orderly  retreat  to  the  trans 
ports  was  all  that  the  best  troops  could  now  have  ac 
complished,  and  to  this  task  under  the  circumstances, 
the  Federals  were  not  equal.  Polk  had  not  been  idle 
in  the  interval,  and  had  dispatched  five  regiments 
across  the  stream  in  boats  to  take  the  assailants  in 
flank.  Three  of  these  had  already  landed,  and  their 
skirmishers  were  spreading  in  the  woods  between  the 
Federals  and  their  transports.  "  We  are  surrounded," 
said  one  of  the  staff  riding  up  to  Grant,  with  the 
warmth  of  a  man  in  action  for  the  first  time.  "  Well," 
was  the  calm  reply,  "  if  that  is  so,  we  must  cut  our 
way  out  as  we  cut  it  in."  Some  of  the  troops,  at  the 
first  thought  of  their  being  entrapped,  had  been  for 
laying  down  their  arms  at  once :  but  taking  heart  at 
their  leader's  coolness,  they  pushed  on  and  cleared 
their  way  without  difficulty.  Grant  had  in  truth 
already  discovered  the  secret  which  he  so  often  after 
wards  used  with  success  ;  that  when  both  sides  are 
equally  undisciplined  and  confused,  success  belongs  to 
that  which  makes  the  boldest  front  and  moves  the 
most  promptly  to  attack.  The  re-embarkation  was 
no  easy  matter :  for  he  was  anxious  to  carry  off  as 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  I  r 

many  of  his  wounded  as  possible ;  his  men  were  too 
confused  to  attend  to  orders ;  not  one  of  his  staff  had 
the  smallest  experience:  and  the  reserve  battalion 
which  was  to  have  covered  the  rear,  had  gone  off  to 
the  transports  on  its  own  account.  Grant  was  the 
last  man  on  the  bank  when  the  boats  were  moving 
away;  and  the  Confederate  skirmishers  got  so  close  to 
him  that  he  would  certainly  have  fallen,  but  that  they 
were  bent  on  trying  to  disable  the  crews,  and  not 
distinguishing  his  rank  under  his  private's  overcoat, 
suffered  him  to  slip  almost  from  under  their  hands. 

The  Battle  of  Belmont,  as  this  combat,  the  first 
of  any  serious  nature  in  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi, 
was  magniloquently  termed,  has  formed  a  subject  of 
controversy  beyond  its  natural  importance.  Polk,  who 
had  driven  off  the  assailants  finally,  having  seen  them 
embark  in  much  disorder,  and  captured  many  of  their 
wounded,  claimed  it  loudly  as  a  victory.  Grant,  who 
had  attained  his  immediate  object,  gained  the  confi 
dence  of  his  men,  and  inflicted  on  the  enemy  a  loss 
(including  nearly  200  prisoners  whom  he  brought  off) 
greater  than  his  own,  regarded  it  as  a  valuable  success 
for  his  side ;  and  the  improved  tone  of  his  troops  fully 
justified  the  boast.  But  the  North  was  looking  al 
ready  for  advance  at  all  cost  into  the  enemy's  country; 
and  seeing  only  the  fact  of  the  troops  retiring  from 
the  point  which  they  had  occupied,  long  spoke  of  it  as  a 
disaster  which  was  atoned  for  by  the  leader's  later  suc 
cesses.  No  doubt  it  was  for  this  reason  that  Grant, 
years  afterwards,  when  he  had  climbed  to  the  highest 
military  honors,  withdrew  the  summary  report  of  the 
affair  which  he  had  originally  sent  in,  to  substitute  for 
it  an  elaborate  narrative  showing  fully  what  were  the 


12 


THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 


objects  of  the  expedition,  and  how  far  they  had  been 
accomplished.  It  is  worth  while  to  note  that  this 
later  report  coincides  fully,  except  as  to  the  exact 
numbers  lost,  with  a  graphic  account  written  the  very 
morning  after  the  battle  to  his  father,  by  the  general, 
a  dutiful  son  as  well  as  a  good  correspondent  through 
out  the  war.  This  account  concludes  with  the  follow 
ing  sketch  of  the  retreat : 

"  We  found  the  Confederates  well  armed  and  brave.  On 
our  return,  stragglers,  that  had  been  left  in  our  rear  (now 
front),  fired  into  us,  and  some  recrossed  the  river  and  gave 
us  battle  for  a  full  mile,  and  afterwards  at  the  boats  when 
we  were  embarking. 

"  There  was  no  hasty  retreating  or  running  away.  Tak 
ing  into  account  the  object  of  the  expedition,  the  victory 
was  complete.  It  has  given  us  confidence  in  the  officers 
and  men  of  this  command,  that  will  enable  us  to  lead  them 
in  any  future  engagement  without  fear  of  the  result.  General 
M'Clernand  (who,  by  the  way,  acted  with  great  coolness  and 
courage  throughout  and  proved  that  he  is  a  soldier  as  well 
as  a  statesman)  and  myself,  each  had  our  horses  shot  under 
us.  Most  of  the  field  officers  met  with  the  same  loss, 
besides  nearly  one  third  of  them  being  themselves  killed  or 
wounded.  As  near  as  I  can  ascertain,  our  loss  was  about 
two  hundred  and  fifty  killed,  wounded,  and  missing." 

The  mistaken  view  of  the  Belmont  affair  taken  by 
an  excited  press  was  not  that  of  the  trained  soldiers 
now  rising  to  control  of  the  war.  One  of  these,  Gen 
eral  Halleck,  a  man  deserving  more  credit  for  his 
organizing  faculties  than  he  ever  obtained  in  Europe, 
arrived  at  St.  Louis  to  supersede  Fremont  not  many 
days  later.  He  not  only  retained  Grant  in  his  com- 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  !3 

mand,  but  in  December  largely  augmented  it,  allotting 
nearly  the  whole  of  Kentucky  to  his  district,  and  thus 
making  him  the  chief  instrument  in  the  strategy  of 
the  coming  campaign.  For  it  was  of  this  Kentucky, 
the  state  most  central  to  the  operations  of  the  war 
viewed  as  a  whole,  that  Sherman,  to  the  great  indig 
nation  of  sanguine  politicians,  and  to  his  own  tem 
porary  damage,  had  already  prophesied  that  "  it  would 
need  200,000  men  to  keep  her  to  the  Union." 

The  year  1862  opened  on  a  new  phase  of  the  war. 
It  had  now  passed  entirely  beyond  the  stage  of  local 
divisions,  constitutional  measures,  and  separate  action 
of  states,  and  had  become  a  grave  struggle  of  the 
vastest  dimensions  between  two  great  sections  of  a 
divided  nation  ;  a  civil  war,  in  fact,  such  as  the  world 
had  never  witnessed  before,  on  the  issues  of  which 
depended  not  merely  the  unity  of  a  country,  but  the 
shaping  the  whole  destinies  of  a  continent.  The  sword 
of  the  North,  slow  to  move  but  terrible  in  its  force, 
was  now  fully  drawn  ;  though  the  time  had  not  yet 
come  for  Lincoln,  by  his  proclamation  against  slavery, 
to  fling  away  the  scabbard,  and  pledge  the  Union  of 
the  future  to  enforce  emancipation,  so  winning  the 
world's  opinion  to  his  side. 

To  understand  the  strategy  of  the  spring  campaign 
which  followed,  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  general  survey 
of  the  Confederate  line  to  be  attacked.  This  began 
far  to  the  east  in  Kentucky,  where  Sydney  Johnston, 
at  that  time  the  best  known  of  the  Southern  officers, 
lay  with  25,000  men,  by  rumor  magnified  to  100,000, 
and  it  ran  across  Kentucky  to  the  Mississippi  at 
Columbus,  and  thence  into  Arkansas,  where  forces  of 
vague  but  very  considerable  strength  were  collecting, 


I4  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

to  repel  any  advance  from  Missouri.  The  centre  of 
the  line  may  be  regarded  as  the  strip  of  Kentucky 
stretching  from  the  Mississippi  for  sixty  miles  east 
ward  across  the  Tennessee  to  the  Cumberland,  a  large 
stream  running  near  the  latter  river  and  parallel  to  it 
in  the  northern  portion  of  its  course,  into  the  Ohio. 
The  weakness  of  this  part  of  their  line  was  not 
unknown  to  the  Confederates;  since  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland  are  open  to  steamers  high  up  during 
the  spring,  and  the  Federals,  holding  the  mouths  of 
both  ever  since  Grant's  seizure  of  Paducah,  were  known 
to  be  augmenting  their  transport  constantly  at  that 
place  and  at  Cairo,  with  a  view  either  to  forcing  the 
Mississippi,  or  penetrating  through  Kentucky  into  the 
state  of  Tennessee  by  the  two  minor  streams.  It  was 
supposed,  however,  these  might  be  easily  closed  by 
works,  as  the  former  was  already ;  and  at  one  of  the 
narrowest  points  between  the  two,  where  they  are 
but  fifteen  miles  from  each  other,  Fort  Henry  on  the 
ri^ht  or  eastern  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  and  Fort 

o 

Donelson  on  the  left  or  west  of  the  Cumberland,  were 
thrown  up  for  that  purpose.  The  operations  that  fol 
lowed  have  been  often  described,  and  their  credit,  as  a 
whole,  assigned  to  Halleck:  but  it  is  but  fair  to  state 
that  both  Grant,  and  the  naval  commander  with  him, 
the  gallant  Foote,  had  early  in  the  year  sought  per 
mission  to  capture  Fort  Henry,  as  their  letters  of  Jan 
uary  prove  ;  so  as  at  least  to  keep  the  Tennessee  open 
and  paralyse  the  Confederates  on  the  Cumberland,  as 
well  as  those  on  the  Mississippi  at  Columbus,  by  break 
ing  the  line  between  them  and  threatening  each  in 
reverse.  On  the  other  hand,  Halleck's  instructions, 
which  were  issued  in  detail  on  January  thirtieth,  and 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  1 5 

the  care  with  which  he  had  accumulated  his  means 
under  Grant's  hand,  prove  sufficiently  that  he  had 
resolved,  before  hearing  from  them,  on  the  very  course 
his  lieutenant  had  agreed  to  adopt ;  and  as  he  alone 
could  control  the  operations  on  the  whole  western 
theatre,  it  is  just  that  the  praise  of  the  original  con 
ception  should  remain  his.  Grant  and  Foote  started, 
accordingly,  with  17,000  men  and  seven  gun-boats,  on 
February  second,  and  the  spring  campaign  of  1862  was 
opened,  a  campaign  which  Grant's  energy  was  destined 
to  carry  to  infinitely  greater  results  than  the  designer 
dreamed  of. 

The  plan  of  the  joint  commanders  was  to  first 
attack  Fort  Henry  by  water  and  land  simultaneously, 
so  as  to  invest  the  garrison  and  take  it  with  the  works. 
The  combination  party  failed  however,  for  Tilghman, 
who  commanded,  sent  his  infantry  off  to  avoid  such 
a  contingency ;  but  finding  his  gunners  unable  to 
maintain  their  posts  in  face  of  the  fire  of  the  gun-boats, 
surrendered  presently  to  Foote  at  discretion.  Hal- 
leek's  next  instructions  pointed  rather  to  a  strong 
occupation  of  the  point  in  the  enemy's  line  thus  taken 
than  to  any  similar  operations  on  the  Cumberland  ; 
but  his  bolder  lieutenant,  rising  with  success  to  the 
height  of  his  position,  at  once  telegraphed  his  inten 
tion  to  march  across  the  neck  of  land  between  the 
streams  against  Fort  Donelson,  and  issued  orders  to 
his  troops  accordingly.  His  design  was  stayed  for  the 
time  by  the  sudden  rising  of  the  Tennessee,  which 
flooded  the  roads  eastward,  and,  as  he  reported  at  the 
moment,  "  perfectly  blocked  in  "  the  army.  Hearing 
of  this,  Halleck  still  spoke  in  his  orders  solely  of 
defensive  measures.  Grant's  resolution,  however,  had 


i6 


THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 


been  taken,  and  with  that  determination  of  character 
which  marks  his  whole  military  Career,  he  wrote  to 
Cairo  during  the  delay  for  all  possible  reinforcements, 
and  to  Foote  (whose  gun-boats  were  exploring  the 
Tennessee),  to  move  round  to  the  Cumberland  and 
help  him.  "  I  feel  that  there  should  be  no  delay  in 
this  matter,"  were  his  words  on  the  tenth  ;  and  finding 
himself  able  to  move  on  the  twelfth,  he  marched 
across  at  once  on  Fort  Donelson.  The  distance  was 
about  twelve  miles;  and  as  the  enemy  remained 
entirely  on  the  defensive,  though  at  this  time  not 
inferior  in  numbers  (as  careful  inquiry  has  since  proved) 
to  their  bold  assailants,  Grant  got  in  sight  of  the  works 
in  the  afternoon,  drove  in  the  pickets,  and  prepared 
to  invest  the  place  as  coolly  as  though  he  outnumbered 
the  defenders  threefold.  The  few  days  that  followed 
were  probably  the  most  anxious  in  his  life.  His  gun 
ammunition  fell  short.  His  men,  having  marched 
without  tents,  were  benumbed  by  the  cold  showers  of 
sleet.  The  iron-clad  gun-boats  were  fairly  beaten  off 
in  their  attempt  to  subdue  the  river  defences  on  the 
fourteenth,  and  Foote  himself  hurt.  It  was  not  until 
the  same  night  that  Grant's  numbers  were  raised  by 
reinforcements  to  a  strength  superior  to  that  of  the 
force  he  held  enclosed  ;  and  when  the  enemy  issued 
forth  next  day  in  an  attempt  to  force  his  lines,  he  was 
absent  on  a  visit  to  the  wounded  commodore,  and 
returned  in  haste  to  find  his  troops  demoralized  and 
shaken  by  their  losses,  although  they  saw  the  foe 
retiring.  His  own  tenacity  and  military  quickness  of 
perception  here  changed  a  doubtful  struggle  into  a 
brilliant  success.  "Are  their  haversacks  filled  ?"  he 
asked,  as  he  saw  some  prisoners  led  in,  carrying  each 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  lj 

a  heavy  load.  Three  days'  rations  were  reported  to 
be  found  in  each.  "  Then  they  meant  to  cut  their 
way  out,  and  not  to  fight,"  he  said  ;  and,  looking  at 
his  own  disordered  men,  added,  "  whichever  party  first 
attacks  now,  will  whip;"  then  riding  sharply  to  his 
left,  which  had  not  been  attacked  in  the  sally,  he 
ordered  an  immediate  assault  upon  the  works. 
General  C.  Smith  commanded  this  wing,  an  excellent 
officer  of  regulars,  though  now  somewhat  advanced  in 
years.  When  last  they  were  thrown  together,  he  had 
been  the  College  Commandant  of  West  Point,  and  his 
present  chief  one  of  the  cadets  who  held  him  in  awe. 
"  I  am  now  a  subordinate,  and  know  a  soldier's  duty," 
he  had  said  shortly  before  to  Grant,  observing  the  natu 
ral  hesitation  with  which  the  latter  issued  him  some 
orders.  "  I  hope  you  will  feel  no  awkwardness  about 
our  new  relations;''  and  as  he  had  already  shown  his 
thorough  subordination  in  the  preceding  movements, 
so  now  he  led  on  his  men  with  all  the  ardor  of  a 
youthful  soldier.  For  once,  an  event  seldom  repeated 
during  the  war,  the  intrenchmentswere  fairly  assaulted 
and  carried  with  the  bayonet.  False  attacks,  directed 
by  Grant  with  his  right  and  centre  at  other  parts  of 
the  work,  distracted  the  attention  of  the  Confederates, 
and  prevented  their  concentrating  to  drive  Smith  out ; 
and  at  dark  his  division  still  held  the  key  of  Fort 
Donelson.  The  rest  of  the  story  is  too  well  known 
for  us  to  do  more  than  refer  to  its  strange  details ;  the 
disgraceful  personal  fears  which  caused  Floyd  and 
Pillow  successively  to  abandon  the  troops  under  their 
command  ;  the  fine  escape  of  Colonel  Forrest  (after 
wards  a  Confederate  general  of  mark)  with  the  cavalry ; 
the  vain  attempt  of  Buckner,  the  third  commander  of 


T  g  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

the  garrison,  to  procure  terms;  the  decisive  demand 
of  Grant  (who  saw  into  the  condition  of  affairs)  for 
unconditional  surrender,  with  the  famous  threat,  "  I 
propose  to  move  immediately  upon  your  works  ;  "  and 
the  triumph  that  followed  ;  all  these  are  fully  set  forth 
in  the  official  narratives  of  either   side.     While    dis 
grace  justly  overtook  the  two  fugitive  leaders  of  the 
South,  a  cry  of  exultation  went  through  the  North  at 
this  unhoped-for  success.     The  14,000  prisoners  borne 
off  to  Cairo  formed  a  solid  presage  of  future  successes 
in  the  West,  which  was  sufficient  to  balance  the  dis 
credit   of    Bull's    Run,   and   to    leave   the    advantage 
already   on    the    stronger   side.     Grant    was    at    once 
recommended  by    Stanton    for  a  major-generalcy  of 
volunteers,  and  his  name  passed  from  the  Secretary  to 
the  President,  and  the  President  to  the  Senate  the 
same  day.     Halleck  alone  appears  to  have  dissented 
from  this  arrangement.     Old  prejudices  probably  more 
than   mere  jealousy  of  his  lieutenant's  vast  success, 
caused  him  to  recommend  Smith  to  be  promoted  over 
Grant's  head,  as  the  true  author  of  the  victory.     But 
this  recommendation,  which    came  late,  received  no 
attention  at  Washington,  where  it    was  plainly  seen 
that  it  was  Grant  who  had  achieved  success  by  taking 
large-  responsibility  upon  himself.     Stanton  declared 
that  his  historic  message  to    General   Buckner  should 
be  the  true  motto  for  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  gave 
the  victor  an  unfailing  support  from  that  time  until   it 
came  to  an  end.     As  to   the   good  old   man  himself 
whom  Halleck  would  have  elevated  over  his  comman 
der,  when  speaking  of  the  assault  to  Buckner  (an  old 
West  Point  acquaintance)  on  the  day  of  the  surrender, 
Smith  said,  "  It  was  well  done,  considering  our  force  ; 


OF  GENERAL   GRANT.  IC} 

but  no  congratulations  are  due  to  me  ;  I  simply  obeyed 
orders." 

The  gratitude  and  reward  which  Grant  at  once 
met  with  were  fairly  his  due  for  the  tactical  success 
of  his  exploits.  He  had  marched  boldly  up  to  a  forti 
fied  camp  held  by  numbers  equal  to  his  own  ;  enclos 
ed  them  in  their  works  until  he  received  reinforce 
ments;  defeated  them  on  open  ground  when,  too 
late,  they  moved  out  to  battle ;  finally,  assaulted  and 
carried  the  most  commanding  point  of  their  intrench- 
ments,  and  forced  them  to  lay  down  their  arms  on  the 
spot.  All  this  was  done  with  a  loss  of  2,500  Federals 
killed  and  wounded — a  number  not  quite  equal  to 
one-tenth  of  those  engaged !  It  is  hardly  surprising 
that  the  effect  of  this  victory  told  much  upon  the 
character  of  Grant.  We  shall  see  it  avowedly  influ 
encing  his  tactics  in  the  battles  that  soon  followed,  and 
that  to  the  advantage  of  his  army  and  -his  fame :  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  no  less  plain  to  the  discerning 
student  of  the  war  that  it  taught  the  chief  Federal 
general  to  overrate  the  effect  of  dogged  resolution  and 
brute  strength,  and  caused  him  to  suffer  some  fearful 
lessons  in  consequence,  when  he  carried  out  his  favor 
ite  idea  beyond  the  bounds  of  prudence  against  a  vet 
eran  and  determined  enemy. 

Great  as  was  the  immediate  effect  of  the  victory 
on  the  confidence  of  his  soldiers  and  of  the  North,  the 
results  were  in  truth  much  larger  than  the  most  san 
guine  of  those  unobservant  of  its  strategic  bearing 
could  possibly  have  expected.  The  Confederate  line 
of  defence  thus  pierced  at  its  centre,  the  ends  were 
cut  off,  fell  back,  and  the  whole  gave  way  to  a  general 
advance  of  the  Federals.  Bowling  Green  on  the  east, 


20  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

and  Columbus  on  the  west,  were  hurriedly  abandoned. 
Kentucky  and  the  greater  part  of  Tennessee  passed  at 
a  blow  into  the  hands  of  the  North.  Halleck's  de 
signs  rose  with  these  successes  far  beyond  the  origi 
nal  views  of  that  general ;  and  though  he  had  writ 
ten  on  the  morning  of  the  surrender  to  Grant  u  not  to 
be  too  rash,"  and  two  days  later  to  "  limit  the  oper 
ations  of  the  gun-boats  "  on  the  rivers  thus  opened, 
he  had  in  two  days  more  attained  a  clearer  perception 
of  the  state  of  affairs,  and  telegraphed  to  M'Clellan 
to  ask  for  himself  the  command  of  the  whole  armies 
of  the  West,  for  "  hesitation  and  delay,"  he  added, 
"  are  losing  us  the  golden  opportunity."  It  would 
have  been  better  for  his  fame  had  the  credit  gained 
by  his  lieutenant  served  to  rouse  no  other  feeling  than 
emulation  of  his  energy. 

One  of  these  armies  of  the  West  was  that  of  Gen 
eral  Buell  in  Kentucky,  which  had  been  opposed  to 
that  under  Sydney  Johnston,  and  was  now  following 
the  Confederates  on  their  retreat  from  Bowling  Green. 
The  line  lay  through  Nashville,  the  capital  of  Tennes 
see:  but  as  this  city  lies  upon  the  Cumberland,  it  was 
as  directly  open  to  Grant  to  enter  it  as  to  Buell. 
Grant,  however,  knew  that  any  further  decisive  opera 
tions  must  be  dependent  on  the  line  of  strategy  chosen 
by  Halleck.  He  therefore  sent  only  his  advanced 
guard  fifty  miles  towards  Nashville,  and  wrote  to  sug 
gest  a  movement  onwards  to  the  city.  This,  however, 
the  leading  division  from  Kentucky  had  reached  and 
occupied  unopposed  before  Halleck's  answer  came ; 
and  Grant  having  heard  of  the  event,  went  on  to 
meet  Buell  and  arrange  as  to  the  disposition  of  the 
troops,  the  two  armies  being  wholly  independent  of 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  21 

each  other.  It  is  painful  to  record  what  followed,  for 
it  would  seem  that  Grant's  chief  had  either  conceived 
a  genuine  distrust  of  his  lieutenant,  or  had  some 
meaner  motive  for  seeking  a  quarrel  with  him.  On 
February  twenty-eighth,  Grant  had  returned  to  his 
army,  and  received  instructions  to  make  more  regular 
returns  of  the  forces  under  his  orders.  Next  day, 
March  first,  Halleck  wrote  him  to  move  back  from  the 
Cumberland  to  the  Tennessee,  with  a  view  of  using 
the  line  of  that  river  for  operations  towards  Corinth, 
a  great  railroad  junction  in  the  state  of  Mississippi. 
On  the  third,  with  no  previous  intimation  to  Grant, 
Halleck  telegraphed  to  Washington  two  complaints 
against  him,  in  a  severe  dispatch : — "  .  .  .  He  left  his 
command  without  my  authority,  and  went  to  Nash 
ville.  ...  I  can  get  no  returns,  no  reports,  no  informa 
tion  of  any  kind  from  him.  Satisfied  with  his  vic 
tory,  he  sits  down  and  enjoys  it.  ...  C.  Smith  is 
almost  the  only  officer  equal  to  the  emergency." 
Next  day,  after  receiving  a  reply  which  has  not  been 
recorded,  he  directed  Grant  to  place  Smith  in  com 
mand  of  the  troops  about  to  go  forward,  and  to  re 
main  himself  at  Fort  Henry,  adding,  "  Why  do  you 
not  obey  my  orders  to  report  strength  and  position  ?  " 
On  Grant's  replying  next  day,  "  I  have  reported 
almost  daily  the  condition  of  my  command,  and  re 
ported  every  position  occupied,"  he  received  a  stern 
reply,  beginning,  "  General  M'Clellan  directs  that  you 
report  to  me  daily"  and  ending  with  the  complaint 
now  first  mentioned  to  himself,  of  his  going  "  to  Nash 
ville  without  authority  " — Grant  was  naturally  much 
hurt :— 


22  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

"  I  have  averaged  writing  (was  his  reply  on  the  sixth)  more 
than  once  a  day,  to  keep  you  informed  of  my  position,  and 
it  is  no  fault  of  mine  if  you  have  not  received  my  letters. 
My  going  to  Nashville  was  strictly  intended  for  the  good  of 
the  service  and  not  to  gratify  any  desire  of  my  own.  Be 
lieving  sincerely  that  I  must  have  enemies  between  you  and 
myself,  who  are  trying  to  impair  my  usefulness,  I  respectfully 
ask  to  be  relieved  from  further  duty  in  the  department." 

And  after  another  rebuke  of  precisely  the  same 
tenor,  Grant  renewed  his  request  on  the  ninth  and 
eleventh  in  stronger  terms.  Halleck  probably  had 
changed  his  mind  as  to  the  wisdom  of  the  course  he 
was  pursuing,  or  was  satisfied  to  have  shown  his  own 
authority  supreme  ;  for  on  the  thirteenth  he  replied  in 
a  friendly  and  almost  apologetic  strain,  concluding, — 
"  Instead  of  relieving  you,  I  wish  you,  as  soon  as  your 
new  wing  is  in  the  field,  to  assume  the  immediate 
command,  and  lead  it  on  to  new  victories  ;  ''  a  wish 
which  Grant  at  once  received  with  good  will,  and  forth 
with  withdrew  his  resignation.  Halleck  now  wrote  to 
Washington  (in  reply  to  inquiries  his  own  complaints 
had  produced),  that  Grant  had  "  made  the  proper  ex 
planations,  and  been  directed  to  resume  his  command 
in  the  field."  Thus  ended  this  strange  episode  of  the 
first  Federal  victory,  the  most  pleasant  comment  on 
which  is,  that  it  in  no  wise  interfered  with  the  cordial 
working  of  Grant  with  Halleck,  when  their  positions 
were  reversed  two  years  later  by  the  rise  of  the  former 
to  the  chief  command  of  the  whole  armies  of  the 
Union. 

Joining  the  forces  which  had  gone  in  advance  up 
the  Tennessee  under  Smith,  who  died  soon  after  from 
the  effects  of  his  exposure  before  Fort  Donelson, 


OF  GENERAL  GRAN7\  2$ 

Grant,    by    Halleck's   orders,  collected    his  divisions, 
amounting  to  38,000  men,  and  remained  on  the  defen 
sive,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Buell  from  Nashville  with 
as  many  more  ;  for  that  general  was  now  also  put  un 
der  Halleck.     General  Smith  had  already  placed   the 
army  on  the  west,  or  hostile  bank  of  the  Tennessee, 
regarding  his  position  as  a  base  for  future   operations 
into  Mississippi  ;  and  Grant  made  no  change  in  the 
disposition  but  by  drawing  his  troops  more  together. 
Yet  there  was  some  obvious  danger  in   this  arrange 
ment,  because  the  enemy  was  known  to  be   rapidly 
concentrating  a  large  force  at  Corinth,  twenty  miles 
off,  by  means  of  his  railroads  ;  and  Grant's  camp   lay 
open  to  their  attack,  inasmuch  as  the  Federal  soldiers 
had  not  yet  begun  to  educe,  from  sharp  experience, 
the    knowledge    (which    afterwards    proved     of    such 
countless  value  to  them)  of  the  use  of  rough  intrench- 
ments.     The    Confederates   were   estimated,  vaguely 
enough,  at  100,000  men,  their  real  number  being  just 
equal  to  that  under  Grant  ;  and  the   Federal  general 
(as  letters  since  published  show  plainly)  grew  more  and 
more   anxious  as  time  went  on,  and  his   colleague,  a 
deliberate  man  much  given  to  cautious  movement  and 
elaborate  bridge-building,  failed  to  arrive.     From  Co 
lumbia,  ninety  miles  off,  which  Buell  reached  on  March 
nineteenth,  it  took  him  seventeen  days  to  attain   the 
Tennessee  at  Savanna,  a  point  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river,  and  seven  miles  lower  down  than  Grant's   camp 
at  Pittsburg  Landing.     This  was  April   fifth.     Grant 
directed  the  leading  division  (Nelson's),  which  only  re 
ported  itself  that  day,  to  rffove  up  the  river  and   hold 
itself  ready  to  reinforce  his  army,  for  there  was  skir 
mishing  along  the  front  of  the  camp  in  the  woods,  and 


24  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

the  enemy's  cavalry  had  been  seen  in  force.  Next 
morning  Johnston's  forces  issued  from  the  cover  they 
had  secretly  occupied  close  to  the  camp,  and  fell  upon 
the  Federals,  resolved  to  overwhelm  them  and  drive 
them  into  the  stream. 

It  is  a  great  mistake  to  say,  with  the  vulgar  ver 
sion,  that  Grant  was  completely  surprised  at  Pittsburg. 
At  the  first  firing  he  sent  to  Buell,  words  which  prove 
the  contrary.  "  I  have  been  looking  for  this,  but  did 
not  believe  the  attack  would  be  made  before  Monday 
or  Tuesday."  Moreover,  General  Prentiss,  who  held 
the  part  of  the  camp  towards  Corinth,  had  been 
warned  of  the  danger,  and  had  doubled  his  guards  and 
pushed  his  pickets  some  way  in  advance  the  day 
before,  though  not  far  enough  for  security.  Ere  he 
could  collect  his  startled  men  from  their  untasted 
breakfasts  and  form  them,  they  were  driven  in  upon 
the  other  divisions,  and  the  battle  became  general  and 
severe.  Grant  received  no  aid  until  late  in  the  day 
from  Nelson,  nor  from  L.  Wallace,  who,  with  one  of 
his  own  divisions,  lay  farthest  down  the  river.  Indeed, 
the  latter  officer,  one  of  the  Federal  commanders  who 
was  unfortunate  throughout  the  war,  did  not  move 
until  he  had  had  his  orders  five  hours,  and  then  took 
the  wrong  route,  arriving  at  seven  P.M.;  whereas,  ac 
cording  to  Grant's  report  to  the  War  Department,  the 
division  might,  but  for  its  commander's  personal  con 
duct,  have  been  on  the  ground  at  one  o'clock.  The 
Federals  in  his  absence  \vere  outnumbered ;  and 
though  little  of  tactical  skill  was  displayed  on  either 
side,  they  gave  ground  gradually,  leaving  General 
Prentiss,  with  part  of  his  division,  who  had  stood  their 
ground  too  long,  in  the  enemy's  hands.  The  fight 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  2$ 

was  carried  on  in  the  simple  form  of  two  long  parallel 
lines  firing  hotly  at  one  another  at  no  great  distance, 
until  at  four  P.M.  the  Federals  were  driven  close  to 
the  landing-place,  where  those  that  were  steady  held 
their  ground  till  dark. 

"  All  around  the  landing"  (says  a  Federal  historian, 
writing  of  the  moment  when  Buell  came  up)  "  lay  the  cravens 
who  had  swarmed  in  from  the  front,  as  many  do  in  nearly 
every  battle  ;  these,  however,  were  not  stragglers  nor  lag 
gards,  but  the  panic-stricken  mob,  who  had  fled  from  that 
danger  which  so  many  of  their  fellows  seemed  to  court.  As 
the  two  generals  were  conversing  at  the  landing,  Grant  ex 
plained  the  situation  of  affairs,  then  apparently  at  the  worst; 
and  Buell  inquired:  'What  preparations  have  you  made  for 
retreating,  General  ? '  His  remark  was  hardly  concluded, 
when  Grant  interrupted  him  at  once,  exclaiming  :  '  I  haven't 
despaired  of  whipping  them  yet.'  " 

He  had  seen  that  the  efforts  of  the  assailants  were 
slackening.  Exhausted  with  their  long  day's  work, 
thousands  of  Johnston's  men  had  left  the  ranks  to 
plunder  the  abandoned  camp  of  the  Federals.  Their 
chief  himself  had  fallen  in  pressing  them  on  to  the  vic 
tory  he  saw  so  near,  and  their  loss  had  not  been  much 
less  than  that  of  Grant's  forces,  which  amounted  to  full 
10,000  put  hors  de  combat,  including  Generals  W.  Wal 
lace  killed,  Prentiss  taken,  and  Sherman  wounded. 
The  Confederates  were  unable  to  push  forward  for  the 
final  effort,  which  would  have  driven  the  Federals  on 
their  boats  ;  and  seeing  this,  Grant  resolved  to  resume 
the  offensive  next  day,  unsupported  or  not,  it  being  on 
his  side  impossible  to  urge  his  jaded  men  into  an  of 
fensive  that  evening.  As  the  turn  in  the  battle  has 


26  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

been  naturally  enough,  both  in  America  and  elsewhere, 
ascribed  to  the  arrival  of  Buell,  it  is  as  well  to  make 
the  matter  clear  by  the  narrative  of  General  Sherman, 
written  in  1865.  This  exactly  confirms  the  assertion 
made  by  those  who  knew  him  best  that  Grant  from 
the  time  of  Fort  Donelson,  believed  in  there  being  al 
ways  a  time  in  every  hard-fought  battle  when  both 
armies  being  nearly  exhausted,  and  it  seeming  impos 
sible  for  either  to  do  more,  the  one  that  first  renews 
the  fight  will  win  it.  Sherman  writes  in  so  admirable 
a  spirit  of  candor  and  fairness,  that  his  words  should 
be  read  in  full : — 

"I  never  was  disposed,  nor  am  I  now,  to  question  any 
thing  done  by  General  Buell  and  his  army,  and  know  that 
approaching  our  field  of  battle  from  the  rear,  he  encountered 
that  sickening  crowd  of  laggards  and  fugitives  that  excited 
his  contempt,  and  that  of  his  army,  who  never  gave  full  credit 
to  those  in  the  front  line  who  did  fight  hard,  and  who  had,  at 
four  P.M.  checked  the  enemy,  and  were  preparing  the  next 
day  to  assume  the  offensive.  I  remember  the  fact  the  better 
from  General  Grant's  anecdote  of  his  Donelson  battle,  which 
he  told  me  then  for  the  first  time — that  at  a  certain  period 
of  the  battle  he  saw  that  either  side  was  ready  to  give  way, 
if  the  other  showed  a  bold  front,  and  he  determined  to  do 
that  very  thing,  to  advance  on  the  enemy,  when,  as  he 
prognosticated,  the  enemy  surrendered.  At  four  P.M.  of 
April  sixth,  he  thought  the  appearances  the  same,  and  he 
judged,  with  Lewis  Wallace's  fresh  division  and  such  of  our 
startled  troops  as  had  recovered  their  equilibrium,  he  would 
be  justified  in  dropping  the  defensive  and  assuming  the  of 
fensive  in  the  morning.  And,  I  repeat,  I  received  such 
orders  before  I  knew  General  Buell's  troops  were  at  the  river. 
I  admit  that  I  was  glad  Buell  was  there,  because  I  knew 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


his  troops  were  older  than  ours,  and  better  systematized  and 
drilled,  and  his   arrival  made  that  certain  which  before  was 


Grant's  army  passed  the  night  under  arms  amid 
storms  of  rain ;  but  the  transports  were  busy  through 
the  darkness,  and  in  the  morning  20,000  of  Buell's 
force  were  ready  for  the  action,  with  the  remains  of 
the  divisions  which  had  fought  the  day  before.  This 
great  accession  of  strength  told  at  once,  when,  in  ac 
cordance  with  Grant's  resolve,  the  Federals  advanced 
to  make  their  counter-attack  at  early  morning.  The 
ground  was  very  heavy  from  the  rain,  and  the  move 
ments  in  consequence  even  more  slow  than  the  ordi 
narily  heavy  mauceuvres  of  the  early  days  of  the  war. 
Beauregard,  who  had  succeeded  Johnston,  found  him 
self  from  the  first  obliged  to  give  ground,  and  falling 
back  slowly,  left  the  scene  of  contest  altogether  about 
noon,  retreating  upon  Corinth  unpursued  ;  for  Buell's 
men  were  declared  by  their  officers  exhausted  by  their 
efforts  to  get  up,  as  Grant's  own  were  by  the  long  bat 
tle  just  ended. 

This  had  been  not  merely  the  severest  contest  of 
the  war  thus  far,  but  its  fierceness  was  hardly  after 
wards  repeated.  General  Sherman  has  expressly  said 
that  he  never  saw  fighting  so  terrible ;  possibly  be 
cause  the  panic  among  some  of  the  raw  troops  of  his 
division,  rendered  necessary  the  exposure  of  his  own 
person  in  a  wholly  exceptional  manner,  and  made  the 
conduct  of  the  rest  seem  heroic.  Grant  has  compared 
the  battle  to  that  of  the  Wilderness ;  but  with  little 
justice,  as  it  seems  to  us,  inasmuch  as  at  Pittsburg 
the  losses  on  either  side  (excluding  those  of  Buell,  all 
suffered  on  the  second  day)  were  as  nearly  equal  as 


28  THE  MILITARY  LIPE 

possible,*  like  the  strength  of  the  original  armies; 
whereas  at  the  Wilderness,  as  will  be  seen  hereafter, 
the  disproportion  was  extraordinary.  The  victory 
was  claimed  by  either  side;  by  the  Confederates, 
because  they  had  captured  their  enemy's  camp  with 
many  prisoners,  and  had  at  one  time  all  but  destroyed 
his  army ;  by  the  Federals,  because  they  had  at  last 
successfully  repulsed  the  assault.  In  all  such  cases 
the  only  safe  method  is  to  consider  what  was  the  real 
object  of  a  battle,  and  how  far  it  was  attained :  and  as 
that  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard  was  undoubtedly  to 
crush  Grant  before  succour  arrived,  and  of  Grant  to 
hold  his  own  until  Buell  joined  him,  the  true  success 
should  belong  beyond  dispute  to  the  Federal  general. 
Its  moral  effect  was,  however,  impaired  by  the  over 
cautious  conduct  of  Halleck,  who  coming  up  at  this 
time  to  assume  charge  of  the  united  armies,  kept 
them  from  directly  following  up  the  enemy,  and  ap 
proached  Corinth  by  the  slower  process  of  advancing 
solely  under  breastworks,  thus  giving  to  his  soldiers 
as  well  as  to  their  country  the  impression  that  he  was 
afraid,  after  late  events,  to  trust  them  in  the  open 
ground. 

In  another  respect  the  battle  greatly  disappointed 
Grant.  He  had  supposed,  with  most  other  North 
erners,  and  in  opposition  to  the  views  which  made 
Sherman  unpopular,  that  one  or  two  sharp  blows,  like 
that  of  Fort  Donelson,  would  end  the  war.  The  vigor 
and  determination  with  which  General  Johnston  had 
taken  the  offensive  so  soon  after  that  great  loss, 
showed  plainly  that  any  such  expectation  was  a  fal- 

*  Grant's  loss  was,  excluding  Buell's  10,040;     Beauregard's  10,699, 
by  their  own    official  reports. 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


29 


lacy.     Then  Grant  arrived  at  the  conviction,  on  which 
as    a  whole    he  thereafter  ever    acted,  that  the   war 
would    never    end    until    the    Southern    armies   were 
crushed  and   worn  down,  and  that  they,  not  forts  or 
cities  or  territory,  should  be  the  chief  objects  of  the 
strategy  which  controlled  the  greater  resources  of  the 
North.     From  this  time  also  he,  and  those   that  fol 
lowed  him,  gave  up  the  notion  of  sparing  the  property 
of  the  South.     The  Confederacy  had  succeeded,  they 
admitted,  in  making  this  a  war  of  the  people.     The 
people,  therefore,  must  suffer,  until  the  people  yielded. 
Hitherto  he,  with  most  of  the  Federal  generals,  would 
have  protected  slavery  as  an   institution.     Hencefor 
ward  that    too  must  perish,  with   state  rights,  inde 
pendent  Constitutions,  and  whatever  else  stood  in  the 
way   of  one  grand    object,  the  unity   of  the    nation. 
These  sentiments  of  her  chief  generals,  conservative 
men  by  nature,  but  clear-eyed  as  to  the  nature  and 
issue  of  the  struggle,  were  soon  to  become  the  policy 
of  the  North.     The  peninsular  campaign  of  M'Clellan 
had  now  begun,  with  its  tedious  advance,  weary  stop 
pages,  and  final  discomfiture.     Then  followed  the  tri 
umphant  counterblow  struck  on  his  army  by  Lee,  the 
new  Confederate  chief  in  Virginia,  Jackson's  magnifi 
cent  flank  marches,  the  second   battle  of  Bull's  Run, 
the   confused    retreat   of   Pope  on  Washington,    the 
summons  of  M'Clellan  to  his    old   command  by   the 
terrified  Cabinet,  the  first  invasion  of  Maryland  (that 
of  September  1862,)  and  its  sudden  check  at  Antie- 
tam.     Lincoln  saw  clearly  that  a  drawn  battle  under 
such  circumstances  was    the    defender's  victory,  and 
launched  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  until    now 
kept  back,  making  reconciliation   no  longer  possible 


30  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

but  by  the  submission  of  the  South  to  a  social  revo 
lution.  Pledged  to  set  free  the  slaves  of  the  revolted 
states,  the  North  could  no  longer  grant  them  accept 
able  terms.  Henceforth  it  became  clear  that  the 
contest  must  go  on  to  the  bitter  end,  the  ruin  of  the 
weaker  section  of  the  Union. 

This  seems  to  be  a  fit  opportunity  for  noticing  a 
subject  which,  though  not  as  yet  surveyed  by  any  his 
torian,  is  intimately  connected  with  the  history  of  the 
war.  It  is  usually  thought  because  Jefferson  Davis 
pressed,  and  General  Lee  consented  to  the  design  of 
carrying  the  war  into  the  Northern  states,  that  its 
wisdom  was  unquestioned.  It  is  time  that  this  delu 
sion — -for  it  is  no  less— should  be  removed.  There 
were  opinions  expressed  which  should  have  been  of 
the  highest  value,  opinions  of  soldiers  which  might 
have  weighed  in  council  even  against  that  of  Lee, 
which  opposed  most  strongly  these  attempted  inva 
sions.  In  their  view,  it  was  throwing  away  a  great 
political  advantage  to  reduce  a  defensive  struggle  for 
rights  to  the  mere  level  of  a  civil  war  for  mastery. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  in  the  North,  who  had  looked 
coldly  on  a  war  of  conquest  against  the  alleged  rights 
of  the  sister  states,  would  be  ready  to  rush  to  arms 
the  moment  that  their  own  soil  was  violated  by  rebels 
in  arms.  The  military  advantage  was  most  doubtful, 
seeing  that  neither  men  nor  warlike  material  (in  both 
of  which  the  South  was  inferior)  could  be  recruited 
to  any  great  extent  by  conquest ;  whilst  the  political 
evil  was  so  great  as  in  all  probability  to  be  ruinous. 
To  the  naturally  weaker  party,  the  defensive  was, 
according  to  all  rule,  the  appropriate  course.  In  this 
case  it  was  the  only  safe  one  as  regarded  the  ultimate 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  3! 

issue,  the  assertion  or  surrender  of  independence. 
Such  were  the  arguments  urged  against  the  invasion : 
but  bolder  or  rasher  counsels  prevailed  at  Richmond, 
and  Lee  was  urged  on  into  Maryland,  and  Bragg 
thrown  into  Kentucky,  to  be  arrested  each  in  turn  by 
the  gathering  of  superior  forces,  and  to  retire  from 
the  invaded  territory,  leaving  those  Northerners  who 
had  hitherto  been  neutral  or  friendly,  banded,  by  this 
threatening  of  their  own  hearths,  with  the  bitterest 
enemies  of  the  Confederacy. 

To  return  to  the  fortunes  of  Grant.  We  left  him 
in  April  1862,  before  Corinth,  superceded  by  the  ar 
rival  of  Halleck,  who  carried  on  the  campaign  until 
Beauregard  retreated  from  the  contested  point  at  the 
end  of  May.  Then  followed  a  complete  breaking  up 
of  the  great  army  gathered  on  the  Tennessee.  Buell's 
force  was  once  more  separated  from  that  of  Grant,  and 
sent  eastward.  Four  divisions  were  soon  after  stripped 
from  the  latter,  and  Grant  was  reduced  to  a  defensive 
in  the  heart  of  the  hostile  state  of  Mississippi,  having 
under  him  at  one  time  less  than  20,000  men,  while  an 
army  about  equal  in  numbers  covered  the  country  to 
the  south,  including  Vicksburg,  the  key  of  the  great 
river,  and  Price  and  Van  Dorn  hung  with  light  forces 
on  his  eastern  flank,  and  threatened  his  communica 
tions.  Thinking  him  to  be  perilously  advanced,  they 
twice  came  down  upon  his  rear;  but  being  seriously 
checked  at  luka  (September  nineteenth),  and  utterly 
defeated  (October  second),  in  an  attack  on  Corinth 
which  place  Grant  had  well  intrenched,  they  fell 
back  once  more  into  Alabama.  Rosecrans,  who  had 
been  left  by  Grant  at  Corinth,  received  the  chief  credit 
of  the  action,  which  gained  him  the  command  of 


32  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

Buell's  army,  on  the  supercession  of  that  general,  and 
Grant  was  relieved  of  a  lieutenant  who  had  more  than 
once  thwarted  his  superior,  and  plainly  thought  less 
of  his  judgment  than  those  who  had  shared  his  vic 
tories  in  the  spring.  The  general  course  of  the  whole 
summer  operations  of  1862,  in  the  Western  states  is 
well  described  in  the  words  of  General  Badeau,  the 
best  of  Grant's  biographers,  whose  account  throws 
special  light  on  this  portion  of  the  war  : 

"  The  truth  is,  that  Grant's  extreme  simplicity  of  behav 
iour  and  directness  of  expression  imposed  on  various  officers, 
both  above  and  below  him.  They  thought  him  a  good  plain 
man,  who  had  blundered  into  one  or  two  successes,  and  who, 
therefore,  could  not  be  immediately  removed  ;  but  they 
deemed  it  unnecessary  to  regard  his  judgment,  or  to  count 
upon  his  ability.  His  superiors  made  their  plans  invariably 
without  consulting  him,  and  his  subordinates  chose  some 
times  to  carry  out  their  own  campaigns  in  opposition  or 
indifference  to  his  orders,  not  doubting,  that,  with  their  su 
perior  intelligence,  they  could  conceive  and  execute  triumphs 
which  would  excuse  or  even  vindicate  their  course.  It  is 
impossible  to  understand  the  early  history  of  the  war,  with 
out  taking  it  into  account,  that  neither  the  government  nor 
its  important  commanders  gave  Grant  credit  for  intellectual 
ability  or  military  genius." 

The  time  was  now  about  to  come  when  this  esti 
mate  was  to  be  greatly  changed  ;  when  those  who 
would  give  him  credit  for  nought  else,  would  learn  to 
admire  his  undaunted  tenacity  and  hopeful  persever 
ance  in  the  face  of  discouragement ;  and  when,  pursu 
ing  one  great  object  steadfastly,  he  was  to  win  it  at  last 
by  a  display  of  resource  such  as  the  most  brilliant  or 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  ^ 

scientific  of  modern  generals  could  not  surpass.  The 
town  of  Vicksburg,  little  known  before  the  war,  had 
taken  the  place  on  the  Mississippi  first  held  by  Colum 
bus,  before  that  port  was  turned  by  the  fall  of  Fort 
Donelson,  and  then  by  Memphis,  which  the  retreat  of 
the  Confederates  from  Corinth  rendered  similarly 
untenable.  It  barred  the  passage  of  the  stream  to 
Federal  use  ;  its  batteries,  high-raised  in  air,  defied  the 
skill  and  valor  of  Farragut's  and  Porter's  fleets  ;  it 
separated  Banks'  force  at  New  Orleans  from  the  rest 
of  those  of  the  North  ;  it  formed  a  point  tV  appui, 
whereby  the  Confederates  on  the  \vest  side  of  the 
Mississippi  could  connect  their  operations  freely  with 
the  main  armies  on  its  east.  They  might  still  indeed 
by  bringing  in  the  great  left  wing,  which  they  had 
kept  uselessly  scattered  through  Arkansas  into  Texas, 
have  added  over  50,000  men  to  the  centre  of  their  line 
of  defence,  and  possibly  turned  the  scale  of  the  war. 
As  there  has  been  indicated  one  grand  error  in  their 
conduct  of  the  war,  the  making  invasions  beyond  their 
means  on  the  eastern  side,  so  it  was  possibly  no  less 
fatal  to  them  that  they  wasted  a  large  part  of  their 
fighting  strength  in  a  defensive  occupation  of  their 
semi-barbarous  western  states.  At  the  time  of  Beaure- 
gard's  retreat  from  Corinth  there  were,  according  to 
the  official  report  of  Cooper,  the  Adjutant-General, 
55,000  fighting  men  enrolled  under  General  Holmes 
and  ready  for  service  in  the  trans-Mississippi  part  of 
the  Confederacy.  It  was  proposed  to  Mr.  Davis  to 
bring  these  across  as  secretly  as  might  be,  and  so  over 
whelm  Grant's  army  near  Corinth,  and  that  in  Ten 
nessee,  in  turn,  if  possible  ;  but  the  advice  was  rejected. 
And  finally  a  great  part  of  Holmes's  army,  tired  of 
3 


34 


THE  MILITARY  LIFE 


inaction,  dispersed  gradually,  and  were  never  employed 
at  all.  Never  was  the  necessity  of  the  concentration 
of  force  on  the  decisive  point  more  forcibly  illustrated 
than  in  this  false  strategy. 

To  return  to  the  operations  about  Vicksburg,  which 
were  to  make  of  Grant  the  acknowledged  hero  of  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Union.  We  left  him  more  than 
loo  miles  to  the  north  of  the  city,  with  a  country  in 
tervening  which  was  but  little  known,  and  crossed  by 
three  great  streams,  each  ending  near  the  Mississippi 
in  a  labyrinth  of  swamps  and  creeks.  Yet  he  had  his 
eye  already  steadily  on  the  important  point ;  for  when 
his  command,  after  his  unsuccessful  defence  of  Corinth, 
was  suddenly  enlarged  in  October,  and  a  further  in 
crease  of  force  promised,  he  wrote  at  once  to  propose 
to  Halleck  a  new  and  bold  plan  of  operations,  ending: 
"  I  think  I  would  be  able  to  move  down  the  Missis 
sippi  central  railroad,  and  cause  the  evacuation  of  Vicks- 
burgh."  This  was  his  first  official  mention  of  the  his 
toric  name.  From  that  time  forward,  until  he  entered 
the  works  as  victor  on  the  fourth  of  July  following,  his 
life,  and  that  of  his  friend  Sherman,  were  bound  up 
with  the  operations  against  the  great  stronghold  of 
the  West. 

It  is  not  within  our  scope  to  recount  these  in  de 
tail,  interesting  as  they  are  as  a  military  study.  Their 
general  features  are  so  well  known  that  we  need  only 
remind  the  reader  of  them.  The  first  attempt  was  by 
direct  march  overland,  which  failed,  owing  to  the  bril 
liant  surprise  by  Van  Dorn  of  Holly  Springs,  the  most 
important  post  in  the  long  line  of  communication 
Grant  had  formed  with  his  base  near  Corinth.  The 
Federal  General  had  not  yet  discovered  the  secret, 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  35 

afterwards  so  freely  used  by  Sherman,  of  working 
an  army  in  these  rich  but  depopulated  states  of  the 
South,  without  a  base  at  all,  by  living  on  the  ene 
my.  He  fell  back,  therefore,  checked  for  the  time. 
Then,  while  he  still  acted  inland,  threatening  another 
advance,  Sherman,  with  a  separate  force,  descended 
the  river,  and  strove  (about  the  Christmas  of  1862)  to 
carry  the  works  by  a  coup  de  main,  a  plan  which  failed 
with  heavy  loss.  But  the  North  had  now  tasted 
enough  of  success  elsewhere  to  nerve  her  to  put  forth 
her  strength.  130,000  soldiers  obeyed  Grant's  orders 
in  January  1863,  and  of  these  fully  50,000  were  em 
ployed  in  the  swamps  opposite  Vicksburg,  in  his  next 
scheme  of  endeavoring  to  divert  the  course  of  the 
Mississippi.  English  writers  have  been  accused  of  ex 
aggerating  the  sufferings  that  ensued  ;  let  an  American 
one,  therefore,  who  served  with  distinction  in  the 
Western  campaign,  give  his  own  account : 

"  The  troops  were  put  in  camps  along  the  west  bank  of 
the  river,  on  the  low  swamp  land,  overflowed  this  year  to 
an  unusual  extent.  This  protracted  freshlet,  together  with 
the  extraordinary  fall  of  rain,  greatly  increased  Grant's  diffi 
culties,  as  well  as  the  hardships  of  his  army. 

"The  camps  were  frequently  submerged,  and  the  dis 
eases  consequent  to  this  exposure  prevailed  among  the 
troops ;  dysenteries  and  fevers  made  sad  havoc,  and  the 
small-pox  even  was  introduced,  but  speedily  controlled. 
The  levees  furnished  the  only  dry  land  deep  enough  for 
graves,  and  for  miles  along  the  river  bank  this  narrow  strip 
was  all  that  appeared  above  the  water,  furrowed  in  its  whole 
length  with  graves.  The  troops  were  thus  hemmed  in  by 
the  burial-places  of  their  comrades." 

No  wonder  that,  as  is  added  by  the  writer : 


36  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

"Exaggerated  rumors  of  disease  and  even  pestilence 
were  circulated  by  the  enemy,  and  at  the  North ;  these 
added  to  the  anxieties  of  the  country,  as  well  as  to  the  diffi 
culties  of  the  commander." 


This  bold  effort  to  deprive  the  place  of  its  com 
mand  of  the  stream  having  failed,  in  March  1863  a 
new  attempt  was  made.  It  was  now  sought  to  turn 
the  works  of  Vicksburg  on  the  north  side  by  carry 
ing  some  of  the  gun-boats  and  troops  into  the  Yazoo 
(which  flows  into  the  Mississippi  above  the  place) 
through  the  net-work  of  swamps  which  lies  between  it 
and  the  course  of  the  great  river  ;  but  this  also  miscar 
ried  from  the  inherent  difficulties.  Grant  had  now 
tried  three  sides  of  the  place  in  vain,  and  had  brought 
so  much  odium  on  himself  as  to  make  his  removal  on 
the  next  failure  certain  ;  yet  in  May  he  was  found 
landing  on  the  west  bank,  thirty  miles  south  of  the 
city,  on  a  new  enterprise  against  it,  which  involved  his 
throwing  himself  into  a  hostile  country,  between  forces 
of  unknown  strength,  arriving  in  the  rear  of  the  place, 
and  dropping  the  base  he  had  marched  from  and  held 
at  first  with  his  left,  to  seize  a  new  one  with  his  ex 
tended  right;  that  new  one  being  itself  dependent  on 
the  success  of  his  march  turning  the  hitherto  impreg 
nable  works  on  the  Yazoo,  and  so  admitting  Porter's 
fleet  to  form  for  him  a  new  line  of  supply  to  it  from 
the  great  depots  further  north.  The  boldness  of  the 
design,  and  the  unity  and  vigor  with  which  it  was  car 
ried  out  to  a  perfect  result,  show  a  strategy  as  remark 
able,  if  it  was  somewhat  slowly  conceived,  as  that 
tactical  use  of  pressure  in  the  crisis  of  battle  which 
seemed  instinctive  in  the  Federal  general,  and  had 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  37 

given  him  his  previous  successes.  The  mistakes  of 
Pemberton,  the  too  late  arrival  of  General  Joseph 
Johnston  (only  now  recovered  from  Virginian  wounds) 
did  the  rest;  and  July  fourth,  1863,  saw  Grant,  in 
spite  of  Meade's  hard-won  victory  of  Gettysburg  the 
day  before,  the  foremost  man  in  the  armies  of  the 
Union.  No  longer  a  mere  volunteer-general,  commis 
sioned  but  for  three  years,  he  received  his  well-earned 
brevet  into  the  regular  army,  and  was  numbered  with 
the  most  honored  members  of  the  profession  from 
which  he  had  not  many  years  before  parted  in  de 
spair. 

The  fame  of  this  happy  general,  whose  merits  were 
made  more  conspicuous  by  the  faults  of  others,  was 
not  to  rest  long  upon  the  conquest  of  Vicksburg 
and  the  triumphant  opening  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
shattering  defeat  of  Rosecrans  at  Chickamauga  by 
Bragg  and  Longstreet,  as  he  sought  to  force  his  way 
from  the  Tennessee  into  Georgia,  brought  Grant  upon 
the  scene  in  the  autumn,  summoned  by  telegraph  to 
retrieve  his  former  subaltern's  disaster.  Thomas,  who 
had  succeeded  the  disgraced  general  at  Chattanooga, 
was  apparently  shut  in  by  the  victorious  army  ;  but  his 
line  of  supply  was  never  wholly  broken.  Grant  (now 
commanding  all  the  armies  west  of  the  Alleghanies) 
hurried  up  a  powerful  reinforcement  under  Sherman  ; 
Halleck  dispatched  Hooker  round  with  two  corps  from 
Virginia  ;  and  every  day  lost  by  Bragg  after  his  victory 
diminished  the  Confederate  chances.  There  was  no 
greater  mistake  (it  has  been  said  by  very  high  authority) 
in  the  history  of  the  war,  than  this  so-called  invest 
ment  of  Chattanooga,  in  truth  no  investment  at  all,  by 
a  numerically  weak  army  distributed  over  a  position 


38  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

which  necessarily  cut  it  in  two.  Too  confident  to  re 
tire  and  too  weak  to  attack,  Bragg  lay  idle  on  his  hills 
before  the  camp,  until  the  enemy  within  it  had  gath 
ered  in  irresistible  strength.  Then  Grant,  attacking 
him  at  last  in  his  own  lines,  drove  him  back  with 
heavy  loss  on  Georgia,  and  opened  the  centre  of  the 
Confederacy  to  be  pierced  next  spring,  as  its  western 
portion  had  already  been  severed  from  it  by  his  suc 
cess  on  the  Mississippi.  The  month  of  March  1864 
saw  him,  with  the  new  rank  of  Lieutenant-Generai 
created  expressly  to  do  him  honor,  assuming,  by  a 
sort  of  national  appointment,  the  chief  command  of 
the  Union  armies,  with  unlimited  control  over  a  mil 
lion  of  men  ;  whilst  Halleck,  superceded  by  his  former 
lieutenant,  was  henceforth  confined  to  those  adminis 
trative  functions  at  Washington,  which  it  is  but  bare 
justice  to  say  that  he  performed  with  constant  energy 
and  success.  The  good  discipline  of  the  Federal  ar 
mies  in  the  coming  campaign  owed  much  to  the  strong 
measures  he  used  during  this  spring,  and  especially 
towards  the  lower  ranks  of  regimental  officers.  On 
the  other  hand,  that  of  the  Confederates,  always  lax 
and  neglected,  fell  off  under  the  influence  of  discour 
agement,  until  it  resembled  rather  that  of  a  band  of 
undisciplined  volunteers  than  such  as  becomes  the 
tried  soldiers  of  a  national  army.  So  loose,  indeed 
was  their  order  that,  however  great  the  courage  of  the 
men,  no  officer  could  count  upon  the  number  of  men 
he  should  bring  in  at  the  end  of  the  day. 

His  new  rank  attained,  Grant  parted  from  the 
comrades  by  whose  help  it  had  been  won,  prepared  to 
try  his  fortune  elsewhere.  Before  the  spring  campaign 
of  1864  was  to  open,  it  was  necessary  that  he  should 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  29 

choose  his  own  field  of  action,  and  assign  those  of  his 
subordinates.     The  Mississippi  being  now  unquestion 
ably  secured  to  the  North,  there  were  but   two  great 
lines  on  which  the  General-in-Chief  could  fitly  conduct 
the    operations   of  1864;  that  which  his  late  success 
against  Bragg  had  laid  open,  or  that  which  led  direct 
to  the  Confederate  capital.     Many  reasons  might  have 
tempted    him   towards  the  former.     Here   he  would 
command  tried  troops,  who  had   in  him   the  implicit 
confidence  gained  by  great  achievements  already  done 
under  his  leadership.     Here  he  would  be  seconded  by 
lieutenants  of  the  rarest  powers  ;  for  it  was  hard  to  say 
whether  he  leant  most  on  the   calm  courage  and   un 
failing  resource  of  Sherman  (long  recognized  by  him 
before  the  world  perceived  them),  or  the  subtle  genius 
and  daring  spirit  of  the  lamented  M'Pherson,  a  soldier 
of  the  very  highest  promise  who  fell  before  Atlanta, 
having  attained,  at  the  early  age  of  thirty-three,  the 
honor  of  commanding  an   independent  army.     Here 
too,  Grant  had  thoroughly  examined  the  scene  of  op 
erations,  and  understood  that  a  moderate  series  of  suc 
cesses  would  plant  his  army  across  the   main   lines  of 
communication  yet  left  to  the  enemy,  dividing  abso 
lutely  the  Atlantic  states  of  the  South  from  those  near 
the  Mississippi,  and  restricting  the  government  of  the 
Confederacy   within   such  limits  as   must  necessarily 
cause  its  extinction.     Against  these  and  all  such  con 
siderations  was  set  that  weightier  than  any,  the  will 
of  his  country  ;  for  the  North  expected  the  general  of 
her  choice  to  show  his  powers  on  the  field  where  her 
military  honor  had  been  so  sadly  tarnished.     While 
victory  after  victory  and  progress  after  progress  had 
accompanied  her  arms  in  the  West,  in   Virginia  the 


4Q  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

Army  of  the  Potomac  was  now  nearly  as  far  from  Rich 
mond  as  when  it  was  first  raised  ;  and  though  holding 
its  own  when  on  the  defensive,  and  with  especial  suc 
cess  since  Meade  had  the  command,  it  had  never  ad 
vanced  without  recoiling  shattered,  or  at  the  least 
wholly  checked,  before  the  unconquerable  strategist 
who  held  it  at  bay  with  his  inferior  force.  Honor, 
therefore,  called  Grant  to  Virginia,  and  policy  also 
plainly  pointed  out  that  to  defeat  Lee  and  to  occupy 
Richmond  would,  if  not  destroying  the  inner  resources 
of  the  Confederacy,  at  least  damage  her  external  pros 
pects  beyond  all  hope.  In  April,  therefore,  it  was  an 
nounced  that  Grant  was  to  command  in  person  in  the 
next  Virginian  campaign. 

He  had  left  Chattanooga  suddenly  on  March 
third,  on  a  private  intimation  of  his  coming  promo 
tion  :  but  his  own  wish  had  been,  as  was  natural,  to 
return  and  conduct  the  Georgian  campaign  in  person, 
a  wish  which  he  cheerfully  relinquished  when  under 
standing  fully  what  the  nation  expected  at  his  hands. 
There  is  nothing  a  military  biographer  could  offer 
more  honorable  to  the  character  of  Grant  than  the 
terms  in  which  he  now  took  leave  of  his  great  lieu 
tenants.  Flaws  may  be  found  in  his  tactics,  or  defi 
ciencies  in  his  strategical  power  ;  yet,  if  not  absolutely 
perfect  as  general  or  soldier,  as  a  commander  full  of 
generous  sentiment  to  the  deserving,  who  could  de 
sire  to  serve  under  a  better  chief?  Not  that  Grant's 
praise  was  of  that  cheap  sort  which  is  easily  earned 
and  little  valued.  On  the  contrary,  few  commanders 
have  spoken  more  severely  of  their  subordinates' 
errors  when  censure  was  called  for ;  and  Hooker, 
Burnside,  and  Butler  are  notable  examples  that  the 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  4! 

scathing  rebukes  which  he  administered  in  his  reports 
spared  neither  rank  nor  standing.  Unqualified  praise 
from  such  a  chief  is  doubtless  the  more  valued  ;  but  it  is 
rather  in  justice  to  himself  than  his  lieutenants  that 
we  insert  the  letter  he  wrote,  on  the  decision  already 
mentioned,  to  the  general  who,  next  to  himself,  had 
earned  most  largely  the  gratitude  of  the  Union  their 
swords  aided  to  preserve  : 

"DEAR  SHKRMAN, 

"The  bill  reviving  the  grade  of  lieutenant- 
general  in  the  army  has  become  law,  and  my  name 
has  been  sent  to  the  Senate  for  the  place.  I  now  receive 
orders  to  report  to  Washington  immediately,  in  person,  which 
indicates  a  confirmation,  or  a  likelihood  of  confirmation.  I 
Start  in  the  morning  to  comply  with  the  order. 

"  While  I  have  been  eminently  successful  in  this  war 
in  at  least  gaining  the  confidence  of  the  public,  no  one  feels 
more  than  I,  how  much  of  this  success  is  due  to  the  energy, 
skill,  and  the  harmonious  putting  forth  of  that  energy  and 
skill,  of  those  whom  it  has  been  my  good  fortune  to  have 
occupying  subordinate  positions  under  me. 

"There  are  many  officers  to  whom  these  remarks  are 
applicable  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  porportionate  to 
their  ability  as  soldiers  ;  but  what  I  want  is,  to  express 
my  thanks  to  you  and  M'Pherson,  as  the  men  to  whom, 
above  all  others,  I  feel  indebted  for  whatever  I  have  had  of 
success. 

"  How  far  your  advice  and  assistance  have  been  of  help 
to  me  you  know.  How  far  your  execution  of  whatever  has 
been  given  to  you  to  do,  entitles  you  to  the  reward  I  am 
receiving,  you  cannot  know  as  well  as  I. 

"  I  feel  all  the  gratitude  this  letter  would  express,  giving 
it  the  most  flattering  construction. 


42  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

"  The  word  you  I  use  in  the  plural,  intending  it  for 
MTherson  also.  I  should  write  to  him,  and  will  some  day, 
but  starting  in  the  morning,  I  do  not  know  that  I  will  find 
time  just  now.  Your  friend, 

"U.S.  GRANT,  Major- General."" 

Less  than  a  fortnight  after  this  letter  reached  him 
Sherman  found  himself  promoted  to  the  chief  com 
mand  of  the  Southwestern  states,  which  Grant  had 
left  on  his  advancement  to  that  of  the  whole  land 
forces  of  the  Union  ;  and  a  few  days  earlier  (March 
ninth)  the  latter  had  publicly  received  at  Washington 
his  commission  of  Lieutenant-General,  bestowed  by 
Lincoln  under  the  authority  of  the  special  Act  of 
Congress.  The  new  Commander-in-Chief  had  already 
decided  to  take  the  personal  direction  of  the  Virgin 
ian  operations,  and  the  protracted  campaign  v*is  to 
begin  which  never  actually  can  be  said  to  have  ceased 
until  Richmond  fell,  and  with  it  the  Confederacy  that 
Lee  defended. 

The  main  purpose  of  the  new  campaign  was  a  con 
centration  of  the  scattered  Federal  invasion  on  two 
points  of  the  long  line  hitherto  assailed.  The  front 
of  the  Union  armies  had  thus  far  practically  extended 
along  a  vast  irregular  curve  from  New  Orleans  to  the 
Lower  Potomac.  Three  years  of  bitter  welfare  had 
not  sufficed  to  make  any  change  in  the  strategic  sit 
uation  at  the  eastern  end  of  this  line ;  although  the  su 
perior  Federal  resources,  wielded  with  ability  and  te 
nacity  by  Grant  and  his  lieutenants,  had  greatly  con 
tracted  the  limits  of  the  Confederacy  along  its  south 
western  border,  forcing  it  back  from  the  Ohio  to  the 
Tennessee,  and  wresting  point  after  point  on  the  Mis- 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  43 

sissippi  from  its  grasp.  It  was  now  resolved  at  Wash 
ington  to  give  up  the  system  of  embracing  with  sepa 
rate  attacks,  the  whole  front  of  the  enemy,  who  had 
by  it  been  permitted  to  avail  himself  of  his  shorter 
lines  of  communication,  and  to  bring  unexpected  num 
bers  to  bear  on  the  points  most  threatened.  The 
whole  weight  of  the  Northern  pressure  was  now  to  be 
thrown  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  upon  the  enemy's 
capital ;  by  Sherman  upon  that  vital  point  of  the  Con 
federacy  which  the  endurance  of  Rosecrans'  army  and 
the  brilliant  victory  of  Grant  had  laid  bare  to  the  next 
advance  from  Chattanooga.  The  first-named  object 
of  this  double  invasion  was  of  course  political.  Not 
withstanding  the  boast  of  the  Confederate  President 
that  the  war  did  not  in  any  manner  depend  upon 
Richmond,  it  was  manifest  that  the  fall  of  that  city 
would  be  felt  as  a  terrible  blow  to  the  Southern  Gov 
ernment  both  at  home  and  abroad,  and  would  greatly 
justify  the  expectation  of  the  mass  of  the  Northern 
people  that  the  Union  was  to  be  reconquered  by  the 
sword.  Against  the  devoted  capital  Grant  was  to  bring 
forces  more  vast  and  powers  more  uncontrolled  than 
any  general  since  the  days  of  Napoleon.  And  should 
these,  aided  by  his  prestige  and  his  proved  vigor  and 
activity,  cause  Lee  in  the  defence  to  exhaust  the  re 
sources  of  the  South,  Sherman,  furnished  with  a  mighty 
army,  would  be  able  to  penetrate  into  and  hold  the 
whole  centre  of  Georgia,  threaten  or  seize  such  war 
like  magazines  as  the  forethought  of  Davis's  adminis 
tration  might  have  placed  in  that  remote  and  hith 
erto  untouched  state,  and  sever  the  Carolinas  and 
Virginia  from  the  rest  of  the  Confederacy.  That  the 
complete  success  of  either  invasion  would  give  the 


44 


THE  MILITARY  LIFE 


latter  its  death-blow  was  the  not  unnatural  expecta 
tion  of  even  those  more  far-seeing  Federals  who 
were  not  blinded  to  the  difficulties  each  must  en 
counter. 

The  key  to  the  whole  campaign  of  1864  in  Virginia 
is  to  be  found  in  Grant's  design  (formed  long  before 
on  the  spur  of  his  success  at  Vicksburg)  of  assailing 
Richmond  by  a  double  method,  combining  direct  at 
tack  and  wide-spread  investment.  He  was  himself  to 
move  straight  on  that  capital,  or  rather  on  the  army 
that  defended  it,  with  a  host  as  large  as  it  was  possible 
to  manoeuvre  in  the  country  through  which  he  must 
pass  ;  while  two  minor  but  considerable  armies,  advanc 
ing  to  the  right  and  the  left  of  the  main  one,  were  to 
sweep  through  the  territory  beyond  the  city  and  aim 
at  the  railroads  which  supplied  it  from  the  west  and 
south.  His  calculation,  made  on  very  reasonable 
grounds,  was  that  in  opposing  his  own  march  Lee 
would  require  to  bring  into  line  every  available  man 
in  the  Virginian  armies,  and  would  thus  be  compelled 
to  strip  the  districts  entered  by  his  subordinate  forces. 
It  was  perfectly  ascertained  at  Washington  that  the 
very  considerable  population  of  the  rival  capital,  as 
well  as  the  large  army  under  Lee  that  covered  it,  were 
maintained  chiefly  by  food  brought  from  great  dis 
tances.  Indeed,  the  district  to  the  north  of  the  James 
had  been  so  harried  by  the  Federal  expeditions,  and 
so  stripped  of  its  negro  laborers,  as  barely  to  produce 
enough  food  for  its  own  scattered  rural  population. 
To  sever  completely  the  railroads  which  led  to  the  city 
would  therefore  quickly  bring  both  its  inhabitants  and 
Lee's  army  to  a  state  of  starvation,  and  inevitably 
force  the  latter  to  retreat,  not  less  than  a  series  of 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


45 


defeats  in  the  open  field.  Grant  believed  himself 
thus  to  have  two  distinct  chances  in  his  favor,  and  dili 
gently  applied  himself  to  work  out  the  details  of  his 
scheme. 

The  first  part  of  this  which  naturally  came  under 
consideration  was  the  line  of  operations  to  be  chosen 
for  his  own  advance.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  with 
which  he  had  fixed  his  own  headquarters  on  assuming 
his  new  office,  at  this  time  lay  around  Culpepper, 
north  of  the  Rapidan,  and  its  supplies  came  straight 
from  Washington  by  the  Alexandria  railroad.  The 
problem  to  be  solved  as  to  the  best  means  of  ap 
proaching  Richmond  was  precisely  that  which  had 
first  produced  open  difference  between  M'Clellan  and 
the  President  two  years  before.  The  preference  of 
the  latter  for  a  direct  movement  across  Eastern  Vir 
ginia,  which  should  at  the  same  time  keep  his  own 
capital  covered,  is  well  known.  The  objections  to  it 
we  prefer  to  give  in  M'Clellan's  own  words,  which 
are  here  quoted  from  his  letter  of  February  third, 
1862,  addressed  to  the  President  in  reply  to  that  of 
the  latter,  challenging  him  to  show  the  superiority  of 
his  design  : 

"  Bearing  in  mind  what  has  been  said,  and  the  present 
unprecedented  and  impassable  condition  of  the  roads,  it  will 
be  evident  that  no  precise  period  can  be  fixed  upon  for  the 
movement  on  this  line.  Nor  can  its  duration  be  closely 
calculated ;  it  seems  certain  that  many  weeks  may  elapse 
before  it  is  possible  to  commence  the  march.  Assuming  the 
success  of  this  operation,  and  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  as 
certain,  the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  the  importance  of 
the  results  gained.  I  think  these  results  would  be  confined 
to  the  possession  of  the  field  of  battle,  the  evacuation  of 


46 


THE  MILITARY  LIFE 


the  line  of  the  Upper  Potomac  by  the  enemy,  and  the  moral 
effect  of  the  victory  ;  important  results  it  is  true,  but  not  deci 
sive  of  the  war,  nor  securing  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
main  army,  for  he  could  fall  back  upon  other  positions,  and 
fight  us  again  and  again,  should  the  condition  of  his  troops 
permit." 

With  the  exception  of  the  Confederate  army  of 
Virginia  being  intrenched  behind  the  Rapidan  instead 
of  near  the  Potomac,  there  was  but  little  change  in 
the  main  conditions  of  the  question  which  M'Clellan 
had  treated.  But  Grant  did  not  rely  like  his  prede 
cessor  on  the  single  hope  of  success  from  his  own 
direct  attack.  On  the  contrary,  he  intended  (as  we 
have  already  pointed  out)  to  use  the  latter  partly  to 
cover  a  separate  system  of  acting  on  his  enemy  by  de 
stroying  the  latter's  communications.  Further  it 
would  have  appeared  a  servile  copying  of  a  plan  which 
had  already  failed  in  the  execution,  and  a  reflection 
on  the  President's  judgment,  if  he  had  proposed  to 
move  his  main  army  by  water  to  the  peninsula,  or 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Rappahannock  (according  to 
M'Clellan's  original  idea),  and  worked  his  detached 
left,  as  it  was  open  for  him  to  do,  from  Norfolk  far 
beyond  the  south  of  the  James.  He  had  already 
decided,  therefore  to  move  across  the  difficult  country 
which  his  predecessor  had  dreaded  to  attempt.  His 
force  for  this  purpose  would  be,  as  we  shall  presently 
see,  fully  as  numerous  as  that  which  M'Clellan  had 
commanded  before  his  rupture  with  Lincoln.  Al 
though  the  staff,  the  organization,  and  the  spirit  of 
the  soldiery  had  most  wonderfully  improved  under 
the  stern  discipline  of  actual  service,  he  yet  felt  the 


OF  GENERAL   GRANT.  47 

necessity  of  keeping  near  to  some  better  line  of  sup 
ply  for  his  numerous  wants  than  cartage,  however 
liberally  added,  could  furnish.  The  railroad  he  now 
had  at  his  back  continued  onward  to  Richmond  ;  but 
even  if  he  could  drive  Lee  from  the  part  his  army 
now  covered,  the  line  thence  runs  due  east  for  forty 
miles,  and  could  only  be  followed  by  exposing  a  flank. 
For  this  cause  he  resolved,  if  failing  to  surprise  Lee's 
position,  to  move  the  army  of  the  Potomac  round  it 
to  his  own  left,  so  as  to  seize  that  short  railroad  from 
Acquia  Creek  to  Richmond,  attempts  to  master  the 
Rappahannock  passage  of  which  near  Fredericksburg 
had  successively  proved  so  ruinous  to  Burnside  and 
Hooker.  From  the  fords  of  the  Rapidan,  which  his 
left  nearly  touched,  to  Bowling  Green,  a  station  on  that 
line,  is  but  twenty-seven  miles.  A  rapid  march  south 
eastward  on  the  latter  place,  through  Spojtsylvania 
Court-house,  would  plant  him  with  his  back  to  Fred 
ericksburg  and  his  face  to  Richmond  ;  and  if  Lee  were 
not  crushed  in  the  coming  collision,  nor  even  forced 
back  into  a  strictly  defensive  attitude,  the  Federal 
army  could  (as  Grant  believed)  so  use  the  difficult  and 
wooded  country  as  to  cover  the  movement  effectually 
by  the  peculiar  tactics  now  become  familiar  to  all  its 
branches. 

For  this  part  of  his  campaign  Grant  made  earnest 
personal  preparations  during  the  six  weeks  that  ol- 
lowed  his  appointment.  The  five  whole  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  were  not  only  recruited,  but 
also  broken  up  and  redistributed  into  three,  under 
Sedgwick,  Hancock,  and  Warren,  all  men  of  proved 
ability  and  courage.  The  chief  cavalry  generals  were 
superseded ;  the  most  active  of  them,  Kilpatrick, 


48  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

being  sent  to  act  in  the  army  of  Sherman,  from  which 
Grant  drew  a  still  younger  officer,  General  Sheridan, 
whom  he  had  previously  marked  out  as  the  most 
fitting  leader  for  his  12,000  horse.  The  whole  of 
these  arrangements  were  made  under  the  supervision 
of  Meade,  who  retained  the  nominal  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  carried  out  his  new 
superior's  instructions  with  a  whole-hearted  earnest 
ness  worthy  of  Wellesley  himself  under  the  like 
trial. 

The  three  infantry  corps  numbered  about  30,000 
each,  distributed  in  four  divisions.  They  were  to  be 
joined,  at  the  last  moment,  by  another,  that  of  Burn- 
side,  which,  on  Longstreet's  retreat  from  East  Ten 
nessee,  had  been  brought  round  from  Knoxville  to  a 
depot  in  Maryland.  Its  regiments  being  filled  up 
with  conscripts,  and  a  large  division  of  colored  troops 
just  raised  being  added,  it  mustered  35,000  strong  at 
the  end  of  April.  This  corps  was  purposely  held  back 
in  order  to  cause  the  Confederates  to  believe  it  to  be 
intended  for  some  separate  expedition,  and  so  to  keep 
their  government  from  reinforcing  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia.  When  the  roads  at  length  were  reported  fit 
for  use,  and  all  Grant's  preparations  on  the  Rapidan 
complete  (and  these  had  included  separate  reviews 
and  movements  of  each  corps  to  test  the  efficiency  of 
the  staff),  Burnside's  divisions  advanced  through 
Washington,  and  having  defiled  before  the  President, 
joined  their  new  chief  at  his  headquarters  in  the  last 
days  of  April.  With  Sheridan's  cavalry,  the  Lieuten- 
ant-General  had  now  assembled,  for  his  immediate 
command,  a  fully  equipped  force  of  135,000  men, 
being  in  number  only  slightly  larger  than  that  which 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  49 

M'Clellan  had  prepared  for  his  first  campaign,  but  for 
the  major  part  composed  of  veteran  troops. 

Beyond  the  Blue  Ridge,  on  his  right,  a  separate 
army  of  25,000  fighting  men  had  been  assembled 
under  Sigel,  to  act  in  the  Shenandoah.  The  super 
session  of  that  general  (who  had  been  in  retirement 
since  the  days  of  Fredericksburg)  had  given  much 
umbrage  to  the  German  Republicans.  This,  Lincoln 
had  lately  striven  to  disarm  by  offering  him  a  new  and 
detached  command  in  the  great  valley.  Augmented 
now  into  a  formidable  army,  his  force  was  to  be  led, 
in  co-operation  with  Grant,  straight  upon  Lynchburg, 
the  important  point  which  commands  both  the  railroad 
and  canal  leading  from  the  Upper  James  to  Rich 
mond.  Grant  believed  there  would  be  but  little  oppo 
sition  on  this  side ;  and  as  the  advance  would  neces 
sarily  cut  the  line  from  the  Shenandoah  into  Rich 
mond,  the  Confederate  capital  would  be  by  it  thrown 
entirely  for  supplies  on  the  railroads  passing  to  the 
South. 

These  are  in  number  two  only,  regarded  as  main 
lines.  The  one  runs  from  Richmond  due  south 
through  Petersburg  to  Weldon,  and  so  along  the  At 
lantic  side  of  North  Carolina.  The  other  nearly  south 
west  through  a  richer  country  to  the  border  of  that 
state  at  Danville.  To  completely  sever  these  we  have 
shown  to  be  a  vital  part  in  Grant's  original  design  ; 
and  the  operations  for  the  purpose  were  to  be  conduct 
ed  by  an  army  assembling  at  M'Clellan's  old  base  be 
tween  the  York  and  James  Rivers.  A  mere  threaten 
ing  of  Richmond,  to  be  followed  by  a  hasty  change 
of  manoeuvre  to  the  south  side  of  the  James,  from 
whence  the  expedition  should  rapidly  penetrate  far 
4 


£0  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

into  the  interior  and  destroy,  or  if  possible,  hold  the 
railways,  was  the  general  plan.  Thirty-five  thousand 
men  were  allotted  to  it. 

Next  to  the  fitness  of  Grant's  main  army  for  its 
own  share  of  the  drama  was  evidently  needful  to  him 
the  proper  conduct  of  these  subordinates  ;  and  here 
we  come  to  the  weak  part  of  his  strategy.  Sigel's 
appointment  had  taken  place  before  his  own,  and 
could  not  well  be  revoked  (no  present  fault  being 
alleged  against  him)  without  great  odium  to  the  gov 
ernment  on  the  part  of  the  German  soldiers  and  voters. 
Grant  therefore  did  not  attempt  to  change  the  staff  in 
the  valley.  But  for  the  still  more  important  change 
on  the  James  he  had  designed  his  protege,  W.  F.  Smith, 
whose  promotion  to  Major-Gen eral  he  had  just  with 
difficulty  succeeded  in  forcing  from  the  Senate,  inclined 
at  first  to  reject  it  from  jealousy  of  his  dictation.  Here, 
however,  he  found  an  absolutely  insurmountable  ob 
stacle  in  the  obstinacy  of  Lincoln,  who  had  resolved 
not  to  allow  the  supersession  of  Butler,  already  selected 
for  this  service :  so  that  after  some  discussion,  Grant 
was  forced  to  content  himself  with  a  half  measure  of 
putting  Smith  at  the  head  of  one  of  Butler's  two  corps 
(the  other  being  formed  of  troops  from  Charleston 
under  Gilmore),  in  the  vain  hope  that  the  civilian 
would  be  guided  by  the  soldier  in  the  actual  opera 
tions  ;  a  hope  which  Butler's  character  for  self-asser 
tion  rendered  vain  from  the  first. 

The  forces  available  for  the  defence  of  Richmond 
against  this  triple  invasion,  though  far  inferior  in  num 
bers,  were  yet  of  formidable  strength.  Longstreet  had 
lately  returned  from  East  Tennessee  with  his  corps, 
which,  with  those  of  Ewell  and  Hill,  mustered  70,000 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  *  I 

infantry  nominally,  and  could  put  52,000  bayonets  into 
the  line  of  battle.  Lee  had  but  few  cavalry  near  the 
Rapidan,  great  part  of  Steuart's  command  lying  nearer 
to  Richmond  to  watch  against  such  raids  as  that  of 
Dahlgren,  which  had  alarmed  that  city  not  long  before. 
There  had  been  but  little  change  in  the  staff  of  Lee's 
force  since  the  days  of  Gettysburg. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  so-called  Army  of  Virginia, 
Richmond  was  defended  to  the  south  by  Beauregard 
and  his  troops,  released  from  their  duties  at  Charles 
ton.  These  were  disposed  along  the  Weldon  railroad, 
ready  for  concentration  on  any  point  threatened  be 
tween  Richmond  and  Wilmington,  at  the  further 
extremity  of  North  Carolina.  They  numbered  about 
20,000,  exclusive  of  a  well-trained  militia  which  guarded 
the  capital  itself.  Twelve  thousand  troops,  in  great 
part  newly  raised,  were  all  that  could  be  allotted  to 
the  defence  of  the  valley  against  Sigel,  where  Early 
was  now  succeeded  by  Breckenridge.  With  this 
marked  inferiority  in  every  quarter,  the  Confederate 
strategy  was  necessarily  of  the  defensive  order,  and 
made  dependent  upon  that  of  their  opponents.  Nor 
was  this  hardly  less  the  case  in  Georgia.  There 
Sherman  had  collected  an  army  of  98,000  men  at 
Chattanooga,  exclusive  of  the  vast  trains  for  rail  and 
common  roads  which  were  to  force  and  maintain  an 
unequalled  system  of  transport ;  while  Johnston  con 
fronted  him  with  but  76,000,  and  this  disproportion 
of  numbers  was  enhanced  by  doubts  whether  his  con 
tingent  from  Tennessee  would  hold  to  the  Confederacy 
from  which  their  state  was  now  wrested. 

All  things  being  now  prepared  for  his  great  adven 
ture,  and  orders  given  for  a  simultaneous  advance  to 


52  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

Sherman  as  well  as  to  Sigel  and  Butler,  Grant 
launched  his  army  by  its  left  across  the  Rapidan. 
The  well-known  passages  at  Ely  and  Germaniatown 
Fords,  used  by  Hooker  in  his  disastrous  attempt  of 
the  year  before,  which  led  to  his  defeat  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  were  unguarded  by  the  Confederates,  and 
crossed  without  difficulty  on  the  night  of  May  third. 
The  cavalry  divisions  of  Gregg  and  Wilson  moved 
first  before  dark  to  lay  the  pontoon  bridges  at  these 
two  points,  three  and  seven  miles  respectively  west 
of  the  fork  of  the  Rappahannock.  Hancock's  (second) 
corps  followed  Gregg  at  the  former  place,  and  War 
ren's  (fifth)  and  Sedgwick's  (sixth,)  forming  a  right  col 
umn,  passed  after  Wilson  at  the  latter.  A  train  of 
8,000  wagons,  carrying  supplies  for  the  whole  army, 
passed  in  rear  of  Hancock,  thus  interposing  the  bulk 
of  the  force  between  itself  and  the  enemy.  From  the 
moment  of  beginning  the  march  all  connection  with 
the  Alexandria  railroad  was  thrown  aside,  and  the 
troops  made  dependent  for  all  supplies  on  their  mov 
ing  commissariat  until  a  new  base  should  be  gained. 
Burnside's  (ninth)  corps  alone  remained  on  the  ground 
where  the  army  had  lately  stood,  to  deceive  the 
enemy  as  long  as  possible.  But  this  for  twenty-four 
hours  only ;  after  which  he  too  moved  across  the 
river,  following  the  right  column  by  Germania,  and 
rejoining  the  other  corps  on  the  fifth.  That  day  saw 
the  first  fighting  of  a  long  and  bloody  series  of  engage 
ments. 

It  was  far  from  being  Grant's  desire  to  force  his 
foe  to  an  immediate  action.  His  wish  was  to  pass 
beyond  the  Confederates  to  Spottsylvania  Court 
house,  the  central  point  of  all  the  tangled  mass  of 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


53 


woods  which  covers  the  country  to  the  south  of 
Chancellorsville,  before  Lee  could  discover  his  real 
object.  He  had,  indeed,  fair  ground  to  hope  that  the 
latter  would  form  his  army  behind  the  strong  line  of 
Mine  Run,  a  brook  running  north  into  the  Rapidan 
between  Grant's  new  position  and  the  Confederate 
right,  under  the  idea  that  the  Federal  army  had 
crossed  the  river  (as  under  Meade  it  had  attempted 
in  the  November  preceding)  to  threaten  that  flank 
and  turn  his  entrenchments.  If  Lee  had  been  thus 
deceived,  the  hostile  army  would  soon  have  gained 
ground  sufficiently  in  its  intended  line  to  threaten  his 
direct  communication  with  Richmond,  and  force  him 
to  seek  to  dislodge  it  at  any  cost.  But  this  was  not 
to  be ;  and  Hancock  was  recalled  from  his  advance 
on  the  coveted  point ;  and  wheeled  rapidly  into  posi 
tion,  to  meet  the  attack  which  Lee  (much  stronger 
now  than  when  opposed  to  Meade  on  the  same  ground 
in  the  autumn)  moved  instantly  to  make.  Of  this 
attack  Grant  received  warning  from  his  cavalry  in 
good  time  to  form  his  line  facing  to  the  west,  and 
covering  the  road  along  which  he  would  have  pressed. 
Hancock  naturally  formed  his  left.  Sedgwick  pro 
tected  the  road  near  the  ford,  with  Warren  more  to 
the  centre.  Burnside  arrived  in  time  to  fill  the  inter 
val  between  the  latter  and  Hancock;  and  as  soon  as 
this  disposition  was  complete,  the  shock  fell  on  the 
Federals.  The  column  reported  on  the  turnpike 
road  from  Orange  proved  to  be  Swell's ;  that  more  to 
the  south  on  the  new  or  plank  road  was  Hill's.  So 
desirous  was  Lee  (who  evidently  hoped  to  take  his 
adversary  by  surprise)  to  commence  the  battle  that 
day,  that  he  entered  on  it  without  the  aid  of  Long- 


54  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

street,  whose  cantonments  were  so  distant  that  he 
could  not  reach  the  scene  of  action  before  the  sixth. 
Night  closed  upon  it  without  decisive  advantage  to 
either  party. 

At  dawn  on  the  sixth  the  battle  was  renewed  ;  but 
by  this  time  the  Federals  had  intrenched  the  more 
prominent  parts  of  their  position,  and  the  contest 
assumed  the  normal  character  of  the  great  majority 
of  the  battles  of  this  war.  The  beginning  of  this  sys 
tem  is  to  be  found  in  M'Clellan's  operations  before 
Richmond;  but  it  had  now  been  fully  developed.  We 
purpose  to  explain  its  details,  which  done,  there  will 
be  but  little  need  to  follow  particular  incidents ;  for  all 
such  contests  bear  of  necessity  a  striking  family  resem 
blance. 

The  tactics  used  in  Europe,  where  the  commander 
of  an  army  can  sweep  the  battle-field  with  his  glass, 
and  direct  the  march  and  instantly  know  the  actual 
danger  or  success  of  each  division,  are  evidently  not  to 
be  applied  to  warfare  conducted  in  the  midst  of  forests, 
broken  only  by  clearings  too  small  in  many  cases  for 
the  free  movement  of  a  brigade.  Combined  move 
ments  can  here  be  done  by  guesswork  only ;  and  the 
front  of  the  army,  instead  of  being  at  least  at  double 
its  artillery  range  from  the  enemy  at  the  close  of  the 
day,  is  often  within  earshot.  Hence  sprang  the  prac 
tice  early  in  the  war,  of  each  corps  entrenching  slightly 
the  ground  on  which  it  was  to  sleep.  The  facility  with 
which  that  could  be  done  (in  a  manner  presently  to  be 
described)  caused  the  same  system  of  breastworks  to 
be  applied  extensively  in  the  midst  of  battle,  so  as  to 
avoid  the  constant  danger  of  being  taken  in  flank  by 
sudden  movements  of  the  enemy  through  the  wood. 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


55 


Flank  attacks  are  alarming  to  the  best  of  troops,  and 
are  especially  applicable  to  the  case  of  a  forest  engage 
ment,  where  the  enemy's  line,  broken  into  skirmishers, 
each  covered  by  a  tree,  could  be  forced  back  from  the 
front  only  by  slow  degrees,  and  with  considerable  sac 
rifice  of  men  ;  and  yet  may  be  approached  without  ob 
servation  at  either  extremity.  At  the  period  of  the 
war  of  which  we  are  writing,  it  had  become  a  fixed 
habit  of  the  armies  to  cover  every  hundred  yards 
gained  by  a  breastwork  wherever  the  materials  could 
be  found.  It  followed  that  the  so-called  battles  degen 
erated  into  a  series  of  long  and  bloody  skirmishes,  car 
ried  on  chiefly  from  under  rude  shelter,  and  occupying 
sometimes  many  days  without  any  decisive  result. 
The  fighting,  in  fact,  had  grown  to  resemble  rather  the 
last  part  of  a  siege  on  a  great  scale,  with  its  constant 
intrenching,  sorties,  counter-attacks,  and  vast  expen 
diture  of  powder,  than  such  conflicts  as  Europe  has 
seen  on  her  great  fields.  Indeed  the  latter  have  often 
been  fought  (as  Leipsic,  Waterloo,  Wagram,  Borodino 
testify)  upon  ground  of  remarkably  open  character, 
naturally  fitted  for  the  parade  movements  of  mighty 
hosts.  Yet  the  length  of  the  American  conflicts,  the 
often-repeated  attempts  of  their  generals  to  search  the 
enemy's  lines,  and  the  deadly  fire  of  the  arms  employed, 
have  made  their  character  scarcely  less  bloody  than 
that  of  the  actions  with  which  we  contrast  them. 

We  must  now  describe  more  particularly  the  breast 
works  which  are  so  identified  with  our  subject,  and  in 
the  forming  of  which  the  Federals  especially  were  so 
skilful  and  laborious  as  greatly  to  counteract  the  indi 
vidual  inferiority  of  their  soldiery  ;  for  many  of  these, 
town-bred  or  recent  immigrants,  were  no  match  in 


5  6  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

regular  skirmishing  for  the  active  Southerners,  trained 
from  their  youth  to  free  use  of  the  rifle,  who  formed  the 
mass  of  the  hostile  army. 

Given  a  piece  of  ground  to  be  occupied,  and  thickly 
covered  with  trees,  there  would  be  found  in  every 
brigade  some  hundreds  of  stout  arms  ready  to  wield 
the  formidable  bushman's  axe,  used  throughout  the 
North  American  continent,  and  carried  in  profusion 
with  the  regiments.  A  line  being  roughly  marked,  a 
few  minutes  sufficed  to  fell  the  trees  along  its  length, 
letting  each  fall  towards  the  front;  and  some  further 
chopping  completed  a  rough  "  abattis,"  (or  "  entangle 
ment"  as  it  is  technically  called)  forming  a  very  awk 
ward  obstacle  to  an  advancing  enemy.  Behind  this, 
and  against  its  rear,  two  or  three  hours  of  spade  labor 
were  enough  to  throw  up  a  line  of  parapet  with  ditch, 
or  row  of  rifle-pits,  sufficient  to  shelter  the  defenders 
of  this  woodland  barricade.  But  to  enclose  the 
whole  of  the  army's  front  in  this  fashion  would  be  to 
renounce  all  attempt  to  advance.  Openings  had 
therefore  to  be  left  at  frequent  intervals,  and  these 
again  were  covered  by  separate  intrenchments,  with 
guns  disposed  to  flank  each  other,  and  the  approach 
to  the  general  line.  If  a  retreat  were  thought  of,  other 
lines  formed  to  the  rear  might  be  so  arranged  as  to 
make  it  secure.  If  the  enemy  were  forced  from  his 
opposing  works,  a  little  ingenuity  converted  them  to 
the  captor's  use.  Allow  but  a  little  time  in  advance, 
and  it  is  hard  to  say  how  resolute  men  could  be  forced 
from  a  succession  of  such  works  as  these.  They  were 
indeed  but  the  revival  on  a  larger  scale  of  those 
against  which  British  valor  and  discipline  were  shat 
tered  at  Saratoga,  to  the  ruin  of  our  war  against  the 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  ^ 

revolted  colonies.     But  it  is  time  to  return  to  our  nar 
rative. 

The  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  begun  late  on  the 
fifth,  was  renewed  next  day,  and  continued  even  after 
darkness  closed  over  the  scene.  Longstreet  had  come 
upon  the  ground  at  dawn,  to  the  great  relief  of  Hill, 
whose  corps  showed  symptoms  of  giving  ground  before 
the  pressure  of  Hancock.  The  newly-arrived  general 
restored  the  day,  and  sought  soon  after  to  decide  it 
by  turning  the  extreme  left  of  the  Federals  with  one 
of  those  wide  sweeping  movements  so  successful  un 
der  Jackson.  To  do  this  it  was  needful  to  march  his 
troops  to  their  right ;  and  in  guiding  his  advanced 
brigades  that  way,  he  was  shot  at  through  the  cover 
by  some  of  his  own  men  while  passing  along  the  front 
of  his  second  line,  and  desperately  wounded,  General 
Jenkins  being  killed  by  the  same  volley.  Less  happy 
in  this  respect  than  his  great  comrade  had  been  at 
Chancellorsville,  the  fall  of  Longstreet  ruined  the  suc 
cess  of  the  manoeuvre  he  had  undertaken,  and  the 
Confederates  made  no  real  progress  during  the  rest  of 
the  day.  As  it  closed,  however,  General  Gordon, 
whose  troops  formed  their  extreme  left,  stole  up  to 
the  breastworks  which  covered  Sedgwick's  right  near 
the  Rapidan,  and  carried  them  by  a  swift  surprise 
made  before  the  pickets  were  posted  for  the  night. 
Great  part  of  two  Federal  brigades  were  captured,  and 
the  rest  of  the  division  fled.  But  the  pursuers  were 
checked  by  another  line  of  intrenchments  raised  by 
some  reserve  artillery  close  at  hand  ;  and  Sedgwick, 
by  gallant  exertions,  rallied  his  men  behind  this, 
which,  though  somewhat  at  an  angle  with  the  general 


5  8  THE  MI  LIT  A  R  Y  LIFE 

front,  served  to  protect  the  right  of  the   army  suffi 
ciently  for  Grant's  purpose. 

Lee  in  these  encounters  had  already  incurred  a  loss 
of  7,000  men,  including  two  of  his  best  generals  ;  and 
although  the  Federals  estimated  theirs  at  double  that 
number,  yet  the  spirit  of  their  soldiery  was  good,  and 
their  position  unshaken.  Another  day  would  see  it 
so  strengthened  that  the  Southern  marksmen  would 
lose  the  advantage  of  that  greater  activity  and  quick 
ness  of  aim  which  had  told  hitherto  in  their  favor,  and 
Grant  would  be  enabled  to  guard  his  front  sufficiently 
and  yet  to  continue  his  original  movement  by  a  grad 
ual  extension  of  his  left.  Lee's  offensive  battle,  in 
short,  had  failed  in  its  object  ;  and,  with  the  versatility 
of  true  genius,  he  shifted  it  at  once  for  the  opposite 
course.  For  the  rest  of  the  campaign  we  shall  find 
him  steadily  pursuing  that  defensive  warfare  which 
the  great  German  writer,  Clausewitz,  points  out  for  the 
natural  course  of  the  weaker  party,  and  which  here  be 
came  especially  necessary  to  him,  as  he  discovered 
that  his  new  antagonist  was  unsparing  to  a  marked 
degree  of  the  lives  of  his  men.  Grant  has  in  fact 
much  to  answer  for  in  this  year's  history  as  regards 
the  charge  of  wasting  his  army  by  pressing  it  on 
against  unfair  odds  of  position.  To  justify  him  in  any 
measure,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  he  came  to  his 
new  work  in  Virginia  after  a  train  of  striking  successes 
won  greatly  by  the  judicious  employment  of  superior 
numbers ;  that  he  had  sound  reason  to  believe  that 
the  enemy  had  no  such  supplies  of  recruits  to  draw 
from  as  were  available  to  himself;  and  that  the  gov 
ernment  he  served  was  of  necessity  compelled  to  in 
sist  on  constant  advance,  and  on  seeming  advantage 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  59 

at  any  present  sacrifice.  Add  to  these  conditions  that 
the  general  was  of  disposition  as  obstinate  as  brave  ; 
and  his  troops  resolute  and  patient  rather  than  daring 
in  their  character  ;  and  we  may  account  for  much  of 
the  waste  of  life  now  so  notorious.  A  little  more  of 
success  in  the  results,  and  we  should  have  heard  noth 
ing  but  praise.  Doubtless  Grant  is  deficient  in  that 
sublime  quality  of  genius  which  instinctively  knows 
the  impossible,  and  recoils  from  it  alone.  His  war 
fare  shows  marvellous  resemblance  to  that  of  Massena, 
whose  obstinate  clinging  to  his  purpose  and  patient 
waiting  for  opportunity  saved  France  and  covered 
himself  with  glory  in  1799,  as  they  proved  the  ruin  of 
his  fame  and  of  Napoleon's  Peninsular  designs  when 
met  by  Wellington  and  Torres  Vedras. 

The  morning  of  the  seventh  saw  Lee  resting  on  the 
defensive,  and  expecting  Grant  to  advance.  But  the 
latter,  finding  himself  no  longer  pressed,  began  in  the 
afternoon  to  detach  to  his  left  in  the  direction  of 
Spottsylvania,  the  coveted  point  where,  as  before  no 
ticed,  the  chief  roads  of  the  district  intersect.  His 
movement  was  complicated  by  the  attempt  to  conceal 
it,  and  the  march  of  the  Federals  filled  so  much  time, 
that  daybreak  arrived  on  the  ninth,  and  found  the 
cross-roads  occupied  by  a  mere  advanced  guard  ; 
while  Lee,  being  warned  of  the  operation  by  his  cav 
alry,  and  at  once  divining  the  full  purpose  of  the  Fed 
erals,  had  resolved  to  throw  himself  across  their  path, 
and  compel  them  to  become  the  assailants.  His  right 
(now  under  Anderson,  who  had  taken  Longstreet's 
place)  marched  rapidly  for  this  purpose  ;  and  arriving 
at  the  double-quick,  drove  the  Federals  sharply  from 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Court-house.  This  corps  was 

o 


60  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

speedily  supported  by  Hill  and  Ewell ;  and  the  Con 
federates  intrenched  themselves  at  once  in  their  new 
position,  which  covered  the  cross-roads,  and  ran  in 
semicircular  form  through  a  piece  of  ground  peculiarly 
adapted  for  their  purpose  of  defence. 

The  tremendous  losses  which  Grant  endured  on 
the  fifth  and  sixth  of  May  (amounting  to  no  less  than 
20,000  men,  not  including  those  of  Burnside's  corps) 
must  have  shown  him  plainly  that  troops  so  hastily 
made  up  as  his  own  (the  brigades  in  some  cases  being 
composed  four-fifths  of  recruits  lately  armed)  were 
helpless  as  skirmishers  among  these  dense  woods  be 
fore  the  veterans  of  Lee,  each  man  of  whom  was  hard 
ened  to  the  work.  In  the  words  of  Swinton,  at  once 
the  ablest  and  the  fullest  of  American  writers  on  this 
campaign : 

"  The  result  was  a  grievous  disappointment  to  General 
Grant,  for  he  shared  an  opinion  commonly  entertained  in 
the  West — the  opinion  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
never  been  properly  fought.  This  belief  was  perhaps  nat 
ural  under  the  circumstances  ;  nevertheless  it  was  fallacious. 
Sharing  it,  he  had  hoped  at  one  blow  to  finish  the  trouble 
some,  and  seemingly  invulnerable  adversary.  And  to 
achieve  this  end,  he  made  little  account  of  those  arts  that 
accomplish  results  by  the  direction  and  combination  of 
forces :  for  at  this  period  he  avowedly  despised  manoeuvring. 
His  reliance  was  exclusively  on  the  application  of  brute 
masses,  in  rapid  and  remorseless  blows,  or  as  he  himself 
phrased  it,  in  'hammering  continually.'" 

This  statement  is  not  made  at  random.  It  is  founded 
on  the  highest  testimony;  for  as  the  same  work 
states : 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  6 1 

"  Shortly  before  the  opening  of  the  Rapidan  campaign, 
General  Meade,  in  conversation  with  the  lieutenant-general, 
was  telling  him  that  he  proposed  to  manoeuvre,  thus  and 
thus ;  whereupon  General  Grant  stopped  him  at  the  word 
'  manoeuvre,'  and  said,  '  Oh !  I  never  manoeuvre.'  This 
characteristic  utterance,  which  the  suavity  of  biographers 
might  readily  pass  over  in  silence,  cannot  be  omitted  here ; 
for  it  is  the  proof  of  a  frame  of  mind  that  essentially  influ 
enced  the  complexion  of  the  campaign.  The  battle  of  the 
Wilderness  can  hardly  be  understood,  save  as  the  act  of  a 
commander  who  '  never  manoeuvred.'  " 

In  quoting  this,  it  is  but  justice  to  General  Grant  to 
add  that  if  he  used  such  expressions  and  acted  here 
with  such  apparent  rashness,  it  was  plainly  owing  to  a 
mistaken  view  of  the  particular  army  he  had  under 
him;  for  in  the  previous  campaigns  of  Vicksburg  and 
Chattanooga  he  had  shown  the  very  highest  powers 
of  manoeuvring,  those  larger  qualities  of  strategy  in 
fact,  which  will  more  and  more  be  demanded  in 
modern  war,  as  the  means  for  great  combinations 
multiply. 

Then  followed  for  twelve  long  days  the  bloody  con 
test  around  Spottsylvania.  Once  only  (May  twelfth)  did 
Grant's  troops  break  fairly  in  upon  the  breastworks, 
on  which  they  were  moved  again  and  again,  searching 
out  the  weak  points  in  Lee's  long  enciente  ;  and  then, 
although  the  capture  of  a  single  projecting  angle  with 
many  guns  and  prisoners  rewarded  Hancock's  bold 
assault,  the  enemy's  position  was  but  slightly  con 
tracted,  not  really  changed.  This  day,  too,  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  lost  8,000  men  in  retaining  the  ground 
thus  won,  for  the  scene  of  the  contest  (says  Swinton, 
speaking  here  as  an  eye-witness)  was  literally,  and  by 


62  THE  MI  LI  TAR  Y  LIFE 

no  figure  of  speech,  "  covered  with  piles  of  dead."  But 
two  days  before,  in  a  less  fortunate  attack,  "  the  loss 
was  between  five  and  six  thousand,  while  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  enemy  lost  as  many  hundreds ;"  and 
finally,  "  after  General  Grant  had  carried  out  with 
much  fidelity,  but  very  indifferent  success,  his  own 
principle  of  hammering  continuously,  ....  the  carry 
ing  of  the  position  was  seen  to  be  hopeless,  and  he, 
abandoning  the  effort  after  twelve  days,  resolved  by  a 
turning  operation  to  disengage  Lee  from  it."  Grant 
had  paid  the  penalty  of  his  want  of  discernment  with 
another  20,000  men  put  hors  de  combat,  whilst  the  Con 
federates,  even  including  nearly  a  whole  division  cap 
tured  by  Hancock's  surprise,  were  again  diminished 
by  only  one-third  of  the  number.  "  Grant's  exhausted 
army,"  says  the  same  writer  before  quoted,  "  began  to 
lose  its  spirit.  It  was  with  joy  that  it  turned  its  back 
upon  the  lines  of  Spottsylvania." 

Largely  reinforced  from  the  reserves  about  Wash 
ington,  Grant  moved  on  May  twentieth  to  the  west, 
passing  beyond  the  right  of  the  enemy,  and  then 
making  southward  ;  but  only  to  find  the  Confederates 
again  established  across  his  front  on  the  North  Anna 
river,  in  a  position  so  admirably  chosen  that  even  his 
audacity  admitted  it  unassailable.  Another  flank 
march,  the  fourth  within  the  month,  carried  him  over 
the  Pamunkey,  and  finally  brought  his  army,  at  the 
end  of  May,  in  sight  of  the  very  ground  occupied  by 
M'Clellan  two  years  before.  Close  to  the  army's  front 
was  the  Chickahominy,  with  the  very  passages  which 
had  connected  the  wings  of  that  general's  forces  when 
pushing  along  that  stream  in  1862  ;  but  between  it 
and  these  passages,  in  a  line  of  hasty  intrenchments 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  63 

covered  by  swamps  and  thickets,  lay  the  ever-watchful 
Lee,  in  that  strictly  defensive  attitude  which  he  held 
throughout  this  campaign  after  the  failure  of  his  first 
attack  in  the  Wilderness. 

Leaving  the  two  great  hosts  once  more  facing  each 
other  after  a  month  of  constant  fighting,  marching, 
and  intrenching,  we  turn  to  follow  the  courses  of  those 
minor  operations  on  which  Grant  had  counted  for  the 
success  of  his  double  scheme.  In  addition  to  the 
movements  of  Sigel  and  Butler  on  their  respective 
lines,  he  had  detached  Sheridan  with  the  cavalry  of 
the  Potomac  army  as  soon  as  the  course  of  the  first 
two  days'  battle  had  shown  this  arm  to  be  unavailable 
about  Spottsylvania,  with  orders  to  pass  through  the 
country  to  the  north  of  Richmond,  and  operate 
between  it  and  Lee.  In  this  there  was  nothing 
original;  for  Stoneman  had  received  the  same  charge 
from  Hooker  the  year  before.  Nor  did  Sheridan  per 
form  any  more  striking  feat  upon  his  raid,  which 
would  be  little  noteworthy,  but  for  its  having  led  to 
the  death  of  General  Steuart,  who  was  shot  down  in  a 
charge  upon  a  party  of  the  Federal  horse  which  had 
appeared  close  to  Richmond  on  May  eleventh. 
Though  this  once  famous  leader  had  never,  though 
for  two  years  in  constant  command,  made  any  reform 
in  the  wasteful  over-work  which  wore  Lee's  cavalry 
away  ;  yet  was  he  unrivalled  in  the  outpost  duties  of 
that  difficult  country,  and  doubtless  was  sorely  missed 
by  his  old  commander,  and  the  army  for  which  he  had 
so  long  kept  watch. 

Sigel's  expedition  up  the  Shenandoah  was  chiefly 
remarkable  for  its  fully  revealing  to  the  Federals  the 
intense  hostility  to  their  cause  which  the  severities  of 


64 


THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 


former  generals  in  that  district  had  created.  This, 
and  a  natural  hesitancy,  caused  him  to  strip  his  column 
so  much  in  order  to  guard  his  communications,  that 
when  met  suddenly  by  Breckenridge  far  up  the  valley, 
he  was  very  decisively  beaten  on  May  fifteenth,  with 
heavy  loss  in  guns  and  men,  and  driven  again  far 
north.  Lincoln  instantly  superseded,  this  time  with 
out  a  murmur  against  the  act,  the  unsuccessful  com 
mander,  and  sent  General  Hunter  in  his  stead.  The 
latter,  in  the  absence  of  Breckenridge  (called  at  this 
time  to  the  aid  of  Lee  on  the  Chickahominy),  began 
another  of  those  advances  up  the  great  valley  which 
the  high  land  on  either  side  throughout  the  war  kept 
so  distinct  from  other  operations. 

Butler  at  this  time  aided  his  chief  but  little  more 
than  did  Sigel.  His  first  movement  was  a  feint  upon 
York  River  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  enemy  from 
the  south  of  Richmond,  and  it  so  far  succeeded,  that 
when  he  debarked  his  force  high  up  the  James,  he 
struck  without  difficulty  the  railroad  mentioned  as 
running  through  Petersburg,  and  sent  his  cavalry  far 
across  country  to  that  of  Danville,  promising  in  his 
first  dispatches  to  wrest  them  from  the  enemy.  But 
neither  of  these  important  lines  was  retained  by  the 
Federals.  Alarmed  by  a  report  that  Lee  was  falling 
back  on  Richmond,  Butler  drew  in  his  posts,  and  con 
fined  his  operations  to  a  feeble  demonstration  against 
Fort  Darling,  the  chief  work  upon  the  river;  and 
being  sharply  attacked  in  flank  by  Beauregard  on  May 
sixteenth  (when  the  Federals  lost,  by  surprise  a  whole 
brigade  captured),  he  abandoned  the  offensive  entirely, 
and  intrenched  himself  upon  a  deep  loop  of  the 
James.  His  campaign  had  failed  decisively  as  a 


OF  GENERAL   GRANT.  65 

separate  operation,  and  half  his  force  was  now  called 
suddenly  from  him  to  join  the  main  army  on  the 
Chickahominy. 

Then  came  the  darkest  spot  in  the  career  of  Grant 
as  a  commander.  It  had  seemed  as  though,  when  he 
recoiled  a  few  days  before  from  Lee's  position  on  the 
North  Anna,  without  attempting  it,  he  had  learnt  by 
bitter  experience  that  the  "  continuous  hammering  "  in 
which  he  not  long  since  had  trusted  might  break 
the  instrument  while  its  work  was  yet  unfinished. 
Not  even  the  vast  resources  on  which  he  had  power 
to  draw  could  long  spare  20,000  men  a  week  for  the 
continuance  of  the  experiment.  It  requires,  therefore, 
more  excuse  than  has  any  where  been  offered  for  the 
sacrifice  which  followed.  It  may  be  that  Grant's  usu 
ally  imperturbable  temper  was  ruffled  by  the  continued 
readiness  with  which  his  adversary  met  him  ;  or  that 
he  believed  the  Confederates  already  so  worn  down 
by  their  unsupplied  losses  as  to  be  unable  to  man  their 
works  ;  or  that  he  judged  that  his  new  command  had 
not  yet  been  sufficiently  put  to  the  proof  by  the  stern 
doings  of  the  month  just  past ;  or  that  all  these  causes 
acted  together.  Possibly  he  was  influenced  more  than 
all  by  the  uneasy  consciousness  that  he  had  brought 
the  criticism  of  the  whole  world  upon  his  strategy  by 
his  famous  dispatch,  "  I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on 
this  line,  if  it  takes  all  the  summer  :  "  for  had  not  this 
chosen  line  been  already  abandoned  and  no  result 
won  ?  At  any  rate  his  conclusion  was  to  try  once 
more  to  force  Lee  out  of  his  path  by  direct  attack. 
So  having  called  up  16,000  of  Butler's  forces  from  the 
James  to  aid  him,  he  ordered  a  general  assault  of  the 
kind  so  often  made  in  the  course  of  this  campaign 
5 


66  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

along  the  whole  front,  to  be  made  at  half-past  four  on 
the  morning  of  June  third. 

The  most  eulogistic  biographer  of  the  great  Fed 
eral  general,  speaks,  as  it  were,  under  his  breath  when 
he  tells  the  story  of  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor. 
"  There  was  a  rush  "  (says  such  an  one),  "  a  bitter  strug 
gle,  a  rapid  interchange  of  deadly  fire,  and  the  army  be 
came  conscious  that  the  task  was  more  than  it  could 
do."  The  testimony  of  Swinton,  himself  an  eyewitness 
is  more  emphatic  and  complete  :  "  It  took  hardly 
more  than  ten  minutes  to  decide  the  battle.  There 
was  along  the  whole  line  a  rush — the  spectacle  of  im 
pregnable  works — a  bloody  loss — a  sullen  falling  back, 
and  the  action  was  decided."  Then  after  some 
details,  he  concludes  : 

"  The  action  was  decided,  as  I  have  said,  in  an  incredi 
bly  brief  time  in  the  morning's  assault.  Rapidly  as  the  re 
sult  was  reached,  it  was  decisive ;  for  the  consciousness  of 
every  man  pronounced  further  assault  hopeless.  The  troops 
went  forward  as  far  as  the  example  of  their  officers  could 
carry  them  :  nor  was  it  possible  to  urge  them  beyond  ;  for 
there  they  knew  lay  only  death,  without  even  the  chance  of 
victory.  The  completeness  with  which  this  judgment  had 
been  reached  by  the  whole  army  was  strikingly  illustrated 
by  an  incident  that  occurred  during  the  forenoon.  Some 
hours  after  the  failure  of  the  first  assault,  General  Meade 
sent  instructions  to  each  corps-commander  to  renew  the  at 
tack  without  reference  to  the  troops  on  his  right  or  left. 
The  order  was  issued  through  these  officers  to  their  subor 
dinate  commanders,  and  from  them  descended  through  the 
wonted  channels  ;  but  no  one  stirred,  and  the  immobile  lines 
pronounced  a  verdict,  silent  yet  emphatic,  against  further 
slaughter.  The  loss  on  the  Union  side  in  this  sanguinary 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  6/ 

.ction  was  over  thirteen  thousand,  while  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederates,  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  reached  that  many 
lundreds." 


t  was  in  fact  not  half  as  many,  if  the  most  authentic 
Confederate  reports  may  be  believed. 

It  is  vain  to  enter  into  elaborate  criticisms  of  such 
in  action.  Grant's  mode  of  assault,  made  u  along  the 
ivhole  line,"  and  without  any  reserve,  was  contrary  to 
jill  the  tactical  rules  of  theory  or  practice.  There  is, 
ndeed,  an  exception  in  one  important  case,  where 
:he  enemy  is  decidedly  worn  out  and  shaken  by  pre- 
nous  events.  So  Wellington  ordered  his  general  charge 
it  Waterloo  when  the  Prussian  shock  had  shattered 
ind  laid  bare  the  French  right  flank,  and  made  Napo- 
eon's  battle  a  hopeless  struggle.  So  Radetsky,  act- 
ng  on  the  same  instinct  of  genius,  threw  all  his  front 
ine  suddenly  on  the  exhausted  Italians  at  Novara,  ere 
-less,  his  more  methodical  chief  of  staff,  could  array 
he  reserves  for  a  final  assault.  Grant  had  no  such 
notive  for  his  battle.  The  troops  that  he  attacked 
vere  not  the  ill-led  swaggerers  whose  indecision  at 
ort  Donelson  had  been  patent  to  his  observant  glance, 
lor  the  wearied  stragglers  whose  officers  stayed  to 
Blunder  with  them  at  Pittsburg.  They  were  veterans, 
,var-hardened  to  suffering  and  danger,  confident  in 
their  general,  feeling  themselves  invincible  on  the 
defensive,  and  making  up  by  their  priceless  value  as 
ndividual  soldiers  for  their  want  of  discipline  and 
numbers.  It  is  better  for  those  who  would  think  well 
pf  Grant,  to  pass  onward  from  the  subject,  with  a 
word  of  pity  for  Burnside,  so  often  condemned  for  the 
like  fault  committed  earlier  in  the  war  at  Frederics- 


68  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

burg  ;  and  to  add  only  that  the  error  of  the  Federal 
generals  was  older  than  their  day  :  since  Napoleon 
(whose  mode  of  righting  battles  it  is  the  fashion  to  im 
agine  faultless)  threw  away  nearly  the  same  number 
of  men  in  1807,  in  a  vain  assault  on  the  Russian  in 
trenched  camp  upon  the  Aller  ;  an  assault  ordered  ap 
parently  without  reason,  for  the  works  were  afterwards 
turned  strategically  without  difficulty  by  a  simple  flank 
movement.  The  holocaust  thus  offered  by  impatience 
at  Heilsberg  was  even  more  inexcusable  than  those  of 
Fredericsburg  and  Cold  Harbor  ;  for  no  excited  nation 
was  crying  out  to  the  French  emperor  for  action  at 
all  cost. 

Unconscious,  it  may  be,  of  his  imitation  of  Napo 
leon,  whose  tactics  in  his  later  period  were  not  unlike 
those  of  the  great  Federal  general,  Grant  now  once 
turned  aside  from  the  works  he  could  not  carry,  and 
with  a  wide  sweep  to  his  left,  the  fifth  and  last  of  the 
year,  passed  away  from  the  blood-stained  meadows  of1 
the  Chickahominy,  crossed  the  James  thirty  miles 
below  Richmond,  and  establishing  himself  south  of 
Petersburg  (which  place  should  have  been  captured 
but  for  a  miscarriage  in  the  movement),  spent  the  rest1 
of  the  year  intrenched  before  that  place. 

To  do  this  was  no  strange  conception,  forced  upon' 
him  by  his  previous  failures.  On  the  contrary,  in  let 
ters  to  Washington  written  before  his  late  promotion, 
he  had  strongly  urged  that  the  future  campaign: 
against  Richmond  should  be  conducted  not  by  any 
direct  advance,  but  rather  by  just  such  an  operational 
conducted  south  of  the  James  and  based  upon  the! 
coast ;  the  tendency  of  which  would  be  ultimately  to 
sever  Richmond  (viewed  thus  as  a  sort  of  advanced! 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


69 


)rtress  thrust  northward)  from  the  rest  of  the  Confed. 
racy,  and  by  straightening  its  defenders,  to  enclose  them 
s  Pemberton  was  shut  in  Vicksburg,  or  at  the  least  corn 
el  its  evacuation.  Strong  indeed  must  have  been  the 
olitical  and  personal  motives  which  had  induced  him, 
rhen  nominally  uncontrolled,  to  lay  aside  this  plan, 
nd  adopt,  in  deference  to  the  well-known  anxiety  of 
^incoln  for  the  national  capital,  the  line  of  advance 
n  which  M'Dowell  and  Pope,  Burnside  and  Hooker, 
.ad  met  their  successive  disasters,  and  had  led  him 
fhen  forced  to  abandon  this,  to  try  that  on  which 
/TClellan  had  failed.  The  result  had  proved  the 
Sagacity  of  his  original  choice ;  for  now  he  found  him- 
elf  at  last  in  the  position  which  he  might  have  assumed 
t  the  first,  and  he  had  only  reached  it  after  suffering 
loss  of  nearly  70,000  men,  while  Lee's  rolls  were 
iminished  by  about  25,000.  The  moral  energy  of 
he  North  sustained  its  commander-in-chief  still ;  but 
German's  successful  advance  into  Georgia  had,  it  may 
eil  be  believed,  much  effect  at  this  time.  Had  that 
•eneral  been  as  rash  as  his  chief,  and  his  campaign  as 
.nfruitful  in  aught  but  losses,  "  it  would,"  in  the  opin- 
on  of  the  Federal  historian  already  cited,  "  have  been 
lifficult  to  have  raised  new  forces  to  recruit  the  Army 
)f  the  Potomac,  which,  shaken  in  its  structure,  its 
:  ?alor  quenched  in  blood,  and  thousands  of  its  ablest 
)fficers  killed  and  wounded,  was  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  no  more." 

From  that  time  forward,  Grant,  not  too  proud  to 
earn  by  adversity,  abandoned  the  costly  tactics  which 
lad  served  him  so  ill.  His  campaign  took  the  shape 
3f  a  siege,  or  rather  a  blockade,  and  the  cumbrous 
form  of  warfare  which  the  world  had  not  witnessed 


^O  THE  MI  LI  TAR  Y  LIFE 

since  Turenne  and  Montecuculi  checked  one  anothe 
in  the  Palatinate,  was  revived  on  a  grander  scale 
Lines  of  circumvallation  round  the  enemy  in  fron1 
arose,  and  lines  of  contravallation  against  the  enerm 
in  rear.  Works  mounted  with  the  heaviest  gun, 
guarded  the  camp  of  the  Federals,  and  a  railroac 
brought  the  rations  along  its  lines.  Bit  by  bit  Gran 
strove  to  extend  his  left  inland  to  seize  the  three  lines 
of  railroad  which  connected  Richmond  with  the  Con 
federacy.  Bombardment  and  mining  of  unknowi 
dimensions  failed  to  shake  Lee's  defences  in  front 
and  the  struggle  gradually  narrowed  to  the  continuou 
effort  to  reach  beyond  him  by  successive  operation 
on  the  western  flank.  August  saw  Grant  in  possessioi 
of  the  coast  railroad  that  led  to  Weldon  ;  but  th< 
year  waned,  and  the  spring  of  1865,  found  th< 
"  Southside  "  branch  line  leading  from  Danvill* 
through  Petersburg  to  Richmond  still  intact,  whilt 
the  more  important  one  direct  to  the  city  was  yet  fa 
from  the  Federal  grasp.  Grant  not  the  less  for  man; 
failures  held  tenaciously  his  threatening  positior 
being  well  supplied  from  those  vast  and  ever-develop 
ing  resources  of  the  Union  cause  which  Sherman' 
brilliant  successes  had  quickened  into  vigorous  action 
and  being  warned  minutely  by  deserters  and  spies  o 
the  waning  strength  of  that  heroic  army  which  had  s 
long  bidden  defiance  to  the  efforts  of  the  North. 

We  have   not    space  here  to  point    out  fully  hov 
fatal  was  that  political   determination  which   cause 
General  Lee,  against  his  own  opinion  and  all  true  mil] 
tary  rule,  to  maintain  himself  in  Richmond  at  the  cos 
of  ruin  to   its  defenders.     Two  causes   operated  wit 
terrible  effect  upon  his  army;  the  want  of  men,  an 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  yi 

he  want  of  supplies.  The  Confederacy  was  not  as 
:ompletely  stripped  of  its  manhood  as  Grant  believed 
yhen  he  publicly  declared  that  winter  of  his  enemies, 
;  they  have  robbed  the  cradle  and  the  grave  :  "  but 
he  conscription,  badly  managed  at  the  first,  failed 
altogether  in  its  object  as  the  powers  of  the  Confeder 
ate  government  were  lessened  ;  and  this  failure,  coupled 
with  the  proposed  refusal  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners, 
)revented  all  recruiting  for  the  forces  at  the  capital. 
As  remarkable,  and  probably  even  more  decisive  of 
he  result,  was  the  utter  break-down  of  the  commis- 
iariat  system  in  force.  This  department,  it  is  now 
veil  known,  was  confided  to  a  man  as  incompetent  by 
nature  as  ignorant  of  his  duties ;  and  the  mode  he 
adopted  of  pressing  supplies  at  a  nominal  price  caused 
evasion  wherever  force  was  actually  wanting.  So 
much  is  now  generally  admitted,  and  has  been  written 
plainly  in  American  works  ;  but,  in  addition  to  these 
errors  of  the  government,  it  is  plain  that  there  was  a 
certain  weakness  on  the  part  of  Lee  himself,  which 
contributed  largely  to  the  result.  If  kept  at  Rich 
mond  against  his  will,  there  was  all  the  more  need  of 
lis  being  fully  rationed  ;  and,  strong  as  he  was  by  his 
position  and  prestige,  had  he  insisted  on  taking  the 
:ommissariat  of  his  force  into  his  own  hands,  and  seen 
to  its  working,  the  failure  of  the  supplies  need  not  have 
occurred.  We  have  been  informed  by  irrefragable 
uthority  that,  when  Richmond  was  abandoned,  there 
were  stored  up  not  far  off,  on  the  North  Carolina  rail 
ways,  four  months'  provisions  for  such  an  army  as  his, 
which  had  only  required  exertion  to  have  been  for 
warded  long  before.  The  food  was  there,  and  the  rail 
roads  still  serviceable ;  but  there  was  a  lack  of  that 


72  THE  MILITAR  Y  LIFE 

personal  energetic  supervision  which  in  such  cases 
smooths  difficulties  away,  and  brings  provisions  and 
army  together.  In  excuse  it  may  be  said  that  a  retreat 
into  North  Carolina  was  constantly  kept  in  view  ;  but 
this  should  not  have  prevented  the  measures  necessary 
to  meet  immediate  wants.  For  lack  of  such  the 
strength  and  spirits  and  number  of  those  glorious  sol 
diers  fell  ruinously  away. 

Lee  discovered  this  too  late.  Desertion  had  thinned 
his  ranks  in  the  winter,  and  increased  so  rapidly  in  the 
spring  of  1865,  that  the  month  of  March  found  himj 
guarding  forty  miles  of  intrenchments  with  but  forty 
thousand  men.  The  strength  of  the  enemy  was  mean-] 
while  constantly  increasing,  and  it  became  absolutely 
necessary  to  make  an  effort  to  extricate  the  army  from 
a  situation  no  longer  tenable.  To  retreat  from  Rich 
mond  was,  however,  no  longer  easy  nor  safe.  The 
necessary  movement  would  involve  the  march  of  long 
columns  past  the  left  flank  of  Grant,  who  was  constantly 
on  the  watch  ;  and  Lee  resolved  therefore  to  force  his 
enemy  to  draw  this  in  by  threatening  the  eastern  or 
right  end  of  his  lines  before  Petersburg  by  a  sudden 
assault.  The  sortie  took  place  accordingly  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-fifth  of  March.  It  was  confided 
to  Gordon,  the  youngest  and  most  daring  of  Lee's 
corps  commanders,  whose  courage  and  conduct  had 
raised  him  from  the  rank  of  simple  brigadier  to  his 
present  charge  during  the  autumn  campaign.  His 
attack  at  first  promised  to  be  successful,  one  of  the 
strong  redoubts  which  guarded  the  Federal  camp  being 
carried  at  a  rush,  and  three  of  the  neighboring  batte 
ries  abandoned  by  their  guards.  But  the  advantage 
could  not  be  followed  up  ;  for  the  supports  which  \vere 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 


73 


to  have  aided  Gordon  to  establish  himself  beyond  the 
works  by  a  further  advance,  failed  to  answer  the  call 
upon  them  :  and  then  the  Federals,  recovering  from 
their  surprise,  drove  back  the  assailants  by  a  counter 
charge,  taking  many  of  them  prisoners,  and  inflicting 
further  heavy  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  the  retreat 
taking  place  under  a  severe  artillery  fire.  The  task  had 
not  seemed  impossible,  nor  the  odds  hopeless  ;  but 
the  Army  of  Virginia  had  failed  because  the  energy 
and  spirit  which  had  made  it  the  world's  wonder  for 
the  past  three  years,  were  decaying  for  lack  of  nour 
ishment  and  hope. 

Grant  detected  his  enemy's  increasing  weakness 
under  this  show  of  offence,  and  made  haste  to  give 
the  counterblow  that  was  to  conclude  the  long  cam 
paign.  With  his  wish  arrived  the  ready  instrument 
in  the  person  of  Sheridan,  the  most  impetuous  and 
active  of  that  new  class  of  generals,  young  in  years, 
but  veterans  in  war,  whom  the  long  series  of  contin 
uous  campaigns  had  raised  to  high  charge  upon  the 
Federal  side.  Grant  had  marked  him  out  first  in  1863, 
at  Chattanooga,  where  he  led  on  his  division  of  infantry 
to  break  the  lines  of  Bragg,  with  all  the  fire  of  youth 
and  the  skill  of  a  practiced  soldier.  Struck  by  his 
spirit  and  tactical  ability,  he  restored  him  to  the  cav 
alry  service  (in  which  Sheridan  had  first  distinguished 
himself  in  the  West),  choosing  him  out,  first  to  com 
mand  the  whole  horse  of  his  army,  and  then  to  take 
charge  of  the  independent  operations  in  the  Shenan- 
doah  valley,  where  he  had  been  opposed  during  the 
autumn  to  General  Early.  Having  first  checked,  he 
finally  routed  and  ruined  that  general's  army ;  and 
then,  his  separate  task  accomplished,  returned  to  his 


74 


THE  MILITARY  LIFE 


chief  to  take  part  in  the  final  struggle,  arriving  at 
the  Federal  headquarters  on  March  twenty-seventh, 
two  days  after  Gordon's  repulse.  His  arrival  was 
the  signal  of  the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign  of 
1865. 

Grant's  first  plan  as  laid  down  in  his  own  orders, 
was  simple  enough,  and  indeed  may  be  regarded  as  a 
continuation  of  the  efforts  made  on  his  left  in  the 
previous  autumn.  Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry,  was  to 
strike  boldly  inland,  and  destroy  the  Southside  and 
direct  Danville  Railroads.  The  other  corps,  taking 
for  lightness'  sake  part  only  of  their  guns,  were  to 
move  by  their  left,  for  the  double  purpose  of  "  turning 
the  enemy's  positions,  and  insuring  Sheridan's  suc 
cess."  The  Ninth  Corps  alone  was  to  remain  and 
guard  the  lines  before  Petersburg.  These,  there 
fore,  would  be  watched  by  20,000  men,  while  10,000 
horse  and  80,000  foot  moved  beyond  them,  and  cut 
Richmond  off  from  the  rest  of  the  South.  The  troops, 
well  fed,  well  armed,  and  confident  of  success,  took 
every  man  his  four  days'  rations  ;  and  light  wagon- 
trains  bore  supplies  for  eight  days  more.  This  was 
enough,  it  was  thought  (nor  was  the  reckoning  false) 
to  finish  well  the  work  in  hand.  The  greatest  Civil 
War,  as  some  prefer  to  call  it,  the  greatest  Rebellion 
ever  known,  had  drawn  to  its  close.  The  energy  and 
resolution  with  which  General  Grant  had  carried  out 
his  purpose,  unwearied  by  delay,  undaunted  by  failure, 
were  at  last  to  bring  their  full  reward. 

The  movement  began  early  on  the  twenty-ninth 
of  March.  That  evening  the  fifth  and  second  Infantry 
Corps,  under  Warren  and  Humphreys,  got  well  out 
side  the  lines,  and  found  slight  intrenchments  ex- 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  ^ 

tended  by  the  Confederates  into  the  woods  beyond. 
Along  the  front  of  these  they  skirmished,  feeling  their 
way  cautiously.  Sheridan  lay  that  night  at  Diri- 
widdie,  six  miles  further  to  the  west  (or  left),  prepar 
ing  to  start  on  his  distant  expedition  next  day.  Sud 
denly  there  fell  upon  Grant  that  sort  of  inspiration 
which,  in  such  great  events,  precedes  and  presages 
success ;  and  changing  his  first  plan,  he  resolved  to 
turn  his  left  inwards,  and  crush  the  enemy  where 
they  stood.  "  /  now  feel"  he  wrote  that  evening  to 
Sheridan,  "  like  ending  the  matter,  if  it  is  possible  to 
do  so,  before  going  back.  I  do  not  want  you,  there 
fore,  to  cut  loose  and  go  after  the  enemy's  roads  at 
present.  In  the  morning,  push  round  the  enemy,  and 
get  on  to  his  right  rear.  We  will  act  altogether  as 
one  army  here  until  it  is  seen  what  can  be  done  with 
the  enemy." 

Lee  was  neither  surprised  nor  idle.  With  his  usual 
insight,  he  had  discovered  the  Federal  manoeuvre, 
and  drawing  15,000  men  from  the  weak  garrison  of 
Petersburg,  he  moved  to  his  right,  to  try  his  old 
method  of  war  once  more  and  strike  at  the  exposed 
flank  of  the  enemy  while  they  were  yet  extending  it. 
The  thirtieth  of  March  found  his  troops  gathering, 
despite  storms  of  rain  which  that  day  stayed  the  Fed 
eral  march  at  Five  Forks,  important  cross-roads  close 
to  the  Southside  Railroad  and  ten  miles  beyond  the 
Petersburg  lines.  Intrenching  themselves  here,  they 
stood  almost  between  Sheridan  and  the  nearest  corps 
of  Federal  Infantry,  that  of  Warren  :  the  next  morn 
ing  the  blow  fell  on  each.  Warren  was  at  first  sur 
prised  ;  but,  improving  on  the  ordinary  Federal  prac 
tice,  he  had  disposed  his  forces  deeply  in  echelon, 


76  THE  MI  LI  TAR  Y  LIFE 

so  as  to  meet  a  flank  attack  by  mutual  support  ;  and 
being  reinforced  by  part  of  the  corps  of  Humphreys, 
he  finally  regained  his  ground.  The  Confederates, 
retiring  before  him,  now  turned  against  Sheridan  (who 
had  reached  Five  Forks  with  his  advance),  and  drove 
him  roughly  back  upon  Dinwiddie.  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  this  battle  of  the  thirty-first  of  March  was 
indecisive ;  though  Grant's  orders  that  night,  show 
that  he  was  inspired  with  grave  anxiety  about  Sheri 
dan,  and  Warren  was  ordered  to  march  directly  to  his 
quarters,  and  support  him. 

The  morning  of  the  first  of  April  decided  the  cam 
paign.  It  showed  Sheridan  that  the  enemy  had 
retired  on  Five  Forks ;  and  he  followed  them  with  his 
horse,  keeping  Warren's  corps  back,  concealed  from 
observation.  When  arrived  before  the  enemy's 
intrenchments,  a  simple  line  of  breastwork,  without 
flank  protection,  held  by  Pickett's  and  Bushrod  John 
son's  divisions,  he  engaged  their  attention  with  some 
of  his  dismounted  troopers,  and  made  as  though  about 
to  turn  the  right  of  their  works  with  another  division, 
while  Warren's  whole  corps  was  secretly  formed  to 
march  in  upon  their  left.  These  tactics  (for  no  gen 
eral  had  mastered,  like  this  young  American  com 
mander,  the  new  art  of  using,  amid  infantry  manoeuvres, 
his  mounted  riflemen),  succeeded  perfectly.  Warren 
swept  on  in  irresistible  strength  upon  the  astonished 
Confederates,  when  occupied  with  the  attacks  of  Sher 
idan  on  their  front  and  right.  A  panic  seized  them ; 
they  broke;  and  5,000  of  the  defenders  of  Five  Forks 
fell  captives  into  the  victors'  hands. 

Next  day,  Grant  followed  up  vigorously  the  success 
which  his  lieutenant's  energy  had  won,  and  attacked 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  >jj 

the  whole  front  of  the  Petersburg  lines.  The  outer 
defences,  too  weakly  manned  for  serious  resistance, 
fell  at  the  first  assault ;  and  although  Longstreet 
(delayed  until  now  at  his  posts  on  the  other  side  of  the 
River  James  by  a  feint)  arrived  in  time  to  restore  the 
fight,  and  save  the  inner  line  of  works,  it  became  neces 
sary  for  Lee  to  order  the  retreat  at  all  risks  that  night. 
But  the  Federals  were  as  near  as  their  enemies  to  the 
Danville  Railroad,  by  which  alone  could  Lee  hope  to 
feed  his  army  in  that  wasted  region  while  on  his  way 
to  North  Carolina :  and  Grant's  forethought  *had 
already  furnished  the  provisions  necessary  for  a  length 
ened  pursuit,  while  the  Confederate  general  had  no 
nearer  supplies  than  at  Danville,  and  was  uncertain  if 
these  would  reach  him  in  time  to  meet  his  wants  on 
the  retreat.  His  uncertainty  began  to  change  into 
despair  when,  early  on  the  fourth,  after  a  severe  march, 
he  reached  the  railroad  at  the  designated  point,  Ame 
lia  Court-house,  to  find  his  trains  missent  to  Richmond ! 
Meanwhile  his  adversary,  the  general  who  had  long 
since  "  felt  like  ending  the  matter,"  had  now  taken  up 
the  pursuit  with  relentless  vigor,  and  was  not  slow  to 
profit  by  the  disparity  of  supplies.  While  the  starv 
ing  Confederate  columns  were  waiting  for  the  foragers 
sent  out  to  gather  up  a  meal,  Grant  himself  directed 
his  infantry  on  a  line  parallel  to  that  of  Lee  ;  and 
Sheridan,  pushing  impetuously  past  them,  struck  the 
railroad  just  south  of  Amelia,  where  he  was  soon  joined 
by  the  Fifth  Corps,  the  same  which  had  turned  the 
scale  at  Five  Forks,  and  disposed  his  force  so  as  effect 
ually  to  block  the  way. 

Not    even   then    did  the  great    Confederate  com 
mander  yield  to  his  fate.     Twice  he  struck  westward 


^g  THE  MILITARY  LIFE 

with  a  wide  sweep  ;  attempting  to  first  pass  around  the 
enemy  and  gain  the  Danville  line  beyond ;  and  when 
that  hope  failed,  to  win  the  branch  railroad  which  ran 
to  Lynchburg  and  the  mountains.  All  was  in  vain 
against  the  prescience  of  Grant,  the  fire  of  Sheridan, 
the  fatal  odds  they  wielded.  His  famished  troops 
could  bear  the  pressure  of  their  misery  no  more. 
"  Hundreds,"  says  an  eye-witness,  "  dropped  from 
exhaustion,  and  thousands  let  fall  their  muskets  from 
inability  to  carry  them  any  farther."  On  the  ninth, 
the  gaunt  relics  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  were  finally 
brought  to  bay  near  Appomattox  Court-house,  and 
were  surrendered  shortly  afterwards  by  their  beloved 
chief  on  terms  so  liberal,  and  enforced  in  so  delicate  a 
manner,  that  one  knows  not  whether  the  transaction 
reflects  most  credit  on  the  victor  or  the  vanquished. 
When  President  Johnson,  not  long  after,  in  the  first 
vindictive  impulse  of  triumph,  would  have  singled  out 
the  Confederate  hero  and  his  favored  officers  for  trial 
and  vengeance,  General  Grant  showed  no  less  resolu 
tion  in  maintaining  the  capitulation  inviolate  than  he 
had  displayed  in  the  campaign  by  which  he  won  the 
right  to  offer  it.  All  honor  to  the  noble  instinct  which 
saved  the  restored  Union  from  the  crime  her  Chief 
Magistrate  meditated  in  the  newness  of  his  power ! 

It  is  not  within  our  present  purpose  to  show  how 
far  Sherman's  masterly  strategy  had  contributed  to 
the  successful  issue  of  the  struggle.  The  war  was  rec 
ognized  as  practically  finished  from  the  day  when  Lee 
laid  down  his  sword,  and  the  cause  of  the  Union 
needed  that  of  Grant  no  more.  And  soon  the  nation, 
grateful  for  his  services  and  expectant  of  more,  resolved 
to  raise  her  favorite  general  to  a  yet  greater  charge 


OF  GENERAL  GRANT.  fg 

than  that  of  army  or  bureau.  As  in  the  crisis  of  the 
war  the  voice  of  the  North  called  Grant  to  supreme 
command,  so  after  peace  was  won,  it  named  him  as 
the  man  who  best  could  solve  the  difficulties  the  war 
had  bequeathed.  It  is  not  for  us  to  prophesy  the  final 
result.  Great,  though  not  faultless,  as  a  general,  act 
ive  and  successful  in  administrative  office,  the  charac 
ter  of  Grant  as  a  statesman  and  the  effect  of  his 
personal  character  as  President  are  enigmas  which  time 
must  solve.  We  know  that  he  has  steered  so  clear  of 
shoals  of  party  that  the  Republicans  have  charged  him 
with  being  at  heart  a  Democrat,  and  the  Democrats 
abused  him  for  his  gross  Republicanism.  We  have  seen 
that  fulsome  and  inappropriate  praise,  virulent  and  per 
sonal  abuse,  have  failed  to  shake  his  reticence,  or  cause 
him  to  commit  himself  unreservedly  to  the  arms  of  fac 
tion.  Yet  the  task  before  him  needs  more  than  mere 
prudence  and  reserve.  It  demands  high  wisdom  as  well 
as  enduring  resolution,  and  statesmanship  no  less  than 
self-restraint.  To  bind  up  the  wounds  left  by  the  war, 
to  restore  concord  between  the  victorious  and  van 
quished  sections  of  the  Union,  to  insure  real  freedom 
to  the  Southern  negro,  and  full  justice  to  the  South 
ern  white  ;  these  are  indeed  tasks  which  might  tax 
the  powers  of  Washington  himself,  or  a  greater  than 
Washington,  if  such  an  one  could  be  found.  It  would 
seem  as  though  his  friend  and  adviser,  Sherman,  had 
foreseen  coming  events  to  the  letter  when  he  wrote, 
five  years  ago,  on  Grant's  elevation  to  be  Lieutenant- 
General,  the  warning  prophecy  which  we  may  quote 
as  peculiarly  appropriate  now : — "  You  are  now  Wash 
ington's  legitimate  successor,  and  occupy  a  position  of 
almost  dangerous  elevation;  but,  if  you  can  continue, 


go       THE  MILITARY  LIFE  OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 

as  heretofore,  to  be  yourself,  simple,  honest,  and  un 
pretending,  you  will  enjoy  through  life  the  respect 
and  love  of  friends  and  the  homage  of  millions  of 
human  beings,  that  will  award  you  a  large  share  in  secu 
ring  to  them  and  their  descendants  a  government  of 
law  and  stability." 

We  would  hope  that  this  worthy  counsel  of  his 
friend  to  the  commander  may  find  its  full  fruition  in 
the  actions  of  the  President.  We  trust  that  there  was 
a  deep  inner  meaning,  as  well  as  fine  political  tact  and 
generous  sentiment  in  the  words  with  which  General 
Grant  closed  his  brief  acceptance  of  his  first  nomina 
tion  for  the  Presidency,  and  that  generations  of  Amer 
ican  citizens  yet  unborn  may  identify  his  name  with 
the  most  noble  aspiration  a  successful  soldier  could 
utter,  "  LET  us  HAVE  PEACE." 


A   MEMOIR   OF  GENERAL   LEE* 

YEAR  after  year  had  passed  by  since  General 
Grant  first  publicly  sought  the  presidency  of  the  great 
republic  which  owed  so  much  to  his  services  in  war ; 
but  the  peace  which  he  then  made  his  motto  has  not, 
yet  smiled  on  the  reconquered  South.  The  world  from 
outside  the  narrow  sphere  of  American  politics  has 
looked  on  with  surprise  at  the  petty  warfare  against 
individuals  which  succeeded  the  gigantic  contest 
between  Union  and  Secession.  Amnesty  upon  am 
nesty,  ever  repeated,  never  complete,  tells  the  tale  of 
mistrust  still  nourished  on  the  victor's  side,  or  of  party 
intrigue  defeating  national  generosity  in  its  purposes. 
Traveller  after  traveller  through  the  limits  of  the  over 
thrown  Confederacy  brings  back  the  sad  story  of 
ceaseless  dissension  and  widespread  ruin.  Rival  legis 
latures,  born  of  mean  fraud  or  open  violence,  contest 
the  political  supremacy  here.  There  negro  revolt, 
unchecked  by  law,  threatens  summary  vengeance  for 
the  long-endured  wrongs  of  the  slave.  In  other  dis 
tricts  secret  and  bloody  societies  strive  by  illegal  com 
bination  to  prolong  the  rule  which  has  passed  away 
from  the  white.  Everywhere  rises  the  same  story  of 
corrupt  administration  and  finances  involved  to  enrich 
the  mean  adventurers  who  have  swarmed  in  upon  the 
prostrate  states  for  booty,  as  foul  birds  seek  their  prey 

*  A  Life  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee.     By  John  Esten  Cooke. 

6 


g2  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

when  the  carnage  is  over.  The  successful  general, 
raised  to  rule  the  Union  saved  by  the  sword,  who 
had  called  upon  the  nation  that  elected  him  to  join  in 
the  noble  wish,  "Let  us  have  peace,"  found  his  task 
of  political  pacification  more  arduous,  more  thankless, 
and  withal  far  more  prolonged,  than  the  command  of 
the  Union  armies  for  the  overthrow  of  Secession. 

If  to  us  afar  off  this  defeat  of  the  first  hopes  that 
came  with  the  victory  of  the  Union  seems  sad  and 
surprising,  how  must  those  feel  it  who  dwell  near  the 
contending  parties  that  prolong  the  strife,  without 
sharing  their  political  passions  ?  Even  among  those 
that  lend  themselves  to  prolong  the  intolerable  state 
of  things  in  the  reconquered  states,  must  be  many 
who  regret  the  results  bitterly,  while  they  excuse  the 
means  used  by  the  false  reasoning  of  expediency. 
And  doubtless  in  the  Northern  States  there  are  thou 
sands  of  good  men  to  whom  each  phase  of  the  political 
conflict  that  makes  its  market  in  the  strife  of  the  South 
seems  an  unmixed  evil,  which  mars,  in  their  view,  the 
full  freedom  and  growing  greatness  of  the  Union.  But 
all  these  can  look  on  with  comparative  serenity.  For 
how  much  happier  are  such  than  those  whose  lot  has 
been  cast  among  the  storms  that  sweep  over  the  face 
of  what  they  once  dreamed  of  as  an  independent, 
well-governed  republic :  who  have  watched  sorrow 
fully  the  growth  of  the  evils  they  could  not  ward  off 
from  the  states  which  gave  them  birth :  who  had 
offered  their  lives  freely  in  battle  to  save  these  from 
what  they  deemed  oppression,  and  yet,  when  the 
cause  for  which  they  had  fought  fell,  bowed  their 
heads  meekly  before  the  victors'  yoke,  in  hopes  that 
their  submission,  possibly  their  sacrifice,  might  save 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  83 

their  humbler  fellow-citizens  from  ruin  :  who,  when 
called  upon  to  set  the  example  of  prudence,  thought 
it  no  shame  to  ask  pardon  at  the  hands  of  that  gov 
ernment  which  once  their  victories  had  shaken :  who 
urged  the  writers  that  would  extol  the  brief-lived 
glories  of  the  Confederacy  to  "  avoid  all  topics  that 
would  excite  angry  discussion  or  hostile  feeling  :"* 
who  turned  their  faces  steadfastly  away  from  the 
ambitions  and  hopes  of  the  dead  past  to  seek  com 
pensation  for  defeat  and  loss  in  the  steady  perform 
ance  of  humble  daily  duties:  whose  blameless  lives 
and  peaceful  bearing  in  adversity  have  testified  to 
their  love  of  country  more  gloriously  than  deaths  upon 
the  battle-field :  whose  conduct,  in  short,  when  con 
quered,  has  won  involuntary  admiration  from  the 
adversaries  who  once  heaped  curses  upon  their  rebel 
lious  names.  Many  such  there  must  have  been,  vic 
tims  of  fate,  sacrifices  to  political  necessity,  innocent 
expiators,  if  the  truth  be  told,  of  wrongs  done  in  ages 
past  to  helpless  Africans,  among  the  leaders  of  the 
late  Secession.  One  such,  at  least,  all  recognize  in 
Robert  Edward  Lee,  General-in-Chief  of  the  ex-Con 
federate  forces,  better  known  as  the  Commander  of 
the  Army  of  Virginia,  who  passed  away,  after  five 
years'  endurance  of  his  altered  position,  without  the 
sign  of  ailment  outwardly,  without  a  word  of  pain, 
that  great  heart  which  repined  not  for  his  own  loss  of 
dignity  or  of  ancestral  fortune,  giving  way  at  last 
under  the  continued  pressure  of  the  ruin  and  degra 
dation  of  the  beloved  state  to  the  freedom  of  which 
the  prospects  of  his  whole  life  had  been  sacrificed. 

*  General  Lee's  words  to  an  author  undertaking  to  write  the  life  of 
"  Stonewall "  Jackson. 


34  ^  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

While  he  lived,  General  Lee  never  ceased  to  con 
template  (as  we  know  from  his  private  correspondence 
with  ourselves)  giving  a  record  of  his  own  career  to 
the  world.  But  the  time  never  came  when  in  his 
judgment  this  could  be  honestly  and  fully  done  with 
out  stirring  up  the  bitter  feelings  he  would  have 
sacrificed  all  he  could  give  to  allay.  Now  that  he  has 
passed  away,  others  cannot  be  so  reticent.  And  Mr. 
Cooke  has  produced  a  life  of  the  dead  hero,  which,  if 
wanting  in  many  particulars,  is  more  so  perhaps  from 
the  greatness  of  the  subject  than  from  the  imperfec 
tions  and  partiality  of  the  writer.  A  large  part  of  his 
volume  is,  of  course,  directed  to  those  campaigns 
which  have  placed  the  name  of  Lee  in  the  very  fore 
most  rank  of  the  world's  great  commanders.  These, 
however,  have  long  been  treated  of  and  studied  in 
England  in  their  general  outlines.  They  were  known 
and  admired  here  before  the  American  public  could 
bear  a  critical  recital  of  the  defeats  of  the  Union 
generals.  Be  it  our  present  task  rather  to  speak  of 
those  portions  of  Lee's  eventful  life  which  are  less 
known  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic :  what  sacrifices  he 
made  when  he  cast  in  his  lot  with  the  South :  how, 
brought  into  command  by  an  accident,  his  first  stroke 
raised  him  to  the  eminence  he  never  lost :  how  he  fell, 
carrying  in  his  fall  the  tottering  Confederacy  which 
had  ceased  to  hope  in  any  other  name :  how  he  bore 
himself  in  his  retirement,  when  vanquished  by  fate, 
yet  crowned  with  undying  fame,  he  rivalled  in  patience 
the  patriarch  of  Uz,  and  waited  in  sad  watch  over 
surrounding  ruin  through  his  appointed  time  for  the 
change  which  he  longed  for  but  would  not  anticipate. 
Some  eulogist,  worthy  of  the  grandeur  of  the  theme, 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  8$ 

will,  we  hope,  arise  hereafter.  But  it  is  time  that  at 
least  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  do  justice  to  the 
virtue  and  patriotism  of  the  man,  known  hitherto  to 
Englishmen  chiefly  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  modern 
generals. 

When  the  American  colonies,  finding  remonstrance 
vain,  rose  in  arms  against  the  overbearing  policy  of 
the  mother  country,  the  descendants  of  the  Cavalier 
families  which  had  transplanted  to  Virginia  the  loyal 
traditions  and  sentiments  of  the  King's  party  in  the 
Civil  War,  were  to  a  man  found  foremost  among  the 
defenders  of  local  independence.  How  this  apparent 
contradiction  came  about  it  is  not  here  pretended  to 
explain.  But  it  is  certain  that  the  so-called  Royalists 
of  1776  were  for  the  most  part  very  recent  immigrants. 
Those  of  their  fellow-citizens  whose  interests  were 
fairly  bound  up  by  long  association  and  descent  with 
the  fortunes  of  the  rising  colonies,  espoused  almost 
without  exception  the  cause  of  the  latter,  no  matter 
how  earnest  their  loyalty  had  been  in  theory  before. 
And  it  is  of  itself  enough  to  condemn  the  measures 
of  King  George  and  his  Ministers  that  they  should 
have  alienated  from  the  very  outset  of  the  struggle 
the  class  whose  natural  sentiments  would  have  been 
on  the  side  of  loyalty,  had  there  been  fair  room  left 
for  them  to  doubt.  One  member  of  this  aristocracy 
of  Virginia,  then  a  youth  of  twenty,  was  Henry  Lee, 
a  direct  descendant  of  Richard  Lee  of  Stratford 
Laughton  in  Essex,  who  had  been  an  ardent  Cavalier 
in  the  Revolution,  and  one  of  many  supporters  of  the 
falling  cause  of  the  Monarchy  whom  fear  of  political 
persecution  after  the  overthrow  of  the  Royalists,  or 


86  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

disgust  at  the  then  triumphant  Puritan  Government, 
had  driven  to  hasty  emigration.  Settling  in  Virginia 
with  considerable  means,  Richard  Lee  had  built  what 
was  an  exact  reproduction  of  the  old  manor-house  of 
a  country  gentleman  in  the  east  of  England,  acquired 
gradually  a  large  estate,  and  maintained,  so  far  as 
possible,  the  dignity  of  a  rich  esquire  of  the  old  coun 
try.  For  those  were  days  when  the  abolition  of 
primogeniture  had  not  been  introduced  into  America  ; 
and  settlers  of  Richard  Lee's  rank  and  fortune  seem 
to  have  looked  confidently  forward  to  a  continuance 
in  the  new  country  of  all  the  privileges  and  enjoy 
ments  possessed  by  their  class  in  Great  Britain.  A 
great  English  writer,  who  has  made  the  "  Virginians" 
of  the  last  century  the  subject  of  one  of  his  most 
skilful  and  touching  fictions,  had  in  view  precisely 
such  a  family,  by  race  and  tradition,  as  that  from 
which  General  Lee  was  descended :  and  if  his  hero 
had  left  descendants  to  our  own  times,  they  would 
have  played  the  same  part  as  the  illustrious  represen 
tative  of  this  other  Virginian  race. 

In  the  manor-house  of  the  Lees  once  burnt,  but 
soon  rebuilt  on  the  same  spacious  lines,  the  family 
were  still  living  more  than  a  century  later,  when  young 
Henry  Lee,  just  graduated  at  Princeton  College,  came 
forward  to  offer  his  services  in  the  Revolutionary  army, 
and  received  a  commission  from  the  Congress  as  cap 
tain  of  horse.  From  the  very  first  he  displayed  mili 
tary  talent  of  a  high  order,  and  became  before  long 
the  most  noted  leader  of  his  army  for  dashing  enter 
prise  in  separate  command.  A  special  gold  medal  was 
awarded  him  by  Congress  for  his  capture  of  the  fort 
at  Paulus's  Hook,  and  in  1781  he  was  sent  to  command 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  g/ 

the  cavalry  of  the  Republican  forces  in  the  Carolinas 
under  General  Greene,  there  matched  against  Corn- 
wallis.  That  Greene  failed  on  the  whole  in  his  en 
counter  is  well  known.  He  was  in  fact  in  a  position 
of  inferiority,  until  Cornwallis  left  the  South  for  Pe 
tersburg  and  the  Richmond  peninsula,  in  the  vain 
hope  of  effecting  the  decisive  junction  with  the  forces 
of  Clinton,  which  the  timidity  or  insufficient  resources 
of  his  Commander-in-Chief  never  allowed  to  be  ac 
complished.  Greene,  however,  though  defeated, 
never  ceased  to  hold  his  own  stoutly  against  Corn 
wallis  for  the  time,  and  afterwards  recovered  the  Car 
olinas  fully  for  Congress  :  and  his  successes  were  due 
in  great  part  to  the  talents  and  energy  of  his  young 
cavalry  commander.  General  Henry  Lee  had  a 
worthy  opponent  in  Colonel  Tarleton,  a  cavalry  offi 
cer  of  no  mean  merit  in  light  warfare.  But  the  repub 
lican  cavalier  established  his  superiority  very  fully  in 
the  series  of  skirmishes  that  ensued.  And  although, 
in  his  own  Memoir  of  the  War,  he  has  the  modesty  to 
attribute  his  own  successes  over  Tarleton  to  his  su 
periority  in  horse-flesh,  readers  of  his  interesting 
work  may  discern  for  themselves  that  his  own  skill 
and  judgment  were  the  prime  causes  of  the  advantage, 
and  will  be  disposed  to  agree  to  the  full  with  General 
Greene,  who  wrote  in  his  personal  thanks,  "  No  man, 
in  the  progress  of  the  campaign,  had  equal  merit  with 
yourself;"  an  expression  of  strong  meaning  coming 
from  a  plain,  blunt  soldier  of  honest  character.  And 
this  praise  was  fully  confirmed  by  Washington's  own 
words  of  "  love  and  thanks,"  in  a  letter  of  later  date, 
written  long  after  enough  to  show  how  strong  in  that 
great  man's  mind  was  the  memory  of  the  services  of 


88  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

"  Light-horse  Harry,"  as  his  contemporaries  familiarly 
called  General  Henry  Lee. 

Retiring  from  command,  when  the  close  of  the 
war  turned  the  swords  of  revolutionary  generals  into 
ploughshares,  Henry  Lee  married  his  second  cousin, 
Matilda  Lee,  heiress  of  the  old  family  estate  of  Strat 
ford,  and  thus  coming,  as  it  were,  into  the  place  of  the 
head  of  the  family,  gave  himself  up  to  local  political 
life.  Alternately  governor  of  his  native  state  of  Vir 
ginia,  and  her  representative  in  Congress,  he  yet  found 
leisure  to  write  the  really  thoughtful  and  accurate  ac 
count  of  his  Southern  campaigns  already  referred  to, 
as  well  as  to  indulge  largely  in  the  open-handed  hos 
pitality  which  was  the  tradition  of  the  family,  and 
which  in  his  case  was  carried  so  far  as  to  impoverish 
his  estate.  His  cousin  did  not  long  survive  their 
union  ;  but  a  subsequent  marriage  gave  him  three 
sons,  the  second  of  whom,  Robert  Edward,  became 
the  renowned  general,  whose  fame  has  almost  caused 
that  of  his  father's  reputation  for  warlike  prowess  to 
be  forgotten.  He  was  born  on  January  nineteenth, 
1807,  in  the  same  room  where  Richard  Henry  Lee, 
his  father's  cousin,  first  saw  the  light,  the  orator  to 
whose  charge  was  intrusted  the  moving  of  the  Declar 
ation  of  Independence,  and  one  of  the  leading  mem 
bers  of  the  original  Congress  which  voted  it. 

"  Robert  was  always  good,"  wrote  his  father  some 
ten  years  later  to  a  relative,  in  a  description  of  his 
young  family.  The  boy  was  then  growing  up  in  a 
healthy  out-of-door  life,  taught  to  ride  almost  from  his' 
infancy,  and  enjoying  the  constant  good  health  which 
a  serene  conscience  and  temp  era  teJ^fl|H^M^d  to 
him  until  the  close  of  a  long  life. 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


89 


of  his  later  boyhood  the  family  lived  in  the  town  of 
Alexandria,  where  there  were  facilities  for  education 
not  attainable  in  the  country,  and  here,  after  General 
Henry  Lee's  death,  his  widow  remained  for  the  same 
reason.  Before  arriving  at  manhood,  Robert  Lee  had 
avowed  his  earnest  desire  to  follow  the  military  pro 
fession  in  which  his  father  had  been  so  distinguished. 
The  services  of  the  latter  were  too  conspicuous  to 
make  it  difficult  to  procure  an  appointment  to  West 
Point  for  his  son;  and  in  1825  he  entered  the  Military 
Academy  for  that  long  and  complete  course  of  study 
by  which  it  is  aimed  in  the  United  States  to  fit  the 
future  officer,  not  as  with  us  for  one,  but  for  every 
branch  of  the  service.  Young  Lee  was  as  remarkable 
here  as  through  the  rest  of  his  career  for  the  blameless 
simplicity  of  his  life  and  his  devotion  to  the  duties  of 
the  hour.  No  entry  was  recorded  against  him  in  the 
defaulters'  book  during  his  four  years'  residence,  and 
when  his  class  graduated  in  1829,  he  took  the  second 
place,  and  was  appointed  to  the  Engineers,  a  small 
corps  regarded  as  the  elite  of  a  highly  trained  service. 
His  manly  form,  great  personal  beauty,  and  sweetness 
of  manner  were  noted  then  ;  and  in  the  young  lieuten 
ant's  carriage  and  appearance  were  the  pledge  of  the 
noble  presence  and  calm  bearing  which  won  the  instant 
confidence  of  the  high-spirited  but  wilful  troops  of  the 
Confederacy,  almost  from  the  first  sight  of  their  new 
commander  thirty  years  later.  Three  years  after  being 
commissioned,  he  became  the  fortunate  suitor  of  Mary 
Custis,  the  daughter  and  heiress  of  George  Custis, 
Washington's  adopted  son.  By  his  marriage  with  her 
he  came  into  possession  of  the  hereditary  estates  of 
the  founder  of  American  liberty,  and  was  the  nearest 


go  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

representative  before  the  world  of  that  great  man's 
family.  This  fact,  as  well  as  the  traditions  of  his  own 
family,  should  be  distinctly  borne  in  mind  by  those 
who  would  understand  fully  his  painful  position  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War. 

Seventeen  years  of  peace  service  passed  by,  and 
Captain  Lee  had  hitherto  found  no  special  opportu 
nity  of  distinction.  In  1846,  however,  the  Mexican 
War  began,  and  his  character  and  attainments  were  so 
well  known  as  to  cause  him  to  be  selected  as  Chief 
Engineer  to  the  army  under  General  Scott,  in  which 
capacity  he  served  through  the  first  campaign  that  any 
American  officer  of  his  standing  shared  in.  It  is  not 
our  purpose  here  to  enter  into  the  details  of  General 
Scott's  difficulties  and  successes.  Suffice  it  to  say  that 
from  first  to  last  Lee  fully  justified  the  choice  which 
had  been  made  of  him  for  his  post,  and  was  mentioned 
in  almost  every  important  report.  "  Indefatigable  in 
the  siege  operations,  in  reconnoissances  as  daring  as 
laborious,  and  of  the  utmost  value  everywhere,"  was 
the  character  he  earned  in  his  commander's  dispatches. 
Three  times  specially  breveted  for  his  services,  he 
returned  to  his  own  country  after  the  close  of  hos 
tilities,  acknowledged  as  one  of  the  most  promising  of 
her  officers,  and  possessing  the  confidence  of  his  chief  be 
yond  any  other  of  the  many  distinguished  men  who  had 
served  with  him.  From  duty  on  the  defences,  or  as 
Superintendent  of  West  Point,  Lee  soon  passed  again 
to  a  service  which  had  more  promise  of  adventure.  In 
a  fit  of  sudden  liberality  the  Congress  in  1855  voted 
two  regiments  of  cavalry  to  be  added  to  the  permanent 
establishment  of  the  army.  Energetic  officers  of  all 
branches  naturally  sought  commissions  in  the  new 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  gi 

corps,  which  were  specially  designed  for  active  frontier 
duty  ;  and  Lee,  being  among  the  number  applying  for 
transfer,  became  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Second 
Cavalry,  in  which  he  found  among  his  comrades  Albert 
Johnston,  whose  death  lost  the  Confederates  their 
advantage  at  Shiloh,  and,  it  has  been  declared,  saved 
Grant's  army  from  ruin ;  Thomas  and  Stoneman,  in 
after  days  leading  generals  on  the  Northern  side  ;  with 
Hardee,  Van  Dorn,  and  Hood,  who  were  equally  \vell 
known  on  that  of  the  South.  The  regiment  was 
ordered  to  Texas,  where  Lee  spent  the  four  years  fol 
lowing  in  guarding  the  new  frontier  of  the  Republic. 

The  next  event  of  Lee's  life  brought  him  promi 
nently  into  collision  with  the  stormy  elements  already 
brewing  to  burst  later  in  civil  war.  He  chanced  to  be 
on  leave  at  Washington  in  the  autumn  of  1859,  being 
then  on  a  visit  to  his  family  at  Arlington,  his  seat  close 
by,  when  he  was  sent  for  very  suddenly  by  President 
Buchanan.  A  gang  of  desperadoes,  he  learnt,  under 
one  John  Brown,  had  attacked  and  taken  the  military 
depot  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  declared  their  intention 
of  raising  a  servile  war  against  the  slaveowners  of  Vir 
ginia.  To  proceed  there  with  the  party  of  marines 
placed  at  his  disposal,  attack  the  rioters  in  the  build 
ing  they  had  fortified,  and  give  them  over,  when  pres 
ently  captured,  to  the  civil  authorities  of  Virginia,  was 
a  duty  executed  with  such  completeness  and  prompti 
tude  as  the  service  called  for.  But  far-seeing  and 
sagacious  as  Lee  was,  he  probably,  as  little  as  any  man 
in  the  states,  could  foretell  that  the  small  cloud  thus 
easily  dispersed  was  but  the  forerunner  of  a  tempest 
of  civil  war  of  more  terrible  extent  and  fury  than  the 
world  had  ever  witnessed.  He  was  again  in  Texas, 


^2  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

commanding  his  department,  when  the  storm  was 
gathering  rapidly  after  the  election  of  Lincoln  in  1860  ; 
and  early  in  the  following  spring  he  was  recalled  to 
headquarters  by  General  Scott,  under  whose  com 
mand  were  the  modest  forces  which  formed  the  whole 
army  of  the  now  threatened  Union. 

Men's  minds  were  on  all  sides  growing  fevered  as 
the  coming  struggle  revealed  its  inevitable  shape  more 
certainly.  To  none  was  it  more  vital  and  terrible 
than  to  the  sons  of  Virginia,  a  state  in  which  the  sen 
timent  of  pride  in  the  growing  greatness  of  the  Union 
balanced  her  natural  inclination  to  side  with  her  more 
forward  and  passionate  sisters  of  the  South.  Border 
ing  too  on  the  capital  of  the  country  and  the  North 
ern  states  behind  it,  interest,  as  well  as  a  loyal  repug 
nance  to  break  up  the  republic,  united  to  arrest  her 
tendency  to  follow  the  example  of  South  Carolina, 
which  had  seceded  in  December.  But  when  Lincoln 
issued  his  decisive  proclamation,  pronouncing  secession 
to  be  open  rebellion,  and  calling  on  each  state  which 
had  not  departed  from  the  Union  to  send  its  contin 
gent  to  repress  the  contemplated  crime,  an  absolute 
choice  could  no  longer  be  deferred.  Virginia  must 
fight  either  with  or  against  the  South.  She  chose  the 
former  alternative,  as  that  which,  if  the  more  immedi 
ately  dangerous,  was  the  more  certain  to  carry  the 
sympathies  of  her  people.  On  the  seventeenth  of 
April  her  Ordinance  of  Secession  was  passed,  and  her 
lot  for  the  future  cast  .by  this  measure  with  the  new 
Confederacy. 

To  none  of  her  children  was  the  crisis  a  severer 
trial  than  it  was  to  Colonel  Lee.  On  the  one  hand 
were  the  traditions  of  his  family,  whose  whole  career 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


93 


from  the  time  of  its  establishment  in  Virginia  had 
been  identified  with  the  honor  and  progress  of  the 
state.  She  was  his  country  proper  in  his  eyes,  having 
been  originally  an  independent  colony,  and  only  by 
her  own  act  long  afterwards  leagued  with  other  inde 
pendent  colonies  into  a  Federation  for  the  mainte 
nance  of  common  rights  and  liberties.  Brought  up  in 
this  faith,  he  could  not  view  any  other  claim  as  more 
than  subordinate  to  that  of  his  native  state. 

On  the  other  hand,  his  professional  interests — we 

lay  stress  on  this  fact,  because  it  has  been   hitherto 

unrecognized    in    England — were    absolutely    on    the 

Union,  since  termed  the  Northern  side.     Distinguish- 

i  ed    by  position  and  pedigree  above  all  those  of  his 

i  standing   in  the  service  he  had  chosen,  beloved  and 

o 

blameless  in  his  private  life,  he  had  been  recognized 
by  all  as  one  of  the  ablest  of  the  country's  officers  du- 
ring  the  Mexican  War;  and  what  was  more  impor- 
j  tant  than  all,  he  had  impressed  his  genius  for  war  so 
j  strongly  on  General  Scott,  that  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  conscious  of  his  own  growing  infirmities,  did 
not  hesitate  to  announce  his  intention  to  propose  Lee 
as  his  successor  in  his  now  weighty  charge.  A  warm 
personal  regard  for  his  junior  made  the  aged  general 
all  the  more  anxious  not  to  lose  his  services.  He 
recommended  him,  therefore,  on  his  arrival  at  Wash 
ington  for  the  first  vacancy  as  brigadier-general  in  the 
regular  army.  And  although  there  is  no  record  of  the 
personal  conversation  which  ensued  when  the  con 
queror  of  Mexico  and  his  trusted  staff-officer  were 
closeted  together  in  that  eventful  April,  we  may  be 
sure  that  no  argument  or  appeal  was  left  unused  which 
could  avail  to  save  the  Union  the  loss  of  Lee's  servi- 


94  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

ces.  Up  to  the  last  hour  before  the  die  was  cast  by 
the  state  Legislature  at  Richmond,  Lee  probably 
hoped  that  its  decision  might  be  stayed,  and  his  own 
rendered  unnecessary.  But  when  certain  news  came 
that  Secession  was  accomplished,  and  he  must  choose 
between  the  flag  he  honored  and  the  state  he  loved, 
he  decided  that  the  latter  claimed  his  first  allegiance, 
and  he  could  no  longer  delay  what  he  believed  to  be 
his  painful  duty.  His  last  sad  interview  with  his  old 
chief  took  place  the  following  day,  and  found  his  res 
olution  fixed  unalterably.  On  the  twentieth  he  sent 
in  his  official  resignation  of  his  commission,  and  apolo 
gised  for  the  two  days'  delay  by  saying : 

"  It  would  have  been  presented  at  once  but  for  the  strug 
gle  it  has  cost  me  to  separate  myself  from  a  service  to  which 
I  have  devoted  all  the  best  years  of  my  life  and  all  the 
ability  I  possessed.  During  the  whole  of  that  time — more 
than  a  quarter  of  a  century — I  have  experienced  nothing 
but  kindness  from  my  superiors  and  the  most  cordial  friend 
ship  from  my  comrades.  To  no  one,  General,  have  I  been 
as  much  indebted  as  yourself.  .  .  .  Save  in  defence  of  my 
native  state,  I  never  again  desire  to  draw  my  sword." 

Writing  to  his  sister  the  same  day,  he  lays  bare 
his  feelings  with  a  candor  which  even  those  who  least 
approve  his  decision  must  honor.  No  doubt  his  words 
express  generally  the  feelings  of  many  others  less 
gifted  with  the  power  of  expression  ;  and  in  these 
days,  when  State  independence  has  been  swept  away 
by  the  keen  arbitrament  of  the  sword,  it  is  well  to 
recall  what  was  thought  on  the  subject  at  that  time 
by  one  of  the  most  pure-minded  and  unselfish  of  those 
who  were  forced  to  choose : 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


95 


"  The  whole  South"  [he  writes]  "  is  in  a  state  of  revolution, 
into  which  Virginia,  after  a  long  struggle,  has  been  drawn ; 
and  though  I  recognize  no  necessity  for  this  state  of  things, 
and  would  have  forborne  and  pleaded  to  the  end  for  the  re 
dress  of  grievances,  real  or  supposed,  yet  in  my  own  person 
I  had  to  meet  the  question  whether  I  should  take  part 
against  my  native  state.  With  all  my  devotion  to  the  Union 
and  the  feeling  of  loyalty  and  duty  of  an  American  citizen,  I 
have  not  been  able  to  make  up  my  mind  to  raise  my  hand 
against  my  relatives,  my  children,  my  home.  I  have  there 
fore  resigned  my  commission  in  the  army." 

He  adds  here  the  same  expression  of  his  hope, 
before  quoted,  that  he  may  not  be  called  upon  to 
serve  save  in  defence  of  his  own  state  :  but  Virginia's 

o 

fortunes  were  now  to  be  -bound  up  for  weal  or  woe 
with  those  of  the  Confederacy  that  she  was  about  to 
join. 

The  very    mansion  of   Arlington   from   which  he 

j  wrote  these  letters  was  his  first  sacrifice  to  his  decision. 
Situated  as  it  was  in  sight  of  the  capital,  it  must  needs 
be  abandoned,  with  the  fine  estate  on  which  it  stood. 
Perhaps  in  quitting  it  and  leaving  its  contents  intact, 

i  he  may  have  vainly  hoped  that  the  venerated  relics 
of  Washington  with  which  it  was  crowded  might  save 
it  from  spoliation.  But  personal  losses  could  weigh 
nothing  with  such  a  soul  as  his  ;  and  leaving  to  its 
fate  of  almost  certain  occupation  by  the  first  advance 
guard  of  the  Union  army  that  house  in  which  he  had 
spent  the  happiest  hours  of  his  life,  he  set  out  for 
Richmond.  Ere,  however,  he  had  reached  the  capi 
tal  of  this  state,  soon  to  become  that  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  he  had  been  appointed  Major-General  of  all 
the  Virginian  forces  by  the  spontaneous  choice  of  the 


g6  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

governor  and  legislature,  and  on  the  twenty-third 
he  was  publicly  received  in  his  new  capacity  at  Rich 
mond.  He  accepted  the  trust  conferred  on  him 
in  a  few  simple  and  dignified  words,  again  expressing 
it  to  be  his  sole  desire  to  defend  his  native  state. 
There  was  general  joy,  the  American  biographer 
states  ;  for  it  had  been  feared  that  he  would  adhere 
to  the  Federal  Government,  and  Virginia  would  have 
looked  upon  his  loss  as  a  public  calamity. 

He  was  now,  though  fifty-three  years  of  age,  still 
remarkable  for  the  manly  beauty  of  his  face  and  form, 
as  well  as  for  his  singular  temperance  and  the  calm 
ness  of  his  manner: 

"  Grave,  silent,  with  a  military  composure  of  bearing  that 
amounted  at  times  to  stiffness,"  says  Mr.  Cooke.  And  he 
adds  that  although  then  "  looked  upon  by  those  who  held  in 
tercourse  with  him  as  a  personage  of  marked  reserve,  the 
truth  and  frankness  of  the  man,  under  all  circumstances,  and 
his  great,  warm  heart,  full  of  honesty  and  unassuming  sim 
plicity,  became  known  only  in  the  course  of  the  war." 

No  doubt  General  Lee  felt  at  that  time  the 
weight  of  his  responsibilities  and  the  serious  character 
of  his  decision,  and  possibly  he  discouraged  the  frivo 
lous  conversation  in  which  the  excitement  of  lesser 
men  would  naturally  vent  itself  at  such  a  crisis.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  it  is  clear  that  the  innocent  gayety  of 
heart  for  which  in  earlier  years  he  had  been  noted  had 
disappeared  under  the  weight  of  official  duties,  or  was 
banished  by  the  gravity  of  his  new  charge  ;  for  this  in 
cluded  the  whole  supply  and  training  of  the  state  forces, 
which  were  collecting  in  large  numbers,  and  gave  him 
incessant  employment.  But  the  defence  of  Virginia 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


97 


soon  became  merged  in  that  of  the  Confederacy  which 
she  joined  formally  in  May.     Her  capital  was  declared 
the    capital   of  the  South.     The    Southern    Congress 
,  soon  met  there.     New  men  pressed  in  to  take  the  lead 
I  in  the  affairs  of  what  claimed  to  be  a  nation,  and  for  a 
time,  General  Lee  was  relegated  to  duties  of  a  second 
ary   order,    the    late   period    at  which   his  state  had 
!  declared  for  the  Confederacy,  having  put  others  already 
into  the  chief  military  posts.     His  immediate  charge 
i  for  the  present  became  that   of  fortifying  Richmond. 
It  is  natural  enough   that  the  works  he  raised  should 
i  have  extorted  admiration  from  the  Northern  generals 
I  whom  they  so  long  defied  ;  but  their  best  eulogy  is 
I  contained  in  the  simple  fact  that  though  often  threat 
ened  they  were  never  seriously  attacked.     From  the 
time  that  he  thus  girdled  Richmond  with  the  full  re 
sources  of  the  engineer's  art,  aided  by  the  use  of  that 
"  eye  for  positions  "  for  which  he  had  been  admired  in 
Mexico,  the  capital  was  destined  to  fall  only  with  the 
Confederacy  itself.     To  other  commanders,  however, 
Davis  had  been  compelled  by  the  political  situation  to 
assign  the  first  honors  of  the  defence  of  the  South. 

While  the  fortifying  of  Richmond  went  on,  the 
battle  of  Bull's  Run,  the  first  great  encounter  of  the 
war,  was  fought  and  won  by  Beauregard,  aided  by 
Johnston,  who  had  marched  to  join  him  from  the  Shen- 
andoah  Valley.  Though  this  event  concerns  us  little 
here,  it  is  right  to  say  that  the  surprise  of  the  Confed 
erates  on  their  flank  was  a  real  one,  and  their  defeat 
at  one  time  very  near,  being  only  averted  by  the  su 
periority  in  steadiness  of  Jackson's  troops  to  their  com 
rades.  And  as  we  laughed  so  loud  and  long  at  the 
behavior  of  the  raw  militia  of  M'Dowell  when  once  in 
7 


98 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


retreat,  it  is  well  to  add  that  there  is  not  the  least 
reason  to  believe,  judging  from  the  testimony  of 
Southern  officers,  that  their  men  would  have  behaved 
one  whit  better  had  the  reverse  been  on  their  side. 
More  than  this.  Those  among  ourselves  who  know 
most  of  war  are  agreed  that,  however  highly  one  may 
think  of  the  spirit  of  the  levies  we  call  our  Auxiliary 
forces,  there  is  no  ground  whatever,  beyond  a  vulgar 
national  vanity,  for  the  common  belief  that  a  mass  of 
these,  once  beaten  and  panic-stricken,  would  show 
conduct  very  different  from  that  of  M'Dowell's  volun 
teers  in  1861,  or  of  the  Mobiles  of  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  ten  years  later.  "  Nations  deceive  themselves 
very  much  in  this  matter  of  their  untrained  troops," 
was  the  remark  made  to  the  present  writer  by  the 
chief  of  the  Swiss  army  ;  one  composed  wholly  of  mi 
litiamen.  And  what  is  true  of  Frenchmen,  of  Swiss, 
and  of  our  own  kith  and  kin  in  America,  would  hardly 
be  greatly  falsified  if  misfortune  fell  upon  ourselves. 
Whatever  may  be  thought  of  this  deduction,  certainly 
nothing  could  be  more  mistaken  than  the  judgment 
hastily  passed  by  our  press  on  the  conduct  of 
M'Dowell's  raw  troops,  sent  as  they  were  into  the 
field  untrained,  and  through  the  ignorance  of  Congress 
left  unfurnished  even  with  the  semblance  of  a  staff. 
Nor  was  the  general  result  of  the  battle  at  all  as  fa- 
vorable  to  the  Confederacy  as  was  then  supposed.  For, 
in  fact,  the  Northern  army  had  been  hitherto  com 
posed  only  of  three-months'  volunteers  ;  and  though 
not  in  proper  fighting  order,  it  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary  to  employ  them,  before  they  dispersed  to  their 
homes,  in  checking  the  hostile  forces  which  had  gath 
ered  to  threaten  Washington.  And  although  com- 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE 


99 


pletely  defeated  in  his  attack,  M'Dowell  yet  left  his 
enemy  so  shattered  as  to  be  not  only  quite  incapable 
of  an  advance  upon  the  capital  of  the  Union,  but  ac 
cording  to  the  confession  of  the  best  Southern  officers, 
unfit  for  some  time  later  for  any  serious  operations. 
Brave  as  the  Confederates  individually  were,  there  was 
not  at  this  time  any  real  power  of  discipline  in  their 
commanders'  hands  which  could  enable  the  latter  to 
reap  the  fruits  of  victory.  And  what  is  more  surpris 
ing,  the  best  generals  never  wholly  established  this 
moral  forceover  them.  But  discipline  on  the  other  side, 
though  far  from  being  ever  brought  up  to  the  stricter 
European  standard,  was  certainly  improved  during  the 
war  ;  and  to  this  difference,  hardly  less  than  to  the  grea 
ter  resources  of  the  Northher  final  triumph  was  due. 
Poor  as  the  military  results  of  the  battle  of  Bull's 
Run  were,  and  serious  as  its  political  effects  proved  in 
rousing  the  North  and  her  leaders  to  real  earnestness, 
it  naturally  caused  great  rejoicing  for  the  hour  at 
Richmond.  Johnston,  who  from  the  time  of  his  arri 
val  was  the  senior  officer  on  the  ground,  was  confirmed 
in  his  command  of  the  whole  army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  and  Lee  still  remained  at  the  capital  completing 
its  defences.  But  attention  was  soon  directed  to 
Western  Virginia,  the  part  of  the  state  beyond  the 
Alleghanies,  which  had  from  the  first  showed  its  Union 
sympathies.  Into  this  M'Clellan,  a  hitherto  unknown 
Federal  officer,  had  been  pushed  from  Pennsylvania. 
By  July  his  forces  were  augmented  to  20,000  men, 
giving  him  a  large  numerical  superiority  over  the  Con 
federate  troops  of  Garnett,  who  attempted  to  hold  it 
against  him.  In  a  series  of  skirmishes  which  followed, 
M'Clellan  and  his  active  lieutenant  Rosecrans  routed 


I00  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

the  Confederates,  killing  their  general.  The  officers 
who  succeeded  to  the  latter,  meeting  with  further 
disasters,  began  to  quarrel  among  themselves.  On 
this  the  Southern  President  dispatched  General  Lee 
to  the  scene  of  action  with  reinforcements,  and  in 
structions  to  bring  into  one  common  plan  the  move 
ments  along  the  scattered  lines  held  by  the  Confed 
erates,  but  with  no  orders  to  take  the  command,which 
he  never  did  officially,  though  for  a  short  time  direct 
ing  the  operations.  The  only  active  part  of  these,  an 
attempt  to  carry  a  strong  position  held  at  Cheat 
Mountain  by  General  Reynolds,  failed  entirely,  owing, 
(as  we  have  gathered  from  direct  personal  information,) 
even  more  to  the  misconduct  of  a  subordinate  com 
mander  than  to  the  ill  discipline  of  the  disheartened 
troops.  Lee  himself  left  on  record  a  full  explanation 
of  the  circumstances,  but  with  the  express  understand 
ing  that  it  should  not  be  made  public  during  the  war; 
and  as  this  confidential  report  perished  in  the  fire  at 
Richmond,  all  that  can  now  be  known  is  from  the 
remark  he  made  to  a  would-be  critic  soon  after. 
"  When  you  read  the  story  by-and-bye,  you  will  be  as 
much  surprised  as  any  one."  After  this  affair,  Lee, 
deciding  that  he  had  no  forces  that  would  justify 
offensive  operations  against  a  superior  enemy  to  whom 
the  feeling  of  the  country  had  proved  favorable,  re 
mained  strictly  on  the  defensive,  and  confined  his 
efforts  to  restricting,  as  far  as  possible,  the  movements 
of  Rosecrans,  who  had  succeeded  M'Clellan.  Winter 
now  came  on,  and  in  that  high  region  fairly  stopped 
all  serious  operations.  But  the  failure  before  Cheat 
Mountain,  where  Lee's  plans  had  apparently  proved 
too  elaborate  for  such  raw  materials,  and  his  subse- 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENEtlAL"L£E. 


ior 


quent  apparent  inaction,  were  little  calculated  to  raise 
the  general's  reputation.  When  he  left  in  the  winter, 
by  Jefferson  Davis's  orders,  to  put  the  defences  of 
the  Carolinas  in  order,  he  was  spoken  of  in  his  new 
command  as  "  a  Virginia  failure/'  his  name  being  as 
unduly  depreciated  as  that  of  M'Clellan  was  exalted. 
For  that  officer's  early  success  in  Western  Virginia 
had  shed  a  gleam  of  light  over  the  North  in  its  humil 
iation.  It  caused  his  instant  selection  as  Commander- 
in-Chief  when  Scott  resigned  the  post  he  had  hitherto 
retained.  And  while  Washington  politicians  spoke 
of  M'Clellan  as  the  young  Napoleon  of  the  Union, 
the  critics  of  Richmond  and  Charleston  poured  forth 
their  strictures  on  General  Lee  as  an  over-refining 
strategist,  too  subtle  for  practical  warfare,  and  de 
clared  him  the  only  mistaken  choice  among  their 
commanders ;  judgments  which  were  destined  to  be 
singularly  reversed  a 'few  months  later.  And  even 
while  they  were  being  made,  the  presence  of  the 
latter  in  Carolina  sufficed  to  bring  back  confidence  to 
the  forces  stationed  there,  who  in  the  first  moment 
of  panic  at  the  success  of  Burnside's  expedition  against 
Roanoke  were  for  abandoning  the  coast  defences 
altogether.  An  officer  at  that  time  serving  on  the 
North  Carolina  staff  has  assured  us  that  Lee's  arrival 
on  the  coast  worked  an  effect  little  less  than  magical 
on  the  conduct  of  matters  there,  and  on  the  temper 
of  the  garrisons  along  the  coast. 

During  the  winter  of  1861-2  M'Clellan,  wielding 
large  resources  at  Washington,  showed  to  the  full  his 
real  genius  for  organization.  At  length,  at  the  head 
of  a  well-organized  army  numbering  over  100,000  men, 
with  a  large  fleet  in  support,  and  the  strategy — not 


OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

without  a  sharp  struggle  with  the  strong  will  of  Presi 
dent  Lincoln — left  to  his  own  judgment,  he  disem 
barked  in  May  on  that  historic  peninsula  below  Rich 
mond  which  had  witnessed  in  former  days  the  triumph 
of  Washington  over  Cornwallis,  forced  his  way  along 
it  despite  obstinate  resistance  near  '  Yorktown,  and 
crossing  his  right  over  the  river  Chickahominy,  which 
describes  a  steady  curve  at  a  few  miles' distance  round 
the  north  and  east  sides  of  the  city,  planted  himself 
firmly  within  sight  of  the  spires  of  the  enemy's  capital. 
The  North,  under  the  influence  of  her  first  defeat,  had 
made  far  more  exertions  than  the  Confederacy  since 
the  previous  summer.  M'Clellan's  army  was  soon 
raised  to  156,000  men,  while  Johnston  could  only  col 
lect  rather  less  than  half  that  number  to  protect  the 
city,  which  was  really  covered  mainly  by  the  works 
that  Lee  had  thrown  up.  Co-operating  with  M'Clel- 
lan  were  further  independent  armies  under  separate 
leadership.  Of  these  Fremont  and  Banks,  with  30,- 
ooo  men,  were  opposed  by  Jackson  with  half  that 
number  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley ;  and  a  more  im 
portant  force  of  40,000,  under  M'Dowell  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  was  designed  to  come  in  on  M'Clellan's  right, 
and  would  complete  the  investment  of  the  city  on  its 
northern  side,  and  bring  an  immense  superiority  ofj 
numbers  to  overbear  its  defenders. 

Such  was  the  programme  on  the  side  of  the  North. 
But  Jackson's  detached  command  against  great  odds 
proved  just  such  an  opportunity  as  that  general  needed 
to  make  his  rare  talent  for  war  conspicuous.  Being 
ordered  by  Johnston  to  take  the  offensive  in  the 
Valley,  and  draw  some  of  the  pressure  off  Richmond, 
he  performed  his  task  so  admirably  as  not  only  to 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


103 


neutralize  the  large  forces  of  Fremont  and  Banks,  but 
to  cause  President  Lincoln,  in  alarm,  to  direct 
M'Dowell  to  send  half  the  Fredericksburg  corps  west 
ward  to  take  part  in  the  operations  against  this  re 
doubtable  adversary.  This  detachment  from  his 
expected  support  held  M'Clellan  motionl-ess  ;  for  he 
had  from  the  first  considered  his  own  force  insufficient 
for  direct  attack  upon  the  enemy  in  his  works,  and, 
indeed,  overrated  the  number  before  him  under 
Johnston :  and  while  he  thus  stood  indecisive,  the 
latter  suddenly  issued  from  his  line  of  redoubts  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  became  the 
assailant.  The  action  that  ensued  on  May  thirty-first, 
known  as  the  Battle  of  Seven  Pines,  was  the  most 
obstinate  of  those  fought  at  this  early  period  of  the 
war.  M'Clellan's  front  was  partly  intrenched  and  well 
guarded  by  artillery,  and  though  the  left  of  his  line 
was  forced,  the  Confederates  gained  no  decisive  advan 
tage  over  him,  while  they  themselves  suffered  the  loss 
of  their  general,  who  was  severely  wounded  in  the 
commencement  of  the  engagement  by  a  shell.  It  was 
of  course  necessary  to  give  the  Southern  army  a  new 
chief  at  once,  and  the  choice  fell  naturally  on  Lee. 
He  had  just  returned  to  Richmond  from  his  duty  in 
the  Carolinas.  He  was  more  intimately  acquainted 
with  the  defences  of  the  capital  than  any  other  officer. 
And,  what  was  still  more  to  the  purpose,  his  former 
rivals  in  reputation  and  superiors  in  the  favor  of  the 
South,  Albert  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  were  far  away, 
the  one  slain  in  the  hour  of  his  promised  victory  over 
Grant  on  the  Tennessee,  the  other  still  in  command  of 
the  large  forces  near  that  river.  President  Davis  had 
therefore  full  opportunity  of  exercising  his  own  judg- 


104 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


ment,  and  giving  effect  to  the  high  opinion  he  had 
from  the  first  entertained  of  the  Virginian  general. 
On  June  third  Lee  took  charge  of  the  army  in  which, 
save  to  battalions  of  his  own  state,  he  was  unknown  or 
thought  little  of,  but  which  was  destined  under  him  to 
achieve  a  history,  hardly  less  glorious  or  less  chequered 
than  that  of  the  African  veterans  of  Hannibal.  Acci 
dent,  rather  than  the  choice  of  the  Confederacy,  had 
given  him  his  high  office.  It  remained  for  him  to  use 
his  opportunity  so  as  to  win  at  once  the  confidence  of 
his  soldiers  and  of  the  government  he  served.  The 
opinion  of  him  at  that  time  was  that  he  was  disposed 
to  be  cautious,  slow,  and  somewhat  timorous.  He  was 
about  to  show  himself  on  the  instant  a  master  of  the 
art  of  strategy,  at  once  as  daring  as  sagacious,  and  as 
brilliant  in  combination  as  decided  in  action. 

M'Clellan's  force,  as  we  have  said,  was  almost 
double  of  that  now  placed  under  his  new  opponent. 
His  front  was  so  strong  that  Johnston's  bold  assault 
had  failed  to  shake  it.  His  left  was  covered  by  the 
vast  morass  known  as  White  Oak  Swamp,  which  ex 
tended  southward  from  the  Chickahominy  nearly  to  the 
James.  The  only  part  left  open  to  Lee's  attack  was 
the  Federal  right,  which,  as  before  mentioned,  was 
thrown  northward  across  the  Chickahominy,  and  plant 
ed  there  to  await  the  reinforcements  through  Peters 
burg  which  the  Federal  general  was  still  demanding 
from  Washington.  Well  supplied  by  the  railroad 
from  the  York  River  behind,  he  had  at  first  little  fear 
for  his  present  position ;  and  it  was  only  when  he 
found  as  June  passed  by,  that  the  President  was  thor 
oughly  alarmed  by  the  ill  success  of  the  Northern 
troops  against  Jackson,  and  had  resolved  to  detain 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


105 


the  promised  succor,  that  M'Clellan  determined  to 
withdraw  his  exposed  right,  and  move  through  the 
White  Oak  Swamp  to  the  James  River,  where  his 
communications  with  the  fleet  would  be  absolutely  se 
cure.  In  not  venturing  an  attack  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  he  still  overrated  the  force  before  Rich 
mond  ;  but  wrhile  his  change  of  plan  had  been  hardly 
more  than  decided  on,  his  enemy  was  upon  him.  Lee 
had  assumed  the  offensive  with  every  man  whom  he 
could  throw  upon  his  foe. 

To  explain  whence  this  apparent  boldness  came  is 
not  difficult.  From  the  hour  of  his  first  command  he 
resolved  on  raising  the  threatened  siege  by  such  a  de 
cisive  stroke  as  should  at  once  give  heart  to  the  army 
and  to  the  government  which  watched  him  anxiously. 
But  to  do  this  with  full  effect  he  resolved  to  bring  Jack 
son  secretly  to  his  aid,  and  hence  time  for  action  was 
practically  chosen  by  that  general,  whose  special  task 
it  was  to  arrive  before  Richmond  without  being  miss 
ed  from  the  Valley :  for  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
for  the  success  prepared  on  the  Chickahominy  that  the 
alarm  of  the  Federal  Government  for  the  safety  of 
Washington  should  be  kept  up,  and  all  succor  denied 
M'Clellan.  The  plan  was  carried  out  with  a  complete 
ness  worthy  of  the  conception.  The  matchless  activity 
with  which  Jackson  marched  and  countermarched  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  up  to  the  very  hour  of  his  sudden 
ly  quitting  it,  deceived  the  Federals  effectually  there : 
while  M'Clellan  was  tricked  for  the  time  into  the  same 
belief  that  Washington  was  threatened,  by  the  ruse 
of  sending  detachments  northward  from  Richmond — for 
a  few  miles  of  course  only — when  exchanged  prisoners 
were  about  to  quit  the  city.  So  completely  was  the 
5* 


IO6  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

Federal  commander  deceived  on  this  occasion,  that  he 
wrote,  certainly  not  with  any  pleasure,  and  in  contra 
diction  of  his  former  views,  to  the  president  on  June 
twentieth,  "  I  have  no  doubt  Jackson  has  been  rein 
forced  from  here."  The  reinforcements  imagined  had 
at  the  time  long  safely  returned  into  Lee's  lines,  and 
Jackson  was  then  making  his  forced  march  from  the 
Valley  to  Richmond  with  such  rapidity  and  secresy 
that  even. the  bulk  of  his  own  men  knew  nothing  of 
their  destination.  To  all  questions  they  were  directed 
to  reply,  "I  don't  know;"  and  so  when  the  general 
himself  demanded  of  a  straggler  his  name  and  regi 
ment,  the  soldier,  using  the  license  which  never  left  the 
Confederate  army  throughout  the  war,  put  his  interro 
gator  off  with  the  answer  the  order  had  enjoined  on 
him,  and  of  course  escaped  punishment.  Jackson's 
distance  from  Richmond,  being  a  straight  line,  was 
short  comparatively  to  that  which  any  of  the  forces 
with  which  he  had  hitherto  been  engaged  must  have 
covered  in  order  to  move  round  to  M'Clellan,  even  had 
they  discovered  their  enemy  in  the  act  of  vanishing. 
Never  was  the  advantage  of  what  are  technically  called 
"  interior  lines  "  more  finely  used  than  in  this  first  de 
sign  of  Lee.  Never  was  the  execution  of  such  a  design 
more  ably  accomplished  than  by  Jackson  on  this  mem 
orable  occasion.  On  the  night  of  June  twenty-fifth  ; 
before  one  of  the  Federal  officers  in  the  sphere  of  his 
late  operations  had  missed  him  from  their  outposts  ; 
before  M'Clellan,  now  abandoning  present  hope  of 
support,  had  issued  the  orders  he  was  preparing  for  his 
change  of  base  from  the  York  River  to  the  James  ;  be 
fore  Lee  himself  could  hope  to  greet  him  ;  Jackson  had 
left  his  divisions  within  a  few  miles  of  Richmond,  and 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  IO/ 

entered  the  city  in   person  after  dark  to  meet  his  new 
chief.     The   colloquy    that    followed    was   but    brief. 
Both  were  essentially,  in  their  several  ways,  men  more 
of  action  than  words.     General   Steuart,  the  hencefor 
ward   famous  cavalry  general   of  Lee,  had  just  distin 
guished  himself  for  the  first  time  by  his  raid,  or  recon- 
noissance   in  force,   round   M'Clellan's  position,  which 
had  revealed  fully  the   exposure  of  the   Federal  right 
and  rear.     The  orders  for  the  attack  had  been  prepar 
ed  by  Lee's  own  hand  the   night  before.     It  was  only 
necessary,  therefore,  to  assign   the  new  comer  his  part 
in  the  action  of  the  next  day,  and  all  would  be  ready. 
Lee's  plan  in  effect  was  this:  Leaving  but  25,000 
men  under  Magruder,  to  guard  the  front  of  Richmond 
on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  he  resolved   to 
march  the  remaining  50,000,  under  Longstreet  and  the 
two  Hills,  to  the  north  of  that   stream,  so  as  to  turn 
and  attack  M'Clellan's  right,  which  was  under  General 
Porter.     Jackson,  keeping  still  more  to  the  northward, 
was  to  pass  behind  this  mass  of  Confederate  troops, 
and  carry  his  divisions  beyond  it  in  a  decisive   turning 
movement  directed  against  Porter's  extreme  right  and 
rear.     Of  course  this  scheme  of  operation,  which  threw 
some  70,000  men   on  the  40,000  of  M'Clellan's  right, 
could  only  be  executed  at  a  certain  risk  to  Richmond. 
M'Clellan,   if  fully    acquainted    with    his    opponent's 
strength  and   design,  would  almost  certainly  have  or 
dered  Porter  to  do  no  more  than   defend  the   Chicka 
hominy  bridges,  while  he  himself  pressed  forward  the 
bulk  of  his  army  to  crush  the  two  divisions  left  alone 
under  Magruder  in  his  own  front ;  and  if  it  proved  not 
possible  to  attempt  the  works  behind  them,  he  at  least 
might  have  got  between  these  and  Lee,  and  so  cut  the 


IO8  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

latter  off  from  the  capital  he  had  to  defend.  But  some 
risk  must  needs  be  run  by  a  general,  who,  with  so  great 
an  infeiiority  as  Lee's,  attempts  vast  combinations. 
And  he  trusted  rightly  as  the  event  shows,  to  his  ad 
versary's  ignorance  of  his  real  strength,  and  to  the 
alarm  this  pressure  on  Porter's  wing  would  certainly 
occasion,  as  sufficient  to  keep  the  Federal  attention 
from  discovering  the  weakness  of  the  force  that  was 
left  in  their  front. 

The  battle  of  the  Chickahominy,  which  lasted 
through  the  twenty-sixth  and  twenty-seventh  of  June 
took  exactly  that  course  which  Lee  had  designed  be 
forehand.  The  brunt  of  the  first  attack  came  from  A. 
Hill's  division,  which  followed  nearly  the  line  of  the 
river  downwards,  and  soon  got  into  serious  collision 
with  the  enemy.  Checked  until  dark  that  day  on  the 
line  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  small  stream  running  from 
the  north  into  the  Chickahominy,  which  afforded  the 
Federals  a  strong  line  to  hold,  Hill  found  them  retreat 
ing  next  morning  as  Jackson  with  a  wide  circling  move 
ment  turned  their  position.  They  fell  back  on  Cold 
Harbor,  where  they  occupied  a  new  line  with  their 
backs  towards  the  Chickahominy,  holding  in  part  the 
same  ground  on  which  General  Grant,  two  years  later, 
threw  away  many  thousands  of  lives  in  a  vain  attempt 
the  last  of  many  such  in  his  Virginian  campaign,  to 
force  a  roughly  intrenched  position  by  direct  attack. 
Reinforced  from  the  south  side  of  the  river,  Porter 
held  his  own  stoutly  for  some  hours.  In  vain  did 
Longstreet,  already  famous  for  his  fierce  courage  in  ac 
tion,  press  his  men  on  to  support  those  of  Hill.  In 
vain  did  General  D.  Hill  bring  his  division  up  to  his 
namesake's  aid.  The  Confederates  were  fairly  beaten 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


109 


off:  yet  their  chief  did  not  dare  to  slacken  their  attack, 
for  every  hour  he  feared  to  hear  far  up  the  stream  the 
din  of  battle  suddenly  rise,  which  would  tell  him  that 
M'Clellan  had  discovered  how  he  was  deceived,  and 
was  making  the  counterstroke  on  Magruder  which  was 
the  chief  danger  the  Confederate  cause  had  to  fear. 
But  at  length  to  his  left,  as  the  afternoon  advanced, 
was  heard  the  roar  of  fresh  guns  coming  into  action. 
Jackson,  it  was  plain,  had  completed  his  flank  march, 
and  was  closing  with  the  Federal  right  rear.  A  few 
minutes  more  and  the  gallant  soldier  himself  appeared 
on  the  scene,  and  rode  up  to  greet  Lee,  cheered  loudly 
by  Longstreet's  men,  already  veterans  enough  in  war 
to  understand  what  his  coming  meant.  Nothing,  it 
has  been  said,  of  this  first  meeting  of  these  great 
soldiers  on  the  battle-field  could  be  in  more  striking 
contrast  than  the  appearance  and  manner  of  the  two. 
Handsome  in  face  and  figure,  finely  mounted,  a  grace 
ful  rider,  calm-visaged,  and  carefully  dressed,  Lee  pre 
sented  the  beau  ideal  of  the  commander  whose  outward 
bearing  captivates  the  soldier's  eye.  His  famous  lieu 
tenant  rode,  apparently  by  choice,  an  ill-groomed,  raw- 
boned  horse,  and  sat  so  short-stirruped  as  to  give  his 
figure  the  most  awkward  appearance.  An  old  cadet's 
cap,  evidently  a  relic  of  the  college  professorship  he 
had  not  long  since  left,  was  drawn  down  over  his  eyes. 
His  coat  was  not  only  threadbare  but  ill-brushed  ;  and 
his  words  were  jerked  out  in  short,  abrupt  sentences, 
between  which  he  sucked  the  lemon  which  was  as  usual 
his  sole  refreshment  during  his  day's  work.  Yet  each 
already  understood  the  other,  and  valued  him  at  his 
true  worth.  "  That  is  a  heavy  fire  down  yonder,"  said 
Lee,  as  the  Federal  guns  opened  in  reply  to  Jackson's. 


HO  .A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

"Can  your  men  stand  it?"  "  They  can  stand  almost 
any  thing.  They  can  stand  that,"  was  the  emphatic 
reply  ;  and  after  a  few  words  of  order  and  explanation 
he  left  his  chief  to  lead  on  the  attack.  This  was  deci 
sive,  aided  as  it  was  by  a  fresh  advance  of  the  troops 
before  engaged.  The  Federals  were  turned,  over 
matched,  and  driven  from  their  position,  and  before 
dark  the  shattered  remains  of  Porter's  force  were  cross 
ing  the  Chickahominy  in  hasty  retreat.  Lee's  first 
battle,  in  fact,  was  as  striking  a  success,  and  as  well 
earned,  as  any  of  the  more  famous  victories  won  by 
him  in  after  days  which  have  been  so  widely  studied 
and  so  often  extolled.  No  word  henceforward  from 
his  government  of  any  want  of  confidence  in  his  pow 
ers,  or  fear  of  his  over-caution.  From  that  hour  he 
became  the  most  trusted,  as  well  as  the  most  noted, 
general  of  the  Confederacy.  As  to  his  soldiery,  his 
fyardy  bearing,  free  self-exposure,  and  constant  presence 
near  their  ranks,  completed  the  influence  gained  by 
that  power  of  combining  their  force  to  advantage  which 
they  instinctively  felt  without  fully  understanding. 
From  man  to  man  flew  the  story  of  the  hour.  The 
subtle  influence  of  sympathy,  which  wins  many  hearts 
for  one,  was  never  more  rapidly  exercised.  Like  Na 
poleon,  his  troops  soon  learnt  to  believe  him  equal  to 
every  emergency  that  war  could  bring.  Like  Hanni 
bal,  he  could  speak  lightly  and  calmly  at  the  gravest 
moments,  being  then  himself  least  grave.  Like  Rag 
lan,  he  preserved  a  sweetness  of  temper  that  no  person 
or  circumstance  could  ruffle.  Like  Caesar,  he  mixed 
with  the  crowd  of  soldiery  freely,  and  never  feared 
that  his  position  would  be  forgotten.  Like  Bliicher, 
his  one  recognized  fault  was  that  which  the  soldier 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  1 1 1 

readily  forgives;  a  readiness  to  expose  his  life  beyond 
the  proper  limits  permitted  by  modern  war  to  the 
commander-in-chief.  What  wonder,  then,  if  he  thence 
forward  commanded  an  army  in  which  each  man 
would  have  died  for  him :  an  army  from  which  his 
parting  wrung  tears  more  bitter  than  any  the  fall  of 
their  cause  could  extort :  an  army  which  followed  him, 
after  three  years  of  glorious  vicissitudes,  into  private 
life,  without  one  thought  of  further  resistance  against 
the  fate  to  which  their  adored  chief  yielded  without  a 


murmur 


Is  it  therefore  asserted  that  Lee  as  a  commander 
was  faultless  ?  Far  from  it.  We  say  it  with  all  hu 
mility,  but  without  any  doubt,  that  from  first  to  last 
he  committed  most  grave  errors ;  errors  which  only  his 
other  high  qualities  prevented  from  being  fatal  to  his 
reputation.  Chief  of  these  was  his  permitting  the  con 
tinuance  of  the  laxity  of  discipline  which  throughout 
the  war  clogged  the  movements  of  the  Confederates, 
and  robbed  their  most  brilliant  victories  of  their  reward. 
The  fatal  habit  of  straggling  from  the  ranks  on  the  least 
pretext ;  the  hardly  less  fatal  habit  of  allowing  each 
man  to  load  himself  with  any  superfluous  arms  or 
clothes  he  chose  to  carry ,  the  general  want  of  subordi 
nation  to  trifling  orders,  which  was  the  inheritance  of 
their  volunteer  origin  :  these  evils  Lee  found  in  full 
existence  when  he  took  command  before  Richmond, 
and  he  never  strove  to  check  them.  Nor  did  he  ever 
use  his  great  authority,  as  he  might  have  done,  to  purge 
his  command  of  the  many  inefficient  officers  whose 
example  of  itself  was  ruinous  to  all  discipline.  Add 
to  this,  that  though  never  careless  of  the  good  of  his 
soldiers,  he  failed  altogether  to  enforce  on  the  Con- 


H2  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

federate  Government  the  vital  necessity  of  bringing 
the  supply  of  their  wants  more  directly  under  the  con 
trol  of  those  who  commanded  them  ;  so  that  at  the 
last  they  were  absolutely  starving  in  Richmond,  while 
the  War  Department  there,  uninspired  by  the  proper 
energy  for  its  task,  had  left  large  supplies  scattered  on 
the  line  of  railroad  leading  to  the  Carolinas.  And 
lastly,  there  must  rest  on  him  the  grave  responsibility, 
shared  certainly  by,  but  not  wholly  falling  on  his  fa 
vorite  cavalry  commander,  of  misusing  the  limited  sup 
plies  of  horseflesh  at  his  disposal  in  repeating  brilliant 
but  unserviceable  marches;  so  that  in  their  last  cam 
paign  the  Confederates  were  left  almost  destitute  of 
that  most  necessary  arm.  "  Divisions  of  cavalry,"  an 
eminent  Southern  officer  and  devoted  admirer  of  Lee 
has  said  to  us,  "  were  sent  in  those  early  days  on  work 
which  squadrons  might  have  done  as  well."  These  are 
grave  charges.  But  the  errors  cited  all  plainly  sprang 
from  one  flaw  in  Lee's  character ;  the  too  yielding 
generosity  of  his  nature,  which  made  him  reluctant  to 
enforce  upon  others  that  self-denial  he  never  forgot  in 
his  own  person.  Trifling  matters  they  seemed  at  the 
first.  The  very  modesty  of  temperament  which  pre 
vented  his  correcting  them,  might  in  another  situation 
have  won  him  fresh  admiration.  But  as  the  war  went 
on,  the  rifts  caused  by  indiscipline  and  carelessness  in 
the  Confederate  armor  widened  more  and  more;  and 
in  the  end,  these  faults  were  hardly  less  fatal  to  the  for 
tunes  of  the  South  than  the  greater  material  resources 
of  her  adversary.  Her  fall  was  to  offer  a  new  proof  to 
the  world  that  neither  personal  courage  nor  heroic 
leadership  can  any  more  supply  the  place  of  discipline 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

to  a  national  force   than  can  untrained   patriotism   or 
vaunts  of  past  glories. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  the  first  relief  of  Rich-, 
mond,  so  brilliantly  accomplished  by  the  victory  on 
the  Chickahominy,  it  is  necessary  to  follow  M'Clellan's 
retreat,  not  only  for  the  story's  sake,  but  in  order  to 
do  justice  to  a  commander  whose  ill  success  before 
Richmond  has  diminished  in  the  world's  eyes  the  great 
services  he  performed  for  the  cause  of  the  Union,  both 
before  and  after  that  fatal  check.  It  has  been  said 
that  the  Federal  general  had  decided  before  the  battle 
to  transfer  his  operations  from  the  Chickahominy  to 
the  James.  Of  this  there  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt. 
Nor  is  there  any  that  the  deciding  causes  ;  the  failure 
of  the  hope  of  support  to  his  exposed  right  wing  from 
M'Dowell  at  Fredericksburg,  and  the  alarm  caused  by 
the  havoc  which  Steuart,  in  his  raid  a  few  days  before, 
produced  on  the  Federal  communication-s  with  York 
River ;  were  very  sufficient  reasons  for  the  proposed 
change  of  base.  Unhappily  for  M'Clellan's  reputation, 
he  had  not,  as  before  noticed,  issued  his  orders  for  the 
movement  when  Lee's  stroke  fell  on  his  right.  It  was 
natural  enough  that  the  success  of  this  served  to  quicken 
the  Federal  commander  in  his  intended  operation ;  but 
it  is  hardly  less  natural  that  when  the  world  learnt 
from  his  dispatches  that  the  severe  defeat  on  the  Chick 
ahominy  was  followed  at  once  by  the  retreat  to  the 
James,  the  one  was  directly  and  wholly  ascribed  to  the 
other :  so  that  M'Clellan's  declaration  that  the  move 
ment  through  White  Oak  Swamp  was  but  "  a  strategic 
change  of  base,"  only  caused  his  expression  to  be 
caught  up  and  used  as  a  taunt  against  himself,  and 
became  a  proverb  in  all  cases  where  a  beaten  general 
8 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

excuses   the   necessity   of  retreat    under   a  cloud   of 
words. 

If  M'Clellan  deserves  sharp  criticism  for  not  having 
sooner  made  up  his  mind,  and  still  more  for  his  failure 
to  discover  and  use  the  absence  of  the  Confederates  in 
his  front,  where  his  advance  in  mass,  according  to 
General  Magruder's  officially  expressed  opinion,  "  would 
have  insured  his  success,  and  the  occupation  of  the 
works  about  Richmond,  and  consequently  the  city;" 
his  character  as  a  commander  never  shone  so  brightly 
as  in  the  hour  of  disaster  and  danger,  when  Porter's 
wing  was  driven  in  upon  his  centre.  The  ill-success 
of  his  campaign  as  a  whole  has  caused  his  conduct  at 
this  crisis  to  be  done  scant  justice  to.  But  there  is  no 
military  reputation  in  the  world  which  would  not  be 
increased  by  the  manner  in  which  that  retreat  to  the 
James  was  conducted  from  the  moment  it  began.  His 
troops  were  so  demoralized  by  the  shock  of  the  two 
days'  unsuccessful  fighting  as  to  begin  their  retreat, 
according  to  the  testimony  of  Hooker,  one  of  the 
oldest  officers  present,  "  like  a  parcel  of  sheep ;  for  a 
few  shots  from  the  rebels  would  have  panic-stricken 
the  whole  : "  expressions  strong  enough  at  once  to 
show  the  importance  of  this  first  victory  of  Lee's  which 
some  writers  have  spoken  lightly  of,  and  to  give  the 
more  credit  to  M'Clellan  for  what  followed.  On  the 
very  evening  of  his  defeat  he  assembled  his  chiefs  of 
corps,  explained  his  plan  for  retreating  to  the  shelter 
of  the  fleet,  and  made  his  arrangements  for  covering 
the  movement.  The  roads  leading  through  White 
Oak  Swamp  direct  to  the  James  were  bad,  and  crossed 
by  many  others  which  the  Confederates  might  advance 
on.  Their  outposts  on  the  Chickahominy  were  close 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

to  his  own  :  their  confidence  as  high  as  that  of  his  own 
troops  was  depressed  ;  and  the  first  movement  of 
retreat  discovered,  would  bring  them  on  in  ardent  pur 
suit,  Lee's  only  doubt  now  being  as  to  which  way  his 
adversary  would  attempt  to  draw  off.  Nevertheless 
M'Clellan  succeeded  in  concealing  his  design  during 
the  whole  of  the  twenty-eighth  while  his  trains  were 
moving  off;  and  when  the  pursuit  was  taken  up  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-ninth,  his  worst  danger  was 
already  over.  Moreover,  the  coolness  and  self-posses 
sion  of  the  Federal  commander  not  merely  stood  him 
self  in  good  stead,  but  had  its  natural  effect  on  his 
subordinates,  and  through  these  began  to  reach  his 
discouraged  men.  Step  by  step  he  fell  back,  using  his 
heavy  artillery  with  great  skill  to  guard  the  dangerous 
approaches  to  his  flanks  by  the  cross-roads  through  the 
swamp.  On  their  side  the  Confederate  staff  showed  a 
not  very  creditable  ignorance  of  the  scene  of  contest. 
No  sketch  or  survey  had  been  made  of  it,  though  lying 
but  a  few  miles  from  their  own  lines ;  and  their  pursu 
ing  columns  were  greatly  delayed  for  want  of  this 
simple  precaution.  Fighting  soon  ensued ;  but  as 
neither  side  could  form  any  front,  it  was  never  serious, 
and  the  advantage  naturally  on  the  side  of  the  defend 
ers.  So  the  retreat  went  on  day  after  day.  In  vain 
did  Longstreet,  relieved  in  his  turn  by  Jackson,  press 
on  the  Federal  rear.  In  vain  Magruder  threw  his 
troops,  eager  to  share  in  the  newly-won  glories  of  their 
comrades,  along  each  approach  towards  their  western 
flank  by  the  cross-roads  leading  from  the  city.  Each 
attempt  was  met  skilfully  and  repulsed  ;  and  when,  on 
July  seventh,  M'Clellan  found  himself  clear  of  the 
swamp,  and  occupied  the  strong  ridge  of  Malvern  Hill 


Il6  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

beyond  it,  his  men  had  so  far  recovered  heart  as  to 
inflict  a  very  sharp  repulse  on  the  advance  guard  of  the 
pursuers,  which  Magruder  has  been  charged  with  en 
gaging  with  useless  rashness.  Thus  closing  his  retreat 
with  an  unquestioned  success,  M'Clellan  drew  off  his 
army,  no  longer  followed,  to  its  proposed  encampment 
by  the  James,  where  the  support  of  the  gun-boats 
gave  him  a  position  well-nigh  impregnable.  He  had 
recovered  the  confidence  of  his  troops.  If  they 
shouted  for  joy  when  he  again  accepted  their  command 
two  months  later  at  Washington  ;  if  they  followed  him 
confidently  when  he  moved  to  check  Lee's  first  inva 
sion  of  the  North,  it  must  be  ascribed  not  to  his  mere 
genius  for  organization,  but  to  the  moral  effect  of  his 
masterly  retreat.  The  battle  of  Antietam,  the  first 
check  in  Lee's  steady  career  of  victory,  was  in  truth 
saved  for  the  Federal  side  at  Malvern  Hill.  Lee's 
dispatch  on  the  subject  of  the  White  Oak  Swamp 
affair  puts  the  general  facts  in  a  clear  light.  "  Under 
ordinary  circumstances,"  were  his  words,  "  the  Federal 
army  should  have  been  destroyed.  Prominent  among 
the  causes  of  its  escape  is  the  want  of  timely  and  cor 
rect  information.  This  fact,  attributed  chiefly  to  the 
character  of  the  country,  enabled  General  M'Clellan 
skilfully  to  conceal  his  retreat,  and  to  add  much  to  the 
obstruction  with  which  Nature  had  beset  the  way  of 
our  pursuing  columns."  Nevertheless,  though  thus 
saved  from  ruin,  M'Clellan's  force  was  for  the  time 
powerless  for  harm.  Richmond  was  relieved  from  all 
pressure,  and  without  strong  reinforcements  there  was 
no  hope  of  a  fresh  advance  from  the  James.  The 
political  differences  between  President  Lincoln  and  his 
unsuccessful  general  aggravated  the  former's  distrust 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

of  M'Clellan's  powers.  He  turned  to  new  projects  and 
new  commanders  for  his  hopes  of  attack  on  Richmond, 
and  the  first  phase  of  the  war  in  Virginia  came  fairly 
to  an  end. 

To  follow  it  farther  would  be  to  tell  a  twice-told  tale. 
Lee  crowded  into  the  next  two  years  as  much  per 
sonal  glory  as  has  ever  fallen  to  the  lot  of  a  commander 
within  the  same  time.  Overthrowing  one  opponent 
after  another  by  brilliant  strategy  wielding  an  inferior 
force  ;  applying  with  unsurpassed  skill  to  each  new  pur 
pose  the  special  resources  of  the  country  he  defended, 
and  the  personal  weakness  of  his  adversaries  ;  he  failed 
only  when  attempting  for  political  reasons  an  offensive 
beyond  the  means  of  his  force.  While  elsewhere,  ill 
success  on  the  side  of  the  Confederacy  became  disaster, 
and  disaster  grew  into  ruinous  defeat,  the  defence  of 
Northern  Virginia  was  never  shaken.  Only  when  a 
general  advanced  upon  it  whose  resources  in  men  and 
material  were  practically  unlimited,  and  who  used  them 
deliberately  in  what  Union  historians,  such  as  Dr. 
Draper,  have  exultingly  called  "  the  process  of  attrition," 
wearing  down  his  adversary's  numbers  gradually  by  the 
free  sacrifice  of  his  own,  was  Richmond  once  more 
seriously  threatened.  But  the  June  of  1864  found 
Grant  almost  in  sight  of  the  city,  upon  the  very  ground 
which  M'Clellan  had  held  on  the  banks  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  two  years  before.  Four  times  he  had  changed 
the  line  of  operations,  chosen  in  obedience  to  Lincoln's 
strong  desire,  on  which  he  had  declared  his  intention  to 
"  fight  it  out  all  the  summer."  Four  times  he  had 
recoiled  from  the  attempt  to  force  his  way  direct  to  the 
rebel  capital ;  for  his  indomitable  and  watchful  adver 
sary  ever  barred  the  way.  Once  more,  on  the  morning 


Il8  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

of  June  third,  he  flung  his  masses  fiercely  against  the 
line  held  by  Lee,  which  ran  across  the  very  field  of 
battle  where  that  general  had  won  his  first  triumph 
over  M'Clellan.  The  result  was  so  fearful  and  useless 
a  slaughter  that,  according  to  the  chief  Union  histo 
rian,*  when  "  later  in  the  day  orders  were  issued  to 
renew  the  assault,  the  whole  army,  correctly  appre 
ciating  what  the  inevitable  result  must  be,  silently 
disobeyed." 

Foiled  and  exasperated,  yet  never  disheartened,  for 
the  fifth  time  Grant  changed  his  strategy.  Following 
M'Clellan's  movement  of  two  years  before,  he  pressed ; 
on  to  the  James  ;  but  without  halting  at  that  stream  in 
indecision,  crossed  it  at  once  to  invest  Petersburg,  and 
gain  the  approaches  to  Richmond  from  the  south  ;  fol 
lowing,  in  fact,  the  plan  by  which  he  had  triumphed  at 
Vicksburg,  and  which  he  had  himself  long  before 
pointed  out,  when  asked  to  advise  freely,  as  the  most 
decisive  mode  of  attacking  the  capital  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  Gaining  the  southern  part  of  Petersburg  before 
his  advance  was  fully  discovered,  he  assaulted  the 
works  fiercely,  and  it  was  not  till  he  had  lost  9,000  men 
more  that  he  desisted,  and  sat  down  deliberately  to 
prepare  the  investing  lines  which  were  thenceforward 
continually  to  be  strengthened  and  extended  until 
Richmond  should  be  won.  But  he  had  still  150,000 
men  at  his  command,  having  been  largely  reinforced 
by  General  Butler's  army  ;  and  he  had  the  prospect 
of  continual  supplies  of  men  and  means.  Lee  had  less 
than  70,000  men  all  told.  The  armies  of  the  South 
elsewhere  were  overmatched,  and  could  promise  him 
no  help.  Want  of  energy  and  ability  in  the  adminis- 

*  Draper,  vol.  iii.  p.  387. 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

tration  of  the  Confederacy,  hardly  less  than  its  inferior 
resources,  left  him  destitute  not  only  of  recruits,  but 
straitened  for  the  most  necessary  supplies.  And  if  his 
enemy  had  weakened  himself  by  fully  60,000  men  in  his 
fruitless  attempts  to  gain  Richmond,  it  had  cost  Lee 
more  than  one-third  that  number  to  defend  it.  He 
well  knew  that  this  loss  could  never  be  replaced. 
Firm  as  his  soul  was,  the  sure  effect  of  that  "  process 
of  attrition,"  of  which  the  chroniclers  of  the  triumph 
ant  Union  now  speak  with  admiration  of  its  success, 
was  already  discovered  by  the  general  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  which  was  melting  away  under  it.  The 
hopes  that  had  brightened  his  earlier  years  of  command, 
were  plainly  disappearing  as  the  increasing  energy  of 
the  North  brought  her  superior  strength  into  full 
play.  From  the  hour  that  Grant  sat  down  before  the 
lines  of  Richmond,  already  too  weakly  guarded,  and  it 
became  plain  that  ill  success  had  not  shattered  the  con 
fidence  of  the  Washington  Administration  in  his  sagac 
ity,  and  that  his  reserves  were  increasing  from  week  to 
week,  the  result  could  never  be  doubtful.  Lee,  above 
all  others,  could  well  forecast  the  event,  which  might 
be  delayed  but  could  not  be  averted.  Two  years 
before,  when  M'Clellan,  after  his  first  retreat,  had  pro 
posed  to  cross  the  James  and  move  on  Petersburg,  and 
the  plan  which  brought  Grant  triumph  in  after  days 
had  been  summarily  rejected  by  Halleck  as  "  imprac 
ticable,"  a  fact  his  official  memorandum  of  his  visit  to 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  records ;  Lee  had  in  his 
private  conversations  expressed  his  own  conviction  that 
Richmond,  now  freed  from  immediate  pressure,  could 
be  held  safely  so  long  as  such  a  movement  on  its  com 
munications  with  the  Carolinas  was  left  untried.  Yet 


I20  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

it  needed  two  years  of  continued  victory  in  the  West 
to  gain  for  Grant  that  prestige  which  could  enable  him 
to  patiently  carry  out,  after  plain  proof  of  the  imprac-j 
ticability  of  the  President's  favorite  plan  of  a  direct^ 
advance,  the  strategy  which  he,  as  well  as  his  great- 
adversary  and  his  predecessor,  all  saw  clearly  to  be  thatj 
to  which  the  defence  of  Richmond  must  succumb. 

Not  in   the  first  flush   of  triumph  when  his  army^ 
cheered  his  victory  over  M'Clellan  ;  not  when  hurling 
back   Federal   masses  three  times  the  weight  of  hisl 
own  on    the  banks  of  the   Rappahannock:    nor  even 
when  advancing,  the  commander  of  victorious  legions,, 
to  carry  the  war  away  from  his  loved  Virginia  into  the 
North ;  had  Lee  seemed  so  great,  or  won  the  love  of 
his  soldiers  so  closely,  as  through  the  dark  winter  that, 
followed.     Overworked  his  men  were  sadly,  with  forty 
miles   of  intrenchments  for  that  weakened    army   to 
guard.     Their  prospects  were  increasingly  gloomy  as 
month  passed  by  after  month,  bringing  them  no  rein 
forcements,  while  their  enemy  became  visibly  stronger. 
Their   rations   grew   scantier  and    poorer,    while  the 
jocund  merriment  of  the  investing  lines  told  of  abun 
dance,    often    raised   to   luxury,  by  voluntary   tribute 
from  the  wealth   of  the   North.     The  indiscipline,  too* 
long  allowed,  told   on   them  ;  and,  with   the  pangs  of ; 
hunger  added,  led  to  desertion,  a  thing  formerly  almost 
unknown  in  the  Army  of  Virginia.     But  the  confidence 
of  the   men    in    their   beloved    chief  never   faltered. 
Their  sufferings  were  never  laid   on  "  Uncle  Robert." 
The  simple  piety  which  all  knew  to  be  the  rule  of  his 
life,  acted  upon   thousands  of  those  under  him  with  a 
power  which  those   can   hardly   understand  who  know 
not  how   community  of  hope,  suffering,  and    danger 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  I2i 

fairly  shared  amid  the  vicissitudes  of  war,  quickens  the 
sympathies  of  the   roughest   and   lowest   as  well  as  of 
those  above  them.     He  who  was  known  to  every  sol 
dier  under  him  to  have  forbidden  his  staff  to  disturb 
the  impromptu  prayer-meeting  that  stopped  their  way 
when  hurrying  to  the  fierce   battle  in  the  Wilderness ; 
he  whose  exposure  was  seen  by  all  to  grow  only  greater 
as  the  hour  grew  darker;  he   who  was  as  constant  in 
the  lines  during   the   monotonous  watch   against  the 
foe  that  never  attacked,  as   he   had   been  when  Grant 
hurled  fresh  legions  on  him  day  after  day  in  the  blood 
stained  thickets   of  Spottsylvania ;  he  who,  in   short, 
had  long  lived  up  to  the  motto  he  is  said  to  have  com 
mended  to  his  own  children   on   entering  life,  as  the 
only  sure  guide,  "  Duty  is  the    sublimest  word  in  our 
language;"   now   illustrated   in   his   own    person   that 
other  motto  which  he  bequeathed  to  the  army  when  it 
dissolved,  "  Human  virtue  should  be  equal  to  human 
calamity."     The  vision  of  becoming  the  new  Washing 
ton  of  a  new  Republic,  had  he  ever  entertained  it,  had 
faded  away,  with  all   its  natural  ambition.     The  very 
hope  of  saving  from   humiliation   the  state  for  whose 
safety  and  honor  he  had   sacrificed  his  high  prospects 
in  the  army  of  the  Union,  must  now  be  despaired  of. 
Yet  the  firmness  of  his  bearing,  and  his  unfaltering 
attention  to  the  hourly   business  of  his  office,    never 
declined  for  a  moment,  and  impressed  alike  the  falling 
government  of  the  Confederacy,  the  dejected  citizens 
of  its  capital,  and  the  humblest  soldiers  of  its  army. 
Once  during  the  sad  spring  of  1865  he  recommended 
earnestly  the  prompt  abandonment  of  the  attempt  to 
defend  Richmond,  and  the  retreat  of  his  force,  while 
it  was  still  capable  of  movement,  far  into  the  South  to 


122  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

concert    further  resistance  with  Johnston.     This   was 
in  February,  when  he  had  received  the  commission  of 
General-in-Chief  of  all  the   Confederate    Armies ;  an 
empty  title  now,  when  those  armies  were  melting  into 
nothingness.     But  though  he  gave  orders  to  prepare 
for  the  march,  and  looked  on  it  as  the  only  hope  of 
using  the  few  men  at  his  disposal  with  effect,  President 
Davis,    ever  buoyed   up  with   false   hopes  of  foreign 
succour  and  loth  to  admit  the  decadence  of  his  brief 
rule,  forbade  the  design  being  carried  out.     The  only 
effect    of  this    contemplated    change   of  strategy  was 
probably  to  delay  the  forwarding   of  supplies  to  the 
troops   at   Richmond,  already  too  ill-cared  for.     And 
when  March   came,  and   Sheridan,  hot  from  his  suc 
cesses  in  the  Shenandoah,  had  joined   General  Grant 
with   10,000  mounted   infantry,  raising   the    Federals 
with  all  deductions  to  a  strength    130,000   men,  well 
fed  and  efficiently  provided   for  in  all  respects,  Lee's 
"effectives,"  a  bare  40,000  men   according  to  the  best 
records,  were  subsisting  solely  on  the   daily  issue  of  a 
quarter  of  a  pound  of  rancid  bacon,  with  a  ration  of  ill- 
baked  maize  bread.     Not  that  they  ever  murmured  at 
their  general.  Their  cheers  for  him  when  he  visited  their 
lines  were  as  ready  as  of  old  ;  but    their  hungry  eyes 
gazed  more  wistfully  and  sadly  on  his  retreating  form 
each  time  that  he  passed  from  them.     And  the  suppli 
cating  look  of  the  citizens  when  he  entered  Richmond, 
fixed  with  inquiring  entreaty  on  the  man  in  whom  they 
still  believed,  there  lay  the  power  to  save  them,  must 
have  added  a  pang  hardly  less  sharp  to  that  felt  each  time 
that  he  saw  the  increasing  gauntness  of  his  unconquer 
able  troops.     No  wonder  that  his   hair  grew  gray  in 
these  days  of  darkness.     No  one  so  well  as  he  knew 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  I2i 

the  hopelessness  of  the  situation  of  all.  He  was  fully 
aware  that  Johnston,  too  late  restored  to  the  com 
mand  of  which  Davis,  in  alarm  at  his  Fabian  strategy, 
had  deprived  him  in  the  crisis  at  Atlanta,  was  quite 
unprovided  with  means  to  check  Sherman's  march 
through  the  Carolinas ;  and  that  that  general,  moving 
steadily  northwards,  was  bringing  up  100,000  victori 
ous  troops  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Richmond  and 
its  defenders. 

But  while  Sherman  yet  approached  the  ruin  fell, 
under  the  vehement  impulse  communicated  to  Grant's 
own  troops  by  the  ardor  of  Sheridan.  The  line  of  de 
fence,  "  stretched  so  long  as  to  break,"  in  Lee's  own 
phrase,  and  ever  more  weakly  guarded,  at  last  gave 
way.  Sheridan's  attack  on  Pickett's  troops,  which 
formed  the  extreme  right  or  west  of  Lee's  positions, 
proved  completely  successful  in  the  decisive  action  of 
Five  Forks,  fought  on  April  second ;  and  Grant  fol 
lowed  up  the  victory  by  assaults  made  all  along  the  Con 
federate  lines.  The  position,  so  long  and  so  painfully 
held,  was  untenable  when  turned ;  and  was  yielded  re 
luctantly,  but  without  hesitation.  Those  around  Lee 
could  judge  of  the  serious  nature  of  his  feelings  only, 
by  the  care  with  which  that  day  he  carried  with  him  the 
sword  he  usually  dispensed  with  in  action.  As  dark 
ness  closed  on  that  eventful  night,  he  was  seen  amid 
the  glare  of  explosions  from  the  abandoned  works, 
standing  at  the  angle  of  the  road  chosen  for  retreat  up 
the  north  bank  of  the  Appomattox,  guiding  and  cheer 
ing  his  troops  in  person  as  they  reached  the  point,  and 
following  them  only  when  the  last  man  of  his  ragged 
and  weary  columns  had  passed  by. 

Space  would  fail  us  did  we  attempt  to  follow  out 


124 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


that  retreat  in  its  memorable  details.  Well-rationed, 
followed  by  light  trains  of  provisions,  and  its  advanced 
guard  led  by  one  who  never  faltered  nor  admitted  hesi 
tation  in  others,  the  Federal  army  started  in  pursuit 
next  morning,  following  parallel  roads.  Great  praise 
has  been  justly  bestowed  on  Sheridan  for  his  nervous 
and  energetic  conduct  of  the  pursuit  by  which  Lee  was 
finally  completely  cut  off.  Nor  less  does  Grant  deserve 
it,  for  the  free  and  ungrudging  manner  in  which  he 
supported  his  ardent  lieutenant.  But  he  who,  above 
all,  should  have  earned  honor  for  the  conduct  of  that 
march  now  sleeps  in  the  grave  ;  and  it  is  due  here  to 
the  reputation  of  General  Halleck  to  say,  that  the 
errors  which  had  marked  his  earlier  conduct  of  the  war 
are  amply  redeemed  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  recognize 
that  to  his  stern  and  unflinching  insistance  on  the 
necessity  of  bringing  proper  discipline  to  bear  on  the 
Federal  volunteers,  was  due  much  of  the  success  with 
which  the  arms  of  the  Union  were  crowned  at  the  close 
of  the  war.  The  disorders  which  had  hindered  the 
efficiency  of  the  Federal  levies  in  earlier  years  had  been 
purged  sharply  from  their  ranks  by  the  stern  applica 
tion  of  the  military  code  to  the  embodied  volunteers 
and  conscripts  on  whom  the  Union  relied  to  save  it. 
While  Meade  and  Grant  pressed  the  enemy  home  in 
Virginia,  courts-martial  at  Washington  cleared  from 
the  service  the  scum  which  accident,  or  bribes,  or 
the  favor  of  state  governors,  had  mixed  with  the  solid 
materials  of  the  Northern  troops.  Week  after  week 
appeared  lists  of  officers  cashiered  for  crimes,  to  look 
back  on  which  is  to  peruse  the  strangest  records  of  in 
competence  and  worthlessness  that  the  annals  of  war 
ever  disclosed.  None  proved  guilty  met  with  mercy. 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  12$ 

The  general  that  sold  his  safe-conduct  to  the  trembling 
people  of  the  district  plundered  by  his  troops  ;  the 
field  officer  who  disappeared  from  his  battalion  before 
the  action  ;  the  captain  who  stole  and  drank  his  men's 
rations  of  whisky;  these,  and  others  such  as  these, 
typical  cases  from  the  official  records  of  the  period, 
found  themselves  treated  with  no  more  leniency  than 
the  private  sentinel  who  slept  before  the  enemy.  And 
as  gazette  upon  gazette  published  the  names  of  culprits 
stripped  of  the  epaulettes  they  had  dishonored,  insen 
sibly  but  steadily  a  higher  tone  of  bearing  was  instilled 
into  the  officers  of  the  army  thus  watched  over.  Sol 
diers  are  ever  dependent  largely  for  their  feeling  of 
subordination  on  the  conduct  of  those  above  them  ; 
and  the  improvement  effected  by  Halleck's  stern  meas 
ures  extended  constantly  downwards.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  which  was  at  once  the  nearest  and  the 
most  important  of  those  which,  as  Chief  of  the  Staff,  he 
supervised,  rose  that  year  in  its  standard  of  discipline, 
if  not  to  the  level  to  which  Europe,  with  the  aid  of 
caste  traditions  and  reverence  for  rank,  brings  her 
standing  forces,  at  least  to  a  measure  of  efficiency 
which  troops  recruited  as  were  these,  the  mixed  volun 
teers  and  conscripts  of  a  young  republic,  can  seldom 
attain.  And  if  Grant  and  Sheridan  were  able  to  press 
the  success  of  Five  Forks  on  to  a  complete  triumph 
over  the  retreating  Confederates  ;  if  the  conduct  of 
their  troops  after  the  victory  of  the  second  of  April 
was  in  marked  contrast  to  the  lassitude  and  indiffer 
ence  which  had  hitherto  followed  advantages  won  on 
either  side ;  the  difference  is  to  be  found  not  so  much 
in  the  circumstances  of  the  time,  or  the  individual  char 
acter  of  the  generals,  as  in  the  moral  power  of  disci- 


126  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

pline,  which  had  been  left  unused  by  both  parties  alike, 
until  Halleck  brought  it  into  play  to  add  to  the  advan 
tages  of  the  North. 

So  the  pursuit  of  the  flying  Confederates  went  on 
unintermitted  from  day  to  day.  It  is  needless  here  to 
follow  it  in  its  details.  Enough  for  us  to  say  that  the 
Federal  troops  were  well  supplied  by  their  trains,  while 
the  depot  on  which  Lee  had  counted  for  his  men  had, 
through  the  blunder  of  the  same  official  who  had  re 
duced  them  to  quarter  rations  while  in  their  lines, 
been  removed  to  the  capital,  just  in  time  to  fall  into 
the  enemy's  hands.  Starving,  except  for  what  could 
be  collected  by  their  disposal  to  forage,  and  moving 
round  an  arc  of  which  their  adversaries  followed  the 
chord,  the  long  experience  in  marching  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia  could  no  longer  avail.  By  the  fifth  day 
their  enemy  had  passed  them,  and  was  across  their 
path ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  ninth  of  April  the 
way  of  escape  was  completely  barred.  Up  to  this  time 
Lee  had  resisted  the  proposals  for  capitulation  which 
had  reached  him  from  his  adversary  ;  but  when  this 
fatal  news  came  from  his  most  trusted  officer,  the  gal 
lant  Gordon  who  led  his  advance,  he  resigned  himself 
to  his  fate.  For  a  moment  those  who  looked  on  him 
saw  him  almost  overcome  ;  and  the  first  words  of  com 
plaint  ever  heard  from  his  lips  during  the  war  broke 
sharply  forth  ;  "  I  had  rather  die  a  thousand  deaths  !  " 
Musing  sadly  for  a  few  seconds,*  as  his  men's  favorite 
cry  broke  on  his  ear,  "  There's  Uncle  Robert !  "  in  deep, 
sad  tones  he  said  to  those  near  him,  "  How  soon  could 
I  end  all  this,  and  be  at  rest.  Tis  but  to  ride  down 
the  line,  and  give  the  word,  and  all  would  be  over." 
Then  presently,  recovering  his  natural  voice,  he  an- 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


127 


swered  one  who  urged  that  the  surrender  might  be 
misunderstood,  "  That  is  not  the  question.  The  ques 
tion  is,  whether  it  is  right.  And  if  it  is  right,  I  take 
the  responsibility."  Then,  after  a  brief  silence,  he 
added,  with  a  sigh,  "  It  is  your  duty  to  live.  What 
will  become  of  the  wives  and  children  of  the  South  if 
we  are  not  here  to  protect  them  ?  "  So  saying,  he  sent 
in  his  flag  of  truce  without  further  hesitation  to  Grant. 
The  coming  action  was  stayed  on  the  instant,  and  the 
struggle  of  the  Confederacy  was  virtually  over. 

Of  the  interview  between  the  great  commanders 
which  followed,  enough  has  been  already  written. 
Those  who  would  understand  how  highly  Lee  was  held 
in  honor  by  the  very  men  who  fought  hardest  against 
him,  should  study  the  story  of  that  eventful  meeting, 
not  in  the  loving  records  of  Mr.  Cooke,  or  of  other 
writers  whose  sympathies  were  with  his  efforts,  but  in 
the  pages  of  the  warmest  partisans  of  the  cause  of  the 
Union  ;  in  such  works,  for  instance,  as  the  well-known 
memoir  called  "  With  Sheridan  in  Lee's  last  Campaign," 
where  the  ardent  Northern  writer,  almost  against  his 
will,  makes  the  chief  of  the  captive  army  the  hero  of 
the  scene.  Or  they  may  read  it  in  the  cold  lines  of 
the  anti-slavery  historian  of  the  war,  where  no  word  of 
bitterness  is  ever  missing  for  the  politicians  whose 
cause  Lee's  arm  had  upheld : 

"  From  the  Rapidan  to  the  Appomattox  Court-house  "  [says 
Dr.  Draper,  vol.  iii.  p.  392]  "  he  had  indeed  made  a  grand 
defence.  He  had  shed  over  Virginia  a  mournful  glory.  In 
the  Wilderness,  at  Spottsylvania,  on  the  Anna,  at  Cold  Har 
bor,  during  the  siege,  and  in  the  final  retreat,  he  had  strug 
gled  against  preponderating  power.  For  a  whole  year  he 
had  tried  to  stay  the  hand  of  Fate.  No  one  can  read  his 


I28  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

gallant  acts  without  lamenting  that  they  had  not  been  in  the 
cause  of  human  freedom  and  national  unity." 

His  parting  words  to  his  troops  are  historical. 
"  Men,  we  have  fought  through  the  war  together.  I 
have  done  the  best  I  could  for  you.  My  heart  is  too 
full  to  say  more."  But  it  is  not  so  well  known  that 
while  he  uttered  them  with  voice  slightly  trembling, 
tears  from  the  rough  soldiers  he  was  parting  from,  an 
swered  those  in  his  eyes,  as  they  pressed  around  him  to 
wring  his  hand  lovingly,  and  offer  their  response  in  the 
rude  prayer,  "  May  God  help  you,  general !  "  In  his 
last  army-order,  issued  the  next  morning,  he  replied  to 
their  sympathy :  "  You  will  take  with  you  to  your 
homes  the  satisfaction  that  proceeds  from  the  con 
sciousness  of  duty  faithfully  performed,  and  I  earnestly 
pray  that  a  merciful  God  will  extend  to  you  His  bless 
ing  and  protection."  His  last  official  act  was  to  inter 
cede  with  Grant  that  the  mounted  soldiers  might  be 
granted  the  use  of  their  horses,  so  as  to  set  at  once  to 
work  on  their  neglected  farms  ;  a  favor  the  Federal 
commander  at  once  accorded  with  a  readiness  as  cour 
teous  in  the  giver  as  it  was  politic  in  the  disturbed 
state  of  the  country.  Indeed,  the  whole  conduct  of 
General  Grant  on  this  memorable  occasion  reflects  on 
him  a  credit  which  the  severest  critic  of  his  chequered 
life  can  never  lessen.  That  the  two  armies  so  fiercely 
opposed  for  four  long  years,  could  have  parted  as  they 
did  without  one  word  but  those  of  sympathy  and  re 
spect,  seemed  to  presage  with  certainty  the  day  when 
the  last  wounds  of  the  recovered  Union  shall  be  fully 
healed,  and  the  great  constitutional  victory  of  the  rights 
of  the  Federation  over  those  of  the  states  shall  be 


A  MEMOIR  CF  GENERAL  LEE. 


129 


spoken  of  with  as  little  bitterness  in  South  and  North 
as  its  petty  prototype,  the  War  of  the  Sonderbund,  is 
to-day  in  all  parts  of  Switzerland. 

Leaving  his  army  dispersing  on  parole,  Lee  passed 
into  Richmond,  declining  the  public  honors  which, 
even  in  their  hour  of  humiliation,  its  people  sought  to 
offer  him.  Living  here  in  the  strictest  retirement,  he 
began  his  new  duty  of  conciliation,  from  which  he 
never  ceased  while  life  remained.  When  he  received 
from  a  Federal  general  a  private  and  friendly  warning 
that  it  was  resolved  to  arraign  him  for  treason,  despite 
the  military  protection  of  his  capitulation,  checking  his 
informant's  violent  indignation,  he  replied  with  a  smile, 
"  Sir,  we  must  forgive  our  enemies.  Since  the  war 
began,  not  a  day  has  passed  that  I  did  not  pray  for 
them."  But  the  danger  that  the  Union  would  be  dis 
credited  by  dishonorable  vengeance  soon  passed  away. 
The  firmness  of  General  Grant  upon  this  point  im 
pressed  itself  on  the  hasty  and  violent  man  whom  the 
murder  of  Lincoln  had  made  President ;  and  when  An 
drew  Johnson  ceased  to  encourage  the  thought,  lesser 
partisans  gave  it  up,  and  Lee  continued  unmolested  in 
his  privacy.  In  vain  his  fellow-citizens  besought  his 
attendance  at  their  public  meetings,  when  these  were 
once  more  resumed.  The  one  duty  he  had  made  his 
own  was  to  set  an  example  of  personal  submission  to 
the  people  who  looked  on  him  as  the  chief  representa 
tive  of  the  South  ;  and  for  this  reason  he  steadfastly 
discouraged  all  premature  and  useless  remonstrance  at 
the  arbitrary  measures  by  which  it  was  long  governed. 
But  despite  his  reticence  and  humility,  he  made  no  at 
tempt  to  hide  his  own  personal  responsibility  for  the 
actions  done  under  the  Confederacy  ;  and  when  sum- 
9 


1 3o 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


moned  before  the  Reconstruction  Committee  of  Con 
gress  he  was  questioned  as  to  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  fallen  Goverment,  he  answered  plainly,  "  I  do  not 
recollect  having  taken  it,  or  whether  it  was  required. 
If  it  was  required,  I  took  it :  or  if  it  had  been  required 
I  would  have  taken  it." 

Virginia,  in  her  ruin  and  suffering,  could  do  little 
for  her  hero,  especially  when  it  became  known  that 
under  no  circumstances,  however  favorable,  would  the 
fallen  general  meddle  with  politics.  What  she  could 
do,  however,  was  soon  done,  and  six  months  after  the 
surrender  at  Appomattox  Court-house  Lee  had  accept 
ed  the  presidency  of  the  State  College  at  Lexington, 
originally  designed  as  a  cadet  school  for  the  militia 
officers  of  Virginia,  but  now  changed  into  a  place  of 
general  training  for  the  sons  of  such  Southerners  as 
were  still  left  the  means  to  educate  their  children. 
His  fortune  had  perished,  like  his  former  professional 
prospects,  with  the  war.  For  his  wife's  sake,  thereforej 
the  offer  was  doubly  welcome,  when  it  came  to  him  as 
the  token  of  the  undiminished  affection  of  his  beloved 
state.  And  employment  was  not  the  less  grateful  to 
one  who  had  never  known  idleness  during  a  long  life 
time,  except  in  the  enjoyment  of  a  hard-earned  holi 
day.  He  took  up  his  post  at  Lexington  therefore 
on  October  first,  and  devoted  himself  to  his  new  duties 
with  not  the  less  assiduity  that  their  sedentary  nature 
made  them  somewhat  a  physical  trial  to  a  man  of  his 
active  habits.  The  appointment  was  a  fitting  one  in 
all  respects,  as  well  as  creditable  to  those  who  made  it. 
From  far  over  the  Southern  States  parents  sent  their 
sons  to  be  trained  under  the  once  renowned  command 
er,  whose  unblemished  character  was  as  well  known  as 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  131 

his  military  greatness.  And  the  College,  which  had 
sunk  into  nothingness  during  the  war,  and  reopened 
in  1865  with  but  a  few  of  its  old  inmates,  boasted  five 
hundred  students  before  his  death  five  years  later. 
Some  of  these,  too,  came  from  far  Northern  States, 
where  very  early  in  the  days  of  reconquered  peace 
there  were  not  wanting  men  desirous  to  do  all  that  in 
them  lay  to  bury  the  remembrance  of  civil  strife  in 
oblivion. 

Here  then,  engrossed  chiefly  by  the  steady  perform 
ance  of  his  daily  duties,  and  in  no  society  but  that  of 
his  pupils  and  his  neighbors  in  the  country  town,  the 
rest  of  that  great  life  was  spent  ;  varied  sometimes  by 
visits  to  Washington,  where  he  was  several  times  sum 
moned  to  give  evidence  on  the  state  and  feeling  of  the 
South,  over  the  hard  fate  of  which  he  never  outwardly 
complained,  though  its  sorrows  were  wearing  his  heart 
away.  Public  cares  never  prevented  his  attention  to 
his  College  labors,  nor  to  the  local  municipal  affairs  in 
which  every  American  citizen  of  mark  is  expected  to 
take  an  interest.  He  became  scarcely  less  popular 
henceforward  with  the  students  than  with  his  soldiers 
in  his  days  of  fame;  while  the  residents  around  rever 
enced  his  name  no  less  for  his  patient  bearing  in  his 
state's  adversity  than  for  his  heroic  defence  of  her  in 
dependence.  The  very  children  learnt  to  recognize  as 
a  friend  the  general  who  had  led  their  fathers  to  victo 
ry,  and  went  outof  their  way  to  seek  the  grave  kindly 
smile  which  had  won  their  simple  hearts. 

Two  objects  only  Lee  seemed  to  have  left  during 
these  years  of  retirement  :  the  one,  to  lead  his  country 
men  back  to  the  Union,  against  which  he  had  fought 
with  such  terrible  effect ;  the  other,  to  make  of  those 


132  A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

under  his  charge  men  who  would  grow  up  to  do  honor 
to  it.  Of  the  many  anecdotes  offered  us  by  Mr.  Cooke 
and  other  Virginian  writers,  one  or  two  will  suffice  to 
illustrate  the  spirit  of  his  life. 

"  This  is  one  of  our  old  soldiers  who  is  in  neces 
sity,"  were  his  words  to  a  friend  who  discovered  him  in 
the  act  of  relieving  a  broken-down  wayfaring  man,  and 
adding  kindly  words  to  his  gift.  "  He  fought  on  the 
other  side,"  he  added  in  a  whisper  ;  "  but  we  must  not 
think  of  that."  To  a  lady,  one  of  the  many  widowed 
in  the  war,  who  on  bringing  her  sons  to  the  College 
burst  out  into  a  strain  of  bitterness  against  the  North, 
he  said,  with  a  gentleness  which  gave  the  more  force  to 
his  rebuke:  "  Madam,  do  not  train  up  your  children  in 
hostility  to  the  government  of  the  United  Sates.  Re 
member  we  are  one  country  now.  Pray  dismiss  from 
your  mind  allj,  sectional  feeling^  and  bring  them  up  to 
be^above  all  Americans."  And  all  this  was  while  his 
feelings  as  to  the  original  act  by  which  he  broke  with 
the  Union  remained  unaltered.  For  when  asked  di 
rectly  by  the  Reconstruction  Committee,  "  What  are 
your  own  personal  views  on  the  question  [of  the  origi 
nal  Act  of  Secession]  ?  "  he  replied  unhesitatingly  :  "  It 
was  my  view  that  the  act  of  Virginia  in  withdrawing 
herself  from  the  United  States  carried  me  along  with 
it  as  a  citizen  of  Virginia,  and  that  her  laws  and  acts 
were  binding  on  me."  The  past  tense  being  plainly 
employed  to  signify,  what  he  constantly  expressed  in 
private,  that  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword  to  which  the 
seceding  states  had  appealed  had  quenched  the  suppos 
ed  rights  claimed  by  them  before  the  war,  without 
affecting  their  original  legitimacy. 

Pages  of  anecdotes  might  here  be  gathered  toillus- 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  ^3 

trate  his  care  for  his  other  main  object,  the  welfare  of 
his  students.  That  this  took  a  deeply  religious  form 
will  surprise  no  one  who  knows  that  during  the  war  he 
had  never  ceased  the  regular  use  of  the  well-worn 
pocket  Bible  which  had  been  his  constant  companion 
before  it,  and  which  still  bore  the  inscription  "  R.  E. 
Lee,  Lt.-Colonel,  U.  S.  Army."  .  In  his  comparative 
retirement,  and  meditating  constantly  over  the  sorrows 
of  his  country,  which  he  had  little  power  to  heal,  it  was 
most  natural  that  this  spiritual  side  of  his  character 
should  become  more  plainly  developed.  He  held  to 
the  Episcopal  Church  in  which  he  had  been  brought 
up,  but  never  showed  any  trace  of  that  sectarian  feel 
ing  which  is  almost  as  much  a  reproach  to  American 
Christianity  as  to  that  of  our  own  country  :  and  when 
once  pressed  by  a  forward  inquirer  for  his  opinion 
upon  Apostolical  Succession,  he  expressed  his  simple 
faith  in  the  words  :  "  I  have  not  cared  to  think  deeply 
of  these  things  ;  I  have  aimed  to  be  a  Christian."  Of 
his  limited  income  a  large  part  was  regularly  devoted 
privately  to  charity.  And  his  feelings  for  his  students 
were  expressed  to  one  who  congratulated  him  on  the 
high  state  the  College  had  attained  under  him,  in  words 
expressed  with  all  the  earnestness  of  the  heart's  near 
est  wish:  "  I  shall  be  disappointed,  sir;  I  shall  fail  in 
the  leading  object  that  brought  me  here,  unless  the 
young  men  I  have  charge  of  become  real  Christians." 
In  saying  this,  it  is  recorded,  tears  sprang  to  his  eyes ; 
for  his  feelings  were  ever  warm  and  sympathetic,  and 
his  heart,  as  his  chief  biographer  has  well  said,  "  was 
so  open  to  every  touch  of  gentle  and  quick  emotion, 
as  to  show  that  beneath  his  heroic  character  was  a  vein 
of  almost  feminine  softness."  "A  noble  action,"  are 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

Mr.  Cooke's  words,  "  flushed  his  cheek  with  emotion ; 
a  tale  of  suffering  brought  a  sudden  moisture  to  his 
eyes  ;  and  a  loving  message  from  one  of  his  old  soldiers 
has  been  seen  to  melt  him  to  tears." 

Thus  living  and  thus  minded,  he  was  ready  when 
the  end  -came  suddenly.  No  failing  strength  of  body 
or  faculty  gave  token  of  the  approaching  close  of  that 
great  life.  The  unruffled  health,  which  in  long  years 
of  war  as  of  peace  he  had  enjoyed  unfailingly,  never 
seemed  to  leave  him  till  the  last.  But  his  heart,  long 
bowed  down  by  the  weight  of  his  country's  sorrows,  at 
last  gave  way.  His  death  may  have  been  profession 
ally  ascribed  to  cerebral  congestion  ;  but  the  medical 
attendants  unanimously  declared  this  to  be  but  the 
effect  of  long-suppressed  sorrows :  and  that  this  was 
the  exciting  cause  no  one  could  doubt  who  knew  how 
his  hope  of  complete  peace  and  restored  tranquillity 
was  deferred  from  year  to  year,  and  how  the  mental 
depression  he  struggled  in  vain  to  cast  off  increased  as 
post  after  post  brought  him  piteous  appeals  for  assist 
ance  from  those  who  had  served  under  him,  many  of 
whose  families  were  starving. 

On  September  twenty-eighth,  1870,  he  had  spent  the 
evening  at  a  vestry  meeting  of  the  church  he  attended, 
and  had  headed  a  liberal  subscription  for  the  object 
which  brought  it  together.  On  his  return  to  the  sit 
ting-room  where  the  evening  meal  awaited  him,  his 
wife  remarked  that  he  looked  very  cold.  "  Thank 
you,  I  am  well  wrapped  up,"  was  his  answer  ;  but  the 
words  were  the  last  he  ever  spoke  articulately.  He  sat 
down  and  opened  his  lips  to  say  grace — a  habit,  it  is 
remarked,  he  had  never  failed  to  preserve  amid  all  the 
haste  of  war — but  no  sound  came  from  them,  and  he 


A  MEMOIR  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  135 

presently  sank  back  in  his  chair  in  a  half-insensible 
state,  from  which  he  never  rallied,  expiring  tranquilly 
on  October  twelfth,  with  his  family  around  him. 

So  passed  away  the  greatest  victim  of  the  Civil 
War.  Even  in  the  farthest  North,  where  he  had  once 
been  execrated  as  the  worst  enemy  of  the  Union,  the 
tidings  caused  a  thrill  of  regret.  But  though  America 
has  learnt  to  pardon,  she  has  yet  to  attain  the  full 
reconciliation  for  which  the  dead  hero  would  have 
sacrificed  a  hundred  lives.  Time  only  can  bring  this 
to  a  land  which  in  her  agony  bled  at  every  pore. 
Time,  the  healer  of  all  wounds,  will  bring  it  yet.  The 
day  will  come  when  the  evil  passions  of  the  great  civil 
strife  will  sleep  in  oblivion,  and  North  and  South  do 
justice  to  each  other's  motives,  and  forget  each  other's 
wrongs.  Then  history  will  speak  with  clear  voice  of 
the  deeds  done  on  either  side,  and  the  citizens  of  the 
whole  Union  do  justice  to  the  memories  of  the  dead, 
and  place  above  all  others  the  name  of  the  great  chief 
of  whom  we  have  written.  In  strategy  mighty,  in 
battle  terrible,  in  adversity  as  in  prosperity  a  hero 
indeed,  with  the  simple  devotion  to  duty  and  the  rare 
purity  of  the  ideal  Christian  knight,  he  joined  all  the 
kingly  qualities  of  a  leader  of  men. 

It  is  a  wondrous  future  indeed  that  lies  before 
America ;  but  in  her  annals  of  years  to  come  as  in 
those  of  the  past  there  will  be  found  few  names  that 
can  rival  in  unsullied  lustre  that  of  the  heroic  defender 
of  his  native  Virginia,  Robert  Edward  Lee. 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER   AND 
THE  NA  VY  OF  THE  UNION* 

"To  overcome  the  dangers  springing  from  so  for 
midable  an  insurrection  three  results  must  be  obtained. 
The  shores  of  the  Seceding  States  must  be  effectively 
blockaded ;  the  course  of  the  Mississippi  and  the 
whole  water-system  of  the  West  must  be  mastered  ; 
finally,  the  rebellious  government  must  be  driven  from 
Richmond,  its  chosen  capital."  Such  were  the  broad 
outlines  (as  traced  by  the  Prince  de  Joinville's  clear 
pen)  of  the  great  task  which  lay  before  the  forces  of 
the  Union  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War.  The 
important  part  borne  by  the  American  navy  in  the 
contest ;  its  absolute  performance  of  the  first  portion 
of  the  task  indicated  in  our  opening  lines ;  the  power 
ful  share  taken  by  it  in  the  river  campaigns  which  cut 
the  Seceded  States  in  twain  ;  the  vast  weight  due  to 

o 

its  exertions  in  the  final  successes  of  the  Federal 
generals,  have  been  but  little  noticed  as  compared  to 
the  din  and  shock  of  the  great  battles  with  which  the 
New  World  rang.  Yet  nothing  is  more  surprising  in 
this  great  contest ;  no  military,  political,  or  financial 
success  more  completely  defied  expectation,  prophecy, 
and  precedent ;  than  the  work  wrought  by  this  arm  of 

*  Reports  of  the  Secretary  for  the  American  ATazy  for  1861-65,  with 
Appendices. 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER,  ETC. 

the  Union  forces,  and  wrought  by  it  in  the  very  pro 
cess  of  creation  out  of  actual  nonenity. 

European  journals  have  not  failed  to  make  occa 
sional  comments  on  the  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  American  Navy.     Yet  out  of  the  United  States 
few   persons    are    aware    of  the    extreme    penury    of 
resources  with  which  that  officer  and  his  chief,  the  new 
President,  had  to  contend,  when  the  terrible  fact  of  the 
unavoidable     contest   burst    upon    them.       Even     in 
America  the  full  truth  of  the  difficulties  which,  in  this 
one  department  alone,  beset  the  Cabinet  of  Lincoln, 
has  only  been  made  known  by  the  publication  of  docu 
ments  which,  for  personal  motives,  it  had  been  designed 
to  withhold.     An  attack  upon  the  political  reputation 
of  Mr.  Seward,   made   some  months  after  the  actual 
jclose  of  the  contest,  first  brought  to  light  incidentally 
the  full  particulars  of  the  failure  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter 
in  April   1861,  the  papers  concerning  which  had  been 
'once  laid  before  the  Senate,  but  suppressed  by  that 
body.     The  report  of  Captain  Fox  (afterwards  Assist 
ant  Secretary  of  the  Navy),  the  principal  actor  in  the 
iaffair,  reveals  in  vivid  colors  the  destitute  condition  of 
^the  department  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  and 
the  shifting  nature  of  the  counsels  which  prevailed  at 
Washington  in  the  first  dread  of  provoking  actual  con 
flict.     This  officer,  who  had  left  the  navy  for  private 
employment  before  the  era  of  Secession,  was  one  of 
many  bold  and  active  spirits  who  flocked  back  to  the 
public  service  of  the  Union   when    its   existence  was 
endangered.     Events  so  vast  as  to  afford  a  field  for  the 
most   daring  and  energetic  of  the  sons   of  the  North 
were  at  hand,  and  were  partly  foreseen  by  the  more 
clear-sighted  of  her  politicians,  though  none  fathomed 


138       ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

fully   their   mighty   scope   and    the    great    results   to 
follow. 

On  January  ninth,  1861,  the  "Star  of  the  West,"  a 
vessel  chartered  to  carry  supplies  to  Fort  Sumter,  was 
turned  back  by  shots  from  Morris  Island,  the  first 
hostile  missiles  of  the  civil  war  proclaimed  by  this  out 
rage  on  the  Federal  flag.  Captain  Fox,  being  then  in 
New  York,  and  well  acquainted  with  the  approaches 
to  Charleston,  lost  no  time  in  laying  before  certain 
eminent  merchants  of  strong  Union  principles  his 
"  views  as  to  the  possibility  of  relieving  the  garrison, 
and  the  dishonor  which  would  be  justly  merited  by  the 
government,  unless  immediate  measures  were  taken  to 
fulfil  this  sacred  duty."  Into  the  details  of  his  pro 
posal  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  here.  So  much  effect 
did  his  vehemence  and  energy  exercise  on  the  hearers, 
that  one  of  them,  Mr.  Marshall,  undertook  to  furnish 
and  provision  the  necessary  vessels  forthwith.  While 
these  preparations  were  made,  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  were  communicated  with;  and  on  February 
sixth  Captain  Fox  was  present  at  the  capital,  sum 
moned  by  a  telegram  from  General  Scott.  Next  day 
his  plan  was  fully  discussed  in  the  presence  of  Mr. 
Buchanan  ;  but  the  simple  vacillation  of  the  latter  was 
(as  his  own  confessions  indicate)  changed  into  down 
right  weakness  when  news  arrived  on  the  following 
morning,  that  the  Seceding  States  had  actually  pro 
ceeded  to  the  election  of  a  President  of  their  own. 
"  I  called  upon  General  Scott,"  says  Captain  Fox,  "  and 
he  intimated  to  me  that  probably  no  effort  would  be 
made  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter.  He  seemed  much  dis 
appointed  and  astonished ;  I  therefore  returned  to 
New  York  on  February  ninth."  Nor  can  we  wonder 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION. 

it  the  retiring  President's  hopeless  view  of  the  case, 
vhen  we  learn  from  Mr.  Welles's  first  report  that  the 
lumber  of  seamen  officially  under  the  control  of  the 
>Javy  Department  in  the  first  week  of  March  amounted 
:o  less  than  300  on  home  service,  with  a  proportionately 
ow  supply  of  stores!  This  weakness  was,  however, 
n  the  main  ostensible  only  ;  for  but  a  brief  time  was 
leeded  to  show  what  a  fund  of  energy  private  will 
:ould  supply,  and  what  wealth  of  means  private 
-esources  could  create  when  the  spirit  of  the  Northern 
States  should  be  fairly  aroused  to  grapple  with  the 
:risis  of  their  fate. 

That  crisis  was  rapidly  approaching.  The  day  of 
:ompromises  and  expedients  ceased  with  Buchanan ; 
and  his  successor,  Mr.  Lincoln,  was  no  sooner  installed 
in  the  seat  of  peril,  when  the  naval  enterprise  which 
had  been  at  first  rejected  was  again  entertained. 

Dismissed  by  the  new  President  with  verbal  instruc 
tions,  Captain  Fox  is  again  found  at  New  York  in  con 
sultation  with  his  merchant  friends,  "  and  making  pre 
liminary  arrangements  for  the  voyage."  At  these  inter- 
jviews,  no  doubt,  was  laid  the  foundation  of  that  new 
naval  system  to  be  created  through  private  agency  for 
the  public  service,  which  may  be  considered  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  products  of  the  great  Civil  War. 

Undaunted  by  the  withdrawal  from  the  project  of 
his  first  ally,  Mr.  Marshall,  who  thought  "that  the  peo 
ple  had  made  up  their  minds  to  abandon  Sumter," 
Captain  Fox  pressed  his  project  forward.  "  Delays 
which  belong  to  the  secret  history  of  the  time;"  in 
plainer  words,  the  irresolution  of  the  majority  of  Lin 
coln's  advisers  and  its  effect  upon  their  chief, 


140 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 


"  prevented  a  decision  until  the  afternoon  of  April  fourth,  when 
the  President  sent  for  me,  and  said  that  he  had  decided  to  let 
the  expedition  go,  and  that  ...  I  should  best  fulfil  my  duty 
to  my  country  to  make  the  attempt.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  had  in  commission,  in  the  Atlantic  waters  of  the  United 
States,  only  the  Powhatan,  Pocahontas,  and  Pawnee,  all 
these  he  placed  at  my  disposal,  as  well  as  the  revenue  steamer 
Harriet  Lane,  and  directed  me  to  give  all  the  necessary 
orders." 


On  April  twelfth,  Captain  Fox  in  a  borrowed  steamer 
made  the  rendezvous  of  Charleston,  just  three  hours* 
before  the  fire  on  Fort  Sumter  was  opened.  The 
expedition  proved  unable  to  succor  it.  The  weather 
was  rough  and  the  means  for  landing  in  the  night  (the 
pith  of  the  design)  totally  inadequate.  Moreover,  the 
squadron  was  left  unexpectedly  incomplete.  A  heavy 
gale  along  the  coast  fully  accounted  for  the  non-appear 
ance  of  certain  hired  tug-boats  ;  but  the  Powhatan  was 
looked  for  all  day,  and  through  the  night,  signals  in 
vain  thrown  up.  It  was  not  until  the  next  morning, 
that  of  the  surrender  of  the  fort,  that  Captain  Fox  first 
learnt  that  the  missing  frigate  had  been  carried  off  to 
another  service  by  still  higher  orders  than  those  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  instructions  of  the  latter 
to  her  captain,  Mercer  (who  was  to  act  as  senior  naval 
officer),  had  been  issued  in  elaborate  detail  on  April 
5th,  the  morning  after  the  President's  promise  to  Fox 
that  the  expedition  should  sail.  That  in  this  promise 
the  Powhatan  was  specifically  included  does  not  appear  ; 
but  that  both  Mr.  Welles  and  Captain  Fox  so  under 
stood  it  is  perfectly  clear,  although  this  all-important 
ship  (as  they  considered  it)  was  in  reality  already 


THE  NA  VY  OF  THE  UNION.  14  i 

ecretly  engaged  for  another  service,  destined  to  be  the 
.rst  step  on  his  way  to  honor  of  the  afterwards  famous 
Admiral,  then  Lieutenant,  Porter,  a  naval  officer  whose 
alents  had  already  brought  him  into  the  private  coun- 
ils  of  President  Lincoln. 

For  while  Fox  had  been  pressing  forward  his  pro- 
ect  for  the  relief  of  Sumter,  Captain  Meigs  of  the 
Engineers  (distinguished  later  for  his  services  as  Quar- 
ermaster-General)  had  been  not  less  urgent  with  the 
Resident  to  attempt  the  reinforcement  of  the  troops 
.t  Fort  Pickens,  the  key  of  Pensacola  Harbor.  This 
>ort  was  so  weakly  garrisoned  as  to  be  subject  to  sur- 
>rise  from  Bragg's  Confederate  force  on  the  main  land  ; 
ind  yet  of  itself  it  was  known  to  be  far  more  susceptible 
!>f  defence  than  Fort  Sumter;  while  Porter  was  confi- 
lent  that  its  relief  by  a  dash  from  the  sea-side  was  an 
idventure  that  only  needed  secresy  and  speed  to  insure 
)erfect  success.  Whether  the  merely  military  view  of 
'he  question  ;  or  the  advice  of  Mr.  Seward,  who  fa- 
'ored  this  project ;  or  the  secret  belief  of  the  President 
:hat  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter  was  of  more  political  value 
i:han  the  holding  it  to  the  Federal  cause,  prevailed  in 
'Lincoln's  decision  over  the  arguments  of  Fox,  is  not 
:lear.  A  consolatory  letter  addressed  soon  afterwards 
:o  the  latter  by  the  President  concludes  with  a  remark- 
ible  expression,  which  seems  to  justify  the  belief  that 
';he  failure  to  relieve  and  consequent  surrender  of  Sum- 
:er  were  events  foreseen  without  much  reluctance. 
The  paragraph  ran  thus  : 

"  For  a  daring  and  dangerous  enterprise  of  a  similar  char 
acter,  you  would  to-day  be  the  man,  of  all  my  acquaintances, 
vvhom  I  would  select.  You  and  I  both  anticipated  that  the 


•  142       ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

cause  of  the  country  would  be  advanced  by  making  the  attempt 
to  provision  Fort  Sumter,  even  if  it  should  fail" 

Whatever  was  the  motive,  the  President  chose 
rather  to  sacrifice  his  failing  hold  on  Charleston  har 
bor  than  give  up  the  other  fort  at  Pensacola.  And 
so  small  was  the  degree  of  confidence  at  that  times 
reposed  in  his  own  officials,  that  Mr.  Welles,  the  Naval- 
Secretary,  remained  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  new- 
design,  and  was  actually  suffered  (as  we  have  seen)  to 
issue  instructions  which  secret  and  imperious  orders 
from  his  chief,  set  aside.  For  when  the  Powhatan  was 
ready  for  sea  and  about  to  quit  New  York  for  Charles 
ton,  Porter  and  Meigs  suddenly  stepped  on  board  ;  and 
the  former  producing  the  President's  sign-manual 
authorizing  the  proceeding,  assumed  command  of  the 
frigate  and  diverted  her  course  from  the  Carolina  coast 
to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

"  It  was  not  [says  General  Meigs,  in  a  recently  published 
account]  without  some  hesitation  that  Captain  Mercer  gave 
up  the  ship.  But  the  positive  order  of  the  President,  detach 
ing  him  and  placing  Lieutenant  Porter  in  command,  over 
ruled  the  order  of  the  Navy  Department.  The  conflict  was 
the  result  of  the  secresy  with  which  the  whole  business  was 
conducted,  and  to  that  secresy,  in  a  great  measure,  was  due 
the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens,  and  the  retention  of  this  finest  har 
bor  in  the  South  by  the  United  States." 

Besides  preserving  the  control  of  the  harbor  of 
Pensacola  (which  the  Union  forces  never  from  that  time 
found  difficulty  in  holding),  Porter  and  his  coadjutors 
were  enabled  on  their  way  to  save  the  islands  of  Key 
West  and  the  Tortugas  from  yielding  to  the  state  au- 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  ^3 

i;horities  of  Florida.  So  rapid  and  complete  was  their 
success,  that  the  first  news  of  it  was  brought  back  by 
.Captain  Meigs  himself,  up  to  the  time  of  whose  arrival 
:he  true  destination  of  the  Powhatan,  and  of  the  steam 
-.ransport  Atlantic,  which  had  accompanied  her,  was 
unknown  to  any  save  the  President  and  the  officers 
who  executed  the  design  ! 

It  is  not  surprising  that  in  his  first  report,  that  of 
July  1861,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  makes  no  allusion 
to  an  achievement  the  conception  of  which  had  been 
kept  secret  from  him  ;  nor  that  Captain   Fox  appears 
to  have  long  harbored  a  very  bitter  feeling  against  Mr. 
Seward,  to   whose  personal  advice  he   attributed  the 
'President's  decision.     We  are  not  here  concerned  with 
the  personal  or  party  aspect  of  the  question,  but  have 
rbrought  this,  the  first  episode  of  the  naval  warfare   in 
^America,  prominently  forward  ;  partly  for  the  light  it 
ithrows  on  the  political  chaos  out  of  which  so  much  en- 
•ergy,  valor,  and  statesmanship  was  to  be   born ;  partly 
for  the  picture  it  affords  of  the  extraordinary  want   of 
any   ready   means   by  which  the  Government  of  the 
iUnion  could  assert  its   authority.     The   Congress  ad- 
jjourning  without  providing  any  men  or  material  to  meet 
•the  threatened  danger :  the  fleet  so  reduced   that   but 
one  steam  frigate  could  be  found  to  execute  all  the  de 
signs  the  President  might  have  for  the  control  of  the 
seceding  ports  :  a  Secretary  of  the  Navy  so  new  to  his 
trust  that  it  was  thought  necessary  to  keep  from   him 
the  knowledge  of  the  orders  sent  to   his  own   depart 
ment  :  a  lieutenant  sent  with  secret  orders  to  supersede 
the  post-captain  on  the  deck  of  his  own   ship,  and   at 
the  hour  of  his  departure  on  an  important  service  :  ex 
peditions  involving  civil  war  urged  on  the  government 


144 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 


by  private  citizens,  who  yet  made  their  aid  dependent 
on  the  undeclared  will  of  the  people;  such  were  some 
of  the  strange  circumstances  which  surrounded  the 
Executive  of  the  Great  Republic  in  the  day  wrhen  its 
power  by  land  and  sea  seemed  rent  in  twain.  Never 
if  war  must  come,  had  a  commercial  state  more  need 
of  a  navy.  Never  were  the  apparent  difficulties  of  cre 
ating  one  greater  ;  for  many  of  the  merchant  princes 
of  the  North  were  inclined  to  take  a  more  lukewarm 
view  of  the  Union  cause  when  its  defence  seemed  to 
threaten  danger  to  their  foreign  trade,  than  in  the  first 
moments  of  excitement,  before  the  cost  was  fully 
counted. 

Lincoln  however  was  more  fortunate  in  his  Cabinet. 
Neither  he  nor  any  of  his  advisers  shrank  from  the 
mere  magnitude  of  the  duties  thronging  on  them,  nor 
lacked  that  faith  in  their  cause  which  should  hereafter 
carry  the  whole  North  with  it  to  a  triumphant  end. 
Mr.  Welles  swallowed  manfully  enough  the  mortifica 
tion  he  had  felt,  and  applied  himself  with  diligence  to 
the  vast  task  before  him ;  while  Captain  Fox  was  soon 
to  find  that  the  President's  expressions  of  satisfaction 
with  his  conduct  in  the  Sumter  affair  were  no  mere 
perfunctory  commendations.  An  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  was  one  of  the  first  additional  offices  rec 
ommended  for  the  sanction  of  the  new  Congress  ;  and 
on  the  approval  of  that  body  being  obtained  to  this  ad 
dition  to  the  now  important  bureau,  the  appointment 
was  at  once  conferred  on  Captain  Fox,  who  held  it  un 
til  the  war  was  brought  to  a  successful  end.  No  better 
selection  could  have  been  made.  The  happy  combina 
tion  he  possessed  of  cultivated  professional  knowledge 
with  close  experience  of  the  details  of  the  Northern 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  i^ 

shipping  trade,  enabled  him,  in  a  degree  to  which  per 
haps  no  other  man  could  have  attained,  to  utilize  the 
resources  of  the  latter  for  the  supply  of  the  vast  de 
ficiencies  existing  in  the  department  of  which  through 
out  the  struggle  he  held  practical  charge. 

How  great  these  deficiencies  were  appears  sufficient 
ly  in  the  first  report  of  Mr.  Welles,  made  before  the 
appointment  of  his  energetic  and  able  coadjutor. 
There  is  a  brevity  and  a  frankness  about  the  bare 
statements  in  this  paper,  which  contrast  not  unfavora 
bly  with  the  more  labored  narratives  of  the  work 
achieved  by  the  department  in  those  which  came  later. 
Forty-two  ships  in  commission,  with  a  complement  of 
7,600  men,  formed  the  active  fleet  of  the  United  States 
at  the  accession  of  Lincoln  ;  and  while  thirty  of  these 
were  absent  on  foreign  stations,  four  only  of  the  re 
mainder,  manned  by  280  sailors,  constituted  the  exact 
force  left  in  the  harbors  of  the  states  adhering  to  the 
Union. 

But  more  serious  still  was  the  disaffection  among 
the  naval  officers,  a  far  larger  proportion  of  whom  than 
in  the  army  sympathized  to  the  full  with  the  objects 
of  Secession.  It  was  found  possible  at  a  later  time  to 
fill  the  posts  of  the  260  who  resigned  their  commissions 
with  volunteers,  who,  like  Captain  Fox,  had  been 
brought  up  to  the  service.  But  before  this  could  be 
done,  one  of  the  principal  naval  depots,  the  yard  at 
Norfolk,  had  fallen  into  hostile  hands.  In  it  was  a 
large  steam  frigate,  the  Merrimack,  now  nearly  com 
plete,  which  the  Confederates,  on  the  hasty  evacuation 
of  the  place,  succeeded  in  saving  from  the  flames  when 
some  lesser  vessels  perished.  Possessing  thus  at  least 
one  formidable  vessel  of  war,  they  forthwith  proceeded, 

10 


I46      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

with  an  ingenuity  which  made  up  for  the  limited  means 
at  their  command,  to  convert  her  into  such  an  invinci 
ble  iron-clad  as  might  hope  to  defy  all  the  fleets  of  the 
North.  To  the  foresight  and  activity  of  Captain  Fox 
it  was  due  that  this  design  was  foiled  in  the  end,  by 
the  counter-measures  adopted  at  his  instance. 

Before  his  official  appointment  as  assistant  to  Mr. 
Welles,  that  statesman  had  in  this  report  brought  the 
subject  of  iron-clad  vessels  before  the  House  of  Con 
gress  ;  and  a  vote  of  a  million  and  a  half  of  dollars  be 
ing  granted  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  experimental 
models,  three  of  those  submitted  were  speedily  selected 
for  practical  trial.  The  first  of  the  ships  thus  ordered 
was  the  "  Ironsides  ;  "  a  steam  sloop  armored  through 
out  with  4J--inch  plates,  and  designed  to  carry  eight  of 
the  Dahlgren  ii-inch  hollow-shot  guns,  up  to  that 
time  the  heaviest  piece  known  in  the  navy.  The  next 
was  the  famous  invention  of  Captain  Ericsson,  the 
"  Monitor,"  the  first  ship  built  with  a  revolving  turret, 
The  principles  of  her  construction  were  (as  is  univer 
sally  known)  altogether  new  in  the  history  of  naval 
architecture,  and  on  their  general  scope  it  is  not  need 
ful  here  to  dwell.  Plated  very  imperfectly,  slow,  and 
dangerously  unseaworthy,  inferior  even  in  armament  to 
her  successors  (her  two  guns  being  i  i-inch,  one  of 
theirs  always  1 5-inch),  she  yet,  by  her  prompt  prepara 
tion  and  opportune  dispatch  to  the  Chesapeake,  arrived 
to  do  such  service  in  her  single  harbor  action  as  few  ves 
sels  of  the  longest  sea-going  history  can  claim  ;  for  her 
success  secured  its  naval  base  to  the  army  of  M'Clellan. 

Undeterred  by  the  sneers  of  the  numerous  critics, 
\yho  prophesied  that  the  Monitor  would  never  float,  or 
if  floating  could  never  venture  beyond  Sandy  Hook, 


THE  NA  VY  OF  THE   UNION. 


147 


the  inventor  and  his  employer  with  equal  eagerness 
pressed  her  to  completion.  Such  confidence  did  Fox 
and  Ericsson  inspire  in  Mr.  Welles  as  the  "  Floating 
Iron  Battery  "  (her  first  official  name)  drew  near  com 
pletion,  that  the  Secretary,  before  the  time  of  actual 
test  arrived,  applied  for  and  obtained,  with  a  little  gen 
tle  pressure,  a  special  vote  from  Congress  for  twenty 
more  iron-clad  gun-boats,  the  greater  part  of  which 
were  ordered  to  be  constructed  at  once  on  the  Moni 
tor  principle.  The  additions  already  made  to  the 

i  strength  of  the  navy  in  the  first  four  months  of  Mr. 
Welles's  charge,  comprised,  besides  eight  steam-sloops 
sanctioned  by  the  previous  Congress,  twelve  large 
steamers  bought,  and  nine  more  hired  from  the  mer 
chant  service,  to  be  fitted  for  war  purposes  with  from 

•  two  to  nine  guns  each.  Much  of  the  report  of  July 
1861  is  devoted  to  an  apology  for  the  responsibility 
assumed  by  the  Secretary  in  making  this  provision, 
and  in  ordering  from  private  yards  twenty-three  gun 
boats  of  about  five  hundred  tons  each  ;  measures  which 
are  especially  justified  by  a  reference  to  the  violence 

|  committed  at  Norfolk  on  the  naval  property  of  the 
Union,  and  to  the  insurrection  against  the  Washington 
authorities  of  the  people  of  Baltimore.  It  is  evident 
that  Mr.  Welles  was  yet  in  some  uncertainty  as  to  the 
support  the  Cabinet  might  receive  in  their  vigorous 
action  ;  an  uncertainty  at  once  removed  by  the  prompt 
approval  of  the  Congress  specially  summoned  to  decide 
whether  the  Union  was  to  be  saved  by  war. 

In  the  next  report  (that  of  December  1861)  it  is 
vain  to  look  for  any  great  progress  beyond  that  shown 
by  returns  of  expenditure,  purchase,  and  blockade  cap 
tures.  With  the  exception  of  the  disastrous  campaign 


148      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

ending  at  Bull's  Run,  the  autumn  of  this  year  was 
chiefly  spent  by  the  North  in  gathering  up  her  strength 
by  land  and  sea  for  that  great  war  which  she  now  saw 
plainly  must  be  passed  through  if  the  Union  was  to  be 
saved.  Critics  there  were  in  abundance,  at  home  and 
abroad,  ready  to  denounce  the  expenditure  as  profli 
gate,  and  the  hope  of  reconquest  as  visionary.  Yet 
every  month  added  to  the  majority  who  supported 
Congress  in  their  resolution  to  place  the  national  forces 
on  a  thoroughly  serviceable  footing ;  and  Captain  Fox 
and  his  superior  availed  themselves  to  the  full  of  the 
grants  made  for  their  department.  Supplemental  esti 
mates  for  five  millions  of  our  money  had  been  submit 
ted  in  the  summer  session,  and  sanctioned  without 
delay ;  so  that  now,  in  addition  to  the  engaging  by 
special  bounties,  a  respectable  number  of  seamen,  one 
hundred  and  twenty-one  more  vessels  had  been  pur 
chased  from  merchants  and  converted  into  transports 
or  vessels  of  war,  in  addition  to  fifty-two  begun  or 
actually  completed  in  the  yards,  or  under  special  con 
tracts — the  greater  part  by  the  latter  means.  Of  the 
old  navy  the  number  of  vessels  brought  into  service 
was  seventy  six  ;  but  one-half  of  those  were  sailing- 
vessels,  unsuited  to  the  new  exigencies  of  the  service. 
It  had  already  become  evident  that  the  proclamation 
of  blockade,  without  an  abundant  use  of  steam-power, 
would  have  proved  a  nullity  ;  while  the  capture  now 
reported  of  one  hundred  and  fifty-three  vessels  attempt 
ing  to  break  it,  proved  the  wisdom  of  (we  quote  from 
Mr.  Welles's  fuller  description  in  a  later  report)  "  the 
steps  which  were  promptly  taken  to  recall  the  foreign 
squadrons,  and  to  augment  the  navy  by  repairing  and 
fitting,  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  every  available  ves- 


THE  NA  VY  OF  THE   UNION.  149 

sel,  by  rapidly  constructing  as  many  steamers  as  could 
be  built  at  the  navy-yards,  and  by  employing,  to  the 
extent  that  we  could  procure  materials,  engines  and 
machinery,  the  resources  of  the  country  in  adding 
others  from  private  ship-yards." 

On  the  whole,  however,  the  year  1861  had  given 
but  little  opportunity  to  show  whether  the  American 
navy,  under  the  new  conditions  would  prove  equal  to 
its  former  reputation.  The  validity  of  its  blockade,  the 
one  work  really  accomplished,  was  questioned  daily  in 
the  foreign  press,  whose  critics,  swayed  often  by  na 
tional  or  party  prejudice,  measured  it  by  the  notorious 
number  of  escapes  rather  than  by  its  practical  effects 
upon  the  South.  Yet  as  we  now  look  coolly  back,  it  is 
evident  that  the  marine  department  of  the  Union  forces 
had  done  more  during  this  period  of  general  girding 
for  the  strife  than  the  administration  of  the  sister  ser 
vice.  It  is  true  that  masses  of  volunteers  were  accept 
ed  for  the  army  and  placed  in  camp :  but  until  Bull's 
Run  had  been  lost,  not  the  smallest  attempt  was  made 
•  to  give  them  consistency  and  value  by  a  working  staff. 

Passing  forward  another  year  in  our  review,  we  find 
more  conspicuous  successes  obtained  by  the  energy  of 
Mr.  Welles's  able  assistant  than  perhaps  even  he  had 
dreamed  of,  when  the  mantle  of  office  fell  on  him  in  a 
fortunate  hour  for  the  Union.  The  general  result  of 
his  exertions,  and  of  the  support  and  confidence  he  re 
ceived  from  the  President  and  Mr.  Welles,  is  best  giv 
en  in  the  words  of  the  latter's  report  of  December 
1862: 

"  We  have  at  this  time  afloat  or  progressing  to  rapid  com 
pletion  a  naval  force  consisting  of  427  vessels,  there  having 


ISO 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGTT  AND  PORTER  AND 


been  added  to  those  of  the  old  navy  enumerated  in  my  report 
of  July  1861,  exclusive  of  those  that  were  lost,  363  vessels, 
armed  in  the  aggregate  with  1,577  guns,  and  of  the  capacity 
of  240,028  tons. 

"  The  annals  of  the  world  do  not  show  so  great  an  increase 
in  so  brief  a  period  to  the  naval  power  of  any  country.  It 
affords  me  satisfaction  to  state  that  the  acquisitions  made  to 
the  navy  from  the  commercial  marine  have  proved  to  be  of 
an  excellent  character,  and  though  these  vessels  were  not 
built  for  war  purposes,  and  consequently  have  not  the  strength 
of  war  vessels,  they  have  performed  all  the  service  that  was 
expected  of  them." 

Some  exceptions  may  of  course  be  made  to  this 
broad  statement ;  but  the  history  of  the  navy  had  now 
become  largely  the  history  of  the  war,  and  it  is  ne 
cessary  to  survey  its  achievements  a  little  more  in  de 
tail,  in  order  to  see  how  great  a  share  it  had  already 
taken  in  determining  the  course  of  events. 

The  greatest  success,  as  a  purely  naval  operation, 
of  the  whole  war — the  greatest  in  naval  history  since 
Exmouth's  victory  at  Algiers — was  that  achieved  in 
the  course  of  the  spring  of  1862,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi.  Captain  Farragut,  whom  Welles  had 
specially  selected  as  fitted  by  his  resolute  character  to 
take  charge  of  the  active  operations  in  that  quarter, 
arrived  at  the  scene  of  action  in  February  with  the 
new  rank  of  Flag  Officer,  soon  afterwards  raised  to  that 
of  Rear-Admiral,  which  a  special  Act  allowed  the  Pres 
ident  to  confer  on  any  captain  or  commander  chosen  to 
lead  a  naval  force.  The  Western  Gulf  Squadron  had 
been  gradually  increased  from  a  few  blockading  vessels 
to  a  powerful  fleet  of  6  steam  frigates  and  12  large  gun- 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  \^\ 

boats.  To  these  a  flotilla  of  20  bomb-vessels  under 
Porter  (raised  to  commander's  rank  for  his  earlier  ser 
vices)  was  added  by  the  eighteenth  of  March.  But  the 
obstacles  to  be  overcome  were  of  the  most  formidable 
character.  Two  strong  forts — Jackson  on  the  west 
bank,  St.  Philip  on  the  east — were  connected  by  a  huge 
boom  of  rafts  and  hulks,  the  approach  to  which,  to  be 
made  against  a  powerful  current,  was  swept  with  their 
fire  of  80  guns,  and  seemed  thus  to  bar  wholly  the  way 
up  the  stream.  Above  this  obstruction  a  flotilla  of 
gun-boats  was  ready  to  support  the  fire  of  the  works  ; 
and  iron-clad  rams  were  known  to  have  been  some  time 
in  preparation  in  order  to  employ  in  the  coming  war 
fare  that  use  of  the  blow  of  the  prow  disused  for  so 
many  centuries,  but  now  revived  by  the  power  of 
steam. 

The  first  attempt  of  this  kind  in  modern  history 
had  been  already  made  off  one  of  the  mouths  of  the 
river  by  Commodore  Hollins  of  the  Confederate  service 
in  the  previous  October,  when  he  had  attacked  and  all 
but  driven  off  a  blockading  squadron  with  the  ram 
Manasses,  a  small  river-steamer  plated  rudely  with 
railroad  iron.  Thus  early  in  the  war,  however,  the 
means  of  the  Confederates  proved  unequal  to  the  car 
rying  out  their  bold  designs.  The  shock  of  the  ram 
fell  partly  as  it  happened,  on  a  coaling  schooner  along 
side  the  steamer  Richmond,  the  vessel  attacked  ;  and 
although  the  latter  was  considerably  damaged,  she  was 
not  reduced  to  a  sinking  condition,  while  the  ram  suf 
fered  so  much  in  her  machinery  as  to  be  disabled  from 
continuing  the  contest.  A  further  attempt  on  the 
same  occasion  to  destroy  the  alarmed  blockaders  with 
fire-barges  failed  also,  the  former  succeeding  in  drifting 


152      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

out  of  the  way  of  the  danger.  Hollins  then  drew  off 
without  any  practical  advantage  gained  beyond  the 
prestige  established  in  favor  of  the  dashing  mode  of 
warfare  which  he  had  the  credit  of  being  the  first  to 
revive,  and  which  the  fleet  of  Farragut  had  to  prepare 
for,  as  one  of  the  most  dangerous  obstacles  to  their 
enterprise. 

The  navy  was  from  the  first  designed  to  bear  the 
labor  and  reap  the  honor  of  the  capture  of  New 
Orleans  unsupported  ;  although  General  Butler,  with 
18,000  men,  was  dispatched  to  the  scene  of  action.  It 
may  be  that  the  fatal  example  of  Pakenham's  defeat  in 
his  attempt  to  reach  the  city  by  land  influenced  the 
arrangements  of  Welles  and  Fox.  Certain  it  is  that 
their  instructions  to  Farragut  set  aside  all  thought  of 
active  use  of  the  troops  in  the  attack.  Their  simple 
wording  ran  (after  some  preliminary  details)  thus : — 

"  When  you  are  completely  ready  .  .  .  you  will  proceed 
up  the  Mississippi  river,  and  reduce  the  defences  which 
guard  the  approaches  to  New  Orleans,  when  you  will  appear 
off  that  city  and  take  possession  of  it  under  the  guns  of  your 
squadron,  and  hoist  the  American  flag  therein,  keeping 
possession  until  troops  can  be  sent  to  you.  ...  As  you  have 
expressed  yourself  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  force  given  to 
you,  and  as  many  more  powerful  vessels  will  be  added  before 
you  can  commence  operations,  the  department  and  the  coun 
try  will  require  of  you  success." 

Such  success  might  have  been  all  but  impossible 
had  the  Confederate  resistance  been  as  perfectly  organ 
ized  as  at  the  time  was  believed.  A  full  knowledge 
of  the  truth  as  it  may  be  gained  from  the  official  re 
ports  laid  before  the  Richmond  Congress,  shows  not 


THE  NA  VY  OF  THE   UNION.  i$<$ 

only  that  much  was  left  undone  in  the  way  of  material 
preparation  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  but  that 
their  commanders  were  wanting  in  the  unity,  vigor, 
and  activity  opposed  to  them  by  their  formidable 
assailants. 

Farragut's  earliest  reports  refer  chiefly  to  the  trans 
port  of  the  needful  supplies,  and  to  the  steps  taken 
for  carrying  the  larger  steamers  over  the  bar.  The 
difficulties  here  encountered  were  greater  than  had 
been  anticipated,  and  it  was  only  on  April  eighth 
that  the  frigates  were  completely  brought  over  the 
obstacle,  with  the  exception  of  the  heaviest,  the  Colo 
rado,  which  it  was  found  impossible  to  tow  through 
the  mud-banks,  however  she  was  lightened.  The  rest 
had  then  to  be  fully  armed  and  coaled  ;  and  in  the 
meanwhile  the  whole  squadron  was  fitted  for  the  com 
ing  conflict,  under  orders  previously  prepared  by  the 
flag-officer  with  elaborate  care  to  meet  the  various 
contingencies  of  a  battle  fought  in  the  contracted 
space  of  a  river's  width.  The  mere  issuing  of  instruc 
tions  was  by  no  means  the  limit  of  Farragut's  care  for 
his  command.  Imitating,  perhaps  unconsciously,  the 
scrupulous  anxiety  of  Nelson  before  the  victory  of  the 
Nile,  he  visited  every  vessel  under  his  flag,  and  saw 
that  the  commander  personally  comprehended  his  own 
share  in  the  work.  Thus,  too,  he  was  enabled  (as  his 
detailed  report  discovers)  to  utilize  such  suggestions  as 
the  ingenuity  of  individuals  offered.  The  first  of  these 
was  by  the  engineer  of  the  Richmond,  who  proposed 
that  the  sheet-cables  should  be  stopped  up  and  down 
the  sides  in  the  line  of  the  engines — a  plan  which  was 
immediately  adopted  by  all  the  vessels.  Then  each 
commander  made  his  own  arrangements  for  prevent- 


154 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 


ing  the  shot  from  penetrating  the  boilers  or  machinery, 
by  hammocks,  coal,  bags  of  ashes,  bags  of  sand,  clothes- 
bags,  and  in  fact  every  device  imaginable.  The  bul 
warks  were  lined  with  hammocks  by  some,  by  splinter- 
nettings  made  with  ropes,  by  others.  Some  rubbed 
their  vessels  outside  with  mud,  to  make  their  ships  less 
visible,  and  some  whitewashed  their  decks,  to  make 
things  more  visible  during  the  fight,  for  the  actual  con 
flict  was  to  take  place  in  the  night. 

While  thus  consulting  in  person  with  his  captains, 
all  of  whose  opinions  Farragut  heard,  that  of  Com 
mander  Porter,  was  listened  to  with  a  deference  cor 
responding  to  his  important  charge  and  the  reputation 
he  had  already  gained,  rather  than  to  his  relative 
rank.  In  his  general  order  of  April  twentieth  the  flag- 
officer  freely  avowed  this,  and  declared  himself  to  be 
about  to  essay  an  attack  which  was  a  combination  of 
two  modes  suggested  by  that  able  and  daring  officer. 
The  forts  were  at  all  risks  to  be  run  past  in  the  dark, 
and  the  troops  to  be  left  behind  until  a  sufficient  naval 
force  to  protect  them  was  in  the  river  above  at  a  point 
(called  the  Quarantine)  near  to  which  they  might  be 
conveyed  by  a  shallow  creek  which  turned  the  Con 
federate  main  works.  The  latter  could  then  be  effect 
ually  besieged,  while  the  bulk  of  the  joint  forces  moved 
up  along  the  stream,  prepared  to  operate  further  by 
land  or  water  according  to  the  means  of  resistance,  as 
yet  hardly  guessed  at,  which  the  enemy  possessed. 
This  project  was  in  the  end  not  executed  in  its  integ 
rity  only  because,  the  forts  once  passed,  opposition 
practically  ceased.  The  assault  was  preluded  by  a 
bombardment  from  Porter's  heavy  mortars.  After 
careful  reconnoissance  that  officer  had  towed  his  flotilla 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION. 


155 


within  range  of  the  works  by  the  morning  of  April 
eighteenth  and  the  work  of  destruction  began  by  their 
throwing  that  day  nearly  3,000  large  shells  about  the 
heads  of  the  garrison. 

Those  who  have  wondered  at  the  success  obtained 
at  New  Orleans  need  do  so  no  more  when  they  con 
trast  the  completeness  of  the  Federal  preparations, 
and  the  vigor  and  decision  with  which  Farragut  at  the 
proper  moment  went  to  work,  with  the  divided  coun 
sels  and  inefficient  armaments  opposed  to  them  by  the 
Confederates.  On  March  twenty-seventh,  General 
Duncan,  a  well-known  artillerist,  who  personally  com 
manded  the  defences,  became  aware  that  the  enemy's 
fleet  was  crossing  the  bar.  Both  he  and  his  superior, 
General  Lovell,  had  previously  anticipated  this,  and 
had  made  urgent  and  repeated  applications  for  a 
change  of  armament  at  the  forts,  the  guns  in  which 
were  but  old  32  and  42-pounders,  justly  held  to  be 
unfit  for  repelling  the  steam  fleet  which  threatened  the 
place ;  while  a  second  line  of  works  nearer  to  the  city 
mounted  but  twelve  of  the  former  pieces,  having  been 
stripped  even  of  the  latter  "at  the  urgent  request  of 
the  naval  authorities,"  who  wished  to  use  this  part  of 
the  armament  on  some  gun-boats  fitting  for  defence 
of  the  creeks.  That  this  most  serious  mistake  of  not 
supplying  proper  ordnance  arose  from  underrating  the 
imminence  of  the  danger  on  the  river  side  appears 
plainly  from  General  Lovell's  reports.  These  also 
show  how  early  in  the  war  the  Confederate  naval 
authorities  had  turned  their  attention  to  the  use  of 
iron-clad  vessels,  of  which  two  large  specimens,  in 
tended  both  for  ramming  and  carrying  guns  in  shot- 
proof  batteries,  were  being  prepared  at  New  Orleans. 


156      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  FOR TER  AND 

Happily  for  the  success  of  the  Union  fleet,  the  mechan 
ical  means  which  their  foes  controlled  were  by  no 
means  equal  to  their  powers  of  conception.  This  de 
ficiency  produced  continual  delay ;  while  the  readiness 
of  Fox  and  Farragut  was  so  far  beyond  that  anticipa 
ted  by  their  professional  opponents,  that  the  iron-clads 
(originally  designed  for  February  first)  wrere  found 
unprepared  for  use  when  the  Federal  fleet,  three 
months  later,  burst  its  way  through  to  the  fated  city. 

"  Immediately"  [says  General  Lovell]  "  after  I  assumed 
command  of  the  department,  finding  there  were  no  guns  of 
the  heaviest  calibre,  I  applied  to  Richmond,  Pensacola,  and 
other  points  for  some  lo-inch  columbiads  and  sea-coast 
mortars,  which  I  considered  necessary  to  the  defence  of  the 
lower  river  ;  but  none  could  be  spared,  the  general  impression 
being  that  New  Orleans  would  not  be  attacked  by  the  river; 
and  I  was  therefore  compelled  to  make  the  best  possible 
defence  with  the  guns  at  my  disposal.  Twelve  42-pounders 
were  sent  to  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  together  with  a 
large  additional  quantity  of  powder ;  and  being  convinced 
that  with  the  guns  of  inferior  calibre  mounted  there  we  could 
not  hinder  steamers  from  passing,  unless  they  could  be 
detained  for  some  time  under  the  fire  of  the  works,  I  pushed 
forward  rapidly  the  construction  of  a  raft  which  offered  a 
complete  obstruction  to  the  passage  of  vessels." 

The  personal  exertions  of  an  ordnance  officer,  a 
relation  of  the  general,  did  at  length  procure  three  ten- 
inch  and  three  eight-inch  columbiad  hollow-shot  guns 
and  five  large  mortars,  which  were  mounted  just  before 
the  bombardment  commenced.  This  was,  as  before 
noticed,  on  April  eighteenth  :  but  a  week  previous  to 
Porter's  attack  the  raft  was  seriously  damaged  by  a 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  157 

storm  accompanied  by  a  flood,  which,  according  to 
General  Duncan's  statement,  "  parted  the  chains,  scat 
tered  the  schooners,  and  materially  affected  the  charac 
ter  and  effectiveness  of  the  raft  as  an  obstruction." 

For  six  long  days  did  the  garrisons  of  the  forts  en 
dure  the  pitiless  fire  which  Porter  rained  on  them. 
Carefully  as  the  casemates  had  been  constructed,  the 
thirteen-inch  shells  inflicted  serious  damage,  and  dis 
abled  a  number  of  the  defenders'  guns.  The  unpro 
tected  barracks  in  the  fort  were  destroyed  with  all 
their  contents  within  the  first  twelve  hours  of  this  tre 
mendous  bombardment.  The  garrison  could  make 
feeble  response,  owing  to  the  inferiority  of  range  of 
most  of  their  pieces ;  yet  the  gunners  never  flinched, 
and  the  enormous  expenditure  of  Federal  ammunition 
determined  Farragut  to  hurry  on  the  endeavor  to 
pass  the  batteries  by  main  force  in  the  hours  of  dark 
ness  on  the  third  night,  under  cover  of  a  furious  fire, 
an  expedition  of  two  gun-boats,  under  Captain  Bell, 
approached  the  barricade  to  attempt  its  destruction  by 
means  of  petards  or,  as  they  are  now  called,  torpedoes. 
"This  duty,"  says  Admiral  Farragut,  "  was  not  thor 
oughly  performed,  in  consequence  of  the  failure  to  ig 
nite  the  petards  with  the  galvanic  battery."  In  fact, 
no  officer  of  the  American  services  had  at  that  time 
been  trained  to  the  use  upon  or  under  water  of  these 
powerful  engines  of  destruction.  "  Still,"  he  continues, 
"  it  was  a  success,  and,  under  the  circumstances,  a 
highly  meritorious  one."  In  fact,  the  Itasca,  under 
Lieutenent  Caldwell,  grappled  one  of  the  schooners, 
which  that  officer  boarded  at  once,  and  detached  from 
the  chains  which  had  secured  her  to  the  barricade, 
which  was  thus  laid  open.  His  gun-boat  was  the  only 


I  5 8       ADMIRAL S  FARRA GUT  AND  POR TER  AND 

one  seen  by  the  look-outs  of  Duncan,  who  writes : 
"  A  heavy  fire  was  opened  upon  her,  which  caused  her 
to  retire,  but  not  until  she  had  partially  accomplished 
her  purpose.  The  raft  after  this  could  not  be  regarded 
as  an  obstruction." 

The  following  night  the  garrison  was  cheered  by 
the  descent  from  New  Orleans  of  one  of  the  two  iron 
clad  rafts,  the  Louisiana,  mounting  sixteen  heavy  guns. 
By  this  time  the  injuries  in  their  defences  were  very 
considerable;  but. under  her  almost  impregnable  cover 
they  had  hoped  to  make  the  necessary  repairs.  On 
conferring  however  with  Captain  Mitchell,  a  naval 
officer  who  now  arrived  and  assumed  charge  of  all  the 
steamers  gathered  for  the  defence,  Duncan  learnt  that 
her  motive  power  was  incomplete,  and  that  so  far  from 
taking  the  offensive  against  the  enemy,  his  coadjutor 
was  bent  on  keeping  her  above  the  forts  until  the  me 
chanics  had  finished  their  labors.  In  vain  did  the  gen 
eral  appeal  to  his  chief  at  New  Orleans,  and  the  latter 
to  Commodore  Whittle,  the  successor  of  Hollins  and 
superior  of  Captain  Mitchell.  The  commodore's  orders 
were  sent  indeed  to  the  latter,  but  with  the  proviso  to 
execute  them  only  "  if  in  his  judgment  it  wras  advis 
able  ;  "  and  in  consequence,  Mitchell  held  to  his  deter 
mination  of  keeping  the  iron-clad  for  the  present  out 
of  fire.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  his  view  was  supported 
by  those  of  the  naval  officers  under  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  naval  volunteers  who  chiefly  manned 
the  steamers  (eight  in  number,  besides  the  small  rarn 
Manasses  and  a  fire-raft  flotilla),  which  had  been  pre 
pared  for  co-operation  with  the  forts,  were  jealous  alike 
of  the  interference  they  had  at  first  met  with  from  the 
generals,  and  of  that  to  which  they  now  were  subjected 


THE  NA  VY  OF  THE   UNION.  !59 

when  transferred  to  the  rule  of  their  professional  breth 
ren. 

It  is  not  for  us,  who  inherit  the  memories  of  Wal- 
cheren,  to  lean  too  hardly  on  the  errors  which  divided 
the  command  of  the  Confederates  at  this  critical  time, 
and  kept  the  real  chiefs  at  New  Orleans,  twenty  miles 
above  the  vital  point  of  action.  It  is  enough  to  say 
that  the  fifth  day  of  bombardment  and  endurance  went 
by  in  vain  correspondence  and  appeals.  Not  only  did 
Mitchell  refuse  to  place  the  Louisiana  where  her  bat 
tery  might  be  of  use,  but  the  only  immediate  service 
remaining  to  be  performed,  the  sending  down  of  fire- 
ships  in  the  night  against  Porter's  fleet,  was  left  undone, 
the  tug-boats  allotted  for  that  duty  being  under  repair. 
"  This  does  not  excuse  the  neglect,"  says  Duncan,  "  as 
there  were  six  boats  of  the  river  fleet  available  for  this 
service,  independent  of  those  alluded  to,  and  fire-barges 
were  plentiful."  More  plainly  still  does  General  Lov- 
ell's  report  speak  of  what  occurred  that  night  and  dur 
ing  the  eventful  one  which  followed.  "  The  river-defence 
fleet,"  he  writes,  "  proved  a  failure,  for  the  very  reasons  set 
forth  in  my  letter  to  the  department  of  April  fifteenth. 
Unable  to  govern  themselves,  and  unwilling  to  be  gov 
erned  by  others,  their  almost  total  want  of  system,  vig 
ilance,  and  discipline  rendered  them  useless  and  help 
less,  when  the  enemy  finally  dashed  upon  them  sud 
denly  in  a  dark  night.  I  regret  very  much  that  the 
department  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  grant  my 
request  to  place  some  competent  head  in  charge  of 
these  steamers." 

The  twenty-third  of  April  broke  warm  and  clear.  The 
garrisons  had  now  given  up  hope  of  immediate  aid  from 
the  steamers,  and  attempted  to  repair  their  pressing 


l6o      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

damages  as  they  best  could  under  Porter's  fire.  Before 
night  the  latter  slackened  perceptibly  ;  and  Duncan, 
struck  by  this  fact  (which  he  correctly  enough,  as  his 
letter  of  that  evening  proves,  ascribed  to  the  enemy's 
growing  short  of  ammunition),  and  observing  move 
ments  in  the  fleet  below,  once  more  wrote  to  Mitchell 
to  urge  the  Louisiana's  being  brought  into  a  position 
to  aid  at  least  by  her  battery  in  the  defence.  His 
request  was  refused,  and  when,  somewhat  later,  he 
communicated  the  additional  news  that  his  suspicions 
were  confirmed  by  the  enemy's  boats  fixing  white  flags 
in  the  line  of  their  expected  advance,  he  learnt  only 
from  Mitchell's  reply  that  the  Louisiana  would  be  ready 
by  the  next  evening.  Before  that  evening  had  arrived 
the  luckless  iron-clad  was  prepared  to  be  blown  up  by 
her  captain's  own  orders.  Kept  so  carefully  out  of 
harm's  way  as  she  had  been,  the  only  damage  inflicted 
by  her  was  that  caused  by  the  explosion,  to  the  garri 
son  she  had  been  built  to  aid. 

The  anxiety  suffered  by  Duncan  and  his  troops 
during  the  early  part  of  the  night  was  enhanced  by  an 
increase  in  the  fire  of  the  bomb-vessels  which  took 
place  when  darkness  closed,  and  by  their  ignorance  of 
what  the  enemy  was  doing  under  cover  of  Porter's 
shells  ;  for,  as  on  the  previous  night,  the  promised  fire- 
rafts  were  not  floated  down  by  the  flotilla.  Who  it  was 
that  should  be  charged  specially  with  this  omission  it 
is  hard  to  say.  It  is  clear  that  Captain  Mitchell,  though 
invested  nominally  with  the  whole  control  of  the  river 
defence,  was  unable  to  make  his  authority  felt  by  the 
naval  volunteers,  whose  senior  officer,  Captain  Steven 
son,  had  declared  officially  three  days  before,  in  the 
name  of  his  force,  "it  would  not  be  governed  by  the 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  j6i 

regulations  of  the  navy  or  commanded  by  naval  offi 
cers." 

At  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fourth 
Farragut  gave  his  pre-arranged  signal,  two  ordinary  red 
lights,  so  as  not  to  excite  special  notice  ;  and  the  ad 
vance  began  in  two  columns.  That  on  the  right,  under 
Captain  Bailey  (Farragut's  second  in  command),  was 
led  by  the  gun-boat  Cayuga,  which  bore  the  flag.  She 
was  followed  by  the  steam  frigates  Pensacola  and  Mis 
sissippi,  and  five  other  gun-boats  in  succession.  The 
left  column,  the  Admiral's  own,  was  similar  in  forma 
tion,  but  stronger  by  a  frigate,  being  led  by  his  fleet- 
captain  in  the  gun-boat  Scioto,  which  was  followed  by 
the  Hartford  (the  flag-ship),  two  other  frigates,  and  five 
more  gun-boats.  The  divided  counsels  of  their  oppo 
nents,  the  exhaustion  of  some,  the  insubordination  of 
others,  the  incompleteness  of  their  defences,  were  all 
unknown  to  the  Federals :  and  how  great  was  their 
commander's  anxiety  as  to  the  issue  of  his  bold  ad 
vance,  and  the  prospect  of  passing  the  forts  with  a  re 
spectable  force  left,  is  best  shown  by  his  own  general 
order,  sent  round  a  short  time  before  : 

"  When,  in  the  opinion  of  the  flag-officer,  the  propitious 
time  has  arrived,  the  signal  will  be  made  to  weigh  and  ad 
vance  to  the  conflict.  If  in  his  opinion,  at  the  time  of  arriv 
ing  at  the  respective  positions  of  the  different  divisions  of  the 
fleet,  we  have  the  advantage,  he  will  make  the  signal  for  close 
action,  No.  8,  and  abide  the  result — conquer  or  to  be  conquer 
ed — drop  anchor  or  keep  under  weigh,  as  in  his  opinion  is 
best." 

At  half-past  three  the  fleet  approached  the  barrier, 
the  bomb-vessels  having  also  placed  themselves  so  as 
ii 


!62       ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

to  fire  freely  on  the  forts,  and  being  strengthened  for 
the  night  by  the  addition  of  the  sailing  corvette  Ports 
mouth,  which  was  towed  up  within  range  of  Fort  Jack 
son.  Severely  damaged  already,  the  boom  gave  way 
to  the  rush  of  the  leading  gunboats,  while  at  the  same 
moment  the  forts  opened  fire,  and  one  of  the  most  fear 
ful  scenes  began  which  naval  annals  record. 

"After  we  had  fairly  entered  into  the  fight "  [writes  Farra- 
gut],  "  the  density  of  the  smoke  from  guns  and  fire-rafts,  the 
scenes  passing  on  board  our  own  ship  and  around  us  (for  it 
was  as  if  the  artillery  of  heaven  were  playing  upon  earth),  were 
such  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  flag-officer  to  see  how 
each  vessel  was  conducting  itself,  and  lie  can  only  judge  by 
the  final  results  and  their  special  reports,  which  are  herewith 
enclosed.  But  I  feel  that  I  can  say  with  truth  that  it  has 
rarely  been  the  lot  of  a  commander  to  be  supported  by  offi 
cers  of"  more  indomitable  courage  or  higher  professional 
merit." 

In  short,  the  darkness  of  the  night,  the  closeness 
of  the  action,  and  the  tremendous  calibre  of  the  Fed 
eral  cannon  made  it  hopeless  for  any  officer  to  do  more 
than  control  the  movements  of  a  single  vessel  in  the 
confused  uproar  which  arose.  The  flag-officer's  own 
was  soon  in  danger  so  imminent  as  to  task  his  utmost 
energies,  and  we  quote  from  his  report  only  that  further 
portion  which  speaks  of  her  share  : 

"  I  discovered  a  fire-raft  coming  down  upon  us,  and  in  at 
tempting  to  avoid  it  ran  the  ship  on  shore  ;  and  the  ram  Ma- 
nasses,  which  I  had  not  seen,  lay  on  the  opposite  of  it,  and 
pushed  it  down  upon  us.  Our  ship  was  soon  on  fire  halfway 
up  to  her  tops,  but  we  backed  off,  and  through  the  good  or- 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  163 

ganization  of  our  fire  department,  and  the  great  exertions  of 
Captain  Wainwright  and  his  first  lieutenant,  officers,  and  crew, 
the  fire  was  extinguished.  Tn  the  meantime  our  battery  was 
never  silent,  but  poured  in  its  missiles  of  death  into  forl  St. 
Philip,  opposite  to  which  we  had  got  by  this  time,  and  it  was 
silenced,  with  the  exception  of  a  gun  now  and  then." 


Silenced  perhaps  for  the  minute  ;  for  the  gunners  at 
such  times  sought  shelter  in  the  casements  close  by, 
which  had  preserved  them  during  the  preceding  bom 
bardment  ;  yet  only  to  rush  forth  at  every  interval  of 
slackening  in  the  fire  of  the  frigates,  and  reply  with 
their  feebler  pieces  to  the  storm  of  grape  hurled  at 
them  from  Q-inch  and  ii-inch  guns.  Their  gallantry  is 
not  merely  testified  to  by  their  own  commanders.  More 
important  witness  to  it  is  borne  by  the  detailed  reports 
of  the  Federal  captains,  and  especially  by  those  of  three 
gunboats,  the  Itasca,  Kennebec,  and  Winona,  which 
became  entangled  in  portions  of  the  barrier  after  the 
frigates  had  gone  by,  and  found  the  fire  of  the  garrison 
still  so  insupportable  as  to  compel  them  to  head  down 
stream,  and  thus,  for  safety,  to  separate  themselves 
from  the  rest  of  the  fleet. 

The   forts  and  boom    once  passed,  as  well  as  the 

fire-rafts  (of  which   only  one,  that    which   struck  the 

Hartford,   did    any    harm,)    the    "  defence   fleet "    of 

Mitchell"  had  yet  to  be  encountered.     This  Farragut 

estimated  at  thirteen  gun-boats,  and  two  iron-clads,  but 

the  truth  was  considerably  within  this.     The  Louisiana 

:  was  but  a   motionless   raft,  so  moored  that  she  could 

hardly  bring   her  bow-guns   to   bear,  and  fired  (it  was 

said  by  the  garrison)  but  twelve  shots.     The  eight  gun- 

;  boats  had  been  but  poorly  fitted,  and  some  of  them 


164 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 


mounted  but  a  single  large  gun,  while  in  weight  they 
were  no  match  even  for  the  enemy's  smallest  vessels. 
The  action,  therefore,  was  of  very  brief  duration,  al 
though  gallantly  undertaken  by  the  Confederates.  Four 
of  their  boats  had  been  fitted  with  iron  plates  over  their 
bows  with  the  intention  of  using  them  as  rams,  and  two 
of  these,  the  Governor  Moore  and  Quitman,  came  im 
mediately  into  collision  with  the  Varuna,  which  had  in 
the  melee  with  the  forts  got  ahead  of  the  rest  of  the 
Federal  fleet.  She  was  in  chase  of  an  unarmed  steamer 
on  board  of  which  was  General  Lovell  himself  (who 
had  arrived  from  New  Orleans  on  a  visit  of  inspection 
just  as  the  firing  commenced),  when  the  Governor 
Moore  attacked  her  boldly,  firing  a  bow-gun  which  dis 
abled  thirteen  of  the  Varuna's  hands,  and  charging  her 
afterwards  on  the  starboard  side.  The  Federals,  how 
ever,  succeeded  in  bringing  an  8-inch  gun  to  bear  on 
the  assailant,  and  disabling  her  completely  in  a  few 
minutes ;  but  the  Quitman,  which  had  approached  the 
Varuna  on  the  port  side  at  the  same  time,  now  butted 
at  her  twice,  at  the  second  collision  driving  in  her  side. 
In  doing  this,  however,  she  swung  round,  and  the  Fed 
erals,  before  their  vessel  sank,  sent  five  of  their  8-inch 
shells  into  their  new  enemy,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of 
seeing  her  in  flames.  Of  the  rest  of  the  "  defence  fleet " 
the  Defiance  was  the  only  one  saved  under  the  guns  of 
the  fort  at  daybreak,  the  others  having  either  been 
sunk,  burnt,  or  driven  ashore,  disabled  by  the  over 
whelming  batteries  which  the  frigates  had  opened  on 
them.  These  last  had  been  attacked  indeed  by  the 
Manasses  with  a  boldness  worthy  of  better  success  ; 
but  her  feeble  power  and  small  tonnage  were  found 
perfectly  unavailing  to  injure  the  ships  through  the 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  165 

chain-armor  so  judiciously  prepared.  Her  encounter 
with  the  flag-ship  Hartford  has  been  already  mention 
ed.  Passing  on  while  the  latter  was  on  fire,  she  charg 
ed  the  Brooklyn  full  on  the  starboard  gangway,  but 
with  little  effect,  beyond  breaking  some  of  the  links  of 
the  chain  and  driving  in  three  planks  above  water  line. 
Wedged  in  between  her  huge  antagonist  and  the 
shore,  the  ram  found  herself  unable  to  get  up  speed  for 
a  fresh  charge,  and  was  glad  to  drop  down  stream. 
She  then  crossed  over  to  attack  the  Mississippi,  and 
struck  her  with  a  very  partial  effect,  inflicting  injuries 
similar  to  those  of  the  Brooklyn,  and  then  passing 
down  to  the  forts,  where  she  lay  for  a  short  while. 

The  gray  of  early  daylight  now  succeeded  to  the 
flashes  of  the  hostile  guns  which  had  lighted  up  the 
scene  ;  and  Farragut  discovering  the  completeness  of 
his  victory,  signalled  to  discontinue  action.  His  fleet 
had  begun  to  form  and  steam  slowly  upwards  when  the 
'  indomitable  little  ram  was  seen  singly  in  pursuit,  and 
preparing  to  renew  her  assaults.  The  admiral  at  once 
signalled  the  Mississippi  to  turn  and  attack  her;  and 
Captain  Smith,  aided  by  the  gun-boats  Pinola  and 
Kineo,  charged  her  at  once.  Captain  Warly  (who,  from 
her  first  construction,  had  commanded  the  ram),  seeing 
I  the  huge  bows  of  the  frigate  coming  straight  towards 
i  him,  steered  to  avoid  the  direct  shock,  and  ran  his 
vessel  aground,  exposing  her  to  the  full  broadsides  of 
the  enemy.  From  this  helpless  position  he  escaped 
with  his  crew  to  the  shore,  and  the  once  famous 
Manasses  was  fired  by  the  boats  of  the  Mississippi, 
which  had  been  ordered  off  to  board  her.  This  was 
the  last  episode  of  the  battle  ;  for  Farragut,  leaving 
behind  him  the  shattered  forts  and  the  relics  of  the 


1 66      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

enemy's  flotilla,  went  upward  on  his  path  of  conquest. 
Captain  Bailey,  still  leading  in  the  Cayuga,  soon  came 
in  sight  of  a  small  camp  of.sharp-shooters  on  the  right 
bank,  who,  finding  their  position  and    line  of  retreat 
along  the  levee  under  command  of  the  gun-boats,  sur 
rendered    at   once.     Near   this   point    known    as    the 
Quarantine,  the  river  is  approached  by  the  creek  before 
mentioned,  as  turning  (for  shallow  boats)  the  forts  and 
barricade.     The  flag-officer  now  made  use  of  it  to  com 
municate  with  Porter  and  General  Butler,  and  leaving 
two  gun-boats  to  protect  the  latter's  advance  from  the 
enemy  still  remaining  at  the  forts,  proceeded  on  with 
the    rest  of  the   fleet.     The   farther  progress   of  the 
Federals  occupied  all  that  day  and  the  early  part  of  the 
twenty-fifth,  "  owing  to  the  slowness  of  some  of  the 
vessels,  and   want   of  knowledge    of  the   river ;"     but 
New  Orleans  was  finally  approached   at  ten  A.  M.  on 
the  twenty-sixth.     Then  came  a  ten   minutes'  contest  i 
with  the  inner  works,  armed,  as  we  know,  with  but  a 
dozen  32-pounders.     The  rest  of  the  story  of  the  con 
quest  ;  the  public  thanksgiving  ordered  by  the  Admiral 
on  board  his  victorious  fleet;  the  fierce  heart-burnings 
of  the  proud   city,  which  lay  helpless  under  his  guns ; 
the  unjust   obloquy   thrown  on  General  Lovell  by  the 
Confederates  for  not  ensuring  its  destruction  by  a  use 
less  resistance  with  his  petty  garrison   of  3,000  men; 
these  things,   and,  above   all,   the  humiliation  which 
followed  on  Butler's  taking  possession,  are  well  known. 
We  pass  them,  therefore,  by;  citing  merely  the  follow 
ing  paragraph  of  Farragut's  letter,  which  tells  the  final 
history  of  the   forces   of    Duncan   and   Mitchell,   and 
observing  that  the  surrender  of  the   former  was  com 
pelled    by  the    violent    insubordination   of   the   same 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  1 67 

volunteer  gunners  who  had  obeyed  him  with  cheerful 
endurance  until  their  retreat  was  cut  off: 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  twenty-ninth,  Captain  Bailey 
arrived  from  below,  with  the  gratifying  intelligence  that  the 
forts  had  surrendered  to  Commander  Porter,  and  had 
delivered  up  all  public  property,  and  were  being  paroled  ; 
and  that  the  navy  had  been  made  to  surrender  uncondition 
ally,  as  they  had  conducted  themselves  with  bad  faith,  burn 
ing  and  sinking  their  vessels  while  a  flag  of  truce  was  flying 
and  the  forts  negotiating  for  their  surrender,  and  the  Louisiana, 
their  great  iron-clad  battery,  being  blown  up  alongside  of 
the  vessel  where  they  were  negotiating  ;  hence  their  officers 
were  not  paroled,  but  sent  home  to  be  treated  according  to 
the  judgment  of  the  government." 

With  the  Louisiana  the  Confederates  had  lost  their 
iron-clad  frigate  Mississippi,  the  most  important  naval 
structure  they  had  undertaken,  which  was  lying 
(unfinished  at  a  wharf  near  the  city,  and  was  burnt  on 
the  approach  of  Farragut,  whose  victory  was  thus  as 
complete  as  any  officer  commanding  afloat  could  have 
jdesired  over  a  combined  land  and  sea  force.  The 
'garrison  of  Lovell,  and  all  its  stores,  should  perhaps 
have  been  added  to  the  prize ;  but  the  Federals  were, 
strangely  enough,  not  aware  that  a  single  ship  anchored 
Iten  miles  above  the  city  would,  at  the  then  height  of 
jthe  river,  have  completely  commanded  the  only  exit, 
jwhich  through  their  ignorance  was  left  open  for  several 
jdays.  At  the  least,  however,  the  success  was  almost 
ibeyond  price  to  the  Union  Government  from  its  moral 
'importance  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  As  to  the 
jmaterial  advantage  won,  it  may  be  best  judged  of  by 
'the  statement  of  the  well-known  Confederate  writer 
Mr.  Pollard:;— 


1 68       A DMIRA LS  FARRAGUT  A ND  P OR 7 *ER  A ND 

"  The  extent  of  the  disaster  was  not  to  be  disguised.  It 
was  a  heavy  blow  to  the  Confederacy.  It  annihilated  us  in 
Louisiana;  separated  us  from  Texas  and  Arkansas  ;  dimin 
ished  our  resources  and  supplies  by  the  loss  of  one  of  the 
greatest  grain  and  cattle  countries  within  the  limits  of  the 
Confederacy;  gave  to  the  enemy  the  Mississippi  river,  with 
all  its  means  of  navigation,  for  a  base  of  operations  ;  and 
finally  led,  by  plain  and  irresistible  conclusion,  to  our  virtual 
abandonment  of  its  great  and  fruitful  valley." 

"  Treachery,"  was  the  cry  raised  by  the  indignant 
South  at  the  loss  of  its  commercial  capital :  and  al 
though  such  a  charge  against  the  Confederate  com 
manders  bears  no  inquiry,  the  fall  of  New  Orleans  and 
its  consequences  must,  as  has  been  shown,  be  held  due 
in  part  to  the  improvident  delays  and  discordant  coun 
sels  of  the  defenders,  as  well  as  to  the  want  of  appre 
ciation  in  their  chosen  government  of  the  greatness  of 
the  danger  which  threatened  the  Confederacy  at  this 
vital  point.  Allowing  fully  for  all  these,  the  highest 
credit  must  yet  be  given  to  the  judgment  which  planned 
and  the  vigor  which  executed  this  successful  stroke. 
If  the  language  of  Mr.  Welles  seems  a  little  exagge 
rated  when  he  says,  "  It  was  regarded  everywhere, 
both  at  home  and  abroad,  as  the  grandest  achievement 
of  the  war,"  no  less  is  it  certain  that,  in  calling  the  cap 
ture  of  New  Orleans  "  one  of  the  most  remarkable  tri 
umphs  in  the  whole  history  of  naval  operations,"  he  is 
fully  justified,  both  by  the  daring  with  which  unknown 
dangers  were  faced  and  the  vast  importance  of  the  vic 
tory  gained. 

The  success  of  Farragut  was  marred,  as  has  been 
seen,  by  the  loss  of  only  a  single  gun-boat  ;  and  com 
ment  on  the  battle  won  by  so  hastily  formed  a  fleet 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  ify 

would  be  incomplete  indeed  if  it  omitted  special  notice 
of  the  fact  that  the  Varuna  was  the  only  one  of  Farra- 
gut's  gun-boats  "  converted,"  from  the  merchant  ser 
vice,  instead  of  being  built  expressly  for  the  rougher 
business  of  the  navy. 

"  Here  let  me  pause"  [says  Lieutenant  Swasey.  in  a  very 
clear  report  of  the  disaster]  "  while  we  reflect  upon  the  una- 
daptedness  of  a  merchant-built  vessel  for  war  purposes,  par 
ticularly  such  as  the  Varuna  was  called  to  take  part  in.  Had 
it  been  built  with  that  strength  which  all  the  other  vessels 
possessed,  and  the  need  of  which  becomes  more  apparent  to 
the  mind  of  the  naval  officer  each  day,  we  would  yet  be  afloat 
off  the  city  of  New  Orleans.  Such  vessels  may  perhaps  do 
for  the  ordinary  duties  of  a  blockade,  and  I  think  it  is  yet  a 
.  question  whether  they  will  or  not ;  but  certainly  they  are  not 
fit  to  trust  lives  and  property  on  to  engage  works  of  the 
strongest  magnitude." 

New   Orleans   once    secured   and  handed    over   to 
.  General  Butler,  Farragut  pushed  up   the    Mississippi, 
j  and  in  the  course  of  the  next  two  months  the  Union 
|  flag  was  hoisted  at  Baton  Rouge,  Natchez,  and  every 
'  town  of  importance  as  high  as  Vicksburg.     This  city, 
strong  by  its  natural  position  on  high  bluffs    sloping 
gently  landward,  and   already  partly  converted  into  a 
fortress   by    intrenchments    heavily   armed,  was   now 
(since  the  surrender  of  Memphis  on  the  sixth  of  June) 
the  only  point  of  importance  held  by  the  Confederates 
on  the  banks  of  the  great  river.     It  at  once,  therefore, 
assumed  an  importance  well  warranted  by  its  later  his 
tory.     Summoned  on  the  eighteenth  of  May  to  evacu 
ate  the  place,  General  M.  L.  Smith,  who   held  it,  gave 
a  decided  refusal  ;  and   Farragut  found  it  necessary  to 


170      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

await  once  more  the  arrival  of  Porter's  flotilla,  which 
was  not  brought  up  and  reported  ready  until  the 
twenty-seventh  of  June.  On  the  twenty-eighth  a  general 
attack  took  place,  Farragut  succeeding  in  taking  two 
of  his  three  frigates  and  six  gun-boats  above  the  bat 
teries,  but  producing  no  effect  on  the  defences.  "  The 
enemy  leave  their  guns  for  the  moment,"  says  his  hasty 
report,  "  but  return  to  them  as  soon  as  we  have  passed, 
and  rake  us."  About  fifty  men  were  killed  and 
wounded  on  board,  and  the  Brooklyn  frigate,  with  two 
gun-boats,  forced  to  retreat  below  the  place. 

The  bombardment  continued  at  intervals,  pending 
an  application  to  General   Halleck  at   Corinth    for   a 
corps  of  his  army  to  aid  the  fleet,  and  the  result  of  an 
experiment  (the  first  of  three)  made  to  cut  a  ship  canal 
through   the   isthmus   opposite   Vicksburg,  and   leave 
the  Federal  ships   an    independent   passage.     On  the  j 
fifteenth  of  July  their  possession  of  the  river  was  sud 
denly  challenged  by  a  large  ram,  the  Arkansas,  which  ; 
the  Confederates  had  been  fitting  on  the  Yazoo,  a  con-  j 
siderable  stream  entering  the    Mississippi  just  above  j 
Vicksburg.     This  new  enemy  was  built,  in  imitation  of  j 
those  destroyed  at  New   Orleans,  with  a  screw-propel-  j 
ler,  and  iron-clad  sides  sloping  inwards;  and,  besides  j 
the  means  of  offence  offered  by  her  sharp  prow,  she  ' 
mounted  nine  guns.     Her  plating,  however,  proved  to 
be  weak,  and  her  machinery  very  defective.     Uneasy 
at  the  reports  of  her,  Farragut  had  sent  a  small  river- 
steamer,  the  Tyler,   to  explore  the   Yazoo,    and    this 
probably  brought   her  down    incomplete  ;  for  she  ap 
peared  suddenly,  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth,  com 
ing  into  the  Mississippi,  apparently    in  chase    of  the 
Tyler,  and  forthwith   ran   down    to  take   shelter  under 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION. 


171 


the  guns  of  Vicksburg.  In  passing  she  received  and 
returned  the  broadsides  of  Farragut's  whole  squadron  ; 
and  several  of  the  heavier  shot  crashed  through  her 
armor,  tearing  up  her  unplated  deck,  damaging  her 
fittings,  and  killing  and  wounding  some  of  the  crew. 
But  this  was  not  fully  known  to  the  Federals,  and  her 
escape  for  the  time  spread  alarm  as  far  as  the  garrison 
of  Butler  at  New  Orleans.  Her  history,  however,  need 
not  be  pursued  at  length.  On  her  first  leaving  her 
shelter  to  co-operate  with  a  Confederate  land  force  in 
the  attack  (made  August  fifteenth)  on  Baton  Rouge, 
her  engines  broke  hopelessly  down  when  yet  five  miles 
from  the  place,  and,  drifting  to  the  shore  end  on,  she 
fell  an  easy  prey  to  the  shells  of  the  Essex,  a  large 
iron-plated  river-boat,  whose  commander  had  taken 
charge  of  the  Lower  Mississippi  on  the  departure  of 
Farragut.  The  latter  officer,  in  compliance  with  orders 
from  Mr.  Welles,  had  abandoned  his  contest  with  the 
Vicksburg  works  on  the  twentieth  of  July,  and  made 
down  stream  for  New  Orleans,  whence  he  proceeded 
with  his  squadron  to  carry  on  operations  along  the 
coast  of  Texas,  where  the  chief  posts  were  (for  the 
time)  recovered  to  the  Union  by  his  detachments  in 
the  course  of  a  few  weeks.  "  All  we  want,"  he  wrote 
on  the  fifteenth  of  October,  "  is  a  few  soldiers  to  hold 
the  places,  and  we  will  soon  have  the  whole  coast.  It 
is  a  more  effectual  blockade  to  have  the  vessels  inside 
instead  of  outside."  In  this  simple  remark  lies  the 
key  to  the  constantly  increasing  success  of  the  Union 
ists  in  restricting  their  enemy's  trade,  a  success  which 
was  finally  complete  when  Wilmington  fell  to  Admiral 
Porter's  and  General  Terry's  combined  forces  two  years 
later  in  the  war. 


1^2       ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

Second  only  in  importance  to  the  exploits  of  Farra- 
gut's  fleet  during  this  remarkable  year,  were  the  ser 
vices  rendered  on  the  rivers  by  the  squadrons  of  the 
Mississippi  and  Tennessee.  Flag-officer  Foote  (raised 
to  rear-admiral's  rank  soon  afterwards  with  Farragut) 
directed  their  operations  with  extraordinary  activity 
until  disabled  by  the  effects  of  a  wound  in  May.  They 
were  continued  for  the  next  four  months  under  Captain 
Davis,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  temporary  charge. 
In  October,  however,  a  new  flag-officer  appeared  in  the 
person  of  Porter,  whose  services  as  lieutenant  and  com 
mander  we  have  already  noticed.  The  constant  ap 
proval  of  Farragut,  Bailey,  and  all  with  whom  he  served, 
had  fully  justified  the  early  selection  of  this  officer  at 
the  opening  of  the  war  for  high  charge  by  the  Presi 
dent;  and  the  latter,  proud  of  so  fortunate  a  choice, 
took  occasion  now  to  advance  him  per  saltuni  to  the 
rank  of  acting  rear-admiral,  and  to  the  command  left 
vacant  by  Foote.  Much  of  the  uniform  though  slow 
success  of  the  Federal  armies  in  the  central  states 
depended  henceforth  on  the  activity  and  energy  by 
which  Porter  showed  himself  worthy  of  his  unexampled 
promotion.  But  the  story  of  his  deeds  in  that  quarter, 
of  Foote's,  and  of  Farragut's,  when  he  appeared  a 
second  time  in  the  Mississippi  to  co-operate  in  the  fall 
of  Vicksburg,  forms  so  essential  a  part  of  the  cam 
paigns  of  General  Grant,  that  we  prefer  to  leave  it  to 
those  writers  who  have  made  the  progress  of  the  Fed 
eral  armies  in  the  West  their  special  theme. 

The  year  1862  and  its  naval  operations  have  an 
interest  which  to  many  may  seem  even  higher  than  that 
which  belongs  to  the  subjects  we  have  hitherto  treated. 
The  world-famous  battle  of  the  Monitor  and  Merrimack 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNIOX.  ^3 

on  April  ninth  first  opened  the  way  to  that  practical  solu 
tion  of  the  proper  form  of  iron-clad  steamers  for  spe 
cial  service  which  no  government  has  attained  to  as 
rapidly  as  that  of  the  United  States.  It  is  as  well  to 
be  fully  understood  on  this  matter  ;  and  the  report  of 
Mr.  Welles  sets  forth  in  the  clearest  light  the  impor 
tance  of  the  Monitor's  victory,  the  prescience  shown 
by  his  practical  adviser.  Captain  Fox,  at  the  outset  of 
the  war,  and  the  conditions  aimed  at  in  the  construc 
tion  of  the  original  vessels  built  on  the  turret  princi 
ple.  The  details  of  the  battle;  the  sudden  appearance 
in  Hampton  Roads  of  the  Merrimack,  heavily  plated 
with  layers  of  iron,  fitted  as  a  ram,  and  well  armed  ; 
her  attack  and  easy  destruction  of  two  large  wooden 
ships  of  war  ;  the  dangerous  situation  of  the  blockad 
ing  steam-frigates,  unfitted  to  cope  with  and  unable  to 
escape  from  their  antagonist,  from  whom  they  were 
only  saved  the  first  day  by  her  dread  of  the  shallows; 
the  unlooked-for  arrival  (in  the  middle  of  that  anxious 
night)  of  the  Monitor,  hurried  from  New  York  by  Cap 
tain  Fox's  exertions  to  meet  and  foil  the  long-threat 
ened  design  of  the  Confederates:  all  these  particulars 
have  been  so  often  and  so  fully  given  to  the  world, 
that  we  forbear  to  repeat  them.  At  noon  next  day, 
the  Merrimack  abandoned  her  attack  and  retreated  to 
Norfolk,  leaving  the  honors  of  her  discomfiture  to  her 
diminutive  but  invulnerable  foe. 

"  Thus  terminated  "  [writes  Mr.  Welles  somewhat  grand 
iloquently]  "  the  most  remarkable  naval  combat  of  modern 
times,  perhaps  of  any  age.  The  fiercest  and  most  formidable 
naval  assault  upon  the  power  of  the  Union  which  has  ever 
been  made  by  the  insurgents  was  heroically  repelled,  and  a 
new  era  was  opened  in  the  history  of  maritime  warfare." 


174      ADMIRALS  FARRAG  UT  AND  PORTER  AND 

The  defeat  and  capture  by  two  other  Monitors  of 
the  Confederate  iron-clad  Atlanta,  prepared  with  great 
toil  at  Savannah,  and  supposed  impregnable  until  tested 
on  her  first  essay  in  June  1863  by  the  rude  shock  of 
1 5-inch  shells  from  the  new  Dahlgren  guns,  put  an  end 
to  the  last  Southern  hopes  of  raising  the  blockade. 
Yet  the  land  defences  of  the  other  Atlantic  ports  still 
defied  the  navy  of  the  Union.  It  seemed  as  though  it 
needed  the  presence  of  Farragut  or  Porter  to  overcome 
the  prestige  of  shore  batteries.  Admiral  Dupont, 
beaten  off  from  the  capital  of  South  Carolina,  was 
superseded  for  declaring  that  "  to  renew  the  attack 
would  be  attended  with  disastrous  results,  involving  the 
loss  of  the  coast."  His  views  of  the  strength  of 
Charleston  were  fully  justified  by  the  conduct  of  his  suc 
cessor.  Dahlgren  did  not  repeat  the  attempt,  and  his 
fleet  played  but  a  secondary  part  in  the  siege  conducted 
by  General  Gillmore  ;  nor  was  it  until  the  latter  had 
captured  Morris  Island  that  the  blockade  was  made 
effective  by  vessels  placed  in  the  smooth  water  near  it, 
and  the  commerce  of  the  city  ceased.  Yet  so  formi 
dable  did  Fort  Sumter,  even  in  its  ruins,  appear,  that 
so  late  as  the  following  summer  a  fresh  attempt  to  force 
the  Monitors  between  it  and  Fort  Moultrie  was  dis 
cussed  and  deliberately  rejected  by  the  Admiral  and 
his  captains  assembled  in  council  of  war. 

The  services  of  Farragut  during  the  year  1863,  in 
cluding  his  forcing  a  passage  at  tremendous  risk  and 
loss  past  Fort  Hudson,  the  new  Confederate  fortress  on 
the  Mississippi,  and  his  subsequent  co-operation  in  the 
all-important  conquest  of  Vicksburg,  though  of  them 
selves  gallant  and  memorable  achievements,  are  yet,  as 
before  mentioned,  of  a  secondary  nature,  being  bound 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE  UNION.  ^5 

up  with  the  history  of  Grant's  armies,  with  which  Por 
ter  also  acted  throughout  the  year. 

The  spring  of  1864,  however,  found  the  former  ad 
miral  returning  from  a  brief  sick  leave,  and  preparing 
for  a  new  enterprise,  more  perilous  in  appearance  than 
the  attack  on  New  Orleans,  where  well-won  success  had 
first  raised  him  to  fame.  Mobile  Bay  was  one  of  the 
few  refuges  remaining  to  the  blockade-runners  at  this 
period  of  the  war.  The  main  entrance  to  it  was  guard 
ed  by  Fort  Morgan,  a  bastioned  work  of  great  strength 
armed  with  lo-inch  hollow  shot  and  rifled  32-pounder 
guns.  The  channel  was  narrow  at  this  part,  must  be 
entered  by  daylight,  and  was  thickly  beset  by  such 
torpedoes  as  that  which  had  recently,  in  spite  of  Dahl- 
gren's  precautions,  proved  fatal  to  the  steam  sloop 
Housatonic  at  Charleston,  and  placed  the  Ironsides 
herself  in  danger.  Yet  more  to  be  dreaded  than  fort 
or  torpedo  was  the  ram  Tennessee,  commanded  by 
Admiral  Buchanan,  whose  courage  and  ability  were 
well-known  to  Farragut,  and  of  strength  and  armament 
beyond  any  of  those  which  the  Confederates  had 
launched.  Her  description,  given  with  exactness  by 
deserters,  spoke  of  her  as  built  upon  the  same  princi 
ples  as  the  Atlanta,  but  with  the  casemate  large 
enough  to  carry  six  guns,  and  plated  all  over  with  three 
layers  of  two-inch  iron,  by  which  additional  strength  the 
Confederates  hoped  to  save  her  from  the  fate  of  her 
model.  Her  speed  was  slow,  and  Farragut  declared 
on  his  arrival  that  he  would  not  hesitate  to  encounter 
her  with  his  larger  wooden  ships,  but  for  the  fear  of 
her  taking  refuge  in  such  shallow  water  as  they  could 
not  enter.  "  Wooden  vessels,"  he  added,  "  can  do 
nothing  with  these  iron-clads  unless  by  getting  within 


176      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

one  hundred  or  two  hundred  yards,  so  as  to  ram  them 
or  pour  in  a  broadside." 

Four  Monitors  being  at  length  supplied  him  in  July, 
he  prepared  to  test  the  strength  of  his  enemies  without 
delay,  the  latter  being  reported  to  be  striving  hard  to 
add  other  iron-clads  to  the  Tennessee,  which  alone 
proved  ready  for  action.  She  was  aided  by  three 
wooden  gun-boats  only,  when  the  Federal  fleet  entered 
the  channel  on  August  fifth,  in  great  strength,  but  with 
much  uncertainty  as  to  the  issue  of  the  attack.  The 
seven  frigates  and  steam  sloops  which  carried  the  prin 
cipal  batteries  were  not  only  protected  by  chains 
stopped  up  and  down,  but  were  lashed  each  to  a  gun 
boat  on  the  port  side,  in  order  that  if  crippled  in  the 
narrow  channel  they  might  be  towed  out  of  range  of 
Fort  Morgan,  which  was  on  the  starboard  hand.  The 
Monitors  formed  a  single  line  between  it  and  the  ships, 
engaging  the  work  and  absorbing  its  fire  as  far  as  pos 
sible.  Thus  covered,  the  wooden  vessels  in  tneir 
double  column  forced  their  way  up  (the  admiral  most 
gallantly  taking  the  lead  when  the  first  ship,  the  Brook 
lyn,  hesitated  at  the  sudden  appearance  of  a  line  of 
buoys),  and  found  themselves  in  half  an  hour  above 
the  forts,  on  which  their  starboard  broadsides  had 
poured  such  a  continuous  fire  of  grape,  the  missile 
specially  chosen  beforehand  by  Farragut,  as  the  gun 
ners  could  hardly  endure.  Not  one  ship  was  disabled, 
and  but  a  hundred  of  their  crews  killed  and  wounded 
But  the  Tecumseh,  which  led  the  Monitors,  was  struck 
in  sight  of  all  by  a  torpedo,  and  went  down  with  her 
crew.  Her  fate  did  not  prevent  her  comrades  from 
gallantly  carrying  out  the  allotted  task  ;  and  when  the 
Tennessee  sailed  from  a  side  channel  higher  up  to  as- 


THE  ArA  7Y  OF  THE   UNION. 

sail  the  wooden  squadron,  the  Monitors  strove  to  take 
share  in  the  general  assault  Farragut  directed  to  be 
made  on  her.  He  had  prepared  for  this  bold  move 
ment  of  Buchanan's  by  providing  false  bows  of  iron  to 
the  frigates  to  charge  the  ram  more  effectually  as  soon 
as  she  drew  near ;  and  having  already  cast  loose  from 
their  respective  consorts,  they  steamed  unhesitatingly 
to  meet  her.  Then  began  a  contest  of  a  completely 
new  order  in  naval  tactics,  and  in  which  the  ram  never 
as  it  proved,  had  a  chance  of  success.  Some  of  her 
enemies  crowded  around  her  sufficiently  to  impede  her 
motion,  while  the  larger  steamers  strove  to  run  her 
down  in  turn.  Steering  badly,  slow  in  movement,  and 
close  pressed  on  each  side,  the  Tennessee  received  in 
succession  the  charges  of  three  of  her  assailants  with 
out  perceptible  damage,  "  the  only  effect  being  to  give 
her  a  heavy  list,"  and  continued  to  ply  her  guns  for 
near  an  hour.  The  flagship  Hartford,  after  charging 
under  the  personal  direction  of  the  Admiral  (who  stood 
lashed  in  his  main-top),  poured  a  broadside  of  9-inch 
shot  at  her  casemates  at  a  distance  of  barely  ten  feet. 
Two  of  the  Monitors  fired  their  1 5-inch  guns  steadily 
at  her  whenever  an  opening  was  made ;  and  though 
one  only  of  their  shots  damaged  the  plating  of  the 
casemate,  another  destroyed  her  steering  chains,  and 
her  chimney  was  carried  away.  The  decisive  injuries, 
however,  were  inflicted  by  successive  damages  to  the 
shutters  of  her  gun-ports  ;  and  three  of  these  being 
jammed  or  made  useless  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  the 
frigates,  her  reply  slackened,  and  presently  a  shell  en 
tering  through  one  wounded  Buchanan  dangerously, 
and  caused  her  immediate  surrender.  The  fall  of  the 
forts  soon  followed,  and  Mobile,  though  still  itself  pro- 

12 


178 


ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 


tected  by  a  shallow  bar  above,  became  harmless  against 
the  Union  :  while  the  victor,  whose  heroic  conduct  had 
won  him  the  personal  adoration  of  his  fleet,  stood  con 
fessed  the  first  seaman  of  the  age.  This  last  achieve 
ment  won  from  the  grateful  Congress  the  rank  of  Vice- 
Admiral,  created  for  Farragut  under  a  special  act ;  a 
just  reward,  which  placed  him  on  an  equal  footing 
with  Grant,  now  raised  to  be  Lieutenant-General  of  the 
Union  army. 

Small  as  has  been  the  success  of  the  Confederates 
with  their  rams,  the  last  brilliant  feat  of  their  arms  in 
the  war,  the  capture  by  Hoke  in  the  spring  of  1864  of 
the  forts  so  long  held  by  the  Union  forces  on  Albe- 
marle  Sound,  was  due  in  great  part  to  the  aid  of  a 
small  vessel  of  this  description,  which  attacked  and 
drove  off  the  covering  gun-boats,  sinking  the  boldest  of 
them  with  a  blow  of  her  prow.  This  first  feat  of  the 
Albemarle  proved,  however,  to  be  her  last.  In  the  fol 
lowing  October  she  perished  by  what  may  beyond 
question  be  called  the  most  daring  action  of  the  war, 
the  attack  on  her  at  night  by  a  steam-launch  carrying 
a  torpedo  at  the  bow.  Of  the  gallant  volunteers  who 
undertook  this  work,  two  only  were  saved  death  or 
capture,  the  boat  being  sunk  by  the  effect  of  their  own 
engine :  but  one  of  these  was  the  young  commander, 
Lieutenant  Cushing,  already  four  times  thanked  for 
conduct  before  the  enemy,  whose  new  exploit  might 
fairly  rank  with  the  boldest  deeds  of  Nelson  or  Dun- 
donald  in  their  youth.  His  escape  forms  an  episode 
of  the  war,  so  romantic  in  itself  and  so  well  told  by  the 
hero,  that  we  prefer  transcribing  from  his  simple  narra- 
rative : 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION. 


179 


"A  dense  mass  of  water  rushed  in  from  the  torpedo, 
filling  the  launch  and  completely  disabling  her.  The  enemy 
then  continued  his  fire  at  fifteen  feet  range,  and  demanded 
our  surrender,  which  I  twice  refused,  ordering  the  men  to 
save  themselves,  and  removing  my  own  coat  and  shoes. 
Springing  into  the  river,  I  swam,  with  others,  into  the  middle 
of  the  stream,  the  rebels  failing  to  hit  us.  The  most  of  our 
party  were  captured,  some  drowned,  and  only  one  escaped 
besides  myself,  and  he  in  a  different  direction.  Acting  Mas 
ter's  Mate  Woodman,  of  the  Commodore  Hull,  I  met  in  the 
water  half  a  mile  below  the  town,  and  assisted  him  as  best  I 
could,  but  failed  to  get  him  ashore. 

"  Completely  exhausted,  I  managed  to  reach  the  shore, 
but  was  too  weak  to  crawl  out  of  the  water  until  just  at  day 
light,  when  I  managed  to  creep  into  the  swamp,  close  to  the 
fort.  While  hiding  a  few  feet  from  the  path,  two  of  the  Al- 
bemarle's  officers  passed,  and  I  judged  from  their  conversa 
tion  that  the  ship  was  destroyed.  Some  hours'  travelling  in 
the  swamp  served  to  bring  me  out  well  below  the  town,  when 
I  sent  a  negro  in  to  gain  information  and  found  that  the  ram 
was  truly  sunk.  Proceeding  through  another  swamp,  I  came 
to  a  creek  and  captured  a  skiff  belonging  to  a  picket  of  the 
enemy,  and  with  this,  by  eleven  o'clock  the  next  night,  had 
made  my  way  out  and  on  board  the  Valley  City." 

No  wonder  that  this  feat  procured  Cushing  not 
merely  his  step  to  commander  in  the  volunteer  service, 
but  the  special  thanks  of  Mr.  Welles  under  his  own 
hand,  with  the  offer  from  that  statesman  of  a  transfer 
to  the  regular  navy  upon  the  completion  of  the  requi 
site  course  of  study. 

The  naval  operations  of  the  war,  which  began  by 
Lieutenant  Porter's  relief  of  Pensacola  with  the  single 
frigate  available  for  Union  service,  in  defiance  of  Bragg' s 


!8o      ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

guns,  were  fitly  closed  by  Admiral  Porter's  capture  of 
the  defences  of  Wilmington,  the  last  port  of  the  Con 
federacy,  with  a  fleet  of  overwhelming  strength,  before 
the  very  eyes  of  the  same  general.  As  nothing  was 
here  proved  of  the  iron-clads  save  their  general  fitness 
to  share  in  a  steady  bombardment  of  forts  or  inferior 
armament,  and  as  we  know  from  undoubted  authority 
that  the  success  of  the  Federals  was  assured  as  much 
by  the  fatal  indecision  of  the  commander  opposed  to 
them  (who,  though  supplied  with  full  means,  made  no 
effort  to  relieve  his  exhausted  garrisons)  as  by  the  vast 
superiority  of  the  fire  of  the  fleet,  we  do  not  think  it 
needful  to  comment  on  the  details. 

Long  before  this  affair  the  efforts  of  the  South  by 
sea  had  been  reduced  to  what  appeared  to  all  the 
world  rather  a  mere  form  of  revenge  than  any  useful 
warfare.  Failing  utterly  in  the  purpose  of  embroiling 
the  North  with  any  neutral  nation,  these  doings  left  a 
seed  of  bitterness,  such  as  needed  much  patience  to 
stay  from  growing  into  evil  fruit  in  the  future.  From 
the  fall  of  Wilmington  the  advantages  of  blockade-run 
ners  and  the  mushroom  growth  of  their  trade  became 
things  of  the  past.  For  the  rest  of  the  war  the  Con 
federate  flag  only  covered  what  was,  after  all  (if  we  ex 
cept  the  cruise  of  the  iron-clad  Stonewall),  an  ignoble 
piracy,  legalized  in  default  of  provision  made  against  it 
by  jurists.  The  ex-Cabinet  of  Richmond,  which  sanc 
tioned  this  system  to  the  end  of  their  rule,  left  as  a 
legacy  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  on  interna 
tional  duties  ever  offered  for  statesmen  to  solve.  But 
we  are  more  concerned  here  to  point  out  the  urgent 
necessity  which  will  arise,  in  case  of  England's  enga 
ging  in  a  war,  for  our  commerce  being  more  efficiently 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  igl 

guarded  at  sea  than  by  iron-clads  of  5,000  tons,  or  first- 
rate  wooden  frigates.  A  class  of  swift  corvettes,  carry 
ing  two  or  three  heavy  guns,  with  engines  so  powerful 
as  to  enable  them  to  overhaul  any  ordinary  merchant 
steamers,  will  be  absolutely  indispensable,  if  our  trade 
is  to  escape  ruin  in  any  future  naval  war  while  privateer 
ing  is  employed  against  it.  At  such  a  class,  Mr.  Welles 
and  Captain  Fox  aimed  when  they  ordered  the  Kear- 
sage  and  her  consorts  ;  but  in  this  particular  service 
alone  did  their  efforts  wholly  disappoint  expectation. 
The  Alabama,  Sumter,  and  Florida  (managed  certainly 
with  extraordinary  skill  under  very  difficult  conditions) 
roamed  unchecked  over  the  ocean.  At  the  close  of 
1864  the  capture  of  193  vessels,  valued  with  their  car 
goes  at  13-!  millions  of  dollars,  bore  testimony  to  their 
activity,  and  to  the  danger  to  which,  under  the  new 
conditions  of  naval  warfare,  an  unprotected  commer 
cial  marine  is  exposed.  That  these  losses  were  not 
from  expenditure  being  too  narrow,  but  from  the  pecu 
liar  direction  which  it  had  taken  under  Mr.  Welles,  is 
abundantly  shown  by  his  report  of  that  date.  The 
navy  which  four  years  before  had  counted  but  76  ships, 
in  and  out  of  commission,  and  of  these  about  one-half 
sailing  vessels,  \vas  now  increased  to  a  total  of  671.  Of 
this  number  no  less  than  71  were  iron-clads  of  different 
classes,  37  of  them  of  formidable  strength  and  carrying 
heavy  Dahlgren  guns  ;  and  only  1 12  of  the  whole  were 
without  steam  power,  these  being  in  fact  used  for  trans 
port  purposes. 

Whether  the  fleet  thus  enumerated  was,  as  Ameri 
cans  openly  declared,  infinitely  beyond  any  that  Eu 
rope  could  at  that  time  show  in  fighting  power,  is  a 
question  we  do  not  here  attempt  to  decide.  Our 


I  82       ADMIRALS  FARRAGUT  AND  PORTER  AND 

space  does  not  allow  us  to  do  more  than  indicate  some 
of  the  more  important  questions  connected  with  the 
discussion,  and  raised  by  even  a  cursory  view  of  the 
performances  of  the  Union  navy  during  the  war. 

The  first  of  these  that  naturally  occurs  is  the  sub 
ject  of  the  exact  value  and  use  of  monitors.  It  is  clear 
from  Mr.  Welles's  original  report  upon  these  vessels 
that  it  was  not  in  England  or  France  alone  that  official 
men  mistrusted  their  ever  being  fitted  for  sea  service. 
That  they  were  at  first  much  disliked  by  American 
naval  officers,  and  were  in  fact  easily  disabled  in  action, 
the  records  of  Dupont's  unsuccessful  attack  on  Charles 
ton  abundantly  prove.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain 
that  Mr.  Welles  and  his  adviser  after  this  failure  still 
approved  of  the  construction  of  Monitors  (the  Puritan, 
Dictator,  and  Roanoke)  built  specially  for  sea  service  ; 
that  the  navigation  of  another  large  one  around  to  the 
Pacific  has  been  found  by  no  means  so  dangerous  as 
was  anticipated ;  that  the  crews  of  these  vessels  have 
not  found  them  unhealthy;  and  that  the  experience 
gained  before  Charleston  has  been  wonderfully  utilized 
for  the  improvement  of  the  mechanism  of  the  turret 
and  ports,  so  that  (as  is  alleged)  the  shots  which  then 
produced  so  much  disabling  effect  might  now  be  easily 
endured.  The  value  of  these  assertions  no  one  was 
more  desirous  to  see  practically  tested  than  Captain 
Fox  himself.  Under  the  special  sanction  of  Congress, 
he  undertook  after  the  war  to  bring  across  the  At 
lantic  a  large  double-turreted  vessel,  the  Miantonomah, 
for  the  conviction  of  the  sceptical  ship-designers  of 
Europe ;  but  her  being  afterwards  handed  over  to 
Russia  for  use  in  the  Baltic,  as  though  the  return 
passage  were  too  dangerous  to  attempt,  naturally 


THE  NAVY  OF  THE   UNION.  ^3 

weakened  the  then  rising  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  the 
Ericsson  system. 

Closely  connected  with  this  subject  is  that  of  the 
American  system  of  heavy  smooth-bore  guns  ;  for  such 
as  those  which  won  the  fight  with  the  Atlantic,  and 
far  more,  the  new  2O-inch,  are  evidently  too  weighty 
for  any  broadside  vessel  now  in  use.  We  know  the 
objection  which  lies  to  their  moderate  charges  and  the 
consequent  low  velocity  of  their  projectiles.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  clear  that  this  may  yet  be  overcome 
by  even  a  slight  improvement  on  the  present  Rodman 
method  of  casting  on  a  cooled  bore,  or  by  the  use  of 
wrought  iron  ;  while  even  as  they  exist,  their  45O-pound 
and  99Opound  balls,  fired  with  only  -g-th  or  -g-th  charges, 
are  missiles  so  powerful  as  none  but  the  highest  class 
of  iron-clads  could  endure.  But  this  subject  with  the 
comparison  of  the  American  model  in  power  and  in 
their  boasted  endurance  with  the  huge  rifled  guns  pre 
ferred  in  Europe,  would  carry  us  beyond  our  subject, 
and  we  therefore  pass  it  by.  For  the  same  reason  we 
do  not  enter  on  that  part  of  the  torpedo  system  of 
defence  and  assault,  to  the  practical  solution  of  which 
the  American  examples  served,  although  dimly  and 
incompletely,  to  point  the  way. 

There  is  one  deduction  which  might  be  made  from 
a  hasty  survey  of  the  naval  annals  of  the  war,  against 
which  we  desire  to  give  an  earnest  warning.  Some 
will  say — as  some  have  already  said — that  the  chief 
thing  shown  is  the  possibility  of  creating,  from  private 
resources  during  actual  war,  all  that  a  great  contest  at 
sea  may  require,  without  that  elaborate  preparation 
and  vast  expenditure  to  which  in  this  country  we 
dedicate  millions  yearly  in  time  of  peace.  The  exam- 


1 84      ADMIRALS  FARRA GUT  AND  FOR TER,  E TC. 

pie  of  the  Great  Republic  and  the  precepts  of  the 
successful  statesmen  who  carried  her  safely  to  a 
triumphant  reunion  prove,  when  studied  conscientious 
ly,  the  very  contrary.  It  cost  them  years  of  toil  and 
uncertainty  and  oceans  of  expenditure  before  the 
naval  predominance  to  which  the  North  had  full  right 
was  completely  asserted.  No  minister  has  ever  more 
loudly  deprecated  the  relying  too  much  on  private 
shipyards  than  Mr.  Welles,  to  whose  earnest  and 
repeated  recommendation  it  is  due  that  the  Congress 
was  soon  after  the  war  engaged  on  the  question  of 
determining  the  site  of  a  grand  depot  for  the  future 
construction  of  American  iron-clads.  We  in  England, 
if  entering  into  a  struggle  for  that  supremacy  of  the 
seas  which  involves  the  very  life  of  our  independent 
existence,  no  less  than  the  protection  of  a  vast  and 
wide-spread  commerce,  must  look  to  meeting  not  a  raw 
seceding  province,  but  Powers  who  may  be  swift  to 
attack,  and  allow  us  brief  space  to  prepare.  A  suffi 
cient  fleet  must  in  such  event  be  ready,  not  waiting  the 
chances  of  a  hurried  creation.  Be  then  the  shock 
what  it  may,  we  doubt  not  it  would  be  met  by  hearts 
as  brave,  by  heads  as  cool,  and  arms  as  skilful,  as  those 
of  the  seamen  whose  exploits  we  have  here  briefly 
traced.  The  jealousies  of  a  day,  we  trust,  will  die, 
while  common  blood  and  language  will  create  new 
ties:  and  Englishmen  who  desire  this  will  not  be  slo\v 
to  recognize  as  worthy  successors  of  our  own  great 
naval  chieftains  those  names  which  now  fill  with  pride 
the  hearts  of  our  kinsfolk  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic. 


A  NORTHERN  RAIDER  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 

[It  needs  some  apology  for  introducing  here  this  excerpt  from  a  for 
mer  work  ;  and  its  being  a  detached  episode,  however  striking,  in  the 
course  of  the  American  Civil  War  would  not  of  itself  be  a  justification. 
But  the  writer  has  observed  that  although  the  struggle  has  now  passed 
into  history,  the  tendency  of  our  countrymen  still  often  is  to  exalt  iso 
lated  feats  of  arms  done  by  the  defeated  party,  while  ignoring  what  may 
be  called  the  romantic  side  of  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  North,  where 
the  same  daring  spirit  in  truth  existed.  Against  that  tendency  the  story 
of  Dahlgren  was  long  since  written  as  a  protest,  and  for  the  same  rea 
son  it  reappears  here.] 

THE  fourth  year  of  the  Civil  War  opened  with  an 
attempt  by  General  Butler  to  surprise  the  capital 
of  the  Confederacy,  which  was  reported  to  be  nearly 
destitute  of  a  garrison.  But  after  a  slight  skirmish 
along  the  banks  of  that  river  on  February  seventh, 
Butler,  finding  his  advance  fully  discovered  and  opposed, 
retired  without  further  pursuing  his  project,  which  had 
been  neither  prepared  with  skill  nor  executed  with 
vigor.  The  alarm  within  the  oft-threatened  city  had 
been  but  slight,  though  there  were  indeed  but  few 
regular  troops  in  its  vicinity ;  nor  did  any  one  at  this 
time  consider  it  possible  that  the  Southern  capital 
should  be  seriously  endangered  by  any  expedition  of 
the  character  of  a  raid.  Yet  a  month  had  hardly  gone 
by  when  its  inhabitants  were  startled  by  an  approach 
to  their  walls  so  daring  in  design,  and  by  them  believed 
so  fell  in  purpose,  that  even  in  its  failure  it  did  more 


A  NORTHERN  RAIDER 

to  rouse  fierce  passions   and  embitter  strife   than  any 
incident  the  war  had  yet  witnessed. 

Colonel  Dahlgren,  the  real  author  of  the  new  pro 
ject,  was  a  man  of  character  in  itself  so  remarkable,  and 
so  typical  of  the  deeper  passions  which  stirred  the 
North  to  its  tremendous  efforts  for  the  reconquest  of 
the  Union,  that  he  well  deserves  the  study  of  the  his 
torian.  Born  of  a  good  family,  and  wedded  by  pre 
scription  to  the  service  of  his  country,  in  whose  navy 
his  father  had  long  been  distinguished  ;  he  was  far 
from  being  of  those  who  could  view  with  indifference 
the  lessening  of  her  external  power  by  the  proposed 
separation  of  the  Southern  States.  By  many  a  thou 
sand  of  her  youth  (and  among  them  all  there  was  none 
of  purpose  more  earnest,  or  soul  more  romantic,  than 
Ulric  Dahlgren)  the  vision  had  been  cherished  of  a 
mighty  democratic  power  growing  up  to  so  fill  the 
western  hemisphere  with  its  greatness  as  to  overshadow 
the  \vhole  earth,  and  shed  freedom  over  its  nations. 
Such  a  feeling  of  belief  in  a  country's  destiny  may  be 
called  lust  of  empire  abroad,  but  it  stands  for  patriot 
ism  at  home  ;  and  those  who  boast  of  England's  great 
ness  and  "  her  dominion  that  the  sun  never  sets  on" 
would  do  well  to  examine  themselves  before  they  con 
demn  the  Young  American.  To  one  born  and 
brought  up  in  these  convictions  of  the  just  future  of 
the  Union,  its  voluntary  disruption  by  the  South 
seemed  such  a  crime  as  sacrilege  could  not  outdo,  and 
the  perpetrators  of  the  act  the  basest  traitors  that  sword 
was  ever  lifted  to  punish.  The  very  force  of  the  re 
ligion  which  a  pious  mother  had,  through  his  earlier 
years,  instilled  into  his  heart,  made  him  long,  like  the 
Puritans  of  our  own  revolution,  to  smite  down  those 


IN  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 


I87 


who  opposed  the  political  faith  which  to  him  seemed 
destined  to  spread  justice  and  freedom  and  truth 
throughout  the  world.  Burning  with  such  thoughts  as 
these,  and  having  just  attained  to  manhood  at  the  out 
break  of  the  civil  war,  he  threw  himself  with  all  the  ar 
dor  of  youth  and  passion  into  the  struggle  against 
secession.  Those  writers  who,  content  to  judge  from 
a  superficial  view,  or  led  by  they  own  sentiments  wholly, 
have  sought  to  trace  the  first  cause  of  the  uprising  of 
North  against  South  in  a  national  hatred  and  loathing 
of  slavery,  have  missed  the  real  motive  power  which 
first  called  twenty  millions  of  free  people  under  arms, 
and  gave  to  Abolition  that  growing  strength  which 
stern  fanaticism  wins  when  it  allies  its  cause  with  revo 
lution.  This  power  it  was,  this  yearning  for  their 
country's  greatness,  and  no  special  love  for  the  negro 
race,  which  moved  Dahlgren  and  a  thousand  others 
less  known  than  he  to  offer  their  lives  freely  for  the 
unity  of  their  country. 

Of  daring  courage  and  noted  horsemanship,  he  had 
soon  become  sensible  of  the  deficiencies  of  the  Union 
cavalry,  and  attempted,  as  early  as  the  days  of  M'Clellan, 
to  lead  them  to  a  better  fame.  The  breaking  up  of 
Hooker's  personal  staff,  of  which  he  had  formed  one, 
on  the  suppression  of  that  general  in  1863,  gave  him 
his  opportunity;  and  he  applied  for  the  command  of  a 
detachment  of  horse,  with  which  he  volunteered  to 
harass  the  rear  of  the  Confederates.  Twenty  dragoons 
only  were  granted  him  at  first  ;  but  his  almost  imme 
diate  capture  of  an  orderly,  bringing  dispatches  to  Lee 
from  Richmond,  brought  him  into  notice,  and  after  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg  he  moved,  with  100  of  the  sixth 
New  York  Cavalry  placed  under  his  orders,  to  attack 


1 8  8  A  NOR  THERN  RA IDER 

the  retreating  trains  and  their  escorts.  In  this  service, 
and  the  series  of  skirmishes  near  Hagerstown,  he  effect 
ed  as  much  real  havoc  as  Kilpatrick  or  Gregg  with  their 
whole  divisions  of  horse  ;  but  on  July  sixth  he  was 
badly  wounded  in  the  leg,  in  covering  some  of  his 
captures  from  a  superior  force.  Amputation  proved 
necessary,  and  his  career  for  some  time  was  closed  by 
the  illness  that  followed  ;  but  his  name  as  a  dashing 
leader  (added  possibly  to  the  great  services  of  his 
father  to  the  Union)  caused  the  President  to  console 
him  with  a  flattering  letter  from  the  War  Secretary,  en 
closing  his  brevet  of  colonel,  bestowed  without  passing 
through  the  usual  grades.  Recovering  by  slow  degrees, 
and  musing  much,  no  doubt,  upon  the  high  career 
which  seemed  open  to  him — who  now  held  rank  such 
as  Napoleon  had  not  reached  at  the  age  of  twenty-one 
— he  returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its  winter 
quarters,  when  hard  weather  and  enforced  idleness 
made  the  sufferings  of  the  Northern  prisoners  at  Rich 
mond  seem  doubly  near  to  all.  There  were  known 
to  be  about  10,000  Federal  soldiers  there  confined  in 
the  Belle  Isle  prison  on  the  James,  while  the  garrison 
of  the  city  was  but  weak.  The  prisoners  crowded  in 
this  island  complained  much  of  their  treatment  ;  and 
although  receiving  the  same  rations  as  were  issued  to 
the  Confederate  soldiers,  these  were  so  scanty  that 
those  who  could  not  eke  them  out  by  private  means 
fared  but  ill  compared  to  their  well-supplied  comrades 
in  the  field.  It  is  not  surprising  that  many  plans  were 
canvassed  for  their  release  by  surprise  ;  and  that  to 
Dahlgren,  whose  feelings  led  him  to  believe  the  worst 
of  the  Confederate  Government,  the  enterprise  how 
ever  carried  out,  seemed  the  holiest  of  duties,  as  well 


IN  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 

as  a  swift  road  to  further  honors.  Forthwith  an  expe 
dition  was  arranged,  under  the  nominal  conduct  of 
General  Kilpatrick,  who  felt  the  urgent  need,  after  the 
autumn  failures,  of  doing  something  to  retrieve  the 
reputation  which  was  slipping  from  him.  The  more 
dangerous  part  of  the  design — and  no  forlorn  hope  was 
ever  mustered  for  more  perilous  work — was  undertaken 
by  Dahlgren.  This  consisted  in  a  proposed  attempt  to 
cross  with  a  detached  force  to  the  south  side  of  the 
James,  and  move  on  Richmond  by  that  bank,  where 
an  enemy  would  naturally  be  but  little  expected,  and 
near  which  the  prison  lay.  Kilpatrick,  with  the  main 
column,  was  to  make  a  simultaneous  demonstration 
against  the  works  to  the  north  of  the  city  ;  and  it  was 
hoped  that,  under  cover  of  this,  Dahlgren's  men  might 
break  their  way  into  the  prisons  and  release  the  cap 
tives.  Once  free,  it  was  even  supposed  that  the  num 
ber  of  these,  and  their  desperation,  might  enable  them 
to  master  the  surprised  capital,  and  perhaps  hold  it 
until  Butler's  forces,  which  were  to  advance  at  the  same 
time  up  the  peninsula,  should  come  to  their  aid.  It  is 
significant  of  the  determined  character  of  the  man, 
that  the  chief  who  was  thus  to  guide  his  dragoons  into 
the  heart  of  a  hostile  city  was  still  suffering  from  the 
debility  of  fever,  and  unable  to  move  on  foot  without 
crutches. 

On  the  night  of  February  twenty-eighth,  after  a 
part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  made  a  feint  on 
Lee's  flank,  the  expedition  left  Meade's  lines  for  Ely's 
Ford,  far  beyond  the  Confederate  left.  It  was  composed 
originally  of  3,800  cavalry,  with  three  light  guns,  the 
whole  being  formed  of  selected  detachments  of  well- 
mounted  men  of  various  regiments.  Crossing  the  Rap- 


190 


A  NORTHERN  RAIDER 


idan  unopposed,  they  pushed  on  through  the  wooded 
district  south  of  Chancellorsville,  called  the  Wilderness 
(soon  to  be  the  scene  of  a  series  of  deadly  struggles 
enduring  half  the  length  of  a  European  campaign),  to 
Spottsylvania  Court-house,  where  Dahlgren,  with  500 
volunteers,  left  the  main  column  on  the  twenty-ninth  for 
his  separate  march,  which  lay  southward  direct  to  the 
James,  which  he  hoped  to  gain  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
threatened  city,  and  yet  far  enough  from  the  works  to 
prevent  his  arrival  being  discovered. 

Kilpatrick,  continuing  his  south-eastward  course, 
struck  the  railroad  to  Richmond  not  far  from  the  well- 
known  junction  at  Orange ;  and  pausing  only  to  do  as 
much  damage  to  the  line  as  was  consistent  with  a 
somewhat  rapid  march,  rested  for  the  night  some  miles 
farther  on,  near  the  southern  branch  of  the  Pamunkey. 
A  detachment  of  400  men  was  sent  eastward  before 
daylight,  with  intent  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge 
over  the  stream,  but  retreated  on  finding  it  protected 
by  a  party  of  infantry ;  and  the  whole  force  was  soon 
on  its  way  towards  Richmond,  now  but  twenty  miles 
distant,  in  the  hope  of  finding  its  way  into  an  unde 
fended  capital.  Early  in  the  afternoon  an  outer  line 
of  redoubts  was  reached  and  passed  through  without 
resistance ;  but  the  advance  had  been  made  known  by 
the  telegraph  some  hours  before,  and  a  heavy  fire  from 
works  within  upon  the  cavalry  of  General  Davies, 
which  supported  the  advanced  guard,  soon  proved  that 
the  movement  was  discovered  and  prepared  for.  Da- 
vies  at  once  dismounted  his  men  and  deployed  them 
as  skirmishers,  after  the  fashion  adopted  by  the  North 
ern  cavalry,  and  in  days  long  past  by  the  extinct  dra 
goon  of  the  European  armies.  But  Kilpatrick,  seeing 


IN  THE  CIVIL    WAR.  igi 

the  redoubts  before  him  to  be  strong  and  apparently 
well  manned  (though  there  were  in  truth  but  a  few 
hundred  troops,  with  some  city  militia  within  them), 
and  hearing  nothing  of  Dahlgren's  expected  attack  on 
the  other  side,  grew  alarmed  at  his  own  position,  and 
drew  his  men  off  before  dark,  moving  westward  across 
the  Chickahominy  to  Mechanicsville.  Here  he  en 
camped  for  the  night ;  but  General  Wade  Hampton, 
who  arrived  that  evening  at  Richmond  after  a  rapid 
march  with  400  Southern  horse,  learning  the  enemy's 
position,  resolved  to  attempt  a  surprise,  which  was  so 
far  successful  that  he  captured  a  hundred  of  their  num 
ber,  and  broke  up  the  encampment,  forcing  them  to  re 
treat  down  the  river.  In  the  morning  however  Kilpat- 
rick  discovered  how  small  was  the  number  of  the  pur 
suers,  and  his  rear-guard  under  Davies  drove  them  off 
with  ease.  Passing  thence,  he  was  met  at  the  close 
of  the  day  by  the  force  from  the  peninsula  under  But 
ler,  which  had  been  intended  to  co-operate  with  him  ; 
and  which,  by  some  unexplained  misconception,  had 
moved  just  a  day  too  late  to  be  of  any  effectual  assist 
ance.  Two  days  later  the  united  column  was  joined 
by  the  greater  part  of  Dahlgren's  command,  coming 
southward  after  circling  round  Richmond  ;  but  their 
enterprise  had  yet  more  completely  miscarried,  and 
their  leader  had  paid  for  his  share  in  it  with  his  life. 

He  had  parted  from  Kilpatrick,  as  before  stated, 
at  Spottsylvania,  and  had  reached  Frederickshall,  his 
next  point,  early  in  the  day.  Having  here  destroyed 
the  railroad  station  with  some  stores,  but  missed  a 
park  of  artillery  which  he  had  hoped  to  capture,  he 
proceeded  onward  to  the  James.  A  negro  fugitive  of 
the  district  had  undertaken  to  conduct  the  party  to 


!Q2  A  NORTHERN  RAIDER 

the  desired  ford  not  far  from  Richmond  :  but  through 
treachery  or  ignorance  he  missed  his  way,  and  at  mid 
night  the  Federals,  after  much  wandering,  found  them 
selves  a  day's  march  higher  up  the  stream  than  the 
point  they  sought.  The  wretched  guide  was  sacrificed 
on  the  spot  to  their  fury,  and  the  course  of  the  river 
followed  down  towards  the  city ;  but  the  latter  was 
now  only  attained  on  its  guarded  side  ;  and  that  at 
dark,  twenty-four  hours  after  Kilpatrick  had  retreated. 
Driven  off  in  a  vain  attempt  to  surprise  the  nearest 
work,  Dahlgren  marched  northward  through  the  dark 
ness,  seeking  for  the  present  only  to  save  his  column, 
which  he  strove  to  guide  in  person ;  but  at  dawn  he 
found  himself  with  but  a  hundred  dragoons  following 
him,  the  rest  having  wandered  from  him  on  the  way  at 
some  turning  of  the  by-roads  he  pursued.  That  day 
he  crossed  the  Pamunkey  and  Mattapony  rivers  in 
succession,  inclining  eastward  in  hopes  to  find  some 
road  open  towards  York  River.  But  the  country  was 
now  beset  by  armed  parties  of  excited  citizens  and 
militia  in  chase  of  the  invaders;  and  in  attempting  to 
continue  his  march  in  the  dark,  he  fell  into  an  ambush 
at  midnight,  and  was  shot  down  with  some  of  his  men, 
the  rest  surrendering.  That  his  body  was  stripped 
and  plundered,  and  a  ring  cut  from  his  hand,  was  but 
natural  under  the  circumstances,  and  no  uncommon 
fate  in  war :  but  the  order  found  upon  his  person,  di 
recting  his  men  "to  exhort  the  released  prisoners  to 
destroy  and  burn  the  hateful  city,  and  not  allow  the 
rebel  leader  Davis  and  his  traitorous  crew  to  escape," 
was  made  the  pretext  for  such  an  act  of  savage  retali 
ation  as  the  war  had  not  yet  witnessed  ;  the  exposing 
his  corps  to  the  common  gaze  as  that  of  a  murderer 


IN  THE  CIVIL    WAR. 


193 


slain  in  the  midst  of  his  felon  deed.  His  family  denied 
the  authenticity  of  this  document :  but  their  charge 
of  forgery  against  the  Richmond  Government  was 
scarcely  supported  by  evidence  or  probability,  though 
the  local  journals  gave  color  to  it,  by  their  folly  in 
printing  as  if  true  whatever  exaggeration  added  to  the 
original  words  in  the  excitement  of  the  hour.  How 
ever  the  exact  truth  may  be,  certain  it  is  that  the 
attempt  on  her  capital  envenomed  to  the  utmost  the 
feelings  of  the  South :  as  the  insult  to  the  remains  of 
the  gallant  dead,  and  the  virulent  assault  on  his  mem 
ory  made  subsequently  in  an  official  report  of  the 
Confederate  Secretary  for  War,  served  to  enhance  the 
bitterness  of  the  Unionists  against  the  Seceded  States. 
Is  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  a  new  generation  is  need 
ed  to  reunite  in  heart  the  two  sections,  the  hopes  of 
whose  bravest  youth  led  to  such  fierce  purpose  and 
such  bloody  end  as  Ulric  Dahlgren's  ?  What  freedom, 
what  greatness,  can  close  the  wounds  made  among 
the  homes  of  the  recovered  Union  by  a  thousand  lives 
and  deaths  like  his  ? 


DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS    OF    THE 
GRAND  ARMY.* 

No  subjects  have  created  wider  differences  between 
critics  than  the  military  genius  and  system  of  Napoleon. 
To  some  few  of  those  who  have  considered  them,  the 
admiration  usually  lavished  upon  them  appears  fulsome 
and  indiscriminate.  This  section  regards  the  French 
Emperor  as  nothing  more  than  a  bold  and  unscrupu 
lous  adventurer,  seizing  the  reins  of  power  by  political 
intrigue,  and  then  using  his  authority  to  collect  and 
throw  into  the  field  unheard-of  masses  of  men,  to 
whose  numbers  and  courage,  opposed  to  feebler 
adversaries,  his  long  train  of  imperial  conquest  was 
due.  Such  men  balance  Acre  against  Toulon,  Aspern 
against  Austerlitz,  Leipsic  and  Waterloo  against 
Friedland  and  Wagram  ;  and  confident  in  the  fact  that 
they  find  weaknesses  and  flaws  in  the  object  pressed 
on  them  as  perfect,  refuse  to  recognize  any  strength  or 
brilliancy  in  it.  A  far  larger  class  there  is  (we  speak 
with  all  respect  of  one  that  has  Thiers  for  its  represen 
tative  and  Napier  in  its  ranks)  who  err  almost  equally 
in  the  opposite  direction.  To  these  Napoleon,  regarded 
simply  as  a  general,  appears  faultless.  His  administra 
tive  arrangements  only  failed  by  Jack  of  care  in  others ; 

*  Souvenirs  Militaires  de  1804  d  1814.     Par  M.  le  Due  de  Fezensac 
General  de  Division. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  GRAND  ARMY.          195 

his  strategy  never  erred  ;  his  tactics  were  to  the  last 
superior  to  those  of  his  foes.  Climate,  diplomacy,  the 
deficiencies  of  his  lieutenants,  the  envy  of  his  allies, 
even  his  own  want  of  political  judgment  and  modera 
tion,  may  have  caused  his  disasters;  but  they  are  never 
to  be  attributed  to  want  of  foresight  in  his  arrange 
ments  for  the  field,  or  mistaken  views  of  the  military 
events  around  him.  Let  any  evidence  be  rejected, 
and  any  supposition  entertained,  rather  than  believe 
that  he  was  ever  wanting  to  his  army,  or  his  army  to 
its  chief. 

A  third  school  of  critics  has  of  late  arisen,  who 
pursue  a  simpler  and  more  truthful  method,  the  only 
one  worthy  a  sound  writer  of  military  history.  This 
is  to  lay  aside,  as  far  as  may  be,  all  prepossession  for 
or  against  the  man,  and  look  only  at  what  the  general 
did.  Take  nothing  for  granted  in  what,  after  all,  are 
mere  matters  of  evidence  and  fact.  Accept  no  one 
sided  statement  from  any  national  historian  who  rejects 
what  is  distasteful  in  his  authorities,  and  uses  only 
what  suits  his  own  theory.  Believe  not  that  any  man 
ever  lived  who,  in  so  dark  and  uncertain  a  science  as 
war,  had  the  gift  of  infallibility.  Gather  carefully 
from  actual  witnesses,  high  and  low,  such  original 
material  as  they  offer  for  the  construction  of  the  narra 
tive.  This  once  being  safely  formed,  judge  critically 
and  calmly  what  was  the  conduct  of  the  chief  actor; 
how  far  his  insight,  calmness,  personal  control  over 
others,  and  right  use  of  his  means  were  concerned  in 
the  result.  This  plan  is  that  which  Clausewitz  has 
pursued  with  the  campaign  of  1812,  Cathcart  with 
that  of  1813,  and  Charras,  with  singular  success,  in 
throwing  light  on  the  great  struggle  of  Waterloo. 


196 


DE  FEZEN SAC'S  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


The  work  of  the  latter  has  left  but  little  that  is  new  to 
be  added  as  regards  his  special  subject,  and  his 
untimely  death  alone  prevented  his  repeating  this 
literary  triumph  by  carrying  his  researches  further 
back.  The  fragment  published  posthumously  of  his 
intended  "  Guerre  de  1813"  shows  the  same  industry 
and  clearness  which  distinguished  his  former  writings,! 
Had  he  lived,  we  may  believe  he  would  have  laid  bare 
the  inner  details  of  the  gigantic  struggle  in  Germany 
with  the  same  thoroughness  which  had  placed  him 
already  at  the  head  of  all  French  writers  who  have 
treated  of  Napoleon's  latest  campaign. 

For  this  high  class  of  military  history,  which  aims 
at  truth,  and  seeks  first  to  know  what  was  done,  before 
delivering  judgment  on  the  action,  all  genuine  narra 
tives  of  eyewitnesses  have  a  peculiar  value.  Many 
such  have  already  served  to  illustrate  the  history  of 
Napoleon's  wars  ;  but  there  has  hitherto  been  wanting 
an  account  by  some  writer  who  had  held  every  rank  in 
the  Grand  Army  from  the  private  to  the  general,  had 
intelligence  enough  to  reason  from  its  details  up  to  its 
general  action,  and  who  could  admire  the  genius  of 
Napoleon,  without  in  any  way  being  identified  with 
the  system  which  he  founded.  The  memoirs  of  no 
marshal,  chamberlain,  or  grand  equerry  meet  these  con 
ditions.  They  could  be  found  only  in  a  man  who  had 
rank  independent  of  Imperialism,  education  outside  the 
Lycee,  and  patriotism  superior  to  party. 

Such  a  man  was  the  Duke  de  Fezensac,  whose 
death,  at  a  most  venerable  age,  the  third  Napoleon 
noticed  in  a  public  letter  addressed  to  his  family.  His 
"  Military  Recollections,"  will  for  ever  occupy  one  of 
the  highest  places  among  the  literature  that  illustrates 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 


I97 


the  Napoleonic  era.     That  portion  which  bears  upon 
the  campaign  in  Russia  was  published  long  ago,  and 
seems  to  have  won  its  way  but  slowly  to  the  notice  it 
merited  ;  for  an  interval  of  more  than  ten  years  elapsed 
before  the  author  was  emboldened  to  offer  to  the  world 
the  complete  work.     There  needed  not  the  apology  of 
his  modest  preface  to  make  this  acceptable.     The  per 
sonal  details  which   abound  in   it  do,  as  he  truly  says, 
paint  the  very  manners  and  spirit  of  the  times.     Let 
us  add  that  they  paint  the  true  features  of  the  system 
of  war  which  the  author  observed  from  its  midst  with  a 
force  and  accuracy,  which  gives  this  unpretending  vol 
ume  a  genuine  historical  value  far  above  that  of  the 
brilliant  pages  of  "  The  Consulate  and  Empire,"  which 
M.  de  Fezensac,  like  many  other  loyal  Frenchmen,  rates 
higher  than  their  worth.     To   tell  plainly  and  without 
exaggeration  or  concealment  the  truth  with  regard  to 
Napoleon's  method  of  war;  to   show  how  great  it  was 
on    some   fit    occasions,  how   full    of  shortcomings   it 
proved  when  overstrained  ;  to  trace   the  effect  of  its 
deficiencies  in  the  vain  efforts  of  the  great  conqueror 
to  stem   the  European  tide  when  it  once  turned   full 
against  him  ;  to  do  all  this  with  the  spirit  of  a  keen- 
eyed  observer,  yet  of  an  honest  soldier  of  France  :  this 
is  no  trifling  task  to  have  accomplished.     Moreover,  M. 
de    Fezensac    has   taken    pains  to  throw  his  personal 
memoirs  into  an  historical  form  by  adding  here  and 
there  outlines  of  the  general  course  of  events  connected 
with  the  war  ;  yet  has  carefully  distinguished  between 
what   he    saw  and  what  he    only  gives   from    report. 
Where  he  differs  broadly  from  the  usual  authorities  as 
to  the  actual  working  of  Napoleon's  army,  he  does  so 
in  the  most  modest  way,  and  gives  good  reason  for  his 


198 


DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


own  sounder  opinion.  In  short,  the  reader  who  visits 
under  his  guidance  the  camp  of  Boulogne,  follows  him 
thence  through  the  brilliant  strategy  of  1805,  !8o6  and 

1807,  in   Germany  and  Poland,  passes  on  with  him  t 
Napoleon's  own  brief  personal  command   in  Spain  in 

1808,  and  later,  makes  the  disastrous  campaigns  of  181 
and  1813  in  his  company,  will  know  more  of  what  th 
warriors  of  the  Grand  Army  really  were  and  did,  a 
these  successive  periods,  than  could  be  learnt  by  a  life 
long  study  of  popular  French  works  on  the  subject 
M.  de  Fezensac  does  not  indeed  pretend  to  tell  us  wha 
went    on   in  the  German    and    Russian  camps  during 
epochs  so  glorious  and  so  fatal  to  the  pride  of  France 
In  this  he  shows  no  special  ignorance,  but  much  supe 
rior  honesty  to  French  historians  of  the  vulgar  clas 
who  take  no   trouble   to  search  any  records  but  thos 
of  their  own   nation,  as  well  as  to  those  who,  like  M. 
Thiers,  never  use  any  records,  save  when  they  seem  to 
corroborate  their  own  prepossessions.     The  campaigns 
above  mentioned  do  not  include  all  the  service  which 
the  author  saw,  but  special  circumstances  prevented  his 
keeping  personal  notes  of  the  gigantic  struggle  between 
Napoleon    and   the   Archduke    Charles   in    1809;  and 
although  he  witnessed   the  great  events  of  Eckmiihl, 
Aspern,  and  Wagram,  he  modestly  mentions  his  omis 
sion  to  record   them,  and   dismisses  them   in   a  page. 
Through   the  other  portions  of  his  narrative  we  now 
purpose   to  follow  him,  not  with  the  intent  to  rewrite 
the  story  of  well-known  marches   and   battles,  but  to 
show  how   much   the  popular  histories   which   delight 
the  worshippers  of  Napoleon  lack  a  reality  to  be  found 
in  the  observations  of  one  single-hearted  individual  of 
his  million  soldiers. 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 


I99 


The  book  opens  with  the  camp  at  Boulogne,  where 
the  author,  then  a  youth  of  twenty,  went  to  join  his 
regiment.  He  was  already  too  old  for  a  military  col 
lege ;  for  his  parents  had  long  withheld  their  consent 
to  his  entering  the  army  of  one  whom  they,  as  mem 
bers  of  the  old  French  aristocracy,  regarded  as  a  low 
born  usurper.  "  Like  all  the  young  fellows,"  he  first 
thought  of  the  cavalry ;  but  a  friend  of  the  family 
who  commanded  the  59th  regiment  of  the  line,  per 
suaded  him  to  enter  under  his  tutelage  into  that  arm 
— a  step,  he  assures  us,  never  afterwards  repented  of. 
In  the  capacity  of  a  private  soldier  therefore,  he  first 
became  acquainted  with  the  vast  machine  by  which 
Napoleon's  busy  brain  was  preparing  to  intimidate 
England  in  the  first  place,  and,  when  this  failed,  to 
strike  Germany  prostrate.  "  If  I  consulted  only  my 
attachment  to  you  and  to  your  family,"  said  his  friend 
Colonel  Lacuee,  "  I  would  make  you  my  secretary  and 
keep  you  personally  about  me.  But  for  the  sake  of 
your  own  career,  you  must  learn  to  know  those  whom 
you  will  one  day  command  ;  and  the  way  to  do  that 
is  to  live  among  them."  "By  doing  this"  he  added, 
"you  will  learn  to  know  their  virtues  ;  otherwise  you  will 
only  know  tlieir  vices."  The  author  italicises  these 
words,  as  implying  that  he  considers  them  the  key  to 
the  whole  relation  between  officers  and  men.  Such 
was,  at  any  rate,  the  creed  of  the  republican  soldiers 
who  furnished  Napoleon  with  his  materials,  of  whom 
Colonel  Lacuee  was  a  fair  specimen.  A  favorite  at  one 
time  with  the  First  Consul,  he  had  shown,  in  common 
with  a  vast  number  of  the  higher  officers,  a  sympathy 
with  Moreau  which  the  new  ruler  of  France  could  not 
brook.  One  must  look  deeply  into  the  history  of  the 


2OQ  DE  FEZENSAC'S  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

time  to  understand  how  widely  this  feeling  of  sympa 
thy  extended  through  the  ranks  of  the  army,  and  how 
bitterly  Napoleon  resented  all  manifestations  of  military 
respect  and  of  personal  regard  towards  the  great  gen 
eral  who  more  than  rivalled  him  (according  to  the  can 
did  statement  of  his  own  favorite,  Dumas)  in  its  affec 
tions. 

Lecourbe  in  exile,  Dessoles  pining  in  neglect, 
Richepanse  sacrificed  in  an  obscure  expedition  in  the 
tropics,  testified  to  the  animosity  with  which  he  pur 
sued  the  more  distinguished  members  of  Moreau's  staff. 
Lesser  men  felt  it  only  in  a  less  degree  ;  and  Colonel 
Lacuee,  being  among  those  who  had  shown  an  interest 
in  the  fallen  general,  was  dismissed  from  snug  employ 
ment  on  the  staff,  and  ordered  to  take  the  command  of 
a  regiment  which  Napoleon  told  him  as  he  left,  was 
one  of  the  worst  in  the  army,  and  which  from  its  ill  ap 
pearance  had  gained  the  soubriquet  of  the  Royal  Tat 
ters  (Royal  Decousii}.  The  59th  had  had  for  their  last 
colonel  an  officer  who  did  not  scruple  to  embezzle 
from  the  regimental  chest ;  a  fact  the  author  mentions 
as  though  it  were  no  extraordinary  occurrence  in  that 
ci-devant  republican  army,  of  whose  severe  purity  so 
much  has  been  written.  Lacuee  was  at  least  a  gentle 
man,  though  ignorant,  it  seems  of  the  duties  assigned 
to  him  as  the  head  of  a  regiment.  He  had  contented 
himself  with  acquiring  the  power  of  manoeuvring  his 
battalions  and  enforcing  discipline,  leaving  in  the  hands 
of  the  quartermaster  the  more  vulgar  care  of  improv 
ing  the  ill  condition  of  the  clothing  which  had  made 
the  regiment  so  notorious.  This  good  colonel,  with 
his  aristocratic  habits  and  republican  theories,  was 
of  a  disposition  much  superior  to  the  troops  he  com- 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  2OI 

manded,  and  his  rough  subordinates  hardly  understood 
though  they  learnt  to  like  him.  M.  de  Fezensac  has 
traced  the  lineaments  of  his  character  with  a  loving 
hand  and  leaves  them  as  clearly  drawn  in  these  open 
ing  pages  as  though  he  sought  to  tempt  some  future 
novelist  with  a  ready-made  hero. 

Handed  over  by  Lacuee  after  a  few  days'  holiday 
to  the  captain  of  his  company,  the  young  aspirant 
began  his  new  life  by  laughing  at  the  eccentricity  of  his 
uniform,  a  compromise  between  the  stiff  republican 
garb  of  the  expiring  age  and  the  imperial  extravagance 
of  the  future.  From  a  full  description  of  this  dress, 
with  its  three-cornered  hat,  black  gaiters,  and  long 
powdered  hair,  we  pass  to  an  admirable  account  of  the 
life  of  the  camp  at  Boulogne,  as  seen  in  the  winter  of 
1804-5.  Here  he  at  once  digresses,  to  show  us  how 
different  practice  is  from  theory,  even  in  the  most  elab 
orately  formed  army.  We  hear  of  various  regula 
tions  which,  as  in  certain  other  services,  exist  only  to  be 
broken.  Of  these  infractions  the  most  striking  in  an 
army  constituted  as  the  French  up  to  that  time  had 
been,  relates  to  the  sergeants,  those  important  links 
between  the  officers  and  their  men.  The  rule  was  that 
they  should  live  among  the  latter;  the  practice  was 
that  they  had  a  separate  hut  to  themselves  in  each 
company.  "  This  arrangement,"  says  the  author,  "  had 
its  good  and  its  bad  side.  The  sergeants  being  sepa 
rated  from  the  soldiers,  could  not  exercise  so  active  a 
watch  over  them.  During  my  apprenticeship  as  private 
and  corporal,  I  saw  many  things  escape  them.  But 
they  were  the  more  respected  for  being  the  less  often 
seen,  and  I  believe,  to  speak  decidedly,  that  this  is  the 
more  important  matter."  Theorists  who  would  con- 


202 


DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


struct  an  ideal  British  army,  upon  the  model  of  some 
French  or  Prussian  Book  of  Regulations  may  here 
learn  how  little  mere  written  rules  signify  when  they 
conflict  with  the  spirit  and  habits  of  the  service. 
Those  who  have  judged  the  separation  enforced  in  our 
own  army  between  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
to  be  the  mere  product  of  aristocratic  prejudice  may 
find  their  lesson  and  reproof  in  this  disinterested 
opinion. 

Placed  as  M.  de  Fezensac  was  for  the  next  few 
weeks  in  the  position  of  a  private  soldier,  it  is  interest 
ing  to  see  how  far  a  young  man  of  fortune  seeking 
promotion  through  the  ranks  of  Napoleon's  army,  had 
to  submit  to  real  hardships,  and  in  what  his  lot  differed 
from  that  of  the  ordinary  recruit.  In  some  matters, 
it  seems  from  the  details  afforded,  the  French  gentle 
man  private  was  destitute  of  the  special  advantages  of 
a  Prussian  advantageury  or  an  Austrian  regimental 
cadet.  He  ate,  sat,  and  slept  with  the  other  privates, 
could  occupy  no  separate  lodging,  employ  no  recog 
nized  servant  from  among  his  comrades,  nor  escape 
being  nominally  detailed  by  his  sergeant  for  the  most 
repulsive  duties  of  the  camp.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  closely  looked  at,  his  service  as  a  private  was 
little  different  from  that  required  of  the  young  German 
noble,  except  in  the  matter  of  his  enforced  companion 
ship  with  those  of  a  different  class  of  life.  His  com 
rades  paid  him  to  the  full  the  respect  due  to  one  who, 
in  their  soldier's  phrase,  "  had  a  louis  a  day  to  eat  of 
his  own,"  and  could  give  a  dinner  to  forty  of  them  at 
a  time.  For  a  few  sous  any  of  them  would  take  his 
turn  at  sweeping  and  cooking.  The  hairdresser  of 
the  company  connived  at  his  avoiding  the  growth  of 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 


203 


the  obnoxious  and  antiquated  cue.  The  corporal  who 
placed  him  on  the  only  turn  of  sentinel  duty  that  was 
ever  allotted  him,  connived  at  his  quitting  his  post 
before  the  proper  time  for  relief.  In  fine,  if  brought 
further  from  the  level  of.  his  personal  rank  for  a  few 
weeks,  he  had  the  advantage  over  the  volunteer  pri 
vate  of  other  armies  in  the  quick  promotion  which 
rewarded  his  endurance.  Having  only  left  Paris  in 
the  month  of  September,  he  gained  his  first  step  of  cor 
poral  on  the  eighteenth  of  October.  Of  this  he  frankly 
tells  us  he  proved  hardly  worthy,  receiving  various 
reprimands  for  his  irregularity  in  his  new  duties,  to 
which  it  was  possibly  owing  that  he  was  allowed  to 
continue  in  this  rank  until  midwinter,  finding  his  life, 
still  spent  among  the  men,  at  times  intolerably  irk 
some.  Ordered  to  go  in  January  with  a  guard  detach 
ment  on  board  one  of  the  gun-boats  which  Nelson  kept 
imprisoned  in  Etaples  harbour,  he  murmured  openly 
to  his  friend  the  colonel,  and  finding  no  comfort  in  the 
cool  reply,  "You  must  learn  to  be  put  out,"  went  off 
in  sad  humor  with  his  new  duty,  which  was  to  last  a 
month.  Lacuee  was,  however,  merely  testing  his  pa 
tience  by  this  service,  and  on  the  fifth  day  he  was 
summoned  back  to  camp  on  promotion  to  the  rank  of 
sergeant,  a  step  which  raised  him  out  of  immediate 
contact  with  the  rough  privates  with  whom  he  had 
now  been  for  four  months  herded.  None  of  these,  it 
would  seem,  showed  any  jealousy  of  the  elevation  of 
their  aristocratic  messmate,  for  birth,  wealth,  and  edu 
cation  had  become  as  sure  passports  to  promotion  in 
the  army  of  the  Consulate  as  in  that  of  the  most 
ancient  monarchies.  Two  months  had  not  passed 
over  the  new  sergeant's  head  when  he  was  brought 


2O4 


DE  FE  ZEN  SACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


before  the  colonel,  charged  with  a  dereliction  of  duty ; 
but  his  supposed  offence  being  shown  to  be  but  an 
ordinary  practice,  though  irregular  enough,  the  color- 
sergeant  (or  company  sergeant-major,  according  to 
French  grade)  was  broken  for  not  reporting  it,  and  the 
cause  of  his  disgrace  promoted  in  his  stead.  At  six 
months'  service  young  de  Fezensac  thus  found  himself 
in  a  position  which  gave  him  practical  charge  of  a 
company,  and  which  was,  as  it  still  is,  the  recognized 
stepping-stone  of  the  deserving  soldier  to  a  commission- 
The  sergeant-major  of  that  day  differed  little  from 
the  subaltern  in  social  condition.  The  officers  had  all 
passed  through  this  rank,  and  all  who  then  held  it  were 
entitled,  if  qualified,  to  look  for  the  epaulette  of  a  sub 
lieutenant  in  their  turn.  Many,  however,  were  not  thus 
classed,  for  a  certain  degree  of  education  and  some 
small  means  were  in  practice  necessary  for  further  pro 
motion.  As  this  last  qualification  sounds  like  an  anom 
aly  in  a  service  where  merit  has  been  commonly  sup 
posed  the  sole  road  to  advancement,  the  autobiographer 
has  taken  pains  to  explain  his  mention  of  it.  It  seems 
that  in  those  days  the  captain  of  the  company  left  to 
his  sergeant-major  the  charge  of  the  accounts,  subject 
only  to  a  quarterly  settlement ;  and  as  the  pay  of  the 
latter  was  actually  insufficient  for  his  wants,  it  followed 
that,  if  he  could  not  eke  it  out  by  other  means,  he 
usually  had  recourse  to  petty  dishonesty.  Where  this 
was  exercised  only  against  the  government,  it  was 
very  lightly  regarded.  The  captains  only  said  they 
should  be  glad  to  know  of  the  little  resources  which 
their  accountants  managed  to  get  hold  of.  The  sol 
diers  were  well  aware  when  their  pay  for  days  of  ab 
sence  or  sickness  was  charged  to  the  public,  and  had 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  2O$ 

their  professional  jest  ready;  "The  sergeant-major's 
arithmetic — put  down  nought  and  carry  nine  :  "  but 
this  indulgence  by  no  means  extended  to  the  plunder 
of  individuals  ;  and  a  case  of  unfair  stoppages  from  a 
conscript  would  ruin  the  author  of  it,  if  detected. 
Always  ready,  as  M.  de  Fezensac  more  than  once  tells 
us,  to  suspect  every  one  of  cheating  them,  from  their 
Minister  of  War  down  to  the  sergeant-major,  they 
watched  narrowly  to  see  that  no  advantage  was  taken 
by  him  of  themselves  ;  and  moreover  they  expected 
for  their  connivance  at  his  other  peculations  a  forbear 
ance  for  their  own  petty  impositions  on  the  hucksters 
who  served  the  camp,  and  their  forays  on  the  neigh 
boring  forest  for  firewood.  Napoleon,  the  author  tells 
us,  issued  in  vain  the  most  severe  orders  against  this 
last  abuse.  Such  was  his  characteristic  way  of  dealing 
with  the  like  difficulties,  and  it  answered  to  some  ex 
tent,  but  only  when  the  army  was  directly  under  his 
own  eye:  an  explanation  which  helps  us  to  understand 
how  in  after  years  the  bonds  of  discipline  snapped 
"under  the  test  of  service  in  Russia.  His  successors 
have  taken  the  more  rational  mode  of  paying  the  sol 
dier  fairly,  and,  as  M.  de  Fezansac  remarks,  have  a 
right  to  be  more  strict. 

Very  coarse  and  bare  was  the  soldier's  life  here 
depicted,  with  its  mixed  good-humor,  grumbling,  and 
dishonesty;  its  wearisome  evenings,  spent  in  bed  for 
lack  of  candle  ;  its  cold  dark  mornings,  enlivened  only 
by  the  chance  of  a  glass  of  brandy  and  a  roll.  Yet 
the  reader  looks  naturally  to  the  camp  of  Boulogne 
with  respect,  as  the  nursery  of  the  Grand  Army  which 
carried  its  eagles  from  Madrid  to  Moscow.  Surely  we 
may  assume  that  the  professional  aspect  of  the  gather- 


206  DE  FE  ZEN  SACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

ing  was  always  kept  in  sight,  and  that  the  military 
spirit  was  here  developed  at  least  as  high  as  a  time  of 
peace  can  allow.  Those  writers  can  hardly  be  wrong 
who,  in  unvarying  chorus,  ascribe  the  success  which 
followed,  to  the  vast  pains  with  which  Napoleon's  staff 
used  the  camp  to  improve  the  tactics  bequeathed  by 
the  revolutionary  wars.  Indeed  that  the  weapon  was 
here  actually  forged  before  which  no  other  army  could 
stand,  has  been  asserted  in  plain  terms  by  French 
writers  of  authority,  from  Marshal  Marmont  down  to 
Baron  Ambert.  We  ourselves  were  led  formerly  to 
adopt  the  same  language,  being  misled  by  authors  of 
such  critical  pretension  as  Trochu  and  the  Due 
d'Aumale.  But  M.  de  Fezensac's  personal  experience 
caused  him  to  take  a  totally  different  view  of  the 
Boulogne  army;  and  as  he  dissents  in  the  broadest 
terms  from  the  class  of  writers  just  cited,  we  quote  his 
evidence  entire,  that  the  reader  may  judge  what  the 
general  assertions  are  worth  which  have  long  deceived 
the  world : 

"The  camp  of  Boulogne,  of  which  that  of  Montreuil 
[held  by  Ney's  corps,  in  which  the  author  served]  formed  the 
left,  has  left  deep  memories  in  our  history  of  that  age.  The 
advantage  of  gathering  troops  into  camps  of  instruction  is 
known  to  all  military  men.  To  that  of  Boulogne  is  attribu 
ted  the  honor  of  the  successes  which  we  gained  in  the  follow 
ing  campaigns,  and  we  are  supposed  to  have  been  always 
occupied  with  manoeuvres,  military  works,  and  exercises  of 
all  kinds.  I  shall  astonish  my  readers  therefore,  by  telling 
them  how  very  little,  at  the  camp  of  Montreuil,  our  chiefs 
occupied  themselves  with  instructing  us,  how  ill  they  profited 
by  this  precious  time.  Marshal  Ney  commanded  two  grand 
field-days  in  the  autumn  of  1804,  and  as  many  in  1805  ;  I 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  2O/ 

was  present  at  them  as  a  private  soldier  first,  and  then  as 
officer.  There  was  a  general  upsetting  and  excessive  fatigue. 
We  started  before  daybreak  after  taking  our  soup,  and  did 
not  get  back  till  night,  having  had  nothing  during  the  day 
but  a  dram  of  brandy.  General  Malher,  who  succeeded 
Partonneaux  in  command  of  the  division,  hardly  brought  it 
together  three  times,  and  handled  it  then  very  badly. 
Brigade  drill  there  was  none,  for  the  brigadier  did  not  even 
come  to  the  camp.  Each  colonel  taught  his  regiment  in  his 
own  fashion.  There  was  some  slight  theoretical  instruction 
and  drilling  of  conscripts,  and  in  the  spring  the  non-commis 
sioned  officers  had  all  to  go  through  their  drill  afresh,  begin 
ning  with  '  the  extension  motions'.  .  .  .  This  instruction  was 
carried  up  to  battalion-drill,  but  the  regiment  was  rarely 
manoeuvred  in  a  line.  There  were  a  few  marchings  out  for 
a  short  single  day's  stage,  and  some  target  practice  without 
any  method  ;  but  no  skirmishing,  nor  bayonet,  nor  fencing 
exercise.  No  field-works  were  thrown  up,  nor  was  any 
officer  employed  in  any  kind  of  instruction.  Regimental 
schools  might  easily  have  been  established,  but  no  one  had 
thought  of  them  in  those  days.  It  was  better  to  get  drunk 
when  one  had  money,  and  to  sleep  when  one  had  none.  The 
other  regiments  did  no  more.  ...  At  the  beginning  of  March 
each  company  was  allotted  a  small  garden  to  cultivate  ;  but 
at  this  the  men  grumbled,  such  charms  had  idleness. 
Soldiers  are  like  children  ;  it  is  necessary  to  do  them  good 
against  their  own  will. 

What  then  were  all  these  young  men  about  at  times  when 
not  under  exercise,  nor  cleaning  their  arms  and  persons  ? 
Nothing  at  all,  I  may  safely  say.  To  sleep  a  part  of  the  day 
after  having  slept  all  night,  to  sing  songs,  tell  stories,  quarrel 
sometimes  without  knowing  why,  and  read  such  few  bad 
books  as  were  procurable.  Such  were  the  daily  lives  of 
sergeants  as  well  as  men,  of  officers  as  well  as  sergeants. 


208  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

Yet,  on  the  whole,  their  morals  were  not  so  bad  as  might  be 
supposed." 

If  any  of  the  recruits  of  that  day  had  been  brought 
up  in  those  religious  habits  which  the  Revolution  had, 
for  the  most  part,  banished  from  France,  they  found 
little  encouragement  for  their  devotions  at  the  camp. 
No  mass  was  celebrated  for  Napoleon's  troops,  except 
when  they  chanced  to  be  quartered  in  towns.  "  I  do 
not  want  a  bigoted  army,"  M.  de  Fezensac  quotes  as  a 
saying  of  the  Emperor,  who  had  abundant  cause  to  be 
satisfied  on  this  head.  He  adds  his  own  opinion,  that 
the  moral  tone  of  the  whole  service  was  lowered  by  this 
omission  of  customary  religious  observance. 

In  thus  exposing  the  waste  by  Napoleon  and  his 
lieutenants  of  their  opportunities  at  Boulogne,  the 
critic  is  careful  to  point  out  how  far  this  great  assem 
blage  was  practically  useful.  Two  chief  advantages 
were  obtained  by  it.  In  the  first  place,  the  rough  life 
of  the  camp,  devoid  alike  of  comfort  or  diversion,  pre 
pared  all  ranks  for  those  inconveniences  of  the  cam 
paign  which  they  were  soon  to  taste  to  the  full.  They 
often  found  the  night  bivouac  of  the  next  winter  more 
endurable  than  the  huts  of  Boulogne.  A  more  impor 
tant  use  of  their  training  lay  in  the  gain  to  all  ranks 
from  their  knowledge  of  those  with  whom  they  were  to 
be  associated  in  the  rough  trials  of  war.  To  the  staff 
and  superior  officers  this  was  especially  valuable. 
Marshal  Ney,  the  author  instances,  was  thus  enabled 
throughout  the  coming  operations  to  confine  his  atten 
tion  to  the  points  that  required  it,  knowing  exactly 
which  of  his  subalterns  might  be  trusted  to  take  care  of 
themselves.  Moreover,  there  was  a  high  military  spirit 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  2OQ 

in  certain  regiments  which  had  done  great  services  in 
the  revolutionary  campaigns,  and  this  spread  by  emu 
lation  among  those  brigaded  with  them,  who  longed 
for  like  opportunities  of  winning  the  respect  of  the 
army.  On  the  whole  therefore,  despite  the  grievous 
shortcomings  he  lays  bare,  M.  de  Fezensac  judges  the 
camp  life  to  have  contributed  much  to  the  success 
which  followed  it. 

If  he  is  severe  on  the  mistakes  and  omissions  of  his 
seniors,  he  is  not  less  plainspoken  as  to  his  own  faults. 
Although  at  first  proud  of  his  advancement  to  sergeant- 
major,  he  was  disgusted  to  find  his  new  rank  laden 
with  liabilities  beyond  his  means,  due  to  his  predeces 
sor's  carelessness  or  dishonesty,  and  he  soon  got  so  out 
of  heart  with  his  duties  as  to  neglect  them  openly,  and 
incur  a  reprimand.  At  this  juncture,  happily  for  the 
prospects  of  the  young  soldier,  a  vacancy  occurred  as 
sub-lieutenant,  It  was  one  of  the  special  steps  still  re 
served  for  election,  in  accordance  with  the  practice  of 
the  old  Republican  army,  soon  afterwards  abolished. 
The  choice  lay,  in  the  first  place,  with  the  sub-lieuten 
ants  of  the  corps,  who  presented  three  names  to  the 
lieutenants,  and  the  latter  selected  one  of  the  three  for 
the  step.  The  popular  notions  of  the  French  service 
of  that  era  would  picture  such  an  election  as  the  very 
model  of  rude  honor  and  martial  integrity.  In  this 
case  the  aristocratic  candidate  had  the  special  disad 
vantages  of  his  recent  known  carelessness,  and  of  con 
siderable  jealousy  on  the  part  of  the  subalterns  at  his 
rapid  progress  from  the  ranks.  Some  of  them  also  had 
personal  friends,  men  who  had  seen  hard  service,  among 
his  competitors.  Against  this,  however,  was  the  sim 
ple  fact  that  young  de  Fezensac  had  not  yet  lost  his 
'4 


2io  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

colonel's  favor,  and  that  it  was  known  that  Lacuee  de 
sired  him  to  receive  his  step  by  election,  as  more  hon 
orable  than  to  wait  for  a  nomination  vacancy.  The 
desire  of  pleasing  the  commanding  officer  outweighed 
merit,  service,  and  friendship,  and  the  choice  fell  on 
the  young  Parisian  lounger  of  eight  months  before, 
rather  than  on  either  of  the  veterans  of  Marengo,  who 
were  the  other  competitors.  Before  the  imperial  con 
firmation  could  be  obtained,  the  sub-lieutenant  elect 
was  startled  by  a  decree — aimed  at  such  families  as  his 
own,  whose  sons  avoided  the  military  schools  of  the 
Empire — requiring  four  years'  service  in  every  non 
commissioned  officer  promoted.  Happily  for  de  Fe- 
zensac  the  imminence  of  a  general  war  rescued  him  from 
this  new  difficulty,  and  after  a  few  weeks'  delay  he  re 
ceived  a  provisional  commission,  which  was  never 
revoked. 

This  was  on  July  second,  1805,  a  day  unfortunate 
at  its  close  in  our  hero's  annals.  One  of  the  sham  em 
barkations,  which  were  still  practised,  was  to  take  place 
next  day,  and  brought  some  guests  into  the  huts  of 
the  5Qth.  This  double  fete  was  too  much  for  the 
newly-made  officer,  who  signalized  his  promotion  by 
getting  drunk,  and  by  using  insubordinate  language  to 
the  captain  of  police,  thus  drawing  on  himself  the 
colonel's  displeasure  and  a  close  arrest  for  a  fortnight. 
A  chief  part  of  this  childish  punishment  (for  such  in  our 
service  it  would  be  regarded)  was  the  fee  to  the  sentry 
stationed  at  the  door,  who  received  a  perquisite  of 
three  francs  a  day  for  his  extra  duty.  No  friends  were 
nominally  to  be  received  by  the  culprit ;  but  as  two 
brother-subalterns  shared  his  hut,  he  had  the  full  ad 
vantage  of  their  guests,  if  his  leisure  proved  wearisome. 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  211 

No  discipline  in  fact  could  be  less  effectual  than  this 
sort  of  compromise  between  the  severity  of  a  court- 
martial  and  the  minor  penalties  inflicted  on  the  rank 
and  file  ;  for  one  of  the  other  subalterns  is  in  the  same 
page  described  as  under  a  succession  of  these  arrests 
half  his  time,  behaving  in  fact  very  much  as  an  ill-con 
ditioned  cadet  of  seventeen  at  Woolwich  or  St.  Cyr. 
M.  de  Fezensac  felt  the  inconvenience  little,  but  the 
displeasure  of  his  colonel  much,  until  a  frank  avowal 
of  contrition  to  the  latter,  with  a  confession  to  his  pa 
rents  of  his  sorrow  at  having  offended  so  good  a  friend, 
restored  him  to  the  favor  which  he  thenceforward  took 
more  care  to  deserve. 

The  ideas  and  customs  of  his  brother-officers  were 
found  by  the  new  subaltern  to  be  in  no  way  superior 
to  those  of  the  class  he  had  now  left.  All  had  seen 
service  ;  but  very  few  had  had  a  decent  education,  and 
fewer  still  had  used  their  leisure  to  improve  it.  "  Their 
manners  were  vulgar,"  he  tells  us,  "  their  politeness 
the  politeness  of  the  soldier."  For  this  the  reader  may 
very  possibly  have  been  prepared  ;  but  it  is  more 
startling  to  learn  how  rarely  such  men  rose  to  any  em 
inence  in  their  profession,  notwithstanding  the  constant 
succession  of  wars  in  which  their  master  engaged.  Of 
all  the  long  list  of  officers  on  the  strength  of  the  59th 
when  de  Fezensac  entered  it,  but  one  became  a  gen 
eral,  and  the  most  distinguished  soldier  of  them  all 
never  was  more  than  colonel  of  a  light-infantry  regi 
ment.  Such  must  of  necessity  be  the  lot  of  ordinary 
men  in  any  service  where  promotion  goes  chiefly  by 
selection,  and  that  selection  depends  wholly  on  a  su 
perior's  will.  Where  one  man  is  advanced  by  sole 
discernment  of  his  merits,  a  dozen  others  will  owe  the 


212  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

like  advantage  to  some  personal  acquaintance  with 
those  near  the  fountain  of  power.  The  interest  which 
as  we  shall  see,  pushed  de  Fezensac  himself  from  his 
first  commission  to  the  rank  of  general  of  brigade  in 
eight  years,  like  that  which  in  as  many  months  had 
passed  him  on  from  the  recruit-squad  to  the  officer's 
epaulette,  could  only  be  exercised  at  the  cost  of  men 
less  known,  and  probably  enough  too,  less  fitted  for 
high  rank. 

The  summer  of  1805  was  passed  by  the  soldiers  of 
Boulogne  in  wondering  whether  the  evolutions  prac 
ticed  by  the  troops  and  flotilla  were  but  a  feint  or  se 
riously  designed  to  lead  to  an  embarkation.  Some  of 
de  Fezensac's  brother-subalterns  prophesied  a  speedy 
conquest  of  the  insolent  islanders ;  some  declared  the 
whole  a  ruse  of  the  Emperor's,  preluding  a  sudden  at 
tack  on  Germany  ;  none  feared  any  event  so  much  as 
another  winter  passed  in  the  same  dreary  purposeless 
existence  as  the  last.  Neither  section  of  these  military 
prophets  was  wholly  wrong  or  right.  Napoleon's  own 
correspondence  has  fully  revealed  the  real  truth  to  be  that 
the  invasion  was  his  first  and  darling  object,  and  was 
abandoned  only  when  he  found  his  admirals  fail  utter 
ly  in  their  share  of  the  task.  On  August  twenty-sixth, 
it  was  known  in  the  camp  that  Villeneuve  had  gone 
back  to  Cadiz,  leaving  the  English  fleet  in  undisturbed 
possession  of  the  Channel.  "  Happily,"  as  our  author 
with  a  soldier's  naivete  says,  "  the  new  coalition  per 
mitted  Napoleon  to  substitute  for  the  expedition,  so 
often  and  so  vainly  announced,  a  general  European 
war."  On  September  first,  the  three  divisions  of  Mar 
shal  Ney  were  on  their  march  for  Strasburg,  and  with 
them  moved  the  new-made  subaltern.  His  provisional 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  213 

commission  had  never  been  confirmed  by  the  Minister 
of  War ;  but  on  this  point  he  now  felt  easy,  feeling 
that  rank  was  more  likely  to  be  won  than  withdrawn 
on  actual  service.  Burdened  with  nothing  but  his 
sword,  he  no  longer  regretted  his  choice  of  the  infan 
try,  and  trudged  gaily  along  at  the  side  of  his  platoon. 
Like  his  own,  the  spirit  of  his  comrades  ran  high,  and 
made  the  constant  onward  move  seem  easy.  He  bears 
special  testimony  to  the  exceptional  order  of  this  three 
weeks'  march,  on  which  the  officers  never  quitted  their 
companies  without  a  reprimand.  He  himself  incurred 
an  arrest  from  his  major  the  first  day  for  a  brief  delay 
in  appearing  on  parade,  a  reproof  from  his  captain 
somewhat  later  for  spending  more  time  over  his  break 
fast  than  the  men,  and  a  sharp  remonstrance  from  his 
colonel  for  over-politeness  to  a  fatigued  vivandiere 
which  threatened  to  cost  him  his  promised  trip  to 
Paris,  where  his  parents  expected  to  see  him  for  a  few 
hours.  Once  more  Lacuee  proved  kinder  in  action 
than  in  word  to  his  young  protege,  and  the  desired  per 
mission  to  quit  the  regiment  for  a  brief  space  being 
granted,  the  young  soldier  posted  rapidly  the  necessary 
hundred  miles,  embraced  his  family,  took  one  brief 
glance  at  those  joys  of  Parisian  existence  on  which  he 
had  often  looked  back  regretfully  during  the  past 
year  and  then  turned  his  face  once  more  to  the  Rhine. 
Borne  back  to  his  regiment  with  all  the  speed  the  post 
would  allow,  de  Fezensac  contrived  to  miss  the  outfit 
which  kind  hands  had  dispatched  beforehand  by  the 
diligence,  and  with  a  borrowed  sword  and  epaulette, 
passed  the  great  frontier  stream  on  September  twenty- 
seventh,  near  Lauterburg,  and  plunged  with  his  regi 
ment  into  the  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest  beyond,  a 


2I4 


DE  FE  ZEN  SACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


unit  in  the  legions  which  were  to  tear  the  crown  of 
the  Western  Empire  from  the  house  of  Hapsburg. 

We  are  not  about  to  follow  the  author  through  his 
narrative  of  the  great  events  which  led  to  the  shameful 
disaster  of  Mack  at  Ulm.  They  have  been  illustrated 
with  marvellous  freshness  in  the  well-known  work  of 
Colonel  Hamley,  who  has  so  clearly  analyzed  the 
strategy  of  Napoleon's  design  as  to  make  the  stupen 
dous  events  of  that  October  as  plain  as  they  can  ap 
pear  regarded  from  the  victor's  side  alone.  Those  who 
would  understand  them  in  their  strictly  German  aspect, 
and  know  the  details  of  the  miserable  delusions  and 
vacillations  which  ruined  the  Austrian  theorist,  must 
go  to  the  exhaustive  work  of  Riistow  on  this  campaign, 
which  is  as  remarkable  for  its  industry  as  for  its  gen 
eral  impartiality.  We  have  another  task  here  specially 
before  us,  which  is  to  show  from  unexceptionable  tes 
timony  how  little  to  be  relied  on  was  the  so-called  sys 
tem  by  which  Napoleon  supplied  his  army  in  such 
movements.  In  this  the  first  week  of  its  first  campaign, 
fresh  from  camp  discipline,  full  of  patriotic  spirit  and 
confidence  in  its  great  head,  scarce  clear  of  the  borders 
of  its  own  fair  land,  the  Grand  Army  is  found,  upon 
the  first  difficulty  it  had  to  encounter,  resolving  itself 
into  a  host  of  armed  and  violent  marauders.  We  give 
M.  de  Fezensac's  account  of  the  affair  in  his  own  words, 
the  simple  force  of  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  im 
prove  : 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  fifth,  before  reaching  Geislingen 
our  division  turned  to  the  left  to  follow  the  movement  of  the 
other  corps  towards  the  Lower  Danube.  We  marchec 
through  the  whole  of  the  night  and  the  day  following,  with 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 


21$ 


only  a  few  moments  for  rest,  and  without  any  food.  The 
;Emperor  had  ordered  that  the  soldiers  should  carry  bread 
for  four  days,  and  that  the  wagons  should  have  four  more 
day's  rations  of  biscuit.  I  do  not  know  what  happened  in 
the  other  corps.  As  for  us,  we  had  nothing,  and  as  the 
,59th  marched  in  the  rear,  according  to  its  number,  it  was 
nightfall  when  we  got  to  our  bivouac  near  Giengen,  the  town 
where  General  Malher,  our  division  commander,  had  his 
quarters.  The  colonel  reported  to  him  the  arrival  of  the  re 
giment  after  their  six-and-thirty  hours'  march,  and  asked  per 
mission  to  make  a  requisition  for  rations.  The  general  re 
fused,  having  promised  to  spare  the  town;  but  the  result  was 
to  authorize  every  sort  of  disorder,  for  the  villages  around 
were  sacked,  and  the  first  day  of  bivouac  became  the  first 
day  of  pillage.  The  colonel,  almost  famishing  himself,  found 
some  grenadiers  roasting  a  pig.  His  appearance  at  first  caused 
some  confusion,  but  a  moment  later  one  of  the  privates,  more 
bold  than  his  fellows,  offered  him  a  share  of  the  repast,  which 
Iwas  heartily  accepted,  and  pillage  thus  became  officially 
sanctioned." 


. 


Thus  initiated  into  the  the  new  system  of  "  making 
ar  with  the  legs,"  Colonel  Lacuee  pressed  his  regi- 
Iment  on  to  the  Danube,  and  fell  at  the  passage  of  the 
'bridge  of  Gunzburg  three  days  later,  the  first  officer  of 
rank  the  French  lost  in  the  campaign. 

M.  de  Fezensac,  who  came  up  with  the  reserve  of 
the  5Qth  after  the  first  part  of  the  fight,  takes  the 
opportunity  of  recounting  this  his  first  action,  to  point 
out,  by  the  simple  process  of  telling  the  exact  truth, 
how  wofully  short  of  the  language  of  bulletins  and  dis- 
: patches  was  the  conduct  and  discipline  of  his  regi 
ment. 


2i6  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

"  This  day  did  our  regiment  much  honor  ;  but  to  speak 
the  truth,  I  do  not  think  the  enemy's  attacks  had  been  very 
severe.  I  found  the  officers  agitated  and  restless,  occupy 
ing  themselves  with  encouraging  the  soldiers,  and  trying  to 
restore  order;  for  the  companies  had  become  mixed,  having, 
as  I  said,  passed  the  bridge  singly,  and  on  getting  to  the 
plain  beyond,  received  the  enemy  without  having  time  to 
throw  themselves  into  proper  order  for  defence.  I  am  per 
suaded  that  there  was  a  moment  when  a  bayonet  attack  and 
a  charge  of  cavalry  on  our  flank  could  have  thrown  us  back, 
and  forced  us  into  the  Danube.  In  this  situation  the  two 
reserve  companies  ought  to  have  been  of  great  value ;  but 
the  captains,  in  their  hurry  to  get  to  the  field  of  battle,  would 
not  take  time  to  form  them  after  passing  the  bridge,  and  the 
regiment  involved  them  in  its  disorder.  Happily  darkness 
was  falling,  and  the  Austrians  were  ignorant  of  our  little 
strength.  Nevertheless  we  passed  the  night  under  arms,  and 
did  not  venture  to  make  fires." 

During  the  night  M.  de  Fezensac  learnt  that  he  had 
lost  his  kind  friend  and  colonel,  whose  last  words  to  an 
officer  who  caught  him  as  he  fell  were  to  "  leave  him, 
and  go  back  to  the  fight."  Very  different  stones  were 
heard  by  the  young  subaltern  of  other  regimental 
acquaintances,  new  to  the  proof  of  war. 

"  One  sergeant  whom  I  knew  (afterwards  a  good  officer, 
and  killed  in  action)  hid  himself,  nor  was  he  the  only  one. 
Each  company  had  a  similar  anecdote  to  relate.  These  night 
affairs  are  very  convenient.  You  may  lose  yourself  in  the 
wood,  or  tumble  into  the  brook  at  your  pleasure.  I  have 
had  occasion  throughout  my  military  career  to  admire  the 
skill  of  men  who  are  always  missing  at  the  moment  of  danger 
but  never  so  as  to  be  compromised  by  their  absence." 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 

The  narrative  of  the  surrender  of  Ulm  which  fol 
lows  is  worth  studying  for  its  own  sake,  and  for  its 
vivid  picture  of  a  well-known  difference  between  Ney 
and  Murat,  which  ended  in  the  former  publicly  chal 
lenging  the  other,  before  Napoleon  and  the  imperial 
staff,  to  follow  him  under  fire.  This,  too,  was  when  all 
was  going  well  with  the  Grand  Army.  A  less  prescient 
mind  than  Napoleon's  might  have  foreseen  in  such  dis 
putes  at  critical  moments  the  germs  of  disaster  in  after 
days,  when  the  tide  of  fortune  should  turn  against  the 
commanders  whose  jealousies  their  master's  presence 
could  hardly  restrain. 

M.  de  Fezensac  has  not  failed  to  record  his  opinion, 
very  different  from  that  usually  accepted,  of  the  sys 
tem  which  in  this  instance  placed  30,000  prisoners  at  a 
stroke  in  the  hands  of  the  Grand  Army.  We  quote, 
with  some  omissions,  his  comments  on  the  means 
which  led  to  this  success,  reminding  our  readers  that 
it  is  no  holiday  soldier  who  thus  speaks : 

"This  short  campaign  was,  as  it  were,  an  epitome  of 
those  that  followed.  Excess  of  fatigue,  want  of  provisions, 
severity  of  weather,  disorders  and  marauding,  nothing  was 
wanting  to  it;  and  in  that  month  I  first  felt  what  I  was 
destined  to  experience  throughout  my  career.  Brigades,  and 
.  even  regiments,  being  sometimes  dispersed  [for  subsistence, 
sake,  the  author  means],  the  order  for  concentration  would 
come  late,  having  to  pass  through  a  number  of  different 
channels.  From  this  it  followed  that  the  men  had  to  march 
day  and  night,  falling  asleep  on  their  way,  and  arrived  at  the 
place  assigned  without  having  eaten  anything,  or  finding  any 
victuals  there.  Marshal  Berthier  used  to  write,  'In  the  war 
of  invasion  that  the  Emperor  is  making,  there  are  no  magazines. 
It  is  for  the  generals  to  find  their  own  means  of  subsistence  in 


2  1 8  DE  FEZENSA  C'S  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

the  country  that  they  traverse.'  But  the  generals  had  neither 
time  nor  means  to  procure  regularly  the  wherewithal  to  feed 
so  numerous  an  army.  Pillage,  therefore,  became  authorized, 
and  the  districts  which  we  passed  through  suffered  cruelly, 
yet  we  were  not  the  less  famished  throughout  the  campaign.  .  .  . 
Bad  weather  made  our  suffering  still  more  severe.  A  cold 
rain  fell,  or  rather  a  half-melted  snow,  in  which  we  plunged 
deep,  while  the  wind  prevented  our  lighting  fires.  On  Octo 
ber  sixteenth,  the  day  when  Philip  Segur  bore  the  first  sum 
mons  to  Mack,  the  weather  was  so  frightful  that  no  one  kept 
his  post.  There  was  no  grand  guard  or  sentry,  the  very 
artillery  was  left  unwatched,  and  each  man  sheltered  himself 
as  best  he  could.  I  never,  except  in  the  campaign  of  Russia, 
suffered  so  much,  never  saw  the  army  in  the  like  disorder." 

Is  this  fairly  written  in  the  histories  of  the  great 
campaign  around  Ulm?  The  French  writers  slight  it  ;* 
the  more  accurate  Germans,  as  Riistow,  have  failed  to 
correct  them  in  a  matter  exclusively  French.  As  far 
as  we  are  aware,  the  truth  would  have  been  universally 
slurred  over  but  for  the  following  notice,  which  shows 
that  history  has  in  this  respect  submitted  to  be  blinded 
in  her  gaze  by  the  sun  of  Napoleon's  genius,  and  has 
actually  gone  back  in  truth  since  the  publication  in 
the  year  1810  in  London  of  a  pamphlet  in  French  by 
an  unknown  Russian  officer  whom  we  shall  here  quote. 
In  it  the  actual  truth  was  told,  as  now  vividly  re- 

*  The  bad  weather  is  mentioned  by  the  various  French  writers  and 
their  followers  ;  but  no  reference  is  made  by  any  of  them  to  the  starvation 
which  accompanied  it.  Dumas,  indeed,  expressly  says  that  Marmont's 
men  suffered  from  the  weight  of  the  rations  they  had  to  carry.  As  Mar 
mont's  corps  came  in  by  a  s£parate  route  through  a  plain  country,  it  is 
quite  possible  that  it  escaped  the  destitution  which  the  rest  of  the  army, 
crossing  the  Black  Forest  and  Suabian  Alps  in  rapid  succession,  naturally 
experienced. 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  219 

produced  by  M.  de  Fezensac.  The  author  appears 
to  have  been  on  the  staff  of  Kutusoff  in  1805,  or 
to  have  had  his  information  direct  from  those  that 
were : 

"  To  surround  Ulm  it  was  necessary  to  concentrate. 
Numerous  columns  defiled  upon  the  same  road,  appeared  at 
the  same  point.  100,000  men,  fatigued  by  long  marches, 
destitute  of  provisions,  come  to  take  up  a  position  which 
grows  more  and  more  confined.  They  are  now  no  more 
allowed  to  straggle  from  their  post,  for  then  the  whole  enter 
prise  would  fail.  What  a  critical  moment !  The  resources 
of  the  country  occupied  by  this  mass  are  consumed  in  an 
hour. 

"  To  enhance  the  difficulty,  the  heavens  seem  to  dissolve. 
A  heavy  rain,  continuing  for  many  days,  floods  the  country. 
The  streams  burst  their  banks.  The  roads  are  frightful,  and 
in  more  than  one  place  altogether  disappear.  The  army 
marches  in  mud,  and  bivouacks  in  water  ;  it  is  ready  to  per 
ish  with  misery  and  hunger ;  discouragement  and  murmuring 
spread  through  it.  What  is  to  be  done  ?  A  proclamation  [of 
October  twelfth  ;  see  Napo.  Corresp.]  is  read  at  the  head  of 
each  column,  which  praises,  flatters,  aud  caresses  the  army, 
pours  eulogy  on  its  constancy,  tells  it  the  enemy  is  enclosed, 
and  that  only  a  few  moments  more  of  perseverance  are  needed. 
Thus  the  soldiers  are  kept  quiet;  but  as  they  must  have 
bread,  active  and  intelligent  officers  are  sent  through  all  the 
neighboring  districts,  to  obtain  it  by  threats,  if  requests  fail. 
All  yields  to  the  power  of  requisition,  and  in  twenty-four 
hours  bread  is  procured,  and  the  horses  and  vehicles  of  the 
inhabitants  are  used  to  bring  it  in  ....  Ulm  is  invested, 
blockaded,  capitulates,  and  the  French  army  reaps  the  fruit  of 
its  endurance  and  of  its  incredible  activity." 

The   writer   of  this   essay    had    evidently    nearly 


DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

reached  the  truth  which  French  military  writers  have 
obscured,  but  which  de  Fezensac's  narrative  enables  us 
to  grasp.  In  fact,  a  general  carrying  on  war  on  the 
system  which  Napoleon  adopted  clearly  does  it  at  tre 
mendous  risk.  The  object  to  be  gained  may  justify 
him  in  a  military  sense  for  the  time,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  an  unexpected  detention  on  the  way,  a  week  of 
bad  weather,  a  slight  check  from  the  enemy,  may  ruin 
the  spirits  of  his  army  beyond  recall.  What  is  more 
important  still  to  note  is  this.  The  system  of  living 
by  requisition  bears  within  it  its  own  Nemesis  in  the 
demoralization  which  it  spreads  through  all  ranks  of  the 
army,  and  in  the  sure  preparation  thus  made,  even  in 
the  midst  of  success,  for  the  day  when  defeat  shall  be 
come  irreparable  disaster.  As  this  truth  is  admirably 
summed  up  by  M.  de  Fezensac  at  the  close  of  the  first 
part  of  his  work,  we  quote  his  words,  themselves  the 
best  condemnation  of  the  popular  historians  of  his 
country,  and  the  plain  proof  that  the  organization  of 
plunder  is,  even  in  the  strongest  hands,  a  deception 
and  a  blunder : 

"  All  these  causes  developed  insubordination,  want  of 
discipline,  and  the  habit  of  marauding.  When  at  such  a  time 
soldiers  went  to  a  village  to  look  for  rations,  they  found  them 
selves  tempted  to  stay  there.  Thus  the  number  of  stragglers 
wandering  through  the  country  became  considerable.  The 
inhabitants  met  with  every  sort  of  annoyance  from  them,  and 
wounded  officers  who  sought  to  bring  them  to  order  were  an 
swered  with  threats.  All  these  details  are  unknown  to  those 
who  read  the  history  of  our  campaign,  where  there  is  only  to 
be  seen  a  valiant  army  of  devoted  soldiers  emulating  the 
glory  of  their  officers.  No  one  knows  what  sufferings  are 
often  the  price  of  the  most  brilliant  successes,  nor  how  ex- 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  221 

amples  of  selfishness  and  cowardice  are  mingled  with  traits 
of  generosity  and  courage." 

Can  those  who  read  this,  wonder  any  longer  at  the  ut 
ter  destruction  of  the  Grand  Army  in  Russia,  and  the 
still  more  marvellous  dissolution  of  the  Cohorts  of  1813  ? 
Ulm  taken,  the  army  pressed  on  to  occupy  Vienna, 
and  conquer  at  Austerlitz  ;  but  in  these  triumphs  the 
corps  of  Ney  had  no  share,  being  left  to  guard  Bavaria 
and  keep  the  Tyrol  in  check.  The  peace  of  Presburg 
sent  the  59th  Regiment  into  four  months'  canton 
ments  near  Salzburg,  where  the  sojourn  of  de  Fezen- 
sac  himself  was  extremely  agreeable,  and  was  the  ori 
gin  of  a  lifelong  friendship  with  the  Austrian  family  on 
whom  he  was  quartered.  Why  he  became  thus  en 
deared  to  his  involuntary  hosts  is  clear  enough  when 
we  recollect  that  he  was  a  gentleman  by  birth  and  feel 
ing,  and  that  the  ordinary  occupation  of  his  comrades, 
even  in  his  own  friendly  coloring,  is  shown  to  have 
been  alternately  to  bully  the  male  inhabitants,  and  to 
pay  unsought  civilities  to  the  females  of  their  respec 
tive  billets.  Two  anecdotes  out  of  many  are  enough 
to  describe  the  miserable  condition  of  things,  of  which 
M.  de  Fezensac  declares  that,  apart  from  the  troubles 
connected  with  the  victualling  and  lodging  of  the  troops, 
the  local  authorities  were  often  treated  with  wanton 
disrespect : 

"  If  a  discussion  arose,  the  soldier  was  always  right,  and 
the  inhabitant  always  wrong.  A  private  of  the  sixth  com 
pany  declared  that  thirty  francs  had  been  stolen  from  him, 
and  his  captain,  without  any  inquiry,  ordered  that  it  should 
be  made  good  ....  The  officers,  often  too  far  away,  could 
not  stop  these  abuses ;  besides  the  greater  part  of  them  gave 


222  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

an  example  of  exaction.  If  any  one  wanted  to  go  anywhere, 
he  made  requisition  for  a  carriage  and  horse,  but  offered  no 
payment.  An  officer  of  high  rank  wished  to  go  in  this  way 
to  Schaffhausen,  and  was  to  have  four  relays  ready,  from 
post  to  post.  At  one  of  these  he  was  kept  waiting,  and  by 
way  of  punishment,  sent  twenty-five  men  extra  to  be  quar 
tered  on  the  village." 

To  impress  the  government  post  service  for  every 
kind  of  private  journey  seems  to  have  been  the  uni 
versal  practice,  even  with  those  who,  like  de  Fezensac 
himself  abstained  from  and  condemned  all  personal 
plunder.  And  it  would  have  been,  concludes  the 
writer  with  his  usual  truth  and  force,  better  for  their 
discipline  to  find  the  soldiers  in  regular  rations  than 
to  quarter  them  individually  on  the  peasants.  But 
these  were  stripped,  while  the  army  was  left  without 
pay,  and  even  without  clothing,  in  order  that  the  stores 
in  France  might  be  left  untouched.  Such  was  that 
economy  of  Napoleon's  military  administration  of 
which  so  much  praise  has  been  written  by  certain 
panegyrists. 

From  its  cantonments  in  the  Hereditary  States 
and  Suabia  the  army  at  length  was  moving  slowly 
towards  France,  when  Napoleon  halted  it,  to  await  the 
pending  rupture  and  war  with  Prussia.  Meanwhile, 
de  Fezensac's  family  had  not  forgotten  him  ;  and  feel 
ing  that  his  regimental  prospects  would  naturally  suffer 
by  the  death  of  Colonel  Lacuee,  they  had  made  inter 
est  at  Paris  with  the  friends  of  various  generals  high 
in  command  to  have  him  transferred  to  the  staff.  Re 
fused  in  more  than  one  quarter,  their  wish  had  found 
favor  with  Ney ;  and  on  October  sixth,  two  days  before 
the  campaign  of  Jena  began,  the  sub-lieutenant  left 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  22$ 

his  regiment  to  report  himself  at  the  Marshal's  head 
quarters  in  his  new  capacity  of  extra  aide-de-camp. 
From  this  date,  until  suddenly  made  colonel  of  a 
regiment  at  Borodino,  his  service  lay  wholly  with  the 
staff. 

M.  de  Fezensac,  at  this  point,  digresses  slightly 
from  his  narrative  to  speak  of  the  essential  differences 
which  separate  the  mind  and  knowledge  of  the  regi 
mental  from  that  of  the  staff  officer.  The  latter,  he 
says,  is  often  as  ignorant  of  the  habits  of  the  soldier 
and  of  the  details  of  duty  as  the  former  of  the  purport 
of  the  movements  he  is  executing.  Hence  he  con 
cludes  that  to  form  a  good  general  officer,  or  even  a 
good  commander  of  a  regiment,*  a  man  should  have 
served  in  both  departments.  In  this  view  he  follows 
strictly  that  of  Napoleon,  who  abolished — in  name,  at 
least — the  practice  of  promoting  officers  on  the  staff 
from  one  grade  to  another,  and  ordered  that  a  captain, 
to  win  rank  as  a  field  officer,  must  return  to  do  duty 
with  a  regiment.  This  rule  was  but  nominal  in  the 
case  of  a  man  of  interest  like  our  writer,  who  in  spite 
of  it,  received  the  rank  of  major  of  cavalry  for  services 
done  as  a  captain  on  Berthier's  personal  staff;  but  its 
existence  served,  as  Jomini,  who  was  strongly  pre 
judiced  against  it,  has  particularly  noticed,  to  drive 
young  men  of  energy  and  promise  from  the  staff  into 
the  line,  and  thus  in  his  view  to  disorganize  what  he 
declares  to  be  the  soul  of  a  well-ordered  army.  The 
system  of  Napoleon  was  abandoned  by  his  successors 
in  French  military  administration,  who  restored  and 

*  The  colonel  of  a  continental  regiment,  be  it  remembered,  has 
two,  three,  or  even  four  battalions  to  superintend,  and  his  duties  in 
many  respects  are  those  which  we  assign  to  the  head  of  a  brigade. 


224  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

completed  the  plan  by  which  the  staff  is  first  selected 
out  of,  and  then  kept  altogether  distinct  from  the 
other  services.  This  reform,  the  creation  of  a  distinct 
Staff  Corps,  has  been  supported  by  writers  who,  with 
Jomini,  declare  that  the  plan  of  Napoleon  failed  to 
give  a  sufficient  supply  of  intelligent  officers  for  the 
higher  posts.  It  has  further  been  adopted  in  other 
services,  the  Austrian  especially  ;  and  its  non-existence 
in  our  own  has  been  often  alleged  as  a  defect  by  those 
who  see  its  advantages  without  all  its  drawbacks.  The 
effect  of  the  French  system  is  necessarily  to  draw  so 
strong  a  line  between  the  staff  and  the  body  of  the 
army  as  to  deprive  the  one  of  all  sympathy  with  the 
other,  and  to  take  away  from  the  general  mass  of  offi 
cers  all  rational  motives  for  studying  the  higher  branches 
of  their  profession.  This  last  result  may  not  seriously 
matter  where  most  of  them  are  so  little  educated  that 
they  would  in  vain  strive  to  raise  their  minds  above 
the  petty  details  of  the  regiment,  nor  the  former 
where  occupation  for  a  large  Staff  Corps  can  be  found 
in  time  of  peace.  With  us  these  conditions  are  re 
versed  ;  and  to  copy  the  French  in  this  matter  was 
neither  necessary  nor  expedient,  however  desirable  it 
might  be  to  avoid  the  chance  method  of  Napoleon. 
Our  own  new  system,  imitated  almost  unconsciously 
from  Prussia  before  Prussian  practice  in  matters  mili 
tary  became  the  fashion,  opens  to  every  intelligent 
young  officer  in  the  service  the  means  of  obtaining  by 
study  and  merit  a  qualification  for  the  staff,  and  his 
turn  of  five  years'  service  in  an  appointment ;  and  it 
seems  in  every  way  better  suited  to  our  circumstances. 
It  needs  but  to  be  thoroughly  and  impartially  applied 
to  give  us  a  supply  of  instructed  soldiers  for  our  future 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  22$ 

needs  at  a  cost  far  less  than  that  of  the  smallest  Staff 
Corps  of  supernumerary  officers. 

In  Napoleon's  army  (as  is  still  the  case  in  our  own) 
all  the  personal  staff  of  a  general  was  selected  from  pri 
vate  considerations  ;  and  when  M.  de  Fezensac  joined 
that  of  Marshal  Ney  before  Nuremburg,  no  one  asked 
if  he  had  even  the  moderate  qualifications  of  service 
and  knowledge  which  an  aide-de-camp  with  us  must 
possess.  The  army  was  already  in  motion  for  Jena, 
and  M.  de  Fezensac  having  spent  his  whole  means  on 
a  single  sorry  horse,  started  with  it.  During  the  next 
few  days  he  had  abundant  practice  in  his  new  duties  as 
messenger,  and  arrived  on  the  famous  field  with  his 
marshal  early  in  the  day  that  ruined  Prussia,  and  gave 
the  death-blow  to  the  tactics  bequeathed  by  Frederic. 
Here  he  saw  Ney  expose  his  person  in  the  reckless  way 
which  earned  for  him  the  title  of  "  the  bravest  of  the 
brave,"  a  fashion  which  on  this  occasion  cost  two  of  his 
staff,  wounds  got  at  his  side.  The  subsequent  pursuit 
of  the  Prussians  is  ordinarily  remembered  only  for  the 
rapidity  with  which  it  was  carried  on.  M.  de  Fezensac, 
while  giving  the  army  full  credit  for  the  activity  dis 
played  by  chiefs  and  men,  shows  us  another  and  a 
darker  side  of  the  picture.  "  Pillage  was  never  carried 
further  than  on  this  march,  and  disorder  reached  the 
height  of  insubordination."  On  the  way  the  young 
aide-de-camp  was  thrown  into  company  with  Jomini, 
then  simply  a  colonel  on  the  staff,  yet  already  a  man 
of  mark;  for  before  joining  for  this  campaign  he  had 
indicated  Jena  as  the  point  where  the  decisive  battle 
would  be  fought.  At  Nordhausen  they  were  both 
nearly  murdered  by  soldiers  whose  excesses  they  sought 
to  stop,  and  \vcre  only  saved  by  drawing  sword  and 
'5 


226  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

riding  through  these  mutineers  ;  for  "  our  subordina 
tion,"  says  the  author,  "  does  not  rest  on  bases  as  solid 
as  that  of  other  armies."  This  state  of  things  caused 
Ney  to  apply  to  the  Emperor  for  special  powers  to  ar 
rest  and  punish  the  stragglers  ;  but  it  was  checked  for 
the  time  by  the  halt  of  the  corps  to  form  the  blockade 
of  Magdeburg,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  completed 
the  pursuit  and  destruction  of  the  Prussians. 

The  young  aide-de-camp  had  (as  already  stated) 
kept  near  to  his  chief  on  the  field  of  Jena,  but,  except 
on  that  occasion,  saw  little  of  him  throughout  the  cam 
paign  ;  for  the  new-made  marshal  was  terribly  afraid  of 
compromising  his  dignity  in  the  eyes  of  his  staff,  the 
more  so,  perhaps,  as  some  of  them  were  of  the  older 
aristocracy  of  birth : 

"  Marshal  Ney  kept  us  at  a  great  distance.  During  the 
marches  he  went  on  alone  in  front,  and  never  addressed  a 
word  to  us,  unless  obliged.  The  aide-de  camp  in  waiting 
never  entered  his  room,  save  in  the  course  of  duty  or  by  spe 
cial  summons,  and  it  was  the  rarest  of  events  to  see  the  mar 
shal  conversing  with  any  one  of  us.  He  ate  alone,  and  never 
gave  an  aide-de-camp  an  invitation.  This  apparent  haughti 
ness  arose  from  the  desire  to  maintain  his  posidon.  The 
transition  was  sudden  from  the  days  of  1796,  when  Augereau 
had  reproved  his  officers  for  allowing  themselves  to  be  ad 
dressed  as  Monsieur.  A  few  years  later  the  Republican  gen 
erals  of  that  date  had  become  marshals,  dukes,  princes. 
This  change  embarrassed  Ney.  who  besides  had  reason 
sometimes  to  believe  that  his  elevation  made  others  envious 
of  him  ;  so  he  thought  to  make  himself  respected  by  the 
hauteur  of  his  bearing,  and  sometimes  carried  it  too  far." 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  the  conquest  of  Prus- 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  22/ 

sia,  it  should  be  remarked  that  this  narrative  effectually 
dispels  certain  common  illusions  as  to  the  perfection  of 
the  details  of  the  system  on  which  the  Grand  Army 
worked.  One,  which  some  of  the  best  of  French  mili 
tary  writers  have  unfortunately  propagated  and  con 
firmed,  relates  to  the  personnel  of  the  higher  officers. 
So  far  from  these  being  invariably  the  efficient  and 
well-trained  leaders  they  have  been  represented,  in 
Ney's  own  corps  one  of  the  divisions  changed  hands 
twice  during  the  two  months  ;  once  because  the  gen 
eral  (Vandamme)  was  of  so  proud  and  violent  a  temper 
that  he  could  not  brook  Ney  as  his  superior;  and  again 
because  his  successor  proved  so  worn  out  as  to  be 
physically  and  morally  unfit  for  active  service,  so  that 
the  marshal  took  upon  himself  the  responsibility,  a 
great  one  for  a  lieutenant  of  Napoleon,  of  dismissing 
him  from  his  charge.  Another  relates  to  the  care 
which  these  rough,  practical  soldiers  gave  to  the  details 
of  their  duty.  What  would  Wellington  have  said,  had 
any  division  commander  of  the  army,  during  one  of 
his  sieges,  changed  his  own  quarters  three  times  for 
considerable  distances,  without  notifying  the  fact  to 
headquarters?  Yet  this  was  done  under  Ney,  during 
the  blockade  of  Magdeburg,  by  the  general  of  a  dra 
goon  division;  and  so  little  was  such  an  irregularity 
regarded,  that  when  brought  by  his  staff  to  the  mar 
shal's  notice,  he  only  shrugged  his  shoulders,  and  said, 
"  What  a  way  to  carry  on  duty  !  "  As  to  the  internal 
service  of  the  staff,  for  which  at  one  time  Napoleon 
got  great  credit,  the  truth,  as  told  by  M.  de  Fezensas, 
enables  us  to  fill  up  the  outline  suggested  by  certain 
hints  of  Jomini  in  his  narrative  of  the  subsequent  cam 
paign  of  Poland,  which  imply  that  the  army  -then 


228  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

already  felt  deeply  the  deficiencies  which  their  master 
discovered  too  late. 

"  Long  journeys  on  duty  were  made  in  carnages  charged 
at  the  post  rate  ;  but  some  officers  put  the  money  in  their 
pockets  and  obtained  horses  by  requisition.  This  was  a 
bad  plan  in  every  view,  for  apart  from  the  dishonesty,  they 
were  ill  served,  and  lost  valuable  time.  As  for  messages 
taken  on  horseback,  I  have  already  said  that  no  person  took 
the  pains  to  inquire  if  we  had  a  horse  that  could  walk,  even 
when  it  was  necessary  to  go  at  a  gallop,  or  if  we  knew  the 
country,  or  had  a  map.  The  order  must  be  executed  without 
waiting  for  the  means,  as  I  shall  show  in  some  special  in 
stances.  This  habit  of  attempting  everything  with  the  most 
feeble  instruments,  this  wish  to  overlook  impossibilities,  this 
unbounded  assurance  of  success,  which  at  first  helped  to  win 
us  advantages,  in  the  end  became  our  destruction." 

From  reflections  thus  darkened  with  the  shadow 
of  the  future,  the  author  carries  us  forward  into  Po 
land,  whither  Napoleon  now  transferred  the  scene  of 
conquest,  determined,  in  his  own  phrase,  "  to  win  back 
on  land  the  colonies  France  had  lost." 

Here  M.  de  Fezensac  places  the  turning  point  of 
Napoleon's  career.  The  first  entrance  into  Poland 
brought  the  French  into  collision  with  Be.nningsen's 
army  ;  and  although  the  Russians  had  to  retreat  after 
the  battle  of  Pultusk,  they  did  so  without  disorder  or 
loss,  for  "  the  time  of  half-successes,  of  incomplete 
triumphs,  had  arrived.  Then  also  began  the  miseries 
of  the  army,  the  want  of  forage  and  provisions,  the  pri 
vations  of  every  kind  which  I  shall  afterwards  have  to 
detail."  Here  the  course  of  duty  threw  the  young 
aide-de-camp  into  the  company  of  Bernadotte,  with 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  229 

whose  courtesy  he  was  much  impressed,  and  whom  he 
suspects,  from  the  excessive  interest  taken  by  him  in 
the  people  of  Poland,  to  have  already  conceived  hopes 
of  an  elective  throne.  Losing  his  way  a  few  days  later 
in  the  search  for  one  of  Ney's  generals  (who,  like  the 
cavalry  commander  previously  mentioned,  had  shifted 
his  quarters  without  informing  the  marshal),  he  fell  in 
'again  with  Jomini,  and  was  directed  rightly  by  that 
officer,  from  whom  he  learnt  that  the  Russians  were 
suddenly  advancing.  The  short  winter  campaign  had 
begun,  which  was  to  end  in  the  desperate  encounter  of 
Eylau,  the  first  check  that  befell  the  Grand  Army  and 
its  master. 

Who  does  not  know  how  bloody  and  indecisive  was 
the  struggle  of  that  day  ?  Genius  has  reflected  the 
whole  story  in  the  ghastly  picture  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Louvre.  The  idlest  traveller  turns  arrested,  in  spite 
of  personal  insensibility  or  national  coldness,  to  gaze 
on  the  sheet  of  snow,  the  burning  villages,  the  agonized 
group  of  wounded  in  the  foreground,  and  above  them 
the  pallor-stricken  face  of  a  man  at  whose  bidding  all 
this  misery  was  wrought,  and  who  felt  at  that  moment 
(so  the  artist  seems  to  tell  us)  some  presage  of  Boro 
dino's  useless  slaughter,  the  fires  of  Moscow,  and  the 
ruin  that  followed.  On  this  occasion  Benningsen's 
firmness  was  insufficient  to  maintain  the  equality  his 
army  had  asserted,  and  he  slowly  withdrew  next  morn 
ing,  leaving  the  ground  to  the  enemy.  M.  de  Fezensac's 
share  in  the  events  of  the  day  was  an  important  onej 
for  he  bore  to  Ney  the  message  which  was  to  bring  his 
corps  to  take  share  in  the  fight.  His  horse  was  already 
worn  out  when  he  got  his  orders  at  eight  A.  M.,  and 
with  difficulty  could  he,  being  fortunately  in  funds,  buy 


230 


DE  FEZENSAC  S  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


a  restive  animal  to  carry  him.  He  knew  nothing  of  the 
roads,  and  had  no  guide.  "  To  ask  for  an  escort  would 
have  been  of  no  more  use  than  to  ask  for  a  horse.  An 
officer  had  always  an  excellent  horse,  knew  the  coun 
try,  was  never  taken,  met  no  accident,  and  got  rapidly 
to  his  destination  ;  and  of  all  this  there  was  so  little 
doubt  that  often  a  second  message  was  thought  un 
necessary."  This  want  of  proper  precaution  was  near 
costing  the  Emperor  dear,  for  his  orders  did  not  reach 
Ney  till  two  P.  M. ;  and  the  corps  only  came  up  at  the 
end  of  the  day.  Bernadotte's  was  wholly  absent,  and 
that,  as  Jomini  assures  us,  solely  for  want  of  a  good 
system  of  messengers.  What,  then,  are  we  to  think 
of  the  assertion  of  M.  Thiers  (which  M.  de  Fezensac 
quotes  to  flatly  contradict  it  as  regards  Ney)  that  Na 
poleon  sent  off  seven  officers  the  evening  before  to  press 
the  two  missing  marshals  to  come  up  ?  What  are  we 
to  think,  may  it  not  be  further  asked,  of  certain  apoc 
ryphal  messages  sent  to  Grouchy  in  the  Waterloo 
crisis  ;  messages  taken  as  historical  facts  by  M.  Thiers, 
though  their  receipt  has  been  consistently  denied  from 
the  first,  and  no  record  of  their  dispatch  exists,  save  in 
the  St.  Helena  "  Memoires,"  an  exile's  apology  for  his 
disasters,  interesting  no  doubt  for  its  ability,  but  hardly 
fit  material  for  serious  history. 

The  battle  of  Eylau  produced  a  four  months'  ces 
sation  of  hostilities,  during  which  the  Russians  suffered 
much,  but  their  enemies  still  more.  Sixty  thousand 
stragglers,  M.  de  Fezensac  assures  us,  were  missing 
from  the  French  muster-rolls,  and  the  greater  part  of 
these  were  mere  marauders,  who  stripped  the  country 
of  the  supplies  which  should  have  been  brought  up  and 
husbanded  by  the  commissariat. 


THE  GRAND  ARMY,  23! 

"  Never  were  more  orders  "  [he  adds]  "  given  than  by  Na 
poleon  to  insure  subsistence  to  his  army  ;  never  were  any 
worse  executed.  Some  of  them  indeed  were  wholly  imprac 
ticable.  There  might  be  traced  in  them  the  illusions  or  char 
latanism  of  him  who,  in  later  days,  ordered  his  troops  to  pro 
tect  the  peasants  who  brought  provisions  into  the  markets  of  Mos 
cow.  To  discover  the  hidden  stocks,  to  bring  them  into 
Warsaw,  to  repair  the  mills,  to  make  regular  issues  of  rations, 
were  all  very  well  on  paper ;  but  those  who  made  the  cam 
paign  knew  what  it  all  came  to.  It  is  wrong  then  to  say  "  [the 
writer  has  here  M.  Thiers  and  others  of  his  class  in  view] 
"that  the  army  had  enough,  and  sometimes  even  more.  I  can 
declare,  on  the  contrary,  that  with  all  these  fine  orders  so 
given  in  January,  our  army  was  dying  with  hunger  in  March." 

In  the  latter  month  M.  de  Fezensac  was  captured 
when  on  a  message ;  and  having  thus  an  unsought 
opportunity  of  seeing  how  the  enemy  fared,  gives  his 
evidence  as  follows : 

"  M.  Thiers  speaks  of  the  sufferings  of  the  Russian  army 
of  Cossacks  asking  bread  of  our  soldiers.  I  do  not  dispute 
the  matter,  but  at  their  headquarters  appearances  gave  the  lie 
to  this  assertion.  I  saw  the  staff  living  in  abundance,  the  sol 
diers  well  clothed,  the  horses  in  good  condition.  Assuredly 
the  comparison  was  not  in  our  favor." 

Refused  an  exchange,  as  having  seen  too  much  of 
the  camp  thus  described,  he  was  sent  into  Russia,  and 
remained  a  prisoner  until  the  battle  of  Friedland  and 
peace  of  Tilsit  released  him. 

Thus  restored  at  last  to  Paris  and  the  society  in 
which  he  had  been  brought  up,  M.  de  Fezensac  met 
and  married  the  daughter  of  Clarke,  Due  de  Feltre,  the 


232 


DE  FE  ZEN  SACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 


Minister  of  War.  It  is  no  reflection  on  an  honest  sol 
dier  to  say,  that  he  thus  secured  his  military  fortunes 
more  certainly  than  if  he  had  followed  Ney  in  the 
famous  echelon  attack  at  Friedland,  which  overthrew 
that  army  whose  condition  he  had  lately  admired,  and 
which  Benningsen  too  confidently  exposed.  Soon 
afterwards  he  was  entering  Spain,  once  more  on  the 
Marshal's  staff,  and  with  him  pursued  Moore's  army  to 
Corunna.  He  had  here  just  time  to  observe  the  bitter 
enmity  of  the  Spaniards  to  their  conquerors,  and  the 
ill  working  of  the  Napoleonic  system  of  requisition  in 
a  poor  and  hostile  country,  when  he  was  recalled,  with 
many  of  the  staff,  to  Paris.  Napoleon  was  about  to 
carry  the  Grand  Army  once  more  into  Germany.  In 
the  fifth  year  of  his  service,  and  now  holding  the  rank 
of  captain  and  the  enviable  position  of  aide-de-camp  to 
Berthier  himself,  M.  de  Fezensac  followed  the  eagles  to 
Vienna  and  received  a  slight  wound  at  Aspern,  which 
procured  him  his  grade  as  major  and  a  pension,  with 
the  title  of  baron — •"  rather  for  what  I  would  have 
done  than  for  what  I  did, "adds  the  narrator,  modestly. 
His  journal  here  was  but  a  record  of  headquarter  move 
ments,  and  he  has  forborne  to  publish  it.  A  short  mis 
sion  to  Spain,  with  some  intructions  to  Macdonald, 
composed  the  rest  of  his  service  until  the  fatal  invasion 
of  Russia  was  begun,  and  he  passed  once  more  east 
ward  through  Germany  on  Berthier's  staff. 

No  part  of  the  work  is  more  interesting  than  that 
which  follows.  In  almost  immediate  attendance  upon 
Napoleon  up  to  the  day  of  Borodino,  M.  de  Fezensac 
was  named  three  days  later  to  the  command  of  the 
fourth  regiment  of  the  line,  which  had  lost  its  colonel 
in  the  fight,  and  thenceforward  served  through  the 


THE  GRAND  ARMY.  233 

rest  of  the  Russian  tragedy  in  his  new  capacity,  and  in 
the  corps  of  his  old  chief,  Ney.  Of  the  whole  library 
of  histories  and  memoirs  devoted  to  the  eventful  retreat 
from  Moscow,  there  is  no  account  more  valuable  than 
his.  A  natural  devotion  to  the  responsibilities  of  his 
new  duty  made  him  sympathize  to  the  full  with  the 
sufferings  of  his  regiment ;  while  his  six  years'  service 
on  the  staff  enabled  him  to  discern  how  much  of  these 
were  due  to  the  shortcomings  at  headquarters.  The 
system  of  requisition  alternated  with  pillage,  which  we 
have  seen  him  denounce  for  its  inherent  unsoundness, 
had  at  last  broken  down  altogether,  and  left  the  army 
helpless  and  starving  in  wastes  of  mud  and  snow.  The 
bonds  of  organization  and  of  regimental  discipline, 
imperfect  in  the  day  of  victory,  had  snapped  asunder  at 
this  great  disaster,  leaving  all  ranks  levelled  into  a 
helpless  selfishness,  until  the  Grand  Army,  so  long  the 
terror  of  Europe,  became  in  its  turn  the  sport  and 
booty  of  an  avenging  peasantry.  One  bright  spot 
only  illumines  the  dark  picture  as  M.  de  Fezensac  has 
painted  it.  The  noble  self-denial  and  inexhaustible 
energy  of  Ney  had  never  had  such  full  justice  done  to 
them  before.  No  one  who  reads  this  narrative  can 
doubt  that  the  marshal  united  in  his  person,  to  a 
degree  no  other  man  has  rivalled,  the  true  physical  and 
moral  qualifications  for  the  rear-guard  commander  of  a 
retreating  army.  On  this  portion  of  the  u  Souvenirs," 
we  forbear  to  dwell  further.  It  was  not  only  published 
(as  before  stated)  many  years  before  the  remainder,  but 
to  many  English  readers  is  especially  known  by  the 
excellent  version  of  Sir  W.  Knollys,  who  has  completed 
his  private  translation  of  the  original  narrative  care 
fully  from  other  sources,  and  thus  made  so  complete  a 


234  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOI  LECTIONS  OF 

handbook  of  the  campaign,  as  to  cause  regret  that  his 
labor  has  never  been  offered  to  the  general  public. 
For  our  present  purpose  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  of 
the  3,000  men  who  originally  composed  the  fourth  regi 
ment,  200  only  recrossed  the  Vistula  after  the  retreat, 
and  of  the  missing  number  only  100  ever  reappeared 
from  captivity;  exactly  nine  tenths  had  been  sacrificed 
to  Napoleon's  spirit  of  adventure.  The  officers 
naturally  suffered  less  in  proportion  than  the  men;  yet 
of  their  original  strength  of  109,  sixty  perished,  and 
fourteen  only  escaped  unhurt.  M.  de  Fezensac  con 
ducted  the  remnant  of  his  corps  to  Nancy  at  the  end 
of  the  winter,  bearing  from  Ney  the  short  but  honor 
able  testimony  (in  a  letter  to  General  Clarke) :  "  This 
young  man  has  constantly  proved  superior  to  the  criti 
cal  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed.  I  present 
him  to  you  as  a  true  knight,  and  you  may  fairly  look 
on  him  henceforth  as  a  veteran  French  colonel."  His 
father-in-law  did  not  take  the  hint  himself,  but  Ney's 
recommendation  reached  the  Emperor  through  others- 
and  while  M.  de  Fezensac  was  in  Paris  soliciting  pro 
motion  for  his  subalterns,  he  was  himself  gazetted  gen 
eral  of  brigade  ;  the  Minister  declaring  himself  as  much 
surprised  as  any  one  at  his  son-in-law's  good  fortune. 
Soon  afterwards  he  was  on  his  way  to  Bremen,  ap 
pointed  to  a  newly  raised  Army  Corps,  of  which  Van- 
damme  had  assumed  the  charge,  and  in  which  the 
author  found  the  officers,  almost  without  exception, 
composed  of  two  classes ;  boys  from  the  cadet-school 
and  worn-out  middle-aged  men.  The  serviceable 
officers  had  for  the  most  part  disappeared,  or  attained 
higher  rank.  Such  was  the  confusion  in  the  War 
Bureau  that  a  lieutenant  of  the  59th  soliciting  a  com- 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 


235 


pany  was  forthwith  gazetted,  by  mistake,  to  a  major's 
rank  in  another  corps.  When  the  error  was  found  out, 
it  was  not  thought  worth  while  to  correct  it,  and  the 
new  major  took  command  of  his  battalion,  at  the  head 
of  which  he  fell.  Of  trustworthy  soldiers  in  any  capaci 
ty  Napoleon  began  to  feel  the  need,  for  he  wrote  to 
Marshal  Davoust,  after  sending  him  to  command  in  the 
north  of  Germany :  "Take  care  and  treat  Vandamme 
well :  men  who  understand  war  are  getting  scarce." 
This  advice,  according  to  M.  de  Fezensac,  came  not  a 
whit  too  soon,  for  the  violent  temper  of  the  general 
soon  after  caused  an  explosion  in  the  presence  of  the 
whole  staff  upon  some  point  of  military  etiquette,  which 
tried  Davoust's  patience  to  the  utmost.  The  war  now 
recommenced,  and  while  the  Grand  Army  was  winning 
Lutzen  and  Bautzen  successively,  causing  Napoleon 
vainly  to  fancy  himself  once  more  the  arbiter  of  Europe, 
Davoust  recovered  Hamburg  and  the  Lower  Elbe  in  a 
series  of  well-managed,  though  not  very  difficult 
manoeuvres.  Vandamme  here  won  much  credit,  and 
General  de  Fezensac,  who  was  often  detached  and  act 
ing  on  his  own  responsibility,  was  highly  praised  by  his 
new  chief;  so  that  when  the  latter,  during  the  ensuing 
armistice,  was  ordered  to  the  Emperor's  headquarters, 
his  brigadier  followed  him  and  again  obtained  a  com 
mand  in  his  corps.  Vandamme's  manner,  he  tells  us, 
though  unbearable  to  his  superiors,  was  by  no  means 
harsh  to  his  own  staff;  and  the  energy  and  vigor  of  the 
man,  who  was  known  to  be  ambitious  beyond  all  things 
of  such  distinction  as  should  place  him  on  a  level  with 
more  fortunate  rivals,  gave  promise  of  brilliant  opportu 
nities  to  the  force  he  led,  numbered  as  the  First  Corps 
of  the  newly  raised  levies  with  which  Napoleon  vainly 


236  DE  FEZENSACS  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

hoped  to  revive  the  glories  of  the  Grand  Army  whose 
name  they  had  assumed. 

M.  de  Fezensac  found  in  his  new  brigade  a  better 
supply  of  officers  than  he  had  hoped ;  for  many, 
invalided  in  the  spring,  had  now  rejoined  the  eagles. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  ranks  were  full  of  young 
untrained  recruits,  and  the  non-commissioned  officers 
were  ignorant  of  the  very  elements  of  their  duties. 
The  dispersion  of  the  force  during  the  armistice  for 
subsistence'  sake  rendered  it  the  harder  to  complete 
the  necessary  instruction,  and  the  more  impossible  to 
enforce  discipline.  "  We  were  to  fight  all  Europe,"  he 
sums  up  his  description,  "  and  yet  never  was  there  a 
more  untrained  force  than  ours.'5  "All  the  world 
knows,"  it  is  significantly  added,  "how  the  countries 
we  occupied  suffered  ;  in  this  respect,  at  least,  our 
young  army  was  quite  as  knowing  as  its  predecessors.^ 
Under  pretext  of  looking  after  the  comfort  of  the  men 
various  officers  ransacked  town  and  country,  made' 
requisitions,  and  allowed  themselves  afterwards  to  be 
bribed  off."  From  such  pursuits  as  these,  and  with; 
unfinished  training  in  its  proper  trade,  the  Grand  Army: 
was  roused  by  the  termination  of  the  armistice.  Aus 
tria  had  thrown  her  slow  but  heavy  sword  into  the  bal 
ance,  and  France  and  her  conscripts  were  hopelessly 
over-weighted. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  as  to  the  exact 
force  brought  to  bear  on  either  side  in  the  new  cam 
paign,  which  exceeded  in  its  dimensions  any  other  the 
world  had  seen.  It  seems  to  us  more  important  to 
note  fully  what  has  been  here  revealed  to  us  of  the 
composition  of  Napoleon's  army,  and  to  remember  that 
no  reinforcement  of  any  importance  reached  it.  We 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 


237 


nay  then  well  understand  how  its  body  and  substance 
nelted  away  under  the  disasters  that  ensued,  more 
apidly  than  the  historian  can  trace.  For  a  moment 
he  brilliant  victory  of  Dresden,  enhanced  by  the  mor- 
.al  wound  of  his  old  rival  Moreau  from  a  French  shot 
)n  his  first  exposure,  led  Napoleon  to  believe  that  the 
>tar  of  victory  had  risen  on  him  once  more  :  but  in  the 
bame  week  that  this  triumph  was  won,  his  dreams  of 
-estored  empire  were  rudely  shattered  into  ruin  by 
:hree  tremendous  blows.  Oudinot's  Army  of  the  North 
,vas  defeated  decisively  within  sight  of  the  hated  city 
)f  Berlin,  which  it  had  been  detached  to  threaten. 
Macdonald  in  Silesia  received  a  fatal  check  on  the 
Katzbach,  which  so  loosened  the  discipline  of  his  con 
scripts  that  the  three  days'  retreat  that  followed  cost 
aim  ten  times  the  number  lost  in  the  really  trifling 
action :  the  real  cause  being  revealed  in  an  intercepted 
.etter  to  Macdonald  from  General  Puthod,  who  speaks 
of  his  division,  before  the  combat,  as  quite  unmanageable 
n  the  existing  want  and  bad  weather.  These  two 
misfortunes  the  Emperor's  panegyrists  charge  to  his 
lieutenants,  forgetting  that  he  was  solely  and  wholly 
responsible  for  the  choice  he  had  made  of  them.  The 
third,  however,  that  of  Vandamme's  corps  at  Culm,  has 
been  so  completely  and  unequivocally  fixed  upon  his 
own  mismanagement  by  concurrent  testimony,  that 
even  M.  Thiers  scarce  endeavors  to  disprove  it,  and 
admits  as  true  the  charge  against  his  hero,  of  striving  to 
excuse  himself  at  first  by  blackening  the  memory  of 
his  general,  then  reported  to  be  slain. 

M.  de  Fezensac  shared,  of  course,  in  all  the  events 
of  that  terrible  disaster.  He  rejoiced  at  the  outset  in 
the  bold  movement  which  threw  the  First  Corps  into 


238  DE  FEZEN 'SAC'S  RECOLLECTIONS  OF 

the  rear  of  the  vast  mass  of  enemies  retreating  from 
Dresden.  He  became  anxious  with  others  when  it  was 
found  that  all  connection  with  the  other  French  corps; 
was  lost.  He  felt  anxiety  change  into  alarm  when: 
Vandamme,  on  the  night  before  the  battle,  left  his 
corps  exposed  to  be  attacked  by  vastly  larger  forces  in 
the  plain  before  Teplitz,  while  the  heights  behind  him 
were  unoccupied,  and  no  friends  heard  of  in  any  quar 
ter.  "  No  one  partook  his  illusions,"  says  M.  de  Fezen-J 
sac,  who  regretted  then,  no  doubt,  his  choice  of  a  lead-: 
er.  "  Generals,  officers,  and  soldiers  alike  wanted  con 
fidence.  That  is  a  bad  feeling  with  which  to  enter 
into  action."  When  40,000  troops  in  such  condition, 
and  so  placed,  are  suddenly  attacked  in  front  and  rear 
by  forces  double  their  own,  the  result  cannot  be  doubt 
ful.  In  two  hours  Vandamme's  corps  was  either  taken 
or  scattered  in  panic  flight  through  the  wooded  emi-< 
nences  by  which  the  Prussians  had  come  behind  it. 
Acting  on  a  maxim  of  Ney's,  that  "  you  should  never 
surrender  till  they  take  you  by  the  throat,"  M.  de 
Fezensac  forced  his  way  through  the  enemy's  skir 
mishers  and  escaped,  finding  one-third  of  his  brigade 
remaining,  when  he  rallied  it  under  cover  of  Saint  Cyr's 
troops  on  the  Dresden  side  of  the  hills.  Less  fortunate 
than  his  brigadier,  Vandamme  was  long  ere  that  time 
a  prisoner  in  the  market-place  of  Teplitz,  his  tall  form 
a  show  to  triumphant  townfolk,  and  his  loud  voice  ap 
pealing  in  vain  for  punishment  on  the  excited  soldiery, 
who  had  plundered  and  threatened  him  with  violence  ; 
for  his  harsh  treatment  of  Silesia  when  quartered  there 
had  made  his  name  infamous  throughout  Germany. 

"  The  moral  effect  of  this  defeat "  [M.  de  Fezensac  observes] 


THE  GRAND  ARMY. 

"was  worse  than  the  numerical.  Its  result  was  a  discourage 
ment  that  lasted  to  the  end  of  the  campaign.  Young  sol 
diers  require  success  ;  only  old  ones  can  bear  up  against  re 
verses.  We  saw  no  more  those  men  who,  the  day  before,  had 
so  boldly  attacked  the  enemy.  On  the  morning  of  the  twenty- 
ninth,  the  First  corps  numbered  40,000  brave  fellows  ;  on  the 
night  of  the  thirtieth,  20,000  disheartened  soldiers." 

The  spirits  of  the  enemy  rose  proportionately,  and  an 
officer  dispatched  next  day  to  seek  exchange  of  prison 
ers,  was  refused  reception  at  their  headquarters. 

Cheered  by  successes  on  all  sides,  the  Allies  now 
set  themselves  firmly  to  the  task  of  ridding  Germany 
of  the  French.  Jealousies  and  divisions  were  laid  aside 
for  the  common  good,  and  the  personal  ambition  of 
powerful  monarchs  sacrificed  to  the  political  object. 
Alexander  himself  set  the  example  of  self-denial,  by 
refusing  the  supreme  command,  pressed  on  him  by  our 
Prince  Regent,  on  the  plea  that,  without  Moreau's  aid 
the  task  would  over-weight  him.  From  that  time  for 
ward  Napoleon's  struggle  was  hopeless.  Hemmed  in 
the  basin  of  the  Elbe  by  his  false  strategy,  straightened 
from  the  first,  and  soon  starved,  his  young  legions  melt 
ed  away  in  the  Saxon  autumn  as  fast  as  their  prede 
cessors  in  the  Russian  winter,  until  the  time  came 
when  their  enemies,  better  fed,  in  better  heart,  and 
with  recruited  numbers,  closed  in  and  gave  them  the 
final  blow  at  Leipsic.  The  First  Corps,  now  under 
Count  Lobau,  saw  little  of  all  this,  being  placed  in 
Dresden  to  recover  its  condition,  and  finally  abandoned 
there  by  one  of  the  many  mistakes  Napoleon  made  in 
this  campaign.  His  retreat  from  Germany  of  course 
compelled  the  surrender  of  the  force  thus  isolated,  and 
M.  de  Frezensac,  again  a  prisoner,  drew  his  sword  no 


240        RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  GRAND  ARMY. 

more.  Those  who  follow  his  "  Recollections  "  ever  so 
carelessly  throughout  will  understand  the  mingled  feel 
ing  with  which  he  heard  the  abdication  of  his  chief, 
whose  genius  he  had  admired,  though  never  blind  to 
his  faults.  He  accepted  the  Restoration  as  the  best 
hope  for  the  future  of  France  ;  and  the  tricolored  cock 
ade,  which  he  doffed  after  ten  years'  wear,  was  laid  by 
as  his  simple  souvenir  of  the  Grand  Army.  Few  saw  so 
plainly  what  strength  and  weakness  met  in  that  vast 
machine;  none  have  better  told  the  story  of  its 
triumphs  and  its  fall. 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT,  A  GERMAN  SOLDIER 
OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE* 

IN  1806  Prussia  had  enjoyed  ten  years  of  the 
ignoble  peace  purchased  by  the  Treaty  of  Basle.  Her 
king,  though  entering  warmly  at  first  into  the  coalition 
against  revolutionary  France,  had  soon  tired  of  a  war 
in  which  defeat  would  fall  heavily  on  Prussia  and 
success  would  but  strengthen  her  German  rival  by  the 
re-establishment  of  Austrian  dominion  in  Belgium. 
The  campaigns  of  1792-3  had  added  no  lustre  to  Prus 
sian  arms.  Long  disuse  of  the  practice  of  war  had 
unfitted  for  the  field  the  stiff  machines  which  in  out 
ward  show  alone  represented  the  warriors  of  the  Great 
Frederic.  Battalions  in  which  each  captain  bought 
recruits  for  his  company  from  crimps  at  the  cheapest 
rate  had  proved  as  unequal  to  the  proof  of  a  campaign 
as  the  untrained  staff  and  commissariat  which  at 
tempted  with  them  the  invasion  of  France.  Military 
pedantry  had  long  had  sway  in  the  service,  and  com 
bined  with  bad  administration  to  cause  the  soldier's 
trade  to  be  shunned  by  all  who  could  choose  one  for 
themselves  ;  nor  had  a  war  undertaken  nominally  to 
restore  the  Bourbons  awakened  the  latent  patriotism 
of  the  Northern  German.  Peace,  therefore,  was 
popular  with  all  classes,  and  prince  and  people  were 

*  A  us  dem  Leben  des  Generals  (Dr.)  Heinrich  von  Brandt.     Berlin  : 

1868—-. 


242 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT 


alike  content  to  withdraw  from  the  inglorious  struggle 
to  a  not  less  inglorious  neutrality,  leaving  Austria  to 
defend  single-handed  the  integrity  of  the  Empire  over 
which  she  nominally  presided. 

While  the  unequal  contest  went  on  from  year  to 
year  between  revolutionary  ardor  and  Hapsburg 
obstinacy  ;  while  worn-out  veterans,  failing  on  either 
side,  gave  way  to  abler  men  ;  while  modern  strategy 
from  the  feeble  warfare  of  1792-3  rose  suddenly,  under 
Napoleon  and  the  Archduke  Charles,  to  the  highest 
stage  the  art  reached  before  the  days  of  steam  ; 
Prussia,  tranquil  in  her  avoidance  of  the  storm  which 
shook  her  neighbors,  applied  all  her  power  to  consoli 
date  the  acquisitions  made  not  long  before  as  her  share 
of  the  partition  of  Poland.  The  struggle  carried  on 
for  centuries  along  the  lower  Vistula  between  the 
Teuton  and  the  Sclave  had  ended  in  the  triumph  of 
the  former.  German  capital  flowed  over  to  fertilize 
Polish  territory ;  to  farm  a  Polish  estate  was  at  once 
the  most  profitable  and  aristocratic  of  employments 
for  the  Prussian  noblesse  ;  and  the  process  of  amalga 
mation  and  absorption  had  fairly  set  in  which  has  con 
tinued  steadily  down  to  the  present  day,  disturbed 
only  for  a  short  season  by  the  era  of  Napoleonic  con 
quest  of  which  we  are  presently  to  speak.  The  old 
university  of  Konigsberg  in  East  Prussia  was  frequented 
by  the  youth  of  both  races  alike  in  the  first  years  of 
this  century,  Among  these  was  our  autobiographer, 
Henry  von  Brandt,  one  of  a  large  and  wealthy  family 
of  noble  race,  who  had  cast  their  lot  in  the  new  terri 
tories  acquired  by  the  House  of  Brandenburg  ;  and  so 
little,  he  tells  us,  was  independence  sought  by  the 
Polish  students  of  1805,  that  it  was  the  fashion  for 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE. 


243 


them  to  mix  freely  with  the  Germans  in  class-room 
and  in  sport,  and  to  call  themselves  "  South-Prus 
sians,"  as  the  others  were  Brandenburgers  or  East-Prus 
sians. 

This  tranquil  process  of  amalgamation  was  not  to 
last  long.  Events  were  at  hand  which  would  shake 
the  foundations  of  prescriptive  authority  throughout 
Europe,  and  change  for  a  season  the  aspirations,  fash 
ions,  and  even  the  names,  of  doubtful  nationalities. 
Napoleon  in  his  camp  at  Boulogne  was  already  the 
object  of  attention  to  the  whole  civilized  world;  and 
young  Brandt,  like  most  of  his  fellow-students,  paid 
more  attention  to  French  than  to  his  proper  study  of 
law,  and  read  the  journals  more  diligently  than  the 
works  on  jurisprudence  which  his  professor  recommend 
ed.  Bonaparte  (for  by  his  family  name  the  Emperor 
of  the  French  was  then  universally  known),  unmatched 
as  administrator  and  general,  elected  sovereign  of  a 
mighty  people,  yet  not  many  years  before  a  friendless 
collegian,  an  unknown  subaltern,  was  the  object  of  ro 
mantic  admiration  on  the  part  of  the  simple  students 
of  Konigsberg.  Some  of  these  would  have  made  an 
actual  idol  of  their  favorite  hero,  but  that  the  sudden 
execution  of  the  Due  d'Enghein  just  before  the  coro 
nation  of  his  slayer,  threw  a  damp  over  the  ardor  of 
many  who,  until  that  dark  deed,  had  counted  Napoleon 
as  good  as  great,  and  had  regarded  his  self-exaltation 
to  supreme  power  as  the  truest  act  of  patriotism  to  a 
distracted  country. 

Germany  and  her  people  were  soon  to  be  unde 
ceived  as  to  the  purity  of  his  motives.  Foiled  in  his 
designs  upon  England,  Napoleon  turned  his  arms  east 
ward,  seeking  to  fix  a-quarrel  first  upon  the  hereditary 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

enemy  of  France.  A  war  with  Austria  was  easy  to 
provoke,  certain  to  be  popular,  and  gave  promise  of 
further  results  than  a  mere  fresh  humiliation  of  the 
twice-vanquished  Court  of  Vienna.  The  word  was 
given  to  pass  the  Rhine,  and  that  campaign  of  Ulm 
began  in  which  (as  De  Fezensac  has  clearly  shown)  the 
shortcomings  of  the  grand  army  proved  to  be  great, 
even  after  its  Boulogne  training  ;  but  which  led  to 
successes  so  vast  that  all  shortcomings  were  forgotten. 
Russia  came  late  to  the  aid  of  her  threatened  neighbor, 
only  to  add  to  the  triumph  of  the  victor  on  the  deci 
sive  field  of  Austerlitz.  Prussia,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
long  been  trained  to  look  coolly  on  at  the  defeats  of 
Austria,  and  would  have  regarded  this  fresh  reverse 
with  complacency  but  for  the  sudden  violation  of  her 
own  territory  made  for  French  advantage  by  Berna- 
dotte's  corps  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign.  This  out 
rage  at  once  raised  her  spirit  against  Napoleon,  and  all 
^Northern  Germany  doubt  the  wisdom  of  the  policy  of 
isolation  which  had  given  the  French  their  recent  ad 
vantage.  Like  the  rest  of  the  Prussian  youth,  the 
Konigsberg  students  cried  out  for  satisfaction  ;  but, 
like  others,  were  easily  appeased  by  the  annexation  of 
Hanover,  offered  their  country  as  a  sop  by  the  wily 
invader,  who  thus  sought  to  gain  time  to  concentrate 
his  army  on  his  new  base  on  the  Main.  He  had  gath 
ered  190,000  men  there  ready  to  crush  their  independ 
ence,  while  they  were  yet,  as  Brandt  honestly  tells  us, 
blindly  rejoicing  over  the  new  addition  to  the  "  strength 
of  their  fatherland."  Then,  indeed,  the  mask  was 
thrown  off,  and  the  struggle  for  the  national  life  they 
held  dear  was  seen  to  have  been  but  deferred  at  the 
invader's  pleasure. 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     24$ 

"  I  can  still  most  vividly  remember,"  says  our 
writer,  "  the  astonishment  which  fell  upon  all  when 
the  news  of  our  defeats  reached  Konigsberg."  Citi 
zens  and  students  had  shared  to  the  full  the  singular 
delusion  entertained  by  high  officers  of  the  army, 
and  even  published  by  General  Riichel  in  a  general 
order  to  his  corps  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign,  that 
the  French  successes  of  which  they  had  heard  had 
been  won  against  inferior  enemies  in  spite  of  a  bad 
system,  such  as  must  inevitably  fail  when  tested  against 
the  better-trained  battalions  of  Prussia.  Jena  has 
been  usually  looked  upon  as  the  crucial  shock  in  which 
the  old  tactics  handed  down  by  Frederic  were  sud 
denly  found  wanting;  but,  in  truth,  the  proof  of  their 
inadequacy  to  meet  the  more  rapid  and  lighter  move 
ments  of  the  enemy,  was  furnished  abundantly  at  the 
very  first  collision  of  the  armies  four  days  before  on  the 
little  plain  of  Saalfeld.  On  the  other  side  came  Lan- 
nes,  Napoleon's  own  favorite  marshal,  the  best  handler 
of  troops  in  action,  according  to  his  master's  judgment, 
of  all  the  quick  tacticians  that  followed  the  Imperial 
Eagles.  On  the  other  was  Prince  Louis  of  Prussia, 
chief  of  the  war  party  in  the  Berlin  Councils,  "a  man," 
says  the  greatest  of  all  German  military  writers,  "  now 
thirty-three  years  of  age,  of  vehement  courage  but 
dissipated  habits,  burning  for  .military  fame  but  un 
versed  in  the  practice  of  war,  and  counting  on  his  own 
personal  valor  to  redeem  every  error  of  judgment." 
Lannes  had  with  him  Suchet's  division,  veterans  long 
trained  to  war  on  the  light  method  bequeathed  by  the 
Revolutionary  armies,  and  perfected  by  practice :  and 
these  officered  by  men  who  had  all  won  their  posts  in 
real  ^ervice.  The  Prussians  opposed  to  them  were  not 


246  HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

much  fewer  in  number,  drilled  with  an  exact  pedantry 
now  unknown,  confident  in  the  hereditary  reputation 
of  their  army,  but  slow  and  unready  in  movement,  and 
led  by  officers  of  little  but  parade-ground  practice. 
The  French  division,  pouring  through  a  pass  into  the 
plain  in  which  the  Prussians  were  drawn  up,  extended 
swiftly  to  its  left  till  it  embraced  the  whole  front  of 
the  enemy,  and  then  prepared  to  advance  in  columns 
covered  by  the  usual  swarm  of  skirmishers  thrown  out 
around  the  head  of  each.  These  the  Prussian  troops 
at  once  began  to  fire  heavily  on,  either  mistaking  them 
for  an  attack  in  force,  or  irritated  by  their  boldness ; 
but  the  well-dressed  lines  and  serried  ranks  of  Louis 
were  vain  against  the  crouching  scattered  foe,  whose 
deadly  dropping  shots  his  battalions  returned  in  vain. 
The  Prussians  fell  thick  and  fast,  until  Lannes  observ 
ing  his  foe  already  shaken,  and  having  placed  his  col 
umns  so  as  to  seize  readily  each  point  of  vantage 
offered  by  the  ground,  threw  them  on  swiftly  to  the 
attack.  Before  the  Prussian  lines  could  change  front, 
they  found  the  enemy  penetrating  between  them  and 
gaining  their  unprotected  flanks.  In  vain  did  Louis 
ride  from  side  to  side  encouraging  his  men  ;  in  vain 
did  he  try  too  late  to  use  the  slow  infantry  of  the  line 
to  support  his  few  riflemen  against  the  skirmishers 
whose  fire  was  mowing  down  his  close  formation.  In 
an  hour  from  the  time  of  the  attack  his  force  was  in 
flight,  and  he  himself  lay  weltering  in  his  blood  in  the 
track  of  the  fugitives,  cut  down  by  a  French  sergeant 
after  a  brief  summons  to  surrender,  a  vain  sacrifice  to 
the  long-cherished  notion  of  the  invincibility  of  the 
tactics  of  a  by-gone  age. 

Such,  though  in  lesser  detail,  was  the  first  irrtelli- 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     247 

gence  from  the  field  of  war  that  rang  through  Prussia. 
Then  came  the  fearful  news  of  the  defeats  of  Jena  and 
Auerstadt.  The  army  had  been  all  but  destroyed, 
three  of  the  four  chiefs  taken  or  slain,  the  king  was  in 
hasty  flight.  The  defeat  by  Bernadotte  of  the  last  re 
serves  upon  the  Saal  soon  followed,  the  investment  of 
Magdeburg,  the  defection  of  the  Saxons,  the  fall  of 
Berlin,  the  capture  of  Bliicher  and  his  flying  cavalry. 
The  evil  now  thickened  day  by  day,  and  accusations  of 
rashness,  of  treachery,  of  imbecility,  of  cowardice,  were 
repeated  whenever  civilians  spoke  of  the  once  admired 
national  army.  At  Konigsberg,  and  wherever  the 
German  Sclavonic  elements  had  met  closely,  there  was 
a  sudden  division  of  sentiment  and  separation  of  soci 
ety.  The  Polish  fellow-students  of  Brandt  had  natu 
rally  but  little  sympathy  for  the  sufferings  of  Prussia. 
They  felt  not  the  shame  of  her  defeats  ;  they  looked 
with  curious  and  not  unfriendly  eyes  to  the  great  con 
queror  who  already  turned  his  arms  towards  their  en 
slaved  country.  After  the  first  positive  news  of  the 
course  of  the  campaign,  they  withdrew  from  mixing 
with  the  Germans,  and  forgetting  their  former  assump 
tion  of  Teutonism,  called  themselves  Poles  or  Lithua 
nians.  Even  the  students  from  Dantsic,  Brandt  tells 
us,  kept  apart  from  the  genuine  Prussians,  among  whom 
the  misfortunes  of  their  country  awoke  a  warlike  spirit 
which  foreshadowed  the  glorious  rising  of  1813.  All 
were  crying  out  for  arms  ;  and  when  a  royal  aide-de 
camp  reached  the  city  with  orders  to  form  new  corps 
of  provisional  battalions,  a  crowd  of  well-born  young 
men  came  forward  to  offer  their  services.  Brandt  was 
one  of  those  accepted  for  an  ensign's  duty  in  one  of 
eighteen  battalions  to  be  raised  in  East  Prussia,  the 


248  HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

ranks  of  which  were  to  be  filled  by  conscripts  or  dis 
charged  soldiers  called  back  to  service.  Little  but  mis 
ery  could  be  expected  in  such  quarters  as  he  no\v  found 
himself,  placed  in  a  semi-Polish  village  for  winter  train 
ing,  under  a  government  whose  warlike  means  were 
exhausted  or  in  the  enemy's  hands,  and  with  small 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  most  of  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  profession  they  had  suddenly  adopted.  Cold, 
dirt,  and  scanty  rations  were  the  chief  features  of  the 
life  of  the  new  ensign  and  his  brother-soldiers,  and  the 
only  military  necessary  of  which  there  was  abundance 
was  the  drill,  which  went  on  unceasingly.  The  training 
was  at  first  by  companies,  but  these  were  soon  formed 
into  battalions,  and  the  latter  before  long  were  com 
pleted  and  tolerably  instructed.  Probably  the  Prus 
sian  Government  had  not  the  means  of  putting  them 
into  the  field,  for  through  the  long  spring  of  1807  they 
were  left  unemployed,  not  without  murmuring  on  the 
part  of  the  officers,  who  envied  the  brave  deeds  of  their 
comrades  at  Eylau,  and  believed  that  a  reinforcement 
to  Lestocq's  corps  before  the  battle  might  have  made 
of  the  indecisive  struggle  a  glorious  victory.  Young 
Brandt  meanwhile  did  not  waste  his  leisure,  but  gave 
his  spare  hours  to  the  study  of  the  small  library  he  had 
brought  with  him,  and  almost  learnt  by  heart  Caesar's 
"  Commentaries,"  the  "  Seven  Years  War,"  and  Vol 
taire's  "  Charles  XII.,"  in  the  intervals  of  drill,  finding 
this  easier,  he  frankly  says,  than  to  command  his  squad 
with  the  full  confidence  necessary  in  an  inefficient  offi 
cer.  At  length  an  order  reached  the  battalion  to 
march  upon  Tilsit,  which  was  received  with  joy  until 
news  came  of  the  cause.  Prussia's  hitherto  faithful 
ally,  the  Czar  Alexander,  had  seen  his  chosen  general 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     249 

Benningsen  throw  away  the  whole  advantage  of  a  long 
and  able  defensive  campaign  by  the  one  morning  of 
rashness  that  brought  on  the  battle  of  Friedland. 
Hoping  vainly  to  surprise  a  French  detachment,  he 
risked  an  army,  inferior  in  numbers  and  less  easily 
moved  than  the  French,  in  face  of  the  enemy  and  with 
a  deep  river  in  its  rear.  Napoleon  seized  on  his  ad 
vantage  with  a  readiness  worthy  of  his  young  days  of 
Italy,  and  the  victory  which  followed,  though  more 
easily  won  than  those  of  Marengo  and  Austerlitz,  was 
as  striking  and  decisive  as  either.  Russia  abandoned 
her  ally  a  few  days  later,  and  the  victor  w^as  able  to 
dictate  his  own  terms  to  the  prostrate  monarchy  of  the 
Hohenzollerns.  Prussia  came  out  of  the  struggle  shorn 
of  half  her  territories,  and  a  mere  helpless  vassal  of  the 
French  Empire.  Among  her  losses  were  the  recent 
acquisitions  of  Polish  soil,  and  her  boundaries  were  so 
freely  clipped  to  make  the  new  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
formidable,  that  some  hundreds  of  thousands  of  pure 
Germans  were  transferred  to  the  latter,  and  became  in 
all  but  name,  subjects  of  France.  Among  those  thus 
abruptly  handed  over  was  the  family  of  Brandt,  and 
the  young  ensign  was  ordered  forthwith  to  lay  aside 
his  Prussian  commission  and  repair  to  his  home.  His 
discharge  bore  on  its  face  the  official  endorsement  of 
its  purpose,  being  "  granted  in  order  not  to  withdraw 
the  bearer  from  the  service  of  the  new  authorities  of 
his  country." 

Following  out  the  instructions  handed  him,  the 
ex-ensign  made  his  way  to  Warsaw  and  presenting  him 
self  to  the  commandant,  was  sent  on  to  appear  person 
ally  before  Davoust,  who  held  a  sway,  almost  absolute 
at  that  period  of  military  rule,  over  the  newly-formed 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

Grand  Duchy,  of  which  he  was  Governor-General.    The 
young  Prussian,  after  some  waiting,  was  ushered  sud 
denly  into  the  presence   of  the   redoubtable   marshal. 
He  found  leaning  against  a  door-post  a  middle-sized, 
strongly-built  man,  somewhat  under  forty  years  old,  of 
stern,  hard  features  and  thoroughly  military  bearing, 
dressed  in  a  simple  uniform,  with  jack-boots  and  a  plain 
officer's   sword,  his   rank  being  denoted  only  by  the 
silver  baton  embroidered  on  his  epaulets.     "  You  are 
from  the  Memel,"  he  asked,  at  once  of  Brandt ;  "  did 
you  see  the  Queen  there  ?  "     "  Yes,  your  Excellency,  I 
saw  her  but  the  day  before  I  came  away."     "  Was  she 
in  trouble  ?     Did  she  look  sorrowful  ?  "  were  the   next 
questions   put    rapidly  by  the  interrogator.     "  I   only 
saw   her   walking    on    the  beach  with  the  .two  eldest 
princes,"  was  the  reply,  which  produced  a  sharp  *'  An 
swer  me  my  question  ;  did  she  look  as  if  she  were  in 
trouble  ?  "     "  Yes,  indeed,"  replied  Brandt  more  boldly  ; 
"  and  she  had  good  cause,  for  they  have  taken  half  his 
country  away  from  the  King."     "  And  whose  fault  is 
that  ?  "    went  xon    the  marshal,  without  showing  any 
anger    at  the  Prussian  sympathies  of  his  hearer,  but 
seeking  apparently  to  work  up  his  own  feelings  of  hos 
tility  to  the  injured  royal  house  ;  "  was  it  not  she  who 
forced  the  poor  King  into  danger?     Did. not  she   com 
pel    him    to   throw  down  the  glove  to  the  Emperor  ? 
Was  not  she  herself  at  Jena,  haranguing  the  regiments 
in  uniform  ?     But  for  her  intrigues  and  the  bluster  of 
the  officers  of  the   guard,  the   King  would  have   now 
been    in    alliance   with   us,  and    the  monarchy  of  the 
Great  Frederic  not  have  been  dashed  to  pieces.     How 
ever,"    he    suddenly  added,  recollecting  himself,  "  all 
this  is  no  business  of  yours.     Go  back  to  your  own 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     251 

home,  and  be  henceforward  a  faithful  subject  of  your 
new  lord." 

Brandt  went,  but  only  to  find  that   all  the  comfort 
and  prosperity  of  his  father's  house  was   destroyed  by 
the  waste  of  war.     The  exactions  of  the   French  com 
missariat  had  almost  ruined  his  own  family,  while  all 
around  them  there  reigned  the  confusion  of  revolution, 
for  the  Prussian  functionaries  had  been  removed   and 
their  places  were  not  yet  supplied.     Feeling  his  pres 
ence  at  home  to  be  but  an  additional  burden  on  means 
already  overtaxed,  and  burning  to  put  his   lately  ac 
quired    knowledge   to   some    use,  Brandt    resolved,  in 
spite  of  Davoust's  warning,  to  seek  entrance  once  more 
into    the   Prussian  army.     His  father  had   once   been 
acquainted  with  Bliicher,  who  was  at  that  time  stationed 
near  the  Polish  frontier  of  Prvssia  ;  and  armed   with  a 
letter  to  the  veteran,  even  then  a  distinguished  officer, 
young    Brandt    made  his  way  to   his   quarters.     The 
general  read  carelessly  the   introduction  handed  him, 
and  roughly  told  the  applicant  that  he   knew  already 
of  too  many  in  the  same  case,  and   could  do   nothing 
for    him.     The     coarse,     sharp    manner    with    which 
Brandt's    suit    was    rejected,  struck  him  all  the  more 
after  a  visit  made  on  quitting  Bliicher  to  the  heroic  and 
ill-fated    Schill,    whose    personal    courage    and    warm 
patriotism  had  made  him  known  in   Prussia  far  better 
than    most    officers  of  higher  rank.     He  had  already 
come  to  be  looked  upon  by  many  as  the  future  cham 
pion  of  their  suffering  country,  and  Brandt's  friends  had 
advised  him  to  try  what  an  interview  there  would  do 
for  him  in  case  he  failed  to  find  aid  in  Bliicher.     SchilJ, 
though  already  the  centre  of  a  movement   which  gave 
birth    afterwards    to    the    famous    Tugcudbund,  could 


252  HENR  Y  VON  BRA  ND  T, 

promise  nothing  for  the  young  man  who  sought  his 
interest ;  but  his  manner  was  in  pleasing  contrast  to 
that  of  the  old  general,  and  the  writer  pays  our  nation 
the  compliment  of  finding  no  word  so  suited  to  express 
his  admiration  of  it,  as  that  of  gentlemanlike,  borrowed 
into  his  text  from  our  tongue. 

Heart-sick  with  disappointments  and  weary  with  his 
journey,  Brandt  once  more  gained  the  Polish  town  of 
Sochaczew,  near  which  his  parents  lived.  He  found 
here  an  ex-Prussian  officer  and  friend  of  his  father's 
who  had  been  appointed  to  the  nominal  command 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  making  him  responsible  for 
the  supplies  of  a  French  division  which  was  in  camp 
not  far  off.  French  officials  in  the  characters  of  town- 
major  and  government  secretary  ruled  the  district 
through  the  Commandant,  and  led  the  the  poor  man, 
who  knew  but  little  of  their  tongue,  a  life  of  misery  ; 
while  he  dared  not  resign  his  post  for  fear  some  suc 
cessor  should  be  appointed,  less  reluctant  than  himself 
to  spare  the  inhabitants  as  much  as  possible  from  fur 
ther  exactions.  Brandt  offered  his  assistance  in  the 
Commandant's  office,  and  was  gladly  accepted,  being 
appointed,  as  the  only  equivalent  his  friend  could  give 
to  the  rank  of  corporal  unattached.  Two  months  pass 
ed  away  in  this  fashion,  the  young  man's  zeal  and  at 
tention  making  him  more  and  more  useful,  when  there 
reached  the  place  a  Polish  major  employed  in  gather 
ing  recruits  for  the  troops  then  being  raised  for  French 
use  on  the  banks  of  the  Vistula.  He  applied  to  the 
Commandant  for  the  aid  of  a  temporary  adjutant,  and 
obtained  the  loan  of  the  services  of  young  Brandt,  who 
received  his  warm  thanks,  when  he  left  the  place  a  few 
days  later,  for  the  assiduity  and  activity  which  had 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     253 

enabled  him  to  finish  his  business  with  unhoped-for 
speed.  But  this  officer,  it  soon  appeared,  had  not  con 
tented  himself  with  empty  praise.  Though  he  had 
held  out  no  promise  of  helping  Brandt  to  a  better  po 
sition,  he  remembered  him  to  some  purpose  when  he 
reached  Warsaw.  Three  weeks  after  his  departure,  a 
French  gendarme  reached  the  Commandant's  office  at 
Sochaczew,  with  a  dispatch  addressed  to  "  M.  Brandt, 
late  ensign  in  the  Prussian  service."  Opening  it,  he 
found,  to  his  astonishment,  that  Marshal  Davoust  had 
appointed  him  sub-lieutenant  in  the  "  Legion  of  the 
Vistula,"  under  authority  granted  to  the  Governor- 
General  to  fill  up  the  vacant  commissions  in  the  new 
corps,  and  now  directed  him  to  proceed  to  the  depot 
of  the  regiment,  which  was  to  be  located  at  Sedan, 
then  an  almost  forgotten  fortress  left  far  within  the 
frontiers  of  the  new  Empire,  but  destined  to  a  sad 
'celebrity  in  later  days,  when  the  heritage  of  that  Em 
pire  should  be  dashed  to  pieces  before  its  walls.  The 
young  Prussian  was  too  well  trained  in  submission  to 
local  authority  and  too  desirous  of  employment  to  do 
more  than  cast  one  glance  of  regret  at  his  lost  chance 
of  fighting  for  his  native  country.  In  a  few  days  more 
he  was  on  his  march  through  it  with  500  Polish  recruits, 
and  ere  long,  traversing  the  great  road  by  which  Napo 
leon  was  to  flee  ruined  from  Leipsic  six  years  later, 
arrived  upon  the  Rhine  at  Mayence,  and  crossed  the 
river  into  France. 

Marching  in  that  country  he  found  more  pleasant 
than  in  Germany,  where  the  political  circumstances  of 
the  time  had  made  the  Poles  peculiarly  obnoxious. 
"  They  left  off  calling  us  barbarians,  and  rascally 
Chinese,"  he  says,  "  though  our  village  quarters  were 


254  HEATR  Y  VON  BRA  ND  T, 

still  rough  and  unpleasant  enough."  Arrived  at  Sedan, 
the  new  recruits  were  properly  shoed,  dressed,  and 
after  a  very  brief  delay,  ordered  forward  to  join  the 
armies  gathering  at  the  gate  of  the  Pyrenees.  Napo 
leon's  first  Spanish  adventure  had  disastrously  failed, 
through  the  incompetency  of  Dupont,  hitherto  a 
favorite  and  distinguished  general.  Europe  had  heard 
with  astonishment  of  20,000  disciplined  French  troops 
laying  down  their  arms  to  a  mere  mob  of  hasty  levies. 
All  Spain  had  risen.  English  gold  and  arms  were 
pouring  in  to  the  aid  of  the  insurgent  Juntas.  More 
over,  the  French  in  Portugal  had  been  completely 
defeated  about  the  same  time  by  a  young  British 
general,  one  Arthur  Wellesley,  hitherto  unknown  to 
European  fame,  and  had  evacuated  that  country  alto 
gether.  A  small  corner  only  of  the  Peninsula  was  left 
to  the  king  whom  Napoleon  had  named  to  the  throne 
of  which  he  had  laid  treacherous  hold,  under  guise  of 
friendly  intervention.  Europe  had  witnessed  the  new 
turn  of  events  with  astonishment,  and  there  were  not 
wanting  prophets  to  declare  that  the  hour  of  Napoleon's 
fall  was  near,  and  that  fortune  had  for  ever  abandoned 
the  man  who  had  used  her  favors  so  ill.  But  the  Em 
peror  took  better  measure  of  the  calibre  of  his  enemies 
and  the  immediate  circumstances  of  the  time,  and  pre 
pared  deliberately  to  enter  Spain  in  person  with  resist 
less  strength,  little  dreaming  of  the  tenacity  of  the 
national  resistance  which  was  before  him,  or  of  the 
fatal  wound  to  his  strength  which  "the  Spanish  ulcer" 
was  little  by  little  hereafter  to  inflict.  A  quarter  of  a 
million  soldiers  were  passing  the  Pyrenees  to  avenge 
the  disaster  of  Baylen,  and  among  them  young  Brandt, 
and  his  squad  of  Polish  recruits,  left  Bordeaux  after  a 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE. 

brief  halt  to  take  their  part  in  the  great  Peninsular 
campaign  of  the  autumn  of  1808.  He  had  time  to 
mark  the  true  Southern  looseness  of  manners  which 
showed  itself  in  forms  repulsive  to  his  stricter  senti 
ment,  as  his  detachment  made  its  last  marches  to  the 
Pyrenean  frontier  of  France  ;  to  observe  the  strange 
likeness  of  the  sandy  wastes  and  fir-clad  heaths  of  the 
Landes  to  the  Polish  plains  in  which  his  childhood  had 
been  passed  ;  to  gaze  wonderingly  at  the  building  at 
Bayonne,  where  the  Emperor  had  meditated  on  and 
fixed  the  fate  of  the  Spanish  princes  who  had  trusted 
themselves  to  his  keeping  ;  to  glance  at  the  baths  of 
Biarritz  lately  used  by  Napoleon  himself,  while  the 
cavalry  of  the  guard  formed  a  chain  of  videttes  from 
sea  to  sea,  circling  round  the  bathing-place  for  the 
protection  of  his  sacred  person  ;  to  call  up  to  memory 
the  mysterious  legends  of  the  stony  pass  of  Fuentera- 
bia  into  which  the  column  next  plunged ;  to  see  at 
every  stage  the  individuality  of  the  Polish  depot  melt 
ing  away  in  the  gathering  military  stream  in  which  it 
formed  but  a  drop  ;  and  so  the  young  subaltern  found 
himself  in  Spain,  marching  as  already  in  the  enemy's 
presence,  with  van  and  rear-guard,  and  side  patrols, 
searching  closely  every  lurking-place,  and  his  illusions 
as  to  the  romance  of  the  country  vanishing  as  the  prom 
ised  land  of  beauty  resolved  itself  into  a  succession  of 
paltry  villages  of  closely  fastened  houses,  tenanted 
chiefly  by  hideous  old  women,  with  here  and  there  a 
few  peasants,  dirty  and  degraded,  but  still  defiant  of  the 
invaders. 

Brandt's  first  Spanish  quarters  proved  more  agreea 
ble  than  the  outer  aspect  of  the  house,  a  close-barred 
decayed  mansion,  had  promised.  The  host,  a  genuine 


256  HENR  Y  VCN  BRA  ND  T, 

hidalgo  in  birth  and  manners,  did  his  best  to  converse 
with  his  unbidden  guests,  "  which,  as  he  did  not  under 
stand  either  French  or  German,  and  spoke  chiefly  on 
religious  subjects,"  was  not  at  first  an  easy  matter. 
Having  made  out  the  tenor  of  his  questions  to  concern 
the  faith  of  the  strangers,  Brandt  wrote  out  for  him  in 
Latin  the  Apostles'  Creed,  which  not  only  satisfied  the 
Spaniard  of  the  soundness  of  their  tenets,  but  led  to 
his  raking  up,  for  present  use,  the  stock  of  that  lan 
guage  he  had  brought  many  years  before  from  the 
University  of  Huesca,  where  he  had  studied  with  intent 
to  take  orders.  A  conversation  in  this  medium  follow 
ed,  turning  on  the  politics  of  the  crisis,  the  host  de 
clining  to  give  Napoleon  the  rank  of  "  Caesar"  or 
"  Imperator,"  and  allowing  him  no  more  honor  than 
was  implied  in  the  title  of  "  Supremus  Dux  Franco-Gal- 
lorum."  When,  on  further  questioning,  the  guest  de 
clared  himself  not  a  Catholic  but  a  Lutheran,  and  assur-j 
ed  the  host  that  in  Germany  people  of  the  two  churches 
could  meet  together,  live  together,  and  even  marry  one 
another,  the  good  Spaniard  declined  to  give  ear  to 
such  wondrous  stories,  but  declared  that  for  him  any 
one  who  used  the  Apostles'  Creed  was  a  good  Catholic 
and  no  heretic,  and  as  such  he  would  welcome  him.j 
"The  conversation,''  adds  the  memoir,  "affords  such 
an  excellent  illustration  of  the  state  of  the  land  in  which 
I  was  to  pass  the  next  few  years,  that  I  have  purposely^ 
dwelt  on  its  details."  The  next  stage  brought  him  to 
Pampeluna,  where  he  found  leisure  to  visit  the  \vorksjj 
of  the  citadel  and  examine  the  entrance  where  a  party 
of  French  soldiers,  from  an  encampment  outside,  had 
surprised  the  place  in  the  preceding  winter  under  cover 
of  a  pretended  snow-ball  match,  the  players  and  spec- 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE. 


257 


tators  having  their  arms  at  hand  in  a  bread-cart.  St. 
Sebastian  and  Barcelona,  with  other  lesser  places,  had 
been  occupied  in  a  like  treacherous  manner,  and  their 
seizure  by  a  pretended  ally,  according  to  our  writer, 
had  much  to  do  with  the  hatred  which  brought  on  the 
subsequent  insurrection. 

The   campaign    had    fairly    opened   when    Brandt 
reached  Pampeluna.     It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  fol 
low  out  in  detail  the  childish  strategy  with  which  the 
Spanish  leaders,  intoxicated   by  the  success  of  Baylen, 
sought  to  surround  and  cut  off  Napoleon's  concentrated 
masses.     Against  such  imbecility  the  Emperor  would 
have  triumphed  with  ease,  even  had  he   not   wielded 
jarmies  superior  in  numbers  as  well  as   training  to  the 
;  ill-organized  bodies  which   were  scattered  on  his  front 
jand  flanks.     An  English  reader  may  well  take  comfort 
in  the  thought  that  the  only  exception  to  the  faults  of 
Napoleon's  enemies  in  that   fatal  autumn,  was  the  gal 
lant  blow  by  which  Moore,  striking  on  the  conqueror's 
communications,  released  Madrid  fora  while  from  pres 
sure,  and  gave  the  remnant  of  the  Spanish  forces  time 
to   recover  from   their  first   disasters.     When    Brandt 
came  on  the  scene,  and  joined  his  regiment,  the  armies 
of  Estremadura  and  Galicia  had  been  already  scattered 
by   the  French,    and    Lannes   was    marching   against 
those  of  Andalusia  and   Arragon,  which   formed   the 
western  part  of  the  great  arc  which   the   Spanish  had 
I  formed  round  their  enemy.     Despite  the  misfortunes 
!  of  their  comrades,  the  two   commanders,  Castanas  and 
Palafox,  had  too   much  jealousy  or  over-confidence  to 
unite,  although  both  were  close  to  Tudela  and  within 
i  sight  of  each  other.     Lannes  paused,  according  to  his 
I  orders,  for  a  day  or  two,   to  give  Ney,  who   was  co-op- 


258  HENR  Y  VON  BRAND  T, 

crating  to  the   westward,   time  to  cut  the   foe  off  from 
Madrid,  and  then  moved  his  columns  against  them.     He 
was  suffering  at  the   time  from   a   severe  accident,  yet 
exerted  himself  personally   to  reconnoitre  the  Spanish 
positions,   and   discovered   the  two  armies  just  so  far 
apart  as  to  give  him  the  opportunity,  which  he  eagerly 
seized,  of  beating  them  in  detail.     Turning  first  against 
Palafox,  whose  troops  were   drawn  up  in  a  line  so  long 
as  to  be  far  beyond   their  commander's  power  to  ma 
noeuvre,  he  rapidly  attacked  the  Spanish  centre  with  the 
division  of  Mathieu,   supported  by  the  brigade  of  Ha- 
bert,  of  which    Brandt's   regiment   formed  part.     The 
Spanish   regiments   menaced   gave    way  at  once,   and 
Lannes  pouring  his  cavalry  through  the  opening,  the 
whole  army  of  Arragon   was   soon  in  ignominious  con 
fusion    and    retreat.     Lannes    then  executed    a    rapid 
change  of  front  to  his  right  to  move  against  Castanos ; 
but  the  troops  of  the  latter  were  so  intimidated  by  the 
spectacle  of  the   defeat    of  their  comrades,  that  they 
moved  off  without  even  waiting  to  receive  the  attack, 
bringing  on  their  commander  by  this  conduct  the  vul 
gar  charge  of  treason,  with   which  the  generals  of  rev 
olutionary   armies    are  for  ever  assailed  when  unsuc 
cessful.     Brandt  relates  but  briefly  the  events  of  this 
important   day,  in  which  the    imaginary   strength   of 
Spain  finally  collapsed  ;  and  his  account  of  it  is  chiefly 
given    from    notes    made    long   after,    partaking    thus 
rather  of  the    historical  than  the   personal  view.     In 
fact,  his  own  battalion  being  held  in  reserve,  never  ap 
proached  the  enemy  at  all,  and  but  that  a  cannon-shot 
or  two  went  over  his  head,  he  could  with  difficulty  believe 
he  had  shared  in  the  great  action,  in  which  the  enemy 
left  behind  them  4,000  killed  (including  many  drowned 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  7 "HE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     2$() 

in  the  attempt  to   escape   over  the   Ebro)  and  thirty 
uns.     The  whole   event  seemed  like  a  dream  to  the 
young   subaltern,  who   never    saw    the   Spaniards   dis 
tinctly,    and    though   continually  advancing    with   his 
egiment,  only  heard  the  shots  getting  more  and  more 
aint  in  the  distance,  as  the  retreat  changed  into  rapid 
d    unresisting    flight.     His   corps,   the  third,   which 
ad    done    most  of  the  work,  had  apparently    reason 
nough  to  despise  their  adversaries  ;  but  were  soon  to 
earn  the  old  lesson,  that  troops  contemptible  in   the 
eld,  may  yet  fight   desperately  under  cover.     The  re- 
jmains  of  Palafox's  army  sought  refuge  in  Saragossa, 
ind  recovering  heart  when   they  found  themselves  un- 
Dursued  by  Moncey  (who  now  commanded  in  Lannes' 
:>lace),  prepared  for  that  defence  which   has  made  the 
:ity  for  ever  famous  in  the  history  of  patriotism.     Mon- 
:ey  was  thought  but  poorly  of  by  his  soldiers,  who  from 
:he  first  instinctively  felt  him  to  be  but  a  slow  and  fee- 
Die  successor  to   the  brilliant   victor   of  Tudela.     Al- 
:hough  the  battle  was  won  on  November  twenty-third, 
lot  two  days'   march   from  Saragossa,  it  was  a  week 
Defore   the   French   commander  came   in  sight  of  the 
:ity ;  and   when   fairly  before   it,    want    of  means,  or 
pread  of  repeating  the  failure  made  earlier  in  the  war, 
held  him  back  from  any  attempt  to  take  the  place  by 
a   coup-de-main  :  nor  was  it  until  he  had  received    a 
fegular  park  of  heavy  guns,  and  been  reinforced  by  the 
whole  corps  of  Mortier,  that  he  commenced,  about  the 
middle  of  December,  after   several  vain  summonses  ,to 
Palafox,  the  first  operations  of  the  memorable  siege. 

The  story  of  that  heroic  struggle  has  never  been  so 
agreeably  told  as  in  the  memoirs  of  the  young  German 
whose  career  we  are  following.  Brandt  was,  indeed, 


26o  HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

unfortunate  enough  to  be  detached  at  its  opening  to 
Alagon,  where  the  hospitals  of  the  army  had  been 
opened  after  the  late  victory,  and  to  fall  ill  of  an  in- 
fectious  fever  which  was  fatal  to  hundreds  of  the 
wounded  soldiers  whose  lives  the  Spanish  bullets  would 
have  spared.  But  after  looking  closely  at  death  in  c 
form  more  frightful  to  the  soldier  than  the  worst  to  be 
met  on  a  battle-field,  after  wandering  from  his  quarten 
in  a  delirium,  and  unconsciously  taking  possession  of  c 
bed  in  a  ward  full  of  dying  privates,  the  young  Prussiar 
fell  into  the  hands  of  a  rough  but  kind-hearted  docto] 
of  his  own  regiment,  and  speedily  recovered.  In  Janu 
ary  he  was  again  at  the  camp,  and  soon  afterward' 
ready  to  take  his  turn  of  the  most  severe  duty  thai 
subaltern  was  ever  taxed  with  ;  for  Grandjean's  divisior 
(to  which  Habert's  brigade  belonged)  was  charged  wit* 
the  principal  attack,  and  no  regiments  were  more  dis 
tinguished  than  those  of  the  Vistula  Legion,  whose 
chief,  Colonel  Chlopicki,  here  first  earned  the  higl 
name  which  he  kept  to  the  end  of  his  career. 

Brandt  found  his  battalion  regularly  quartered  witl 
others  in  some  former  gardens  of  the  suburbs.  The 
field  officers  and  staff  were,  for  the  most  part,  housec 
in  the  ruins  of  some  sheltered  building;  but  the  bull 
of  officers  and  men  alike  were  living  in  narrow  excava- 
tions  covered  over  with  earth  laid  on  branches,  anc 
supplied  with  slender  rations,  eked  out  chiefly  by  fooc 
purchased  from  certain  adventurous  suttlers  of  the 
French  side  of  the  Pyrenees,  who  had  swarmed  acros; 
the  mountains — the  roads  into  France  being  then  toler 
ably  safe — to  trade  on  the  wants  of  their  countrymen 
The  soldiers  would  in  general  have  been  poor  custom 
ers,  but  for  irregular  resources  not  recognized  in  the 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     26 1 


jS  mperial  pay-lists.  The  chief  of  these  during  the  early 
part  of  the  siege  was  the  plunder  of  the  pockets  of  the 
[Spaniards  slain  in  the  continuous  skirmishing  by  which 
?';he  French  carried  the  suburbs  and  olive-yards  around 
;he  city  after  a  contest  of  many  days.  At  that  time 
fche  defenders  were  frequently  more  numerous  than  the 
•issailants,  and  among  them  were  a  large  proportion  of 
patriotic  volunteers  who  had  flocked  into  Saragossa 
i  rom  the  country,  bringing  all  their  little  worldly  wealth 
ppon  their  persons.  There  were  in  Brandt's  regiment 
nany  gamekeepers  and  foresters  from  the  woods  of 
East  Prussia,  accustomed  to  shoot  from  their  youth, 
jvho  found  the  prospect  of  such  human  quarry  so  much 
:o  their  taste,  that  they  were  never  so  pleased,  during 
his  part  of  the  siege,  as  when  it  fell  to  the  turn  of  their 
Battalion  to  furnish  pickets  for  the  front. 

The  work  became  closer  and  more  serious  about 
he  time  that  Brandt  resumed  duty.  Under  the  guid- 
ince  of  a  veteran  sergeant  who  had  fought  in  former 
lays  in  Italy,  Austria,  and  Poland,  he  learned  ail  the 
Hysterics  of  loopholing  to  advantage,  so  as  to  keep 
lis  own  men  under  cover,  at  the  same  time,  as  far  as 
possible,  observing  the  enemy.  Attacks  now  went  on 
anceasingly,  and  before  long  the  besiegers  made  good 
i  lodgement  in  the  city:  but  their  real  work  still  re 
named  to  be  done,  for  Saragossa  was  crowded  with 
riassive  stone  buildings,  convents  for  the  most  part, 
vith  walls  of  such  portentous  thickness  as  to  make  of 
-ach  a  separate  fortalice  ;  while  the  narrow,  devious 
»treets  were  so  wholly  commanded  by  the  windows  or 
oopholed  openings  used  by  the  defenders,  that  they 
were  almost  useless  for  purposes  of  approach.  The 
French  were  reduced  to  winning  their  way  to  the  heart 


262  HENRY  VON  BRANDT 

of  the  place  by  the  slow  process  of  mine  and  sap,  vari( 
by  sharp  assaults  upon  the  strong  buildings  successive 
breached  by  their  explosions,  and  in  each  case  obs' 
nately  defended.  Thus  week  passed  after  week,  \vi' 
constant  losses,  frequent  displays  of  individual  heroisi 
and  a  regular  though  often  very  slow  advance  ;  f 
Lannes  had  returned  to  take  command  of  the  arm 
and  his  energetic  spirit  breathed  itself  through  all  belc 
him.  Lacoste,  the  general  of  engineers,  who  hi 
become  known  in  person  to  every  soldier  of  the  attac 
ing  force,  fell  a  sacrifice  to  a  needless  exposure  of  h 
person  on  a  subaltern's  duty ;  but  Rogniat,  in  lat 
days  the  severest  critic  of  his  imperial  master's  methc 
of  war,  took  up  the  work  with  zeal,  and  it  went  forwai 
steadily,  each  lodgement  in  a  building  newly  gainc 
being  thoroughly  strengthened  by  Lannes'  own  orde 
before  a  new  one  was  made  :  until,  on  the  eighteenl 
of  February,  the  University  buildings,  which  cor 
manded  the  junction  of  the  two  principal  streets,  ar 
had  resisted  all  attempts  at  assaults,  were  blown 
with  1,500  Ibs.  of  powder,  and  the  column  of  attac 
that  followed  the  explosion  safely  lodged  within.  P£ 
afox  then  at  once  wisely  treated,  and  three  days  afte 
wards  the  remains  of  his  once  formidable  garrisc 
defiled  before  the  French  army  and  laid  down  the 
weapons.  The  imperial  soldiers  viewed  with  son 
indignation  the  cortege  of  about  10,000  ill-clad  irreg 
lars  who  appeared.  Their  ranks  were  full  of  gra; 
bearded  men  and  lads,  their  discipline  was  nomine 
their  uniform  for  the  most  part  confined,  except  for  tl 
officers,  to  a  gray  cloak  and  red  cockade,  these  vo 
unteers  being  clad  otherwise  just  as  they  had  left  the 
distant  homes,  in  peasants'  or  artisans'  dress.  Tl 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     263 

7rench  soldiers  murmured  audibly  that  they  should  be 

drawn  up  in  parade  order  to  receive  so  mean  a  set  of 
)risoners  ;  but  the  Spaniards  (our  writer  judges)  looked 

on  their  defenders  with  very  different  eyes,  and  the 
pirit  of  earnest  resistance  which  began  at  Saragossa 
dndled  at  every  opening,  and  made  the  subjugation  of 
he  Ebro  provinces  the  hardest  task  a  French  marshal 

ever  accomplished. 

There  is  nothing  novel  in  the  admiration  extorted 
rom  Brandt  by  the  obstinacy  of  the  defence  ;  but  he 
>hows  us  that  there  is  another  less  popular  but  equally 
rue  side  to  the  story  of  Saragossa,  which  is  that  the 
•esistance  made  by  Palafox  reflects  not  less  credit  to 
hose  who  had  to  overcome  it,  and  involved  losses  to 
he  gallant  Spaniards  out  of  all  proportion  to  their 

number.  The  glory,  he  says,  which  the  world  has 
>estowed  upon  the  latter,  should  by  right  belong  first 
o  their  conquerors.  Deducting  the  divisions  detached 


o  watch  against  attempts  made   to  relieve  the  place, 
Cannes  had  but  about  15,000  men  available  for  the  ac- 
ual  attack.     Of  these  nearly  a  third  succumbed  to  the 
:nemy's  fire,  or  the  more    dreaded  typhus  ;  but    they 
managed  to  hold  within  their  works  a  fighting  force 
stimated  at  the  outset  at  30,000  soldiers  and  irregulars, 
and  to  destroy  or  take  the  whole.     The  service  was 
naturally  unpopular  as  well  as  severe.     "  Why  did  not 
fall  at  Eylau  or   Friedland,"  said   a   dying  officer  of 
renadiers  to  Brandt,  "  where  we  were  fighting  against 
worthy  enemy?''     It   was  only  the  devotion   of  the 
ligher  staff  which  maintained  in  the  soldiers  for  weary 
nonths  the  necessary  zeal  and  fire.     Brandt  himself  on 
various  occasions  saw  not  only  his  brigadier,  Habert, 
%  but  Junot  and  Lannes,  take  up  a  musket  in  the  trenches, 


264  HENRY  VON  BRANDT 

and  exchange  shots  with  the  enemy's  marksmen.  Th( 
latter  exposed  himself  repeatedly  like  the  meanest  sol 
dier,  and  on  one  occasion  Brandt  watched  him  con 
tinuing  to  fire,  until  the  enemy,  annoyed  at  the  persis 
tence  of  the  unknown  skirmisher,  deliberately  trainee 
a  howitzer  on  the  portion  of  parapet  behind  which  he 
stood,  the  first  shell  from  which  killed  a  captain  of 
engineers  at  the  marshal's  side.  Junot  was  more  reck 
less  still  than  his  chief,  fully  justifying  his  reputation 
won  at  Toulon,  where  he  first  owed  Napoleon's  notice 
to  this  quality  of  daring.  He  delighted  apparently  in 
sitting  coolly  under  a  hot  fire,  discussing  the  proceed 
ings  around  him  in  rough  soldier's  phrase  with  any  one 
who  was  near  ;  and  it  was  after  such  a  conversation,  at 
a  time  of  special  danger,  that  Brandt  heard  a  veteran 
major  near  him  grumble  forth,  "  Is  it  possible  that  this 
man,  who  is  so  hopelessly  mad,  can  be  kept  at  the  head 
of  an  Army  Corps  ?  " 

At  times  it  needed  something  more  than  cool  con 
duct  towards  the  enemy  to  preserve  the  sway  of  these 
rough  leaders  over  the  rougher  elements  they  ruled. 
General  Habert,  a  tall,  powerful  man,  a  type  of  the 
coarse  but  daring  officer  of  the  Republican  era,  was 
stooping  one  day  to  gain  cover  as  he  passed  along  a 
trench  by  a  party  of  recruits  who  had  just  joined  one 
of  his  French  regiments.  "  Ha  !  your  generals  are  afraid 
sometimes,  then,"  cried  one  of  the  coarse  jesters  who 
are  to  be  found  in  every  company  of  common  soldiers. 
Foaming  with  sudden  anger,  the  brigadier  turned  upon 
the  daring  speaker,  seized  him  by  the  collar,  and  pull 
ing  him  out  of  his  cover,  held  him  on  the  top  of  the 
parapet,  standing  himself  by  his  side.  A  volley  was 
poured  on  them  at  once  by  the  enemy,  and  the 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE. 


265 


unhappy  joker  fell  dead,  while  the  general  escaped  with 
a  slight  flesh  wound  in  the  arm.  "  It  serves  the  con 
script  right,"  was  the  only  comment  made  by  the  com 
rades  of  the  slain  soldier,  "  for  speaking  like  that 
of  such  a  general  as  ours."  And  to  the  end  of  the 
siege,  the  brigadier,  despite  other  outbreaks  of  vio 
lence,  was  as  popular  as  ever  with  those  whose  perils 
he  shared. 

For  some  months  after  the  fall  of  Saragossa  the 
campaign  in  Arragon  languished.  General  Habert 
was  unfortunate  enough  to  fail — thanks  partly  to  his 
own  fierce  temper — in  the  only  operation  of  importance 
entrusted  to  his  brigade  ;  and  the  failure  was  a  signifi 
cant  proof  of  the  difficulties  nature  had  placed  in  the 
wray  of  the  conquest  of  that  rugged  country.  The 
general  was  engaged  in  crossing  the  Cinca  river,  which 
he  had  approached  by  a  forced  march,  and  hurrying 
on  the  passage  of  the  advance  guard  of  his  brigade  in 
the  only  two  skiffs  available,  when  he  was  interrupted 
by  one  of  the  boatmen,  who  was  seen  by  Brandt  to 
rush  up  and  hastily  accost  him,  as  though  remonstra 
ting  at  the  continuance  of  the  attempt.  The  Spaniard 
was  repelled  with  a  loud  curse,  accompanied  by  a  kick, 
for  his  interference,  and  the  passage  went  on  for  a 
brief  space,  until  the  eight  flank  companies  of  the  bri 
gade  and  a  small  detachment  of  horse  were  safely 
across.  Then  the  wisdom  of  the  warning  became 
apparent.  The  river  suddenly  rose,  as  the  boatman 
had  predicted,  and  poured  down  its  bed  in  a  few  sec 
onds  in  a  raging  torrent,  which  at  once  forbade  all 
thoughts  of  further  crossing.  The  companies  already 
sent  over  were  cut  off  from  the  bulk  of  the  force,  and 
the  noise  of  the  stream  prevented  all  attempts  at  com- 


266  HENRY  VON  BRANDT 

municating  with  them.  The  flood  showing  no  signs 
of  abating,  and  no  orders  from  their  chief  being  likely 
to  reach  them,  they  were  seen  to  move  off,  and  disap 
peared  from  the  sight  of  their  comrades,  no  one  knew 
whither,  while  General  Habert,  after  vainly  trying  to 
pass  at  other  points,  and  waiting  the  whole  day  in 
hopes  of  communicating  with  them,  returned  the  next 
morning  to  Barbastro,  from  which  he  had  marched. 
Two  days  later  the  lost  cavalry  suddenly  appeared, 
but  only  to  bring  the  ill  news  that  the  whole  of  the 
infantry  that  had  passed,  the  picked  troops  of  the  bri 
gade,  had  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Their  senior 
officer  had  formed  the  idea,  on  discovering  his  isolated 
condition,  that  his  safest  course  was  to  march  due  east 
ward  through  the  Pyrenees  into  France ;  but  the 
Spanish  garrison  of  Lerida,  with  the  aid  of  the  gueril 
las  who  swarmed  in  that  district,  had  headed  his 
column  off  on  every  side,  until,  worn  out  with  fatigue 
and  hunger,  it  had  been  compelled  to  surrender.  Ha 
bert,  who  had  forced  them  into  peril,  and  been  unable 
to  devise  means  for  their  succour,  was  in  despair  over 
the  loss  of  his  favorite  companies.  The  rough  soldier 
was  seen  to  burst  into  tears,  exclaiming  frantically, 
"  Oh  !  mcs  pauvres  grenadiers  !  mes  braves  voltigeurs  !  " 
with  genuine  self-reproach  for  his  own  want  of  precau 
tion.  Suchet  has  not  omitted  to  note  the  disaster  in 
his  memoirs,  nor  to  remark  that  for  ages  this  river 
Cinca  had  been  noted  for  the  sudden  and  dangerous 
floods  which  sweep  down  its  bed  from  the  mountains 
without  warning. 

This  failure,  and  some  others  less  important,  had 
seriously  depressed  the  spirits  of  the  third  corps,  which 
ha4  been  left  under  Junqt  after  Saragossa.  fell ;  but  the 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     26/ 

advent  of  Suchet,  who  was  appointed  to  the  command 
in  the  summer  of  1809,  soon  worked  a  wondrous  change. 
Then  was  seen  to  the  full  how  completely,  in  time  of 
active  service,  the  character  of  a  chief  is  infused  through 
the  army  placed  under  him,  and  influences  even  its  low 
est  ranks.  The  new  general  won  the  respect  of  his 
troops  at  once  by  the  practical  skill  \vith  which  he  ex 
amined  their  appointments  in  his  first  inspection,  and 
their  affection  by  the  praise  he  bestowed  freely  where 
officers  and  men  deserved  it.  Each  private  felt  from 
that  time  that  he  had  over  him  a  general  who  cared 
honestly  for  his  wants,  and  exacted  from  him  no  un 
necessary  toil,  though  the  enemy  were  to  feel  his  activ 
ity  against  them  to  be  unsparing  when  activity  was  of 
service.  Discipline  was  rigidly  enforced,  and  the 
country  people  so  fully  protected  from  all  individual 
exaction,  that  Brandt  tells  us  of  a  soldier  being  sent 
before  a  court-martial  for  robbing  a  peasant  of  a  few 
eggs.  Hence  trade  forthwith  resumed  its  natural 
course  wherever  not  interrupted  by  the  guerillas  and 
the  presence  of  these  became  more  dreaded  than  that 
of  a  French  garrison.  The  regular  taxes,  aided  by 
forced  rations  for  troops  on  the  march,  sufficed  for  the 
fair  wants  of  the  army,  and  supplied  means  for  the 
series  of  operations  which  the  new  chief  soon  began, 
and  which  was  continued,  with  almost  unvaried  success, 
until  his  sway  was  extended  over  a  third  of  Spain.  In 
these  campaigns,  of  which  Suchet  himself  has  ably 
written,  Brandt  shared  to  the  full.  The  young  Prus 
sian  subaltern  came  to  be  personally  known  to  the 
marshal ;  had  the  command  throughout  the  years 
1810-11  of  a  picked  company  of  skirmishers;  and  saw 
Blake's  army  driven  out  of  the  field,  shut  up  in  Valen- 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

cia,  and  finally  forced  to  surrender  to  a  force  but  very 
little  exceeding  its  own  numbers.  Two  years  and  a 
half  had  then  passed  by  in  the  operations  which  caused 
Napoleon  to  declare  Suchet  the  best  general  he  pos 
sessed,  and  which  left  the  marshal,  at  the  opening  of 
1812,  in  almost  undisturbed  possession  of  all  that  part 
of  Spain  which  Wellington's  operations  could  not  reach. 
Brandt  judges  Suchet  rather  to  have  been  a  man  of 
exceeding  energy  in  action  and  carefulness  in  prepara 
tion,  than  a  soldier  of  great  genius.  He  lived  with 
remarkable  simplicity  even  when  ruling  absolutely  three 
large  provinces ;  and  although  his  wife  was  w7ith  him 
whenever  he  halted,  his  table  was  invariably  of  the 
plainest  description.  "  Vegetables  of  the  country  and 
the  inevitable  mutton  cutlet,  the  whole  consumed  in  a 
quarter  of  an  hour,"  formed  the  simple  entertainment, 
at«which  Brandt,  in  his  capacity  of  officer  on  guard  at 
headquarters,  was  often  present.  He  had  gained  the 
marshal's  confidence  by  this  time  very  specially  for 
one  of  his  rank,  and  had  received  from  him  the  Cross 
of  the  Legion  of  Honor  after  a  second  wound,  with  a 
promise  of  promotion,  which  however  accident  with 
held  from  him  for  some  time  after.  He  was  therefore 
but  little  surprised  when  sent  for  by  his  chief,  and  told 
that  he  was  selected  to  escort  the  captive  Spanish  gen 
eral  on  the  first  stages  of  his  journey  towards  France. 
At  this  his  last  interview  with  his  renowned  leader, 
Brandt  could  observe  plainly  a  depression  ill  correspond 
ing  to  the  recent  triumph  that  had  rewarded  such  long 
toils,  and  believed  it  to  be  the  consequence  of  the  news 
which  had  just  reached  the  army  of  a  fresh  outbreak 
of  the  insurrectionary  spirit  of  Arragon,  extending  to 
the  very  gates  of  Saragossa.  Possibly  the  marshal,  in 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     269 

the  midst  of  his  successes,  foresaw  the  day  when  the 
faults  of  others  would  undo  all  the  advantages  he  had 
won  for  France,  and  force  her  to  abandon  his  hardly- 
won  conquests.  "  Marmont  calls  him  a  mediocre  officer 
• — not  one  of  those  special  men  who  grow  greater  with 
danger,"  observes  our  writer  justly  ;  "  but  for  all  that 
he  was  the  only  French  general  in  Spain  who  uniform 
ly  succeeded  in  all  his  undertakings."  The  marshal 
gave  his  instructions  as  to  Blake  in  the  few  significant 
words,  "Treat  him  like  a  Commander-in-chief,  but 
watch  him  as  you  would  a  rascal ;  "  renewed  his  prom 
ise  of  obtaining  Brandt  his  early  promotion,  and  dis 
missed  him  to  his  new  duty  with  the  kindly  expressed 
hope  of  seeing  him  soon  again  in  Valencia — a  hope 
not  destined  to  fulfilment,  for  the  young  lieutenant  was 
never  again  to  meet  the  chief  under  whose  teaching 
he  had  been  trained  into  a  practised  soldier. 

The  escort  set  out  on  its  way,  and  Brandt,  before 
his  task  was  ended,  found  good  reason  to  remember  the 
marshal's  caution.  The  frontier  of  the  province  of 
Valencia  had  not  long  been  passed  when  he  found  him 
self  compelled  to  halt  at  Uldecona,  a  small  place  which 
had  been  vacated  for  some  reason  by  the  French  gar 
rison.  This  being  the  first  time  he  had  been  com 
pelled  to  trust  to  his  own  detachment  for  security 
through  the  night,  and  the  vicinity  being  thickly 
wooded,  he  spent  the  evening  in  placing  his  posts  so 
carefully  as  if  possible  to  guard  against  surprise  from 
without  or  escape  from  within.  Some  steps  from  the 
balcony  of  General  Blake's  chamber  led  direct  into  the 
garden,  and  near  this  point  the  anxious  lieutenant  not 
only  placed  a  special  post,  but  visited  it  repeatedly 
after  darkness  came  on.  It  was  an  hour  after  midnight 


270  HENR  Y   VON  BRA  ND  T, 

that  he  was  thus  inspecting  his  watch,  when  he  heard  a 
door  open  quietly  on  the  balcony,  and  saw  the  general 
appear  full  dressed.  Finding  himself  however  observ 
ed  by  Brandt,  who  now  ascended  from  below,  the 
Spaniard  asked  who  was  there,  and  receiving  the  reply, 
"  The  commander  of  your  Excellency's  guard,"  retired 
either  disconcerted  from  his  attempt  or  annoyed  at  the 
appearance  of  suspicion.  Although  the  exercise  of  this 
vigilance  by  Suchet's  orders  towards  a  high  officer  on 
his  parole  might  seem  at  first  unjustifiable,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  Generals  O'Donoghue  and  Renovales 
had  just  before  disappeared  from  similar  custody,  vio 
lating  their  words  of  honor  under  pretence  that  these 
were  made  void  by  a  guerilla  attack  upon  their  escort. 

Next  day  the  party  arrived  at  Tortosa,  but  on  the 
way  were  joined  by  a  Colonel  Pepe,  a  Neapolitan  in 
the  French  service,  who  had  been  appointed  to  con 
duct  the  Spanish  commander  thence  into  France. 
Blake  having  complained  to  Pepe  of  the  surveillance 
under  which  he  had  been  placed  the  night  before,  the 
colonel  took,  or  pretended  to  take,  the  captive's  part, 
and  reproached  Brandt  roundly  even  threatening  to 
report  him,  although  the  latter  showed  that  he  had  but 
carried  out  Suchet's  orders.  The  subaltern  was  not 
sorry  when  a  slight  return  of  an  old  fever  came  on  him 
at  Tortosa,  and  gave  a  fair  excuse  of  his  leaving  his 
detachment  for  the  time,  and  with  it  the  obnoxious 
duty.  This  was  his  last  employment  in  Spain  ;  for 
making  his  way  on  recovery  to  his  battalion,  he  found 
it  under  sudden  orders  for  France  with  the  rest  of  the. 
Vistula  Legion.  The  spring  of  1812,  had  now  set  in. 
Napoleon's  gigantic  scheme  for  completing  the  subju 
gation  of  continental  Europe  was  about  to  be  put  in 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     07 1 

execution  ;  and  Polish  troops  could  least  of  all  be 
spared  from  this  greater  design  to  share  any  longer  in 
the  Spanish  struggle  which  he  deemed  of  such  minor 
importance.  Yet  Wellington  had  now  wrested  Portu 
gal  a  second  time  from  the  grasp  of  the  Imperial 
Eagles,  and,  firmly  established  on  its  strong  eastern 
frontier,  was  preparing  to  pierce  the  barrier  of  fortress 
es  which  separated  him  from  Spain,  and  to  win  fresh 
triumphs  from  the  divided  armies  of  Joseph  in  the 
new  year's  campaign.  The  spring  was  to  give  him 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajos ;  the  summer  to  behold 
him  scattering  in  rout  the  army  of  Napoleon's  favorite 
marshal  at  Salamanca ;  the  autumn  to  find  the  French 
authority  tottering  throughout  the  Peninsula  in  every 
province  save  those  held  by  Suchet.  But  this  year, 
destined  to  be  so  fatal  to  his  armies  in  Spain,  was 
selected  by  the  Emperor  for  throwing  the  bulk  of  his 
forces  to  the  very  opposite  extremity  of  Europe,  thus 
leaving  his  brother's  marshals  wholly  beyond  reach  of 
succor,  if  fortune  should  declare  itself  for  the  patient 
and  watchful  enemy  who  had  just  baffled  them  in  Por 
tugal.  Such  rashness  was  not  unnoticed  by  those  in 
the  French  army  to  whom  a  long  course  of  training 
under  the  Eagles  had  left  an  independent  thought. 
Murmurs  were  audible  among  the  officers  ordered  from 
Spain,  and  the  thoughts  of  many  were  put  into  plain 
words  by  Chlopicki,  the  favorite  chief  of  the  Polish 
Legion,  whose  saying,  "  Our  good  Napoleon  has  light 
ed  his  candle  at  both  ends,  and  will  be  burning  his 
fingers  very  soon,"  expressed  pithily  the  doubts  of  the 
hour,  and  reads  now  with  all  the  force  of  fulfilled 
prophecy. 

Although  expecting  soon  to  revisit  their  own  coun- 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

try,  and  possibly  to  assist  in  restoring  her  past  glories, 
the  Polish  soldiery  had  many  regrets  in  leaving  Spain. 
Hard  as  their  service  had  been  (for  Suchet's  campaigns 
were  in  fact  a  series  of  sieges,  varied  by  marches  and 
combats),  it  had  had  its  alleviations.  The  character  of 
the  commander  had  caused  his  troops  to  be  everywhere 
respected.  Except  where  the  professional  guerillas, 
little  better  often  than  bandits  on  a  grand  scale,  held 
sway  over  a  district,  Suchet's  forces  had  of  late  met 
with  but  little  of  that  persistent  hostility  with  which 
the  French  had  to  struggle  in  other  parts  of  Spain. 
They  had  advanced  gradually  in  the  career  of  conquest 
from  the  rugged  districts  of  Arragon  and  Catalonia  into 
the  smiling  plains  of  Valencia,  which  Brandt  declares 
to  have  struck  him  as  worthy  of  the  Spanish  saying 
which  makes  of  them  "a  Paradise,"  though  he  will  not 
admit  that  the  violent  passions  of  the  natives,  though 
remarkable  enough  even  in  Spain,  deserve  the  qualifica 
tion  which  the  proverb  adds,  "  peopled  with  devils." 
The  rough  Polish  soldiery  fully  appreciated  the  produc 
tiveness,  if  not  the  scenery,  of  their  late  quarters,  and 
a  veteran  sergeant,  as  he  turned  his  back  on  the  last 
view  of  the  district,  was  heard  to  declare,  what  was  no 
uncommon  sentiment,  "  One  can  live  better  there  by 
soldiering  than  by  hard  work  in  our  country  ;  "  words 
which  clothe  with  reality  the  old  tale  of  the  avidity 
with  which  the  barbarian  invaders  of  the  Roman  Em 
pire  poured  down  upon  the  sunny  lands  of  Southern 
Europe. 

Brandt  himself  had  his  personal  regrets  as  he  turned 
his  face  towards  the  Pyrenees.  The  mountains  shut 
from  the  young  man's  gaze  a  spot  to  him  sacred,  which 
he  was  never  more  to  revisit,  the  small  town  of  Cata- 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     273 

layud,  where,  two  years  before,  he  had  passed  through 
what  he  terms  the  "  Idyll  of  my  Life,"  an  innocent 
love  passage  with  the  young  ex-novice.  All  the  senti 
ment  of  a  true  German  lover  is  poured  forth  in  his 
description  of  his  short  acquaintance  with  the  fair  Inez, 
whose  guardian,  a  hard  uncle  of  the  true  Spanish  type 
and  deep  hater  of  French  rule,  removed  her  suddenly 
from  the  place  during  one  of  the  absences  on  duty  of 
her  young  adorer.  Brandt  from  that  day  never  saw  nor 
heard  more  of  his  Inez.  Happy  for  them  both  as  he 
admits  this  separation  to  have  been  (since  there  could 
have  been  no  good  issue  to  such  an  attachment,  and  their 
one  hope,  to  escape  from  her  family  and  get  married 
in  France,  was  practically  a  dream),  yet  the  sorrow  of 
that  loss  he  declares  to  have  dwelt  with  him  through 
fifty  years  of  prosperous  after-life  and  a  long  and  happy 
marriage  with  one  of  his  own  rank  and  nation.  No 
other  love,  he  will  have  it,  is  so  deeply  tender  and 
unselfish  as  that  of  a  Spanish  maiden.;  and  in  reading 
his  picture  of  the  simple  grace  and  loveliness  of  the  fair 
girl  of  Catalayud,  one  may  realize  the  truth  and  beauty 
of  those  minor  romances  of  Cervantes,  which  are  so 
much  less  known  than  the  world-admired  u  Don 
Quixote,"  though  hardly  less  picturesque  or  less  illus 
trative  of  the  people  of  whom  he  wrote. 

Brandt  found  his  march  through  France,  when 
fairly  entered  on,  an  agreeable  change  enough.  The 
Poles  were  everywhere  looked  on  as  good  friends  and 
worthy  soldiers,  and  the  Cross  of  Honor,  borne  by  the 
young  sub-lieutenant,  attracted  constant  notice.  The 
decoration  was  in  those  days  not  easily  earned.  It 
was  something,  he  says,  that  men  turned  round  to  look 
at  ;  and  princes  would  do  well  to  remember  how  vastly 
18 


274  HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

the  indiscriminate  distribution  of  such  honors  de 
teriorates  their  practical  use  as  genuine  yet  cheap 
rewards  of  faithful  service.  Readers  of  the  "  Fezensac 
Souvenirs"  will  remember  how  rapidly  promotion  in 
the  Grand  Army  fell  upon  those  who  had  good  military 
connections.  It  speaks  volumes  for  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining  it  without  such  help  that  Brandt,  after  hav 
ing  been  chosen  before  the  enemy  for  the  command 
of  a  flank  company  (for  such,  with  its  full  complement 
of  officers  and  men,  his  charge  had  been),  leading  it 
constantly  in  a  succession  of  combats  and  sieges  for 
two  years,  and  winning  favorable  notice  and  special 
military  honors  from  a  marshal  of  France,  yet  left 
Spain  still  a  sub-lieutenant,  though  he  was  soon,  as  we 
shall  see,  to  receive  his  long  promised  step.  The 
Legion  marched  leisurely  at  first,  but  was  hurried  for 
ward  through  Central  France,  and  at  Montlieu  the 
commanding  officers  of  battalions  received  sudden 
orders  to  send  their  men  forward  in  country  carts. 
The  account  of  the  whole  march  speaks  ill  enough  for 
the  internal  discipline  under  pressure  of  the  Imperial 
regiments.  The  colonel  was  never  seen  by  the  men ; 
the  battalion  leaders  only  appeared  now  and  then, 
instead  of  sharing  the  march  step  by  step  ;  and  when 
the  carts  were  provided,  for  want  of  any  proper  super 
vision,  parties  were  allowed  to  fill  each  and  drive  off 
just  as  they  chose,  and  to  straggle  at  night  from  their 
already  dispersed  quarters.  It  was  not  surprising  that 
from  three  to  four  hundred  men  were  absent  when  the 
Legion  mustered  at  Versailles,  many  of  whom  did  not 
rejoin  their  standards  until  the  regiment  was  marching 
from  Paris  some  days  later. 

On  March  twenty-second,  1812,  the  Legion  entered 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     2?$ 

the  capital,  and  as  it  stood  waiting  for  orders  on  the 
Place  Vendome,  Brandt  heard  his  name  called  out, 
and  saw  his  colonel  holding  a  paper,  which  proved  to 
be  his  long-expected  brevet  of  lieutenant.  It  was 
dated  on  March  twenty-fifth,  1812,  an  obvious  mistake 
as  he  judged,  for  that  day  year  had  been  the  date 
from  \vhi,ch  Suchet  had  recommended  him,  as  that  on 
which  he  had  specially  distinguished  himself  by  sup 
pressing  with  his  company  a  serious  emeute  in  the  bat 
talion  against  an  unpopular  major.  Moreover,  the 
commission  was  a  duplicate  copy,  and  the  original 
had  of  course  been  sent  to  his  late  headquarters  in 
Spain.  But  before  Brandt  had  had  full  time  to  dis 
cover  the  mistake,  much  less  to  take  steps  to  have  it 
rectified,  he  was  on  his  way  to  Russia,  where  the  rav 
ages  of  the  dreadful  campaign  that  followed  were  to 
give  him  further  well-earned  promotion.  He  was  yet 
therefore  in  the  first  flush  of  unalloyed  pleasure  when 
the  regiment  was  ordered  to  move  on  to  the  Tuileries, 
and  making  its  way  with  difficulty  through  the  crowd 
of  vehicles  which  even  in  those  days  choked  the  Rue 
St.-Honore,  turned  into  the  Place  du  Carrousel,  where 
the  Emperor  was  in  the  act  of  reviewing  a  large  mass 
of  troops.  There  was  little  attempt  at  show ;  the 
divisions  were  drawn  up  in  column  ;  and  the  Polish 
Legion  took  the  place  assigned  to  it  near  the  Guard 
in  a  very  confused  state,  for  it  was  only  by  degrees 
that  its  ranks  were  brought  out  of  the  disorder  caused 
by  hurrying  through  the  crowded  streets.  But  the 
purpose  of  the  day  was  not  mere  parade,  nor  even  the 
evolutions  with  which  commanders  of  peace  armies  are 
wont  to  act  dramas  hardly  possible  in  war.  The  troops 
had  been  summoned  together  for  the  special  object, 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

more  important  than  these  in  Napoleon's  eye,  of  bring 
ing  his  own  person  into  that  familiar  contact  with  his 
soldiery  which  he  had  long  proved  a  most  powerful 
means  of  calling  forth  their  ardor  at  the  commence 
ment  of  some  great  undertaking.  The  Polish  Legion 
waited  its  turn  for  inspection  patiently,  while  above 
them  in  a  gallery  a  party  of  gaily-dressed  spectators 
made  comments  on  the  scene  below.  Among  them 
one  gentleman  was  conspicuous  for  the  marked  indif 
ference  with  which  he  turned  his  back  on  the  review, 
while  keeping  up  a  lively  conversation  with  the  ladies 
he  accompanied  ;  and  some  of  Brandt's  Polish  com 
rades  recognized  by  his  uniform  the  Russian  ambas 
sador,  not  yet  dismissed  from  the  Court  already  openly 
hostile  to  his  master.  In  fact,  that  last  exchange  of 
diplomatic  forms  was  still  in  progress,  by  which  great 
nations  bent  on  war  strive  to  hide  from  the  world  their 
willingness  to  enter  on  the  contest,  and  to  throw  on 
their  opponents  as  much  as  possible  the  responsibility 
of  the  evils  which  it  must  needs  bring  in  its  train. 

A  half-hour  or  more  had  thus  passed,  when  a  sud 
den  call  from  their  commander  brought  the  Legion  to 
attention  ;  and  in  a  few  minutes  more  the  historic  form, 
which  was  recognized  by  all  as  soon  as  seen,  approach 
ed  the  head  of  the  regiment.  The  Emperor  was  on 
foot,  with  but  a  few  attendants ;  and  among  them  were 
Chlopicki,  some  time  since  made  general,  and  one  or 
two  other  well-known  Polish  officers,  to  whom  he  first 
expressed  his  general  satisfaction  with  the  conduct  of 
the  Legion.  Then  he  walked  slowly  down  the  side 
of  the  column,  and,  stopping  suddenly  every  now  and 
then,  interrogated  the  oldest  looking  captain  as  to  his 
exact  country  and  length  of  service,  inquired  the 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE. 

cause  of  the  absence  of  another  whose  place  with  his 
company  was  filled  by  a  junior  officer,  asked  Brandt 
himself  sharply  how  often  he  had  been  wounded  to  get 
that  cross,  and,  satisfied  with  the  reply,  added,  "You 
are  young  enough  still ;  you  will  be  a  captain  in  good 
time."     Then  he  pulled  from  a  private's  haversack  a 
piece  of  his  morning's  ration  of  bread  which  was  pro 
jecting,  tasted  it,  and  with  an  emphatic   "  Pas  mal" 
passed  on.     His  eye  falling  next  on  a  man  of  the  light 
company   who  was   exceptionably  obese,  he  told  the 
Polish  general  to  question  him  as  to  where  he  had  con 
trived  to  get  so  fat,  and  having  the  answer  re-transla 
ted,  "  Since  I  got  back  to  France,"  ordered  him  to  be 
told,  "  You  are  quite  right  to  take  good  care  of  your 
self   now ;  you  may   be    obliged  to  fast  by-and-bye. " 
Passing  on,  the  Emperor  indicated  one  or  two  men  to 
be  called  out  and    show    their    packs    and    cartridge- 
boxes,  and   expressing  his  satisfaction   with   the  con 
dition  of  these,  told  them  to  fall  in  again.     Had   he 
unrolled  the  great-coats,  Brandt  adds,  he  might  have 
seen  that  they  were  in  a  miserable  condition,  the  hasty 
march  of  seventeen  days  which  had  brought  the  regi 
ment  to  Paris  having  ruined  those  which  the  Spanish 
bivouacs    had  spared  ;  but  this  discovery  was   spared 
the  colonel,  whom  Napoleon  complimented  by  declar 
ing  loudly  that  his  regiment  did  not  the  least  show  the 
effects  of  the  hard  campaign  it   had  just  shared.     Be 
fore  passing  from  it,  he  selected  a  veteran  sergeant  out 
of  those  he  saw  decorated  with  the  Polish  medal  (the 
ordinary  reward   of  good  conduct   in  the  Legion)   to 
question  him   publicly  as  to  his  services,  and   finding 
him  to  have  been  five  times  in  the  list  of  the  wounded, 
ordered  him   the   coveted   distinction   of  the  Cross  of 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

Honor.  This  last  stroke  done,  he  left  the  regiment, 
telling  the  colonel  to  express  officially  for  him  his 
pleasure  at  its  condition.  That  afternoon  at  their 
quarters  an  order  was  read  out,  conferring  a  number 
of  decorations  on  officers  and  men,  those  of  the  former 
carrying  the  title  of  Knight  of  the  Empire  and  pen 
sions  varying  from  500  to  3,000  francs.  The  payment 
of  these,  however,  was  not  charged  upon  the  military 
chest  which  the  Emperor  watched  so  closely,  but  on 
certain  taxes  on  the  trade  of  the  Rhine,  or  on  the 
newly  conquered  districts  of  Valencia.  Prize-agents 
forthwith  appeared,  who  in  those  days  made  a  regular 
traffic  of  buying  up  such  donations;  and  the  officers 
who  had  the  Rhenish  pensions  found  no  difficulty  in 
obtaining  advances :  but  even  Suchet's  successes  had 
not  made  Spanish  securities  marketable,  and  the  few 
recipients  who  lived  through  the  coming  campaign 
found  the  value  of  the  Valencian  grants  limited  to  the 
accompanying  title  of  Chevalier. 

Brandt,  with  about  five  thousand  other  officers,  was 
that  night  invited  to  a  huge  banquet  to  be  given  by 
the  Emperor,  at  which,  however,  the  Imperial  presence 
was  represented  vicariously  by  Marshal  Bessieres.  The 
scene  was  confusing  enough,  and  seemed  suited  rather 
to  the  headquarters  of  a  conquering  army  than  to  an 
emperor's  court.  Loud  bands,  rough  soldier  waiters, 
and  coarse  crockery,  all  strangely  smacking  of  the 
canteen,  were  intermingled  with  choice  wines  and 
viands  of  true  Parisian  excellence.  The  music  of  the 
instruments,  and  the  clatter  of  the  French  voices  (none 
but  Frenchmen  could  be  heard,  says  Brandt,  in  such 
a  din)  ceased  for  a  few  seconds  after  the  meal  was 
over,  and  a  loud  Vive  /'  Empereur  to  the  single  toast 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     2/9 

of  the  night  resounded  through  the  building.  Then 
the  assembly  dispersed  through  the  city  to  seek 
amusement  elsewhere.  Brandt  and  his  party  found 
places  at  the  theatre,  where  the  QEdipus  Coloneus  was 
performed  in  a  French  dress  ;  but,  except  the  acting 
of  Talma  (which  was  well  suited  to  the  tragic  part  of 
Sophocles's  unhappy  hero),  the  taste  of  the  young 
Prussian,  trained  to  the  classic  original  in  his  student 
days,  found  the  whole  representation  unreal  and  almost 
grotesque. 

A  long  inspection  by  Marmont,  who  had  not  yet 
left  Paris  for  the  duel  with  Wellington  which  was  to 
ruin  his  rising  fame,  occupied  the  next  morning,  the 
whole  interior  economy  of  the  regiment  being  looked 
into  by  the  marshal  in  his  capacity  as  Inspector-Gen 
eral  of  Reviews.  Then  followed  hasty  visits  to  the 
chief  sights  of  Paris,  among  which  it  is  strange  to  note 
that,  despite  the  presence  of  Imperialism  which  perva 
ded  the  atmosphere,  the  death-place  of  the  slaughtered 
D'Enghien  was  especially  sought  out  by  curious  Polish 
and  German  eyes,  and  its  site  found  to  be  already  made 
a  show-place.  Three  days  later,  the  regiment  was  on 
its  march  to  Sedan,  where  its  depot  had  been  stationed 
ever  since  the  Legion  was  raised.  One  only  of  the 
four  brother  officers  who  had  left  the  place  for  Bor 
deaux  with  Brandt  four  years  before,  came  back  to  it 
again,  so  severe  had  been  the  demands  of  the  Spanish 
war.  The  regiment  was  now,  with  some  others  of  the 
Legion,  assigned  to  a  newly  formed  division,  and  the 
Emperor  lost  all  the  popularity  he  had  gained  among 
them  on  his  late  inspection,  when  the  Poles  heard  that 
their  beloved  chief  Chlopicki  had  been  passed  over  in 
favor  of  a  French  general,  Claparede,  one  noted  too  for 


2 SO  HENRY  VON  BRANDT, 

an  overbearing  brutality  of  manner,  uncommon  even 
in  those  of  the  rough  school  of  the  Revolutionary 
armies  in  which  he  had  been  trained.  "  We  shall  find 
him,"  said  the  old  adjutant-major,  "  a  very  unpleasant 
comrade,  a  perfect  roaring  lion,  seeking  whom  he  may 
devour  ;  "  while  another  officer  bitterly  remarked  that 
Napoleon  \vas  imitating  with  the  Polish  Legion  what 
the  allies  had  done  with  their  country,  Poland  ;  tearing 
it  in  pieces,  and  distributing  it  out  to  foreigners.  The 
soldiers  were  as  little  pleased  as  their  officers,  nor  had 
they  as  solid  consolation  as  the  latter,  who,  on  the 
same  day  that  gave  them  their  new  commander,  receiv 
ed  through  him  the  Imperial  order  for  the  instant 
formation  of  the  skeleton  of  a  third  battalion  to  the 
regiment,  an  order  repeated  throughout  the  Legion. 

This  augmentation  of  the  strength  of  the  corps  was 
carried  out  with  the  celerity  which  probably  in  no 
other  service  but  that  of  Napoleon  has  ever  been  at 
tained  consistently  with  the  least  approach  to  efficiency. 
The  promotion  of  all  the  junior  ranks  was  made  over 
to  the  colonel,  who  forthwith  told  off  a  sub-lieutenant 
to  take  temporary  charge  of  each  of  the  new  compa 
nies,  whose  commission  as  lieutenant  was  to  follow  as 
matter  of  course.  Similarly  a  non-commissioned  officer 
was  selected  for  each  to  act  as  sub-lieutenant,  to  be 
confirmed  in  the  rank  after  a  short  trial.  The  higher 
commissions,  however,  were  reserved,  and  Brandt 
found  himself  for  the  present  in  command  of  the  new 
light  company,  composed,  besides  its  three  officers,  of 
a  few  picked  corporals,  and  some  recruits  from  the 
depot.  A  few  hours  later,  he  had  drawn  up  his  charge 
for  Claparede's  inspection,  and  had  to  face  the  sneer 
with  which  his  new  general  expressed  his  doubts 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     28l 

whether  so  young  a  man  could  really  have  deserved 
the  decorations  he  bore.  A  warm  retort  from  the  lieu 
tenant,  declaring  that  he  had  won  what  he  wore  under 
Marshal  Suchet's  own  eyes,  produced  no  more  apology 
than  the  coarse  advice,  "  Don't  get  hot  about  it, 
Mister  Officer  ;  "  but  the  rest  of  the  inspection  went  on 
quietly  enough ;  and  as  the  new  battalion  marched 
early  next  morning  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  regi 
ment,  Brandt  was  for  the  time  freed  from  any  disagree 
able  consequence  of  the  collision.  Claparede's  conduct 
it  may  be  observed,  at  the  head  of  the  division,  fully 
justified  the  reports  that  had  been  heard  of  his  charac 
ter  ;  but  his  brutal  severity  fell  oftener  during  the 
campaign  upon  luckless  peasants  and  others  who  came 
by  chance  within  his  grasp  than  upon  his  own  soldiery. 
It  is  in  time  of  peace,  or  in  the  comparative  leisure  of 
a  garrison,  that  the  exactions  of  the  martinet  press 
most  odiously  on  those  he  commands.  On  the  march 
or  before  the  enemy,  there  is  less  opportunity  for  the 
exercise  of  petty  tyranny ;  and  soldiers  will  then  forgive 
much  that  would  be  obnoxious  within  the  barrack- 
walls  in  a  general  who  shows  himself  fertile  in  resource 
and  fearless  in  peril  in  the  field. 

In  joining  his  new  battalion  Brandt  had  parted 
from  the  more  educated  part  of  his  comrades,  and  so 
found  little  companionship  in  what  would  have  been 
otherwise  a  most  interesting  journey  to  one  whose  rec 
ords  at  every  step  show  him  to  have  been  an  intellec 
tual  observer  of  scenery  and  manners.  At  Metz,  how 
ever,  he  was  fortunate  in  a  fleeting  acquaintance  with  a 
young  artillery  officer,  who  escorted  him  over  the  works 
of  the  great  fortress,  and  in  whom  modesty  and  knowl 
edge  seemed,  his  German  listener  thought,  strangely 


2g2  HENR  Y  VON  BRA  ND  T, 

mingled  for  one  just  emerged  from  cadethood,  and 
joining  the  most  renowned  and  successful  army  the 
world  had  ever  seen.  The  controversy  not  yet  wholly 
settled  in  our  own  country  as  to  the  value  of  practical 
or  theoretical  training  for  officers,  even  then  occupied 
men's  minds  in  some  degree  ;  for  Brandt's  new  friend 
lamented  the  length  of  the  time  he  had  been  compelled 
to  pass  in  studying  exact  sciences,  as  so  much  deduct 
ed  from  that  in  which  he  might  have  been  traversing 
the  world  with  his  regiment,  and  perhaps  witnessing, 
instead  of  reading  of,  deeds  of  arms.  The  young  men 
parted  next  day,  but  they  were  destined  to  meet  once 
again.  In  the  crisis  of  the  great  battle  of  Borodino, 
when  Brandt's  division  was  ordered  to  hold  the  great 
redoubt  just  carried  from  the  Russians,  it  was  flanked 
by  a  battery  of  artillery  which  had  lost  all  its  officers 
but  one  young  subaltern,  whose  valor  and  exertions 
awoke  admiring  comment  from  Berthier,  Davoust,  and 
the  Viceroy  Eugene,  who  were  all  near  the  scene,  and 
opposite  the  Russian  centre.  Seeing  him  suddenly 
struck  by  a  cannon-shot  towards  the  close  of  the  fight, 
the  Viceroy  desired  Brandt  to  take  a  surgeon  to  the 
spot,  and  in  the  dying  youth,  who  was  fearfully  man 
gled,  our  writer  recognized  the  newly-commissioned 
artillerist  of  Metz,  and  thought  sadly  of  the  aspirations 
for  real  service  which  were  so  soon  to  be  fatally  real 
ized. 

The  Legion  recrossed  the  Rhine,  marching  stead 
ily  eastward.  The  smiling  plains  of  Saxony  and  the 
rougher  districts  of  Silesia  were  passed  in  turn;  Brandt 
giving  his  few  leisure  hours  to  the  study  of  a  Russian 
grammar  which  he  had  bought  upon  the  way.  The 
roads  grew  sandier  and  heavier  as  the  Oder  was  ap- 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     283 

preached,  until  the  march  was  so  toilsome  that  wagons 
were  furnished,  contrary  to  the  usual  practice,  to  carry 
the  knapsacks  and  rations,  so  that  the  soldiers  should 
be  weighted  with  nothing  but  their  arms.     The  villages 
now  grew   dirtier  and  more   poverty-stricken  at  every 
stage,  until  the  German  frontier  was  fairly  passed,  and 
the  Poles  found  themselves  once   more  in  their  own 
country  under  the  shadow  of  the  White  Eagle,  which 
everywhere   marked   the  spurious  sovereignty  of  that 
hybrid   creation,  neither   province    nor   kingdom,  the 
Grand    Duchy   of    Warsaw.     French    protection    had 
indeed  done  little  for  the  physical  aspect  of  the  country. 
Focus  of  Napoleonic  intrigue,  debateable  land  between 
the  aggressive  Frank  and  unyielding  Muscovite,  Poland 
had  had  for  years  to  bear  much  of  the  pressure  of  war 
without    its    excitement    or  its    glories ;  and    now,  as 
forming  the  base  from  which  the  Grand  Army  was  to 
move  to  its  greatest  enterprise,  the  burden  lay  doubly 
heavy  upon  her.     Yet  no  one  complained  of  the  gov 
ernment,  or  threw   the  odium    of  crushed   trade    and 
exhausted   means    on    French    domination.     No    one 
expressed  a  wish  to  have  the  Prussian  rule  restored  in 
Posen.     No  one,  amid  all  the   poverty  and  misery  of 
the  land,  murmured  at  anything  more  than  the  general 
hardness  of  the  times.     The  Grand  Ducal  Government 
was  national  and  popular,  because  it  was  felt  to  sympa 
thize  with   its  subjects.     This  is  strange  testimony  to 
gather  from  a  Prussian  pen  ;  but  it  is  more  striking  still, 
and  may  bring  a  lesson  to  other  rulers   than  the  coun 
sellors  of  the  Hohenzollern,  to  find  from  such  unbiassed 
authority  that  the  reasons  of  this  strange  and  complete 
acquiescence  of  the  Poles  in  the  revolution  which  had 
overthrown  their  late  masters,  lay  in  the  intense  dislike 


284  HENRY  VOAT  BRANDT, 

entertained   towards  the  Prussian    officials,  with  their 
cold,  rigid  measurement  of  Polish  inferiority,  their  zeal 
for   forcing   improvements  and  education  of  a  strictly 
North-German    type    upon    a  country    unprepared    to 
receive  them — in  short,  what  Brandt,  seeking  for  a  single 
words,  terms    the    Borussomania,  which    had    led    his 
countrymen,  during  their  years  of  possession,  to   strive 
to  bring  the  whole  of  the  institutions  of  their  conquest 
into  the  exact  mould   of  their  own.     It  was  not  what 
Prussia  had  desired  to  do  for  Poland,  but  the  manner 
of  her  doing  it,  which  had  made  her  government  so 
obnoxious  that  amid  the  standing  exactions  caused  by 
protracted    preparations   for    war,  none   regretted  the 
change  of  rulers ;  none,  at  least,  except  the   few  who, 
like  Brandt's  own  family,  born  and  bred  Germans,  had 
settled  in  Posen,  and  thus  been  severed  by  the  political 
circumstances  of  the  time  from  the  land  which  still  held 
their  affections.     For  these  Prussian  settlers,  represent 
atives    of    the    Teutonic    civilization   which,  writh    the 
sword  in  one  hand  and  the  spade  in  the  other,  had  in  i 
the  struggle  of  long  centuries  been  winning  the  broad 
basin  of  the  Vistula  from  the  Pole,  now  suffered  no 
less  in  property  than  sentiment  by  the  conditions  of 
the  struggle  in  which  Napoleon  had  embarked.     "  You  . 
have  come  to  a  beggar's  house,"  was  Brandt's  father's  j 
salutation,  as   he  clasped  the  young  lieutenant  in  his 
arms  ;  and  their  greeting  was  not  ended  when  word  j 
was  brought  that  the  foragers  of  a  passing  French  col 
umn  were  taking  the  very  crop  off  the  ground  for  their 
horses.     "  What  am  I   to  do  ?  "  said  their  commander,  | 
in  answer  to  Brandt's  remonstrance.     "  I  will  give  the 
bons  "   (the  orders  for  repayment  of  the  supplies  by  the 
commissariat).     "  I    make    myself    responsible    to  the 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     285 

Emperor  for  all  I  take.  But  I  must  carry  out  my 
instructions,  and  collect  whatever  is  really  necessary  for 
my  party.  And  I  find  the  magazines  all  cleared 
already."  Empty  they  were,  indeed,  those  stores 
which  in  Brandt's  early  years  had  expanded  only  to 
grow  fuller  year  by  year.  Ney  and  his  whole  staff  had 
been  lodging  here  for  days  not  long  before.  The 
Crown  Prince  of  Wurtemburgand  his  retinue  had  suc 
ceeded  closely  the  marshal  and  his  attendants;  and 
the  roomy  mansion  was  no  sooner  freed  from  the 
pressure  of  this  uninvited  presence  of  royalty,  when  it 
became  the  quarters  of  a  battalion  of  French  infantry. 
Brandt's  visit  to  his  former  home  was  necessarily  short, 
and,  with  a  saddened  heart  and  much  anxiety  for  his 
parents'  future,  he  turned  his  back  on  Sochaczew,  and 
made  his  way  to  rejoin  his  battalion  near  Thorn. 

Early  experience  had  skilled  Brandt  in  his  present 
duty  of  training  Polish  recruits  rapidly  for  the  field. 
Supplies  of  the  necessary  clothing  and  arms  were  abun 
dant  and  freely  dispensed,  most  of  the  former  having 
been  prepared  near  the  frontier  ready  for  the  design 
which  Napoleon  had  framed  long  before.  Brandt  saw 
the  Emperor  but  once  at  this  period,  when  he  rode 
hastily  on  to  the  ground  at  the  close  of  a  brief  review 
held  for  him  by  Mortier,  and  called  sharply  for  the  pre 
fect  to  complain  of  the  youth  of  the  Polish  conscripts, 
adding,  "  Young  lads  do  nothing  but  keep  the  hospi 
tals  full" — words  which  he  must  have  had  a  hundred 
occasions  to  repeat  when  the  wild  enterprise  in  which 
he  was  embarking  had  left  him  to  struggle  during  the 
year  following  against  united  Europe  with  armies  built 
up  of  the  youthful  material  he  thought  so  ill  of. 

Anecdotes    of  the    Emperor's   sayings  and  doings 


286  HENR  Y  VON  BRAND  T, 

abounded  at  this  era  among  the  vivacious  Poles,  and 
circulated  freely  through  the  motley  force  which  was 
gathering  at  his  orders.  Brandt  repeats  as  one  of  the 
most  prominent  of  these  the  well-known  address  of 
Napoleon  to  the  Polish  deputies,  in  which  he  declared 
himself  that  in  place  of  court  dress  he  would  have 
desired  to  see  them  "  booted  and  spurred  like  their 
ancestors  in  presence  of  a  threatened  Tartar  invasion." 
This  story  has  been  often  told  before  ;  but  the  over 
bearing  manner  of  the  Emperor  to  his  allies  is  better 
illustrated  by  his  personal  treatment  of  certain  distin 
guished  individuals  who  attended  his  levees.  Among 
these  came  the  Count  Szoldrecki,  the  richest  land-owner 
of  Poland,  whose  name  Napoleon  mistaking  for  some 
manufacturer  of  whom  he  had  heard,  addressed  him 
with  the  abrupt  interrogatory,  "  How  many  hands  do 
you  employ  in  your  works?"  Receiving  no  reply  from 
the  puzzled  nobleman,  he  added  sharply,  "  You  own 
porcelain  factories,  do  you  not?"  and  when  the  pre 
fect,  horrified  at  the  mistake,  whispered  who  the  Count 
really  was,  his  questioner,  far  from  apologizing,  merely 
turned  away  with  an  "Ah!  cest  tr'ts-bien"  and  spoke 
to  the  next  comer.  So  at  a  special  reception  of  the 
Polish  ladies,  he  addressed  to  a  young  noble-woman  of 
rather  gross  proportions  the  startling  words,  "  How 
many  children  have  you?"  "None,  sire,"  was  the 
reply.  "  What,  then,  are  you  a  divorcee  ?  "  "  I  am 
not  married  at  all,"  said  the  lady.  "•  Better  not  take 
long  in  choosing  ;  you  have  not  much  time  to  lose," 
was  the  gallant  reply  which  closed  the  conversation. 
There  were  even  severer  stories  than  these  afloat ;  and 
Brandt  meeting  an  old  friend  who  moved  in  the  best 
Warsaw  society,  heard  that  the  impression  made  by 


A  GERMAN  SOLDJER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     28/ 

Napoleon  was  of  the  most  unpleasant  character.  "  His 
manners  are  thought  bad,  his  voice  sharp  and  creaking, 
his  address  imperious  and  overbearing."  There  was 
current  at  this  time  everywhere  an  epigram  on  the  new 
ruler  of  Poland  by  a  nobleman  who  had  been  well 
known  for  his  intimacy  with  the  former  king,  Stanislaus, 
and  who  gave  his  verdict  on  the  head  of  the  newly 
revived  Court  in  the  sententious  Latin  words,  Nee 
affabilis,  nee  amabilis,  nee  adibilis.  In  fact,  the  singular 
elevation  which  Napoleon  had  reached,  his  sense  of  the 
enormous  means  of  offence  he  wielded,  the  servility  of 
the  vassal  princes  who  obeyed  his  edicts,  had  altogether 
blinded  his  eyes  to  the  insecurity  of  his  position.  The 
muttered  threats  of  hatred  and  vengeance  which  had 
followed  his  triumphal  progress  through  Europe  were 
unheard  by  its  dictator.  The  growing  dimensions  of 
the  Spanish  war  which  threatened  his  rear,  the  activity 
of  the  Tugendbund,vr\i\c\\.  spread  its  ramifications  across 
(the  vast  territory  that  lay  between  him  and  his  faithful 
[France,  was  unknown  or  unheeded.  Even  in  Poland 
pis  policy  was  suspected,  and  the  strength  which  that 
Kill  powerful  country  might  have  put  forth  against  his 
enemies,  lay  dormant  because  he  lacked  the  political 
courage  to  promise,  as  the  price  of  victory,  her  longed- 
for  independence.  To  pledge  himself  to  this,  it  is  true, 
might  have  cost  him  the  half-hearted  support  of  an 
illy;  but  the  secresy  with  which  he  preferred  to  veil 
lis  future  policy  was  sufficiently  alarming  to  Austria  to 
Drevent  her  from  exerting  herself  heartily  for  the  over- 

hrow  of  Russian  power,  while  it  checked  the  beating 
:>f  the  national  pulse  of  Poland,  and  made  the  enter- 

Drise  seem  to  be  for  the  aggrandisement  of  an  individ 
ual  rather  than  the  liberation  of  a  people.  The  most 


2gg  HENRY  VON  BRANDT 

eminent  of  the  many  writers  who  servilely  worship 
Napoleon's  genius  as  a  chief,  has  pointed  out,  in  an 
eloquent  passage  of  "  The  Consulate  and  Empire," 
that  this  political  error,  at  the  very  crisis  of  his  for 
tunes,  was  an  irremediable  misfortune  to  his  cause. 
It  has  been  said  of  late  that  he  lost  his  last  campaign 
mainly  for  want  of  boldness  and  decision.  The  histo 
rian  who  cannot  credit  his  idol's  having  in  the  least 
degree  been  found  waiting  in  those  qualities  on  the 
plains  of  Belgium,  condemns  their  absence  in  his  Polish 
policy  with  severity  as  bitter  as  any  hostile  critic  could 
employ  ;  and  this  opinion  of  M.  Thiers  is  fully  sup 
ported  by  that  of  General  Brandt,  reviewing,  in  the 
long  years  of  calm  that  followed,  the  stormy  scenes  in 
which  he  had  borne  a  part. 

We  should  need  space  for  a  volume  rather  than  an 
essay  were  we  to  attempt  to  follow  our  author  through 
the  story  of  the  last  six  months  of  1812.  No  passage 
of  history  has  been  more  brilliantly  or  abundantly 
illustrated  by  the  actors  in  it  than  the  fatal  invasion  of 
Russia;  and  yet  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  no 
commentary  on  its  details,  nor  any  narrative  of  its  suc 
cessive  phases,  has  ever  been  given  to  the  world  sur 
passing  that  of  General  Brandt  in  vivid  interest.  We 
may  add  that  the  future  critic  or  historian  of  Napo 
leon's  great  disaster  can  hardly  accomplish  his  task 
completely  without  viewing  the  expedition  as  it  ap 
peared  to  one  who  has  combined  in  his  description  a 
personal  sympathy  with  the  Grand  Army  with  the  un 
biassed  judgment  of  a  foreigner  on  its  shortcomings  ; 
and  who  being  by  education  a  German,  by  country  a 
Pole,  and  by  profession  a  Frenchman,  was  able  to 
regard  the  whole  struggle  of  the  eventful  year  without 


A  GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     289 

sharing  the  delirium  of  national  passions  amid  which 
Europe  arose  to  tear  off  the  chains  that  had  bound 
her.  Without  entering  here  into  any  discussion  of  the 
general  causes  of  Napoleon's  failure,  it  may  be  said 
that,  in  Brandt's  opinion,  the  aggravated  sufferings  and 
vast  losses  of  the  retreat  from  Moscow  were  due  almost 
entirely  to  the  shameful  lack  of  discipline  which  had 
crept  into  the  Grand  Army.  Probably  the  very  dimen 
sions  of  his  overgrown  force  prevented  Napoleon  from 
knowing  its  disorderly  condition.  When  the  frost  had 
once  set  in  with  its  attendant  miseries,  it  was  alto 
gether  too  late,  in  Brandt's  opinion,  to  attempt  to 
restore  control :  but  had  the  staff  not  previously  lost  the 
respect  of  the  soldiers  by  avoiding  its  share  of  the  hard 
ships  of  the  campaign,  had  the  same  energetic  means 
of  punishing  stragglers  been  resorted  to  as  in  the  equal 
ly  severe  winter  of  1806-7,  order  might  have  been 
retained  through  the  most  trying  periods  that  followed. 
A  few  examples  of  corporal  punishment,  such  as  were 
administered  on  the  bloody  field  of  Eylau  to  the  ab 
sentees  who  came  in  after  the  battle,  an  execution  or 
two  at  the  head  of  each  column  of  the  first  men  who 
wilfully  threw  away  their  arms  after  turning  their  faces 
homeward  :  and  the  retreating  army  might  have  pre 
served  its  cohesion.  The  stores  formed  upon  the  road 
would  then  have  been  properly  distributed,  instead  of 
being  dissipated  by  plunder  and  waste,  leaving  those 
who  came  late  to  starve  even  where  plenty  had  been 
laid  up  for  all.  Supplied  with  food,  the  combatants 
might  have  held  together,  and,  by  showing  a  good  front, 
have  obtained  rest  for  themselves  and  given  time  for 
the  staff  to  collect  and  organize  the  stragglers.  But  all 
order  had  fled  before  the  frost  set  in  and  found  thou- 


290 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT 


sands  of  unarmed  soldiers  and  disorderly  followers, 
mixed  with  equipages  laden  with  plunder,  impeding 
and  confusing  the  columns  of  march.  The  cold  and 
suffering  that  ensued  only  completed  the  demoraliza 
tion  of  the  army  which  lax  discipline  had  begun.  As 
to  the  part  played  by  the  Russians,  General  Brandt 
asserts  that  but  for  their  faults  no  single  Frenchman 
should  have  recrossed  the  Beresina,  much  less  have 
made  his  way  safely,  as  he  did  himself,  though  suffer 
ing  from  a  wound,  back  into  Poland,  where  he  was 
received  and  nursed  to  recovery  at  his  father's  house. 
It  was  not  until  the  end  of  May  1813  that  he  was  able 
to  rejoin  the  Legion,  now  shrunk  into  a  single  regi 
ment,  with  the  well-won  rank  of  captain  and  senior 
adjutant. 

The  eventful  autumn  which  followed  saw  Napoleon, 
after  temporary  successes,  expelled  from  Germany  by 
a  succession  of  disasters  which  only  the  greater  dimen 
sions  of  those  endured  the  year  before  in  Russia  have 
cast  into  the  shade.  Brandt  shared  to  the  full  in  the 
last  and  worst  of  these  reverses,  and  at  Leipsic  fell  des 
perately  wounded  into  Russian  hands.  His  memoirs, 
if  continued  to  this  point,  would  have  been  invaluable 
to  the  student  of  the  War  of  Independence ;  but  his 
capture  and  subsequent  illness  prevented  his  preserv 
ing  even  the  most  fugitive  notes  of  the  events  of  1813, 
and  as  far  as  the  military  portion  of  the  work  is  con 
cerned,  it  closes  at  the  escape  of  the  author  from 
Russia.  When  next  the  life  of  the  veteran  of  Spain 
and  Moscow  is  continued  in  detail,  we  find  him  once 
more  serving  under  the  flag  beneath  which  the  young 
student  of  Konigsberg  had  been  enrolled  ten  years 
before  in  the  hour  of  Prussia's  calamity.  It  was  the 


A   GERMAN  SOLDIER  OF  THE  FIRST  EMPIRE.     2QI 

policy  of  the  victorious  House  of  Hohenzollern  to  show 
that  Prussia's  late  temporary  losses  of  territory  had 
been  the  mere  consequences  of  military  calamity,  and 
to  ignore  the  attendant  political  circumstances  now  that 
military  success  had  restored  the  kingdom  to  its  former 
dignity  and  possessions.  The  involuntary  transfer  of 
allegiance  which  had  placed  Brandt  beneath  the  Im 
perial  Eagles  found  easy  pardon,  and  he  was  received 
on  his  own  application  into  the  Prussian  service, 
resigning  with  pleasure  the  commission  proffered  him  in 
the  Polish  army,  now  absorbed  into  that  of  Russia. 
The  remainder  of  the  long  and  varied  career  we  have 
too  briefly  reviewed  was  passed  in  honorable  employ 
ment  under  his  legitimate  sovereign.  He  lived  to 
serve  under  Gneisenau  and  Clausewitz  as  a  confidential 
staff  officer,  during  the  armed  neutrality  which  Prussia 
maintained  upon  her  eastern  frontier  in  the  Polish 
Revolution  of  1831.  He  became  noted  as  a  military 
essayist,  his  pen  attracting  such  attention  as  to  single 
him  out  by  royal  choice  to  defend  the  Prussian  admin 
istration  against  certain  virulent  attacks  made  on  it  by 
the  Paris  journals  in  the  early  days  of  Louis  Philippe's 
reign.  His  ability  thus  becoming  fully  known  to  his 
sovereign,  it  was  a  natural  choice  which  sent  him  soon 
after,  as  the  Military  Commissioner  of  Prussia,  to 
report  on  the  condition  of  the  French  army  under  the 
new  regime.  At  the  camp  of  Compiogne,  where  the 
chief  force  of  the  Citizen  King  was  then  exercised, 
Brandt  met  on  equal  terms  many  ex-Napoleonist  gen 
erals  whose  names  had  been  historic  when  he  was  yet 
serving  as  a  subaltern  under  Suchet ;  he  discussed 
Prussian  organization  with  Marshal  Soult,  and  was 
introduced  to  Thiers,  then  in  the  early  prime  of  par- 


292 


HENRY  VON  BRANDT. 


liamentary  power,  and  to  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  study 
ing  hard  his  part  for  the  crown  he  was  never  destined 
to  wear.  Among  the  incidents  of  the  chief  review  he 
attended,  Brandt  observed  a  young  aide-de-camp  twice 
thrown  from  his  horse,  yet  remounting  each  time  to 
pursue  his  duties  as  actively  as  if  refreshed  by  his  fall. 
He  asked  and  noted  the  name  of  this  energetic  officer, 
then  Lieutenant  Macmahon  of  the  1st  Cuirassiers, 
and  before  closing  his  own  memoirs  lived  to  recog 
nize  in  him  the  victor  of  Magenta  and  favorite  marshal 
of  France.  That  these  memoirs  were  not  published 
until  after  the  writer's  decease,  is  sufficiently  explained 
by  the  outspoken  views  they  express  on  Prussian  pol 
icy  in  Poland.  As  a  record  of  the  achievements  of 
Marshal  Suchet  in  Spain,  as  a  contribution  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  ever-fresh  tragedy  of  the  Russian  in 
vasion,  as  an  impartial  criticism  of  the  process  by  which 
Northern  Germany  absorbed  the  Sclavonic  provinces 
on  her  borders,  these  volumes  are  of  deep  importance 
to  the  student  of  the  stormy  period  with  which  this 
century  opened.  But  above  all  these  in  interest,  in 
the  eyes  of  many,  will  be  the  author's  description  of 
the  realities  of  military  life  under  the  First  Empire. 
It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  the  study  of  this 
work,  following  that  of  the  Fezenac  "  Souvenirs," 
throws  more  light  upon  the  details  of  the  Grand 
Army,  and  upon  the  working  of  the  system  which  all 
but  enslaved  the  world,  than  had  been  shed  by  all 
the  national  histories  and  official  biographies  with 
which  Europe  has  been  deluged  these  sixty  years 
past. 


CORN WALL  IS  AND  THE  INDIAN  SERVICES* 

To  rule  a  subject  empire  with  wisdom,  vigor,  and 
purity ;  to  make  the  name  of  England  respected 
throughout  the  decaying  empires  of  Asia ;  to  infuse 
into  the  stagnant  material  of  Oriental  civilization  the 
life  that  springs  from  European  progress ;  such  have 
been  some  of  the  tasks  which  our  supremacy  in  India 
has  imposed  upon  those  who  there  serve  the  state. 
Great  missions  often  seem  to  call  forth  great  men ;  or 
if  these  are  not  always  to  be  found,  at  least  the  high 
est  qualities  of  those  employed  are  brought  out  and 
nourished  by  the  very  difficulties  of  their  task.  Thus 
it  has  happened,  that  if  in  India  the  baser  elements  of 
the  ruling  race  have  not  failed  sometimes  to  take 
advantage  of  the  ductility  of  the  subject,  England  has, 
on  the  whole,  good  cause  to  be  proud  of  the  services 
to  whom  her  charge  has  been  confided.  From  the 
time  of  Lord  Cornwallis  to  the  present  day,  it  may 
truly  be  affirmed  that  Indian  officials,  as  a  body,  would 
bear  favorable  comparison  for  energy  and  purity  with 
the  public  men  of  any  empire  in  the  world.  More 
than  this  ;  as  the  personal  conduct  of  the  administrator 
may  there  influence  the  destiny  of  millions,  so  the 
chivalrous  side  of  the  dominant  race  has  found  an  op 
portunity  denied  in  the  close  atmosphere  of  European 

*  Lives  of  Indian  Officers,  illustrative  of  the  History  of  the  Civil  and 
Military  Services  of  India.     By  Sir  John  Kaye. 


294  CORNWALLIS  AND 

politics.  The  services  of  India  have  had  in  their  ranks 
men  of  such  saintly  lives  and  heroic  action  as  mediaeval 
writers  dreamed  of,  if  they  did  not  see.  But  that  the 
names  of  men  of  this  type,  and  of  others  eminent 
under  the  Company's  rule,  have  become  household 
words  in  the  land  that  sent  them  forth,  is  due  chiefly 
to  the  special  knowledge  of  a  small  band  of  writers. 
Those  only  who  themselves  are  acquainted  with  the 
East  can  make  the  conditions  of  life  there,  and  espe 
cially  those  that  affect  our  rule  of  interest  to  far-off 
British  readers.  And  among  them  none  has  done  so 
much  to  bring  the  scenes  of  modern  Indian  history, 
and  the  figures  that  move  among  them,  home  to  his 
countrymen  as  the  veteran  author  Sir  J.  Kaye.  In  his 
more  important  works  he  has  made  familiar  among 
English  families  the  deeds  of  their  kinsmen  who  have 
lived  and  died  to  preserve  and  consolidate  our  empire. 
In  his  "  Lives  of  Indian  Officers"  he  presents  us  with 
a  gallery  of  portraits  of  characters,  of  various  types 
indeed,  but  of  all  of  whom  their  countrymen  may  well 
speak  with  pride. 

Cornwallis,  statesman  and  soldier,  forms  a  worthy 
foreground  to  the  group  selected  from  the  civil  and 
military  services  which  owe  their  high  character  to 
him.  A  great  man  and  a  good,  his  heart  was  in  his 
work,  and  his  work  lives  after  him.  His  success  in 
Indian  administration  contrasts  so  strongly  with  the 
sad  story  of  his  American  enterprises  as  to  justify  those 
who  attribute  the  failure  of  the  latter  to  any  cause 
rather  than  want  of  zeal  or  judgment.  We  could  have 
wished  to  avoid  following  Sir  J.  Kaye  into  the  history 
of  the  difference  between  General  Clinton  and  his  great 
lieutenant.  This,  and  the  military  events  with  which 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES.  29$ 

it  is  interwoven,  are  rather  touched  upon  than  written 
in  the  work  before  us ;  and  for  its  purpose  it  would 
have  been  better  to  have  kept  to  that  Indian  ground 
where  the  biographer  treads  more  safely  than  in  the 
swamps  of  Carolina  and  Virginia.  It  would  certainly 
have  been  juster  to  Cornwallis.  His  name  is  of  ne 
cessity  so  connected  with  the  disasters  which  closed 
the  Revolutionary  War  of  America,  that  an  imperfect 
notice  of  these  is  in  the  very  nature  of  things  almost 
an  injury  to  him.  Nor  is  this  repaired  by  extracts 
given  us  from  one  or  two  of  the  less  important  letters 
of  the  series  relating  to  the  occupation  and  defence  of 
Yorktown.  This  correspondence,  published  originally 
by  Cornwallis  himself  in  1783,  should  be  read  as  a 
whole  by  those  interested.  Thus  treated,  it  proves 
abundantly  what  he  asserts  in  his  introduction  :  "  When 
the  arrival  of  the  French  fleet,  and  the  approval  of 
General  Washington,  were  made  known  to  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  it  will  appear  that  his  promises  of  relief  in 
person  were  uniform,  without  giving  me  the  smallest 
particle  of  discretionary  power,  different  from  holding 
the  posts  that  I  occupied."  That  he  did  not  attempt 
to  break  out  of  the  toils  in  the  early  part  of  the  invest 
ment,  is  thus  explained  by  Cornwallis  with  a  clearness 
which  seems  to  defy  contradiction  :  "  The  enemy  were 
in  a  strong  position  and  considerably  superior  in  num 
ber,  but  I  should  have  attacked  them  without  hesita 
tion  if  I  had  thought  myself  at  liberty,  after  a  victory, 
to  escape  into  the  Carolinas  [from  whence,  be  it  ob 
served,  he  had  but  lately  marched  triumphantly]  with 
the  troops  that  were  able  to  move.  No  other  object 
appeared  sufficient  to  justify  this  measure.  But  a 
defeat  would  probably  have  been  followed  with  the 


296 


CORNWALLIS  AND 


immediate  loss  of  our  post,  which  until  the  end  of  Sep 
tember  was  in  a  most  defenceless  state  :  and  as  I  could 
never  have  proved  that  I  should  not  have  been  relieved, 
I  should  have  been  exposed  to  public  execration,  as  a 
man  who,  having  reason  to  expect  the  early  arrival  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  supersede  him  in  his  command, 
had,  in  hopes  of  personal  reputation  from  a  victory, 
sacrificed  the  essential  interest  of  his  country." 

Thus  much  in  justice  to  a  great  man  who  struggled 
manfully  against  the  fates  that  bore  him  down,  and 
with  him  the  last  hope  of  recovering  America  by  the 
sword.  Billow,  the  Prussian  military  writer,  a  man  of 
genius  as  brilliant  as  his  fate  was  unhappy,  witnessed 
the  struggle  in  person,  and  has  borne  disinterested 
evidence  that  these  hopes  were  not  as  chimerical  as  it 
is  now  the  fashion  to  assert.  From  the  day,  however, 
that  Britian  lost  the  control  of  the  ocean  which  divided 
her  from  her  revolted  colonies,  the  war  could  have  had 
but  one  result.  A  success  on  Cornwallis's  part  in  Vir 
ginia  might  have  added  to  his  laurels  already  gained 
in  New  Jersey  and  the  Carolinas,  but  would  have  only 
delayed  the  issue  for  a  little  space.  Such  a  free  com 
munication  as  the  Federal  fleets  had  along  the  coast 
of  the  revolted  states  during  the  Civil  War  was  equally 
needed  in  our  case.  Without  it  Sherman's  overland 
march  from  Savannah,  made  eighty  years  afterwards, 
might  have  had  little  better  issue  than  that  of  Corn- 
wallis  through  precisely  the  same  district.  With  such 
aid  the  modern  commander  established  his  fame,  as  the 
elder,  for  lack  of  it,  came  nigh  to  ruin  his  reputation. 
Happily  the  discussion  of  the  circumstances  of  the 
Yorktown  surrender  produced  a  clearer  impression  in 
Cornwallis's  favor  among  the  statesmen  of  the  time 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES.  297 

than  Sir  J.  Kaye's  narrative  will,  we  fear,  among  his 
readers.  Hardly  was  the  American  War  concluded, 
when  we  find  both  Fox  and  Pitt,  amid  the  acrimony 
of  the  Indian  debates,  looking  to  Cornwallis  as  the  man 
who  best  might  wield  supreme  control  in  our  new  great 
dependency.  "The  name  of  such  a  man,"  said  the 
"ormer,  "  might  make  Parliament  consent  to  the  vest- 
ng  of  such  powers  in  a  Governor-General ;  but  certain 
[  am  that  nothing  but  the  character  of  that  noble  Lord 
could  ever  induce  the  legislature  to  commit  such  pow 
ers  to  an  individual  at  the  distance  of  half  the  globe." 
The  latter,  when  his  new  India  Bill  was  in  a  fair  way  to 
3ass,  offered  the  Earl  his  choice  of  the  offices  of  Gov 
ernor-General  or  Commander-in-Chief ;  and  when  he 
persistently  declined  then,  and  again  after  the  Macart 
ney  interregnum,  to  accept  either  separately,  or  to  take 
the  former  office  at  all,  unless  with  independent  power 
n  cases  of  emergency,  the  amending  Bill  of  1786  was 
ntroduced,  under  which  he  could  no  longer  refuse  to 
act.  By  this,  which  became  henceforward  the  rule  of 
[ndian  government  the  functions  of  the  Supreme  Coun 
cil  were  reduce  to  those  of  mere  advice  or  remon 
strance,  whenever  the  Governor-General  chose  to  de 
cide  for  himself.  The  members  might  in  such  case  col- 
.ectively  or  severally  recommend  or  object,  but  action 
belonged  to  the  Governor-General,  on  whom  hencefor 
ward  lay  the  real  responsibility  of  administration, 
checked  only  by  the  higher  authority  at  home.  As 
the  latter  could  always  receive  the  recorded  opinions 
of  the  councillors,  the  Governor-General  would  natu 
rally  take  good  care  not  to  override  them  without  show 
ing  good  cause.  This  system  had  been  devised  at  the 
time  of  the  introduction  of  the  Indian  Bill  in  1784,  but 


298  CORNWALLIS  AND 

Mr.  Pitt  had  abandoned  the  proviso  which  to  Corn 
wallis  and  others  seemed  the  pith  of  the  whole  Act,  ir 
order  the  more  easily  to  secure  its  passage.  Two  year; 
later,  however,  it  was  found  necessary  to  supply  th( 
omission  ;  and  in  spite  of  Burke's  powerful  opposition 
the  arguments  of  Dundas  (then  President  of  the  Boarc 
of  Control)  prevailed,  and  the  Governor-General  receivec 
the  vast  powers  he  has  ever  since  held.  One  weak 
point  was  left  in  the  measure.  It  was  open,  from  the 
nature  of  the  government,  for  the  Governor-General  tc 
reduce  himself  from  his  rank  as  responsible  ruler  to  the 
mere  President  of  a  Committee,  by  ceasing  to  exercise 
his  individual  authority,  and  referring  each  business 
to  a  single  member  or  to  the  voice  of  the  Council. 
This  is  the  temptation  natural  to  any  Yiceroy  who 
would  avoid  excessive  responsibility  ;  and  if  report  be 
true,  it  is  precisely  in  this  direction  that  the  Supreme 
Government  has  on  the  whole  for  some  time  past 
tended. 

To  return  to  Cormvallis.  Voyaging  to  Calcutta 
with  Shore,  afterwards  Lord  Teignmouth,  for  his  chief 
fellow-passenger,  he  landed  on  September  fourteenth 
1786,  and  began  that  career  of  administrative  reform 
on  which  his  future  fame  was  to  rest  more  surely  than 
on  American  campaigns.  It  is  not  necessary  to  peruse 
the  twenty  pages  which  Sir.  J.  Kaye  has  devoted  to  the 
earlier  history  of  the  Indian  Civil  Service,  in  order  to 
see  that  Cornwallis  had  before  him  an  Augean  taskj 
To  pay  collectors,  judges,  even  councillors,  rather  less 
than  the  salary  of  a  merchant's  junior  clerk,  and  to 
leave  these  high  officials  to  eke  out  their  pittance  by 
jobbery  and  corruption,  had  been  the  normal  practice 
of  the  good  old  company.  Nearly  two  centuries 


THE  INDIAN  SER  VICES,  2gg 

before,  Sir  Thomas  Roe  had  written  the  golden  truth, 
which  it  was  left  for  Cornwallis  to  reduce  to  practice. 
"  Absolutely  prohibit,"  said  the  far-seeing  ambassador 
of  James  I.,  "  the  private  trade,  for  your  business  will 
be  better  done.  I  know  this  is  harsh.  Men  profess 
they  care  not  for  bare  wages.  But  you  will  take  away 
this  plea  if  you  grant  great  wages  to  their  content  ; 
and  then  you  know  what  you  part  from."  As  has  been 
well  added,  Roe  was  in  this  matter  a  great  man,  ob 
viously  in  advance  of  his  age.  So  far  from  profiting 
by  his  wisdom,  the  company  adopted  the  very  con 
trary  policy,  attempting  by  the  ridiculous  device  of 
temporary  edicts,  framed  16,000  miles  off,  to  keep  the 
daily  habits  of  their  servants  down  to  their  meagre 
salaries.  As  their  rule  extended  from  factories  to 
provinces,  and  from  provinces  to  kingdoms,  the  childish 
fetters  they  had  imposed  were  silently  laid  aside  or 
openly  scoffed  at,  and  the  picking  of  the  Pagoda  tree 
became  a  recognized  art,  dividing  the  attention  of  the 
civilian  with  his  care  of  his  office.  Thus,  as  soon  as 
Cornwallis  had  investigated  the  state  of  things,  we  find 
him  writing  of  one  of  the  company's  civil  servants  in  a 
manner  that  gives  a  lively  picture  of  the  existing 
regime  : 

"  111  as  I  thought  of  the  late  system  of  Benares,  I  found 
it  on  inquiry  much  worse  than  I  could  have  conceived.  The 
Resident,  although  not  regularly  vested  with  any  power,  en 
joyed  the  almost  absolute  government  of  the  country  without 
control.  His  emoluments,  besides  the  thousand  rupees  per 
month  allowed  him  by  the  company,  certainly  amounted  to 
little  less  than  four  lacs  a  year,  exclusive  of  the  complete 
monopoly  of  the  whole  commerce  of  the  country,  with  the 
power  of  granting  perwannahs,  etc.  It  has  been  generally 


CORNWALLIS  AND 

supposed  that  in  return  for  all  these  good  things,  the  Residents 
at  Benares  have  not  been  ungrateful  to  the  friends  of  the 
Governor-General.  I  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Mr.  - 
took  more  than  his  predecessors.  God  knows  what  he  gave. 
But  as  he  was  on  bad  terms  with  the  Rajah  and  his  servants, 
and  as  new  measures  are  more  likely  to  succeed  with  new 
men,  I  thought  it  better  to  remove  him." 

In  the  same  letter  he  adds,  in  a  passage  quoted  by 
Sir  J.  Kaye:  "I  am  sorry  to  say  that  I  have  every 
reason  to  believe  that  at  present  almost  all  the  collec 
tors  are,  under  the  name  of  some  relative  or  friend, 
deeply  engaged  in  commerce,  and  by  their  influence  as 
collectors  and  judges  of  Adaulet  they  become  the  most 
dangerous  enemies  to  the  company's  interest,  and  the 
greatest  oppressors  of  the  manufacturers."  So  much  for 
the  state  of  things  :  then  came  the  cause,  and  the 
remedy  which  Cornwallis  had  already,  not  having  been 
in  the  country  a  year,  brought  into  use  without  waiting 
for  the  directors'  sanction  to  his  reform.  "  I  hope  you 
will  approve  of  the  additional  allowances  that  we  have 
given,  for  without  them  it  was  absolutely  impossible 
that  an  honest  man  could  acquire  the  most  moderate 
competence.  After  this  liberality  I  made  no  scruple 
of  issuing  the  revenue  regulations  against  embarking 
in  trade,  and  will  make  an  example  of  the  first 
offender." 

The  remedy  in  such  a  case  was,  in  fact,  clear  as  the 
Disease,  being  no  other  than  that  which  Sir  Thomas 
Roe  had  so  long  since  recommended.  Yet  it  needed 
all  the  prestige  and  influence  which  Cornwallis  had 
brought  with  him,  to  enforce  his  views  on  the  slow 
hearing  of  the  directors.  The  earnestness  with  which 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES.  301 

he  insisted  upon  what  he  felt  to  be  the  cardinal  point 
of  Indian  administration  is  abundantly  illustrated  by 
the  "  Cornwallis  Correspondence/'  which  Sir.  J.  Kaye 
has  freely  and  usefully  employed.  The  sweeping 
inferences  he  has  drawn  from  this  valuable  work  seem 
to  us,  in  one  case,  hardly  justified,  for  an  expression 
quoted  as  written  with  reference  to  the  company's  civil 
servants — "  I  sincerely  believe  that,  excepting  Mr. 
Charles  Grant,  there  is  not  one  person  on  the  list  who 
would  escape  prosecution  " — appears  in  the  original 
letter  to  be  applied  to  a  special  "  list  "  of  persons 
whose  cases  were  submitted  to  the  Court  of  Directors 
for  lenient  consideration,  on  the  score  of  their  having 
been  coerced  by  their  superiors.  The  word  "  list  " 
thus  specially  used  by  Cornwallis  in  the  sentence  im 
mediately  preceding  could  hardly  be  applied  by  him  in 
the  next,  that  already  quoted,  to  the  whole  civil  service 
without  qualification.  If  not  a  very  elegant  writer,  he 
was  certainly  by  no  means  a  loose  one. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  measures  already  taken  for 
the  amendment  of  the  service  by  the  Earl  were 
approved  at  home,  where  Dundas  rendered  him  due 
support.  In  vain  was  it  asserted  that  however  well 
men  were  paid  in  India,  at  that  distance  they  could 
not  refrain  from  fee-taking  or  corruption  in  some  form. 
The  honorable  soul  of  Cornwallis  revolted  at  this 
theory  ;  and  the  objections  raised  by  the  Directors  to 
his  grants  of  salaries  were  thus  met  by  him  in  a  private 
letter  to  Dundas  of  August  twenty-sixth,  1787  : 

"If  the  essence  of  the  spirit  of  economy  of  the  whole  Court 
of  Directors  could  be  collected,  I  am  sure  it  would  fall  very 
short  of  my  anxiety  on  that  subject.  ...  If  it  is  a  maxim  that, 


302 


CORNWALLIS  AND 


pay  our  servants  as  we  please,  they  will  equally  cheat,  the 
sooner  we  leave  this  country  the  better.  .  .  .  From  the  spirit 
of  this  letter"  [of  the  Directors]  "  I-conclude  that  the  commis 
sion  given  to  the  collectors,  the  allowances  to  the  residents,  will 
all  be  disapproved  of.  I  see  the  pay  of  the  sub-treasurer  is 
objected  to.  When  I  came  I  found  the  sub-treasure  playing 
with  the  deposits,  amounting  to  three  or  four  lacs.  I  fancy 
of  the  two  he  had  rather  I  had  taken  his  salary  from  him.  I 
have  saved"  [he  forcibly  concludes]  "since  I  came,  upon  the 
salt  upon  the  various  contracts,  upon  remittances,  balances,  and 
jobs  of  different  kinds,  ten  times,  I  may  say  fifty  times  the 
amount  of  the  salaries  that  are  retrenched.  I  am  doing  every 
thing  I  can  to  reform  the  Company's  servants,  to  teach  them 
to  be  more  economical  in  their  mode  of  living,  and  to  look 
forward  to  a  moderate  competency  ;  and  I  flatter  myself  I 
have  not  hitherto  labored  in  vain.  But  if  all  chance  of  sav 
ing  any  money  and  returning  to  England  without  acting  dis 
honestly  is  removed,  there  will  be  an  end  of  my  reformation." 

A  better  destiny  than  he  hoped  awaited  his  vigor 
ous  measures.  The  promise  made  to  him  by  Dundas, 
"You  may  depend  upon  my  giving  the  most  exact 
attention  to  every  suggestion  you  communicate  to 
me,"  appears  to  have  been  literally  fulfilled.  As  the 
minister  observed  in  the  same  letter,  "  We  never  before 
had  a  government  of  India,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
acting  in  perfect  unison  together  upon  principles  of 
perfect  unity  and  integrity  ;  these  ingredients  cannot 
fail  to  produce  their  consequent  effects."  Those  effects 
began  to  appear  sooner  than  Viceroy  or  Minister  could 
have  hoped ;  for  we  find  Cornwallis  writing  but  four 
months  after  the  receipt  of  this  assurance,  "  The  Com 
pany  has  many  valuable  servants  ;  the  temper  of  the 
times  is  changing.  Men  are  beginning  to  contrast  their 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES. 


303 


present  expenses  and  their  future  views."  His 
unwearied  war  upon  sinecures,  jobbery,  and  fraud  had 
already  reduced  the  expenditure  within  the  estimates, 
"which  never,"  he  writes,  "  happened  before;"  while 
the  civil  service  was  beginning  to  feel  the  advantage 
held  out  to  it  by  the  honester  system  which  refused 
(to  use  Cornwallis's  words)  "  to  place  men  in  great  and 
responsible  situations,  where  the  prosperity  of  our 
affairs  must  depend  on  their  exertions  as  well  as  integ 
rity,  without  giving  them  the  means  in  a  certain  num 
ber  of  years  of  acquiring  honestly  and  openly  a  mod 
erate  fortune." 

Not  that  Dundasand  Cornwallis  had  the  opposition 
of  the  Directors  for  their  only  difficulty.  A  still  more 
scandalous  one  lay  in  the  system  of  sending  out  to 
Calcutta  the  needy  and  improvident  hangers-on  of 
court  officials  or  party  leaders,  in  expectation  that  the 
Governor-General  would  provide  for  them.  This  prac 
tice  the  innate  honesty  of  Cornwallis  did  more  to  check, 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  than  the  spirit  of  his  times 
could  possibly  have  taught  him.  In  truth,  his  conduct 
in  this  matter  was  before  the  age ;  although  to  say  of 
him  "  he  could  not  perpetuate  a  job  to  please  the 
King,"  is  an  instance  of  the  misuse  of  high-flown  lan 
guage  which  is  our  author's  besetting  sin ;  and  it  is  the 
less  excusable,  as  in  a  note  to  the  next  page  we  find 
that  he  quotes  from  a  letter  of  Cornwallis,  explaining 
his  rejection  of  William  Burke's  suggestions  of  modes 
of  serving  him  :  "  I  have  treated  him  with  the  greatest 
personal  attention,  and  I  have  done  little  favors,  as 
ensigncies  in  the  King's  service,  etc.,  to  his  friends."  It 
was  quite  consistent,  at  that  period,  with  the  honorable 
character  of  the  man  that  such  gifts  should  be  made  to 


304 


CORNWALL1S  AND 


conciliate  the  cousin  of  Edmund  Burke,  and  yet  that 
Cornwallis  should  absolutely  decline  proposals  for 
alterations  in  the  mode  of  payment  of  the  troops, 
which  were  intended  to  put  large  sums  of  money  into 
the  pocket  of  this  same  Burke,  then  Paymaster-General 
in  India.  In  the  same  spirit  a  gentleman  coming  out 
to  be  provided  for  with  a  recommendation  from  the 
Queen,  was  put  off  with  a  clerkship  at  250  rupees  a 
month  ;  but  Cornwallis's  own  friends  fared  much  worse. 
Their  claims  were  met  with  inexorable  refusal,  while 
that  of  a  mere  acquaintance  was  treated  as  summarily 
as  if  the  pressing  it  were  a  crime.  "  If  I  was  inclined 
to  serve  you,"  he  writes  to  such  a  one,  "  it  is  wholly 
out  of  my  power  to  do  so  without  a  breach  of  my  duty. 
I  most  earnestly  advise  you  to  think  of  returning  to 
England  as  soon  as  possible.  After  the  first  of  Janu 
ary  next  I  shall  be  under  the  necessity  of  sending  you 
thither." 

Such  vigor  and  wisdom  as  this  portion  of  the  "  Cor 
respondence"  shows  is  well  worthy  the  first  place  in  a 
work  which  set  out  with  the  design  of  illustrating  the 
high  qualities  of  the  Indian  services.  The  measures 
which  Cornwallis  adopted  for  the  improvement  of  the 
civil  branch  won  their  way  to  acceptance.  His  rule  of 
securing  the  whole  devotion  of  the  official  by  paying 
him  so  liberally  as  "  to  enable  him  to  save  honestly  and 
openly,"  became  the  charter  of  a  great  body  of  gentle 
men;  and  by  their  aid  the  foundations  of  our  growing 
empire  were  laid  deep  and  strong. 

The  care  of  Cornwallis  for  the  military  force  was  no 
less.  Justice  indeed  has  hardly  been  done  by  Sir  J. 
Kaye  or  any  other  writer  to  this  portion  of  the  subject ; 
for  the  abuses  which  had  crept  into  the  contingents 


THE  INDIAN  SER  VICES,  30$ 

raised  by  native  states  were  hardly  less  than  those  in 
the  political  offices,  while  the  regular  troops  of  the 
Company  were  in  a  very  low  condition,  the  recruiting 
of  respectable  Englishmen  being  practically  interdicted 
by  home  jealousies.  Of  the  European  troops  Corn- 
wallis  wrote :  "  They  are  such  miserable  wretches  I 
should  be  ashamed  to  acknowledge  them  for  country 
men  ; "  and  added,  as  the  only  remedy,  some  words 
that  seem  to  us  well  worth  quoting  for  their  curious 
acknowledgment  of  the  early  jealousy  of  the  royal 
troops  towards  their  brethren  of  the  Company,  a  jeal 
ousy  afterwards  amply  repaid  by  Indian  officers,  and 
which  lasted  until  the  Company  was  merged  in  the 
Crown  :  "  I  know  it  will  be  unpopular  with  my  brother 
officers  at  home  ;  but  it  is  my  duty  to  state,  that  if 
these  dominions  are  worth  preserving,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  East  India  Company  should  be  per 
mitted  to  treat  publicly  for  recruits,  and  to  keep  them 
under  martial  law  until  the  time  of  their  embarkation." 
In  the  same  spirit  he  set  himself  to  abolish  all  the 
invidious  distinctions  hitherto  made  in  India  between 
the  military  services. 

Before  his  arrival,  all  field  officers  of  the  King's 
were  wont  to  receive  special  brevet  rank,  so  as  to  super 
sede  those  of  the  Company  who  were  of  the  same 
standing,  while  the  local  commissions  of  the  latter  were 
often  altogether  ignored,  as  far  as  it  lay  in  the  power 
of  the  royal  officer,  who  looked  on  their  holders  as 
irregular  rivals  of  his  profession.  Representations  on 
this  head  came  with  peculiar  force  from  one  who  was 
known  at  home  as  the  favorite  general  of  the  royal 
troops  in  the  field,  the  leader  who  had  come  out  of  our 
American  disasters  with  honor  unsullied  and  military 
20 


CORNWALLIS  AND 

reputation  raised.  In  1788  CornwalHs  received  the 
needful  powers  for  bestowing,  in  the  sovereign's  name 
local  commissions  for  India  on  the  company's  officers 
while  the  special  higher  rank  of  the  King's  field  officers 
was  ordered  to  be  absolutely  swept  away  after  eighteen 
months'  notice.  From  this  day  forward  the  officers  of 
the  three  local  armies  already  in  pay  under  the  com 
pany  saw  the  road  open  to  the  highest  honors  of  their 
profession  ;  at  least  as  regarded  service  in  their  adopt 
ed  country.  It  needed,  however,  three-quarters  of  a 
century's  habit,  and  a  formal  assumption  by  the  Crown 
of  the  imperial  authority  in  India,  before  British  states 
men  could  learn  the  simple  elementary  lessons  that  the 
military  strength  derived  from  our  Eastern  possessions 
is  but  part  of  the  general  strength  of  the  state,  and 
that  our  Indian  Empire  is  the  natural  base  of  all  our 
warlike  operations  in  the  East. 

With  certain  very  irregular  contingents  raised  in 
the  subject  native  provinces,  the  existence  of  which 
was  a  private  profit  and  no  public  benefit,  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  dealt  in  the  most  summary  fashion.  How 
abused  the  power  of  our  Residents  had  been  in  this 
direction  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  letter, 
addressed  by  him  to  a  certain  captain,  whose  pretend 
ed  battalion  had  been  disbanded,  and  who  made  a 
large  claim  on  his  own  account  against  the  Vizier  of 
Oude: 

"  Near  PL  ASSY,  November  22,  1787. 

"  SIR, — I  am  sorry  to  say  that  on  my  arrival  at  Lucknow 
1  could  not  meet  with  any  person,  either  European  or  native, 
that  knew  anything  of  your  battalion,  or  had  seen  any  part  of 
iU  Although  I  could  not  help  placing  proper  confidence  in 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES. 


307 


your  assurances  of  its  being  perfectly  complete,  both  in  offi 
cers  and  men,  yet  as  there  was  not  a  trace  of  it  existing  at 
the  headquarters  where  it  was  raised,  and  had  been  so  lately 
disbanded,  and  you  had  been  so  improvident  as  to  keep  no 
voucher  for  any  of  your  disbursements,  you  did  not  put  it  in 
my  power  to  say  to  the  Vizier  or  his  ministers  that  part  of  the 
large  sum  of  money  which  you  received  was  not  issued  to  dis 
charge  your  personal  pay  and  allowances.  Circumstanced, 
therefore,  as  your  claim  is,  I  do  not  think  that  my  interference 
would  be  warranted  by  the  order  of  the  Board  relative  to  the 
reduction  of  your  corps.  I  am,  etc. 

"  CORNWALLIS." 

In  short,  the  care  of  his  lordship  for  the  military 
departments,  as  might  have  been  expected  from  his 
previous  training,  was  as  great  as  that  which  he  be 
stowed  on  the  civil  service  ;  and,  fortunately  for  the 
future  of  the  Indian  army,  he  remained  long  enough 
at  its  head  to  see  his  recommendations  carried  into 
practical  working.  Under  this  wiser  rule  the  heart 
burnings  and  discontents  of  the  company's  officer  van 
ished,  and  a  commission  in  the  Indian  army  became  an 
honorable  object  for  the  ambitious  and  energetic  of  the 
youth  of  England.  A  class  pressed  into  the  service 
from  this  time  by  which  the  government  has  been 
doubly  strengthened.  The  Viceroys  have  found  in  it 
some  of  the  most  able  administrators  that  India  has 
known,  having  in  its  vast  list  the  ready  means  of  rein 
forcing  the  civil  element  in  their  higher  departments  ; 
while  the  army  has  furnished  sabreurs  as  bold,  artille 
rists  and  engineers  as  skilful,  staff  officers  as  sagacious, 
as  any  modern  military  school  from  the  time  of  Gusta- 
vus  downwards. 


308 


CORN  WALL] S  AND 


It  has  been  the  fashion  of  late  to  suppose  that 
Cornwallis,  as  a  reformer,  was  but  an  instrument  in  the 
hands  of  better-informed  men,  experienced  in  Indian 
affairs.  A  late  popular  history  of  India  takes  this  view 
of  his  viceroyalty,  which  would  regard  him  almost  as 
simply  an  able  and  honest,  yet  ordinary  executive 
officer.  A  mere  glance  at  the  first  part  of  the  "  Cor 
respondence"  should  dissipate  for  ever  this  theory, 
which  deserves  to  stand  with  that  of  a  worthy  officer 
not  many  years  dead,  who  published  a  work  in  three 
volumes  to  prove  that  Napoleon  rose  to  the  crown 
of  France  and  the  sway  of  Europe  by  a  series  of  lucky 
accidents.  Sir  J.  Kaye  has  done  his  subject  more  jus 
tice.  He  has  shown,  among  other  points,  that  the 
care  of  Cornwallis  reached  not  only  to  financial  and 
administrative  measures  of  every  kind,  but  to  the  moral 
and  social  condition  of  the  Anglo-Indian  community. 
To  reform  this  by  mere  austerity  and  simplicity  of 
living  would  have  been  impossible.  Banquets  and 
balls  were  the  more  rational  mode  adopted  by  Corn 
wallis,  whose  genial  hospitality  kept  him  in  his  proper 
social  position  as  the  head  of  Calcutta  society,  and 
enabled  him  to  influence  its  tone  largely  for  present 
and  future  good.  With  his  usual  industry  our  author 
has  adduced  extracts  from  newspapers  of  the  day,  and 
from  an  interesting  work  on  Indian  society,  written 
soon  after  Cornwallis  had  left,  which  sufficiently  proves 
the  vast  change  for  the  better  made  by  his  personal 
influence  and  example.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that 
the  very  habits  of  our  countrymen  in  the  East  are 
indebted  to  the  same  far-seeing  wisdom  and  energy 
which  the  best  informed  of  them  declare  to  have 
founded  the  prosperity  and  usefulness  of  the  services 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES.  309 

of  the  company,  and  to  have  left  traces  of  its  happy 
influence  on  every  succeeding  generation  of  officials. 

Cornwallis  had  not  too  long  a  space  allowed  him  for 
his  reforms.  They  were  scarcely  complete  when  the 
troubles  in  the  Presidency  of  Madras  began,  which 
were  to  keep  us  constantly  engaged  in  or  expecting 
war  until  the  death  of  Tippoo  Saib  many  years  later. 
The  account  of  Cornwallis's  expeditions  in  Mysore  is 
well  worth  study,  were  it  only  for  the  purpose  of  see 
ing  how  he  prepared  the  way  for  the  final  triumph  of 
our  arms  under  Harris  and  Wellesley.  But  it  is  more 
important  to  follow  him  back  to  Calcutta  after  he  had 
wrested  a  hard-won  peace  from  Tippoo,  and  see  him 
devote  the  remainder  of  his  Indian  career  to  the  com 
pletion  of  his  administrative  reforms,  and  their  com 
plement  of  legislation.  Those  who  would  understand 
exactly  how  far  Cornwallis  deserves  the  credit  of  the 
famous  Regulations  of  1793,  which  have  formed  the 
basis  of  our  later  administration  of. justice  in  India, 
should  study  the  memorandum  of  Sir  George  Barlow 
(which  Sir  J.  Kaye  was  the  first  to  bring  to  light),  ex 
plaining  in  the  most  precise  terms  what  he  did  in  this 
matter.  His  reform  was  that  which  came  naturally 
from  a  wise  ruler  in  a  country  hitherto  administered 
by  individual  officials  who  acted  personally  for  the  gov 
ernment  according  to  their  own  views  and  their  sep 
arate  instructions.  He  reduced  these  instructions  to 
definite  published  laws,  and  enforced  by  their  means 
uniformity  of  practice  in  the  courts.  That  in  doing 
this  he  was  acting  rightly,  and  indeed  anticipating  what 
otherwise  his  successors  must  perforce  have  undertaken, 
is  admitted  by  men  of  all  parties,  and  stands  deservedly 
to  his  credit  as  a  statesman. 


3 1  o  CORN  WALLIS  A  ND 

It  is  far  otherwise  with  the  celebrated  Revenue 
Settlement  effected  under  his  rule.  Our  author  seems 
to  avoid  offering  any  opinion  of  his  own  on  this 
debated  question,  to  which  he  devotes  but  a  single 
page.  Yet  as  he  gives  room  for  the  reproval  of  James 
Mill,  who  in  his  History  asserts  of  this  measure  that 
"  the  aristocratical  person  now  at  the  head  of  the  gov 
ernment  avowed  his  intention  of  establishing  an  aris 
tocracy  upon  the  European  model,"  he,  in  justice,  does 
not  omit  to  show  that  the  arguments  of  the  perpetual 
Zemindar  Settlement  were  far  older  than  the  days  of 
Cornvvallis,  having  been  completely  exhausted  in  re 
ports  made  before  his  appointment.  Mr.  Law,  then 
collector  of  Behar,  he  terms  u  the  father  of  the  Perma 
nent  Settlement ;"  but  the  praise  or  blame  should  in 
truth  be  allotted  rather  to  the  whole  service  of  which 
Mr.  Law  was  but  one  active  member.  A  large  part  of 
the  second  volume  of  the  "  Cornwallis  Correspondence" 
is  devoted  to  papers  concerning  this  vexed  question ; 
and  it  is  there  abundantly  shown  that  what  the  Gov 
ernor-General  recommended  was  enforced  by  the  delib 
erate  opinion  of  all  the  chief  administrators  of  revenue 
in  Bengal,  and  of  his  own  councillors,  excepting  always 
Mr.  Shore,  afterwards  Lord  Teignmouth.  The  latter 
argued  earnestly  in  favor  of  the  settlement  being 
renewable  every  ten  years,  instead  of  being  made  in 
-perpetuity,  and  his  arguments  were  fully  weighed  before 
the  final  decision  was  arrived  at  by  Pitt  and  Dundas, 
who  (as  appears  plainly  shown  from  the  "  Correspon 
dence")  were  the  ultimate  judges,  assisted  only  by 
Charles  Grant.  It  is  plain,  however,  that  Shore  dis 
sented  merely  on  the  question  of  the  length  to  which 
the  settlement  should  run.  There  was  no  difference 


THE  INDIAN  SER  VICES.  3  r  j 

of  opinion  at  the  time  among  those  who  knew  the 
newly-acquired  country,  as  to  the  wisdom  of  creating 
from  the  Zemindars  of  Bengal  a  territorial  aristocracy, 
or  rather  of  confirming  them  in  the  tenure  they  had 
already  acquired  by  prescription.  The  only  question 
much  discussed  was  as  to  the  terms  on  which  this 
should  be  done.  Possibly  Mill's  attack  upon  Corn 
wallis  would  have  been  spared  had  he  known  the  "  Cor 
respondence,"  or  had  he  written  after  it  had  become 
the  fashion  with  recent  Indian  rulers,  warned  by  Dal- 
housie  experience,  to  copy  in  other  districts  the  orig 
inal  prescription  under  which  Lower  Bengal  has  proved 
the  model  portion  of  our  dominions  for  tranquillity  and 
wealth  of  produce. 

Sir  J.  Kaye  follows  Cornwallis  from  India  to  Ireland, 
and  gives  an  epitome  of  the  important  events  which 
marked  his  viceroyalty  there.  These  belong,  however, 
in  no  sense  to  the  story  of  our  Indian  empire,  and,  as 
with  the  American  portion  of  the  biography,  are  too 
briefly  treated  to  do  full  justice  to  the  subject.  Corn- 
wallis's  connection  with  the  Union  measures  might 
well  have  a  work  to  itself,  and  is  at  any  rate  too  impor 
tant  a  matter  in  national  history  to  be  treated  merely 
as  an  episode  of  his  Indian  career.  While  occupied 
thus  at  home,  and  subsequently  in  diplomacy  on  the 
Continent,  he  watched  the  brilliant  schemes  and  daring 
policy  of  Lord  Wellesley  with  the  natural  anxiety  of 
an  ex-ruler  who  sees  much  of  what  he  judged  a  sound 
policy  reversed  by  his  successor.  Even  the  great  suc 
cesses  which  it  was  given  to  the  new  Governor-General 
to  organize  in  council,  and  to  see  achieved  by  his  broth 
er's  sword  in  the  field,  hardly  reconciled  Cornwallis 
to  our  new  and  comparatively  aggressive  position. 


312 


CORNWALLIS  AND 


What  was  written  by  him  at  this  time,  embodies 
exactly  the  opinions  and  difficulties  of  many  able  and 
honest  men  from  that  day  to  the  present.  "  The  ques 
tion  is,  have  we  not  too  much  ?  But  I  hardly  know, 
when  the  power  was  in  our  hands,  what  part  of  our 
acquisitions  we  could  prudently  have  relinquished." 
At  last  came  the  supersession  of  Wellesley,  and  the 
almost  inevitable  recourse  to  Cornwallis  as  his  suc 
cessor.  The  story  of  the  quarrel  of  the  Directors  with 
their  representative  has  nothing  very  new  or  striking 
in  it,  being  but  the  natural  collision  between  a  board 
of  commonplace,  narrow-minded  men  and  the  bold, 
ambitious  Viceroy  whom  they  sought  to  restrict  by 
drafting  instructions  for  his  guidance  from  the  other 
side  of  the  world.  To  displace  so  able  and  successful 
a  Governor-General  as  Wellesley  was  a  serious  step, 
and  fully  accounts  for  the  warm  desire  of  the  Directors 
to  secure  Cornwallis's  return  to  the  post  without  sup 
posing  (as  some  have  done)  that  his  great  name  was 
the  only  help  open  to  the  British  Government  in  a 
dangerous  crisis,  which,  but  for  him,  might  have  ruined 
our  Eastern  Empire.  For  although  Cornwallis  accepted 
the  offer  and  went,  he  went,  as  is  well  known,  only  to 
die,  and  left  his  former  administration  of  India  the 
single  and  sufficient  groundwork  of  his  reputation  in 
that  country. 

Before  passing  from  the  subject  of  these  two  great 
men  and  their  varying  views  of  Indian  policy,  it  is  but 
just  to  pause  and  point  out  that  it  was  not  in  the 
power  of  either,  or  of  any  of  their  successors,  wholly  to 
shape  or  even  to  control  the  limits  of  our  sway  in  Hin- 
dostan.  There  is  a  general  darkness  on  this  subject 
of  Indian  conquest  which  is  hardly  creditable  to  a 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES.  313 

nation  whose  public  writers  are  usually  well  informed 
on  questions  of  merely  practical  policy.  It  has  not 
been  either  a  national  or  individual  lust  of  empire  which 
has  carried  our  standards  from  the  Hooghly  to  the 
Indus.  The  force  of  circumstances  has  been  too  strong 

o 

for  the  most  pacific  in  our  list  of  governors.  In  fact, 
from  the  day  that  our  factories  began  to  hire  troops 
and  take  independent  dealings  with  the  native  states, 
the  result  was  sure.  It  must  be  remembered  that  when 
we  first  set  foot  in  India,  the  foundations  of  the  old 
Mogul  Empire  were  thoroughly  broken  up.  Wave 
after  wave  of  conquest  had  passed  over  it,  destroying 
and  altering  ancient  landmarks,  but  without  raising  up 
any  single  central  power  strong  enough  to  control  the 
rest,  and  to  restore  order  to  the  peninsula.  The  seeds  of 
such  a  one  once  planted  by  the  company,  the  process  of 
growth  went  on  in  the  same  constant  form.  Insult  and 
aggression  on  the  new  civilization  came  naturally  from 
the  native  states  whose  robber-chiefs  had  made  inva 
sion  of  peaceful  neighbors  the  normal  practice  of  their 
rule.  Defeat  of  the  invader  must  needs  involve  pun 
ishment  for  the  past  and  indemnity  for  the  future,  and 
these  could  rarely  be  secured  but  by  the  rough  expe 
dient  of  annexation.  That  this  process  should  be  con 
stant  until  Afghanistan  was  reached  was  simple  neces 
sity  for  a  reason  too  generally  overlooked.  There 
never  was  any  strategic  frontier  to  our  dominions  until 
they  touched  the  mountains  which  separate  Hindostan 
from  the  rest  of  the  world  ;  and  an  empire  like  ours, 
won  by  the  sword,  and  mantained  at  first  mainly  by 
the  force  of  arms,  must  needs  find  such  to  cover  it 
before  it  can  rest.  Only  since  we  were  secure  from 
outward  enemies  has  it  been  found  possible  to  throw 


CORNWALLIS  AND 

the  energy  of  our  government  into  the  path  of  peace 
ful  development  of  its  resources.  A  military  empire, 
such  as  ours  was  purely  until  of  late,  must  conform 
its  policy  to  military  necessities  :  a  truth  we  have  been 
unconsciously  illustrating  ever  since  Clive  began  the 
long  series  of  conquests  forced  on  us  by  those  we  have 
conquered. 

We  have  dwelt  before  on  what  Cornwallis  did  for 
the  services  which  owe  to  him  their  efficiency  and 
virtue.  The  absorbing  policy  of  Wellesley  and  suc 
ceeding  Governors-General,  willingly  or  unwillingly 
pushing  our  frontiers  ever  forward,  gave  to  the  young 
Englishman  who  entered  them  such  a  field  for  energy 
and  ability  as  the  whole  world  beside  could  not  offer. 
The  constant  political  changes  of  the  peninsula,  and 
the  increasing  dominions  forced  against  our  will  as  it 
were  on  us,  raised  up  a  class  of  officers  in  whom  the 
military  and  administrative  elements  seem  to  combine 
so  closely  that  it  is  hard  to  distinguish  where  the  sol 
dier  ends  and  the  diplomatist  or  ruler  begins.  Of  such 
men  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  century,  Malcolm, 
whose  life  in  the  work  before  us  follows  that  of  Corn 
wallis,  may  be  taken  as  the  type,  or  at  least  as  a  very 
happy  example.  Sir  J.  Kaye  has  so  fully  written  on 
the  same  subject  in  his  "  Life  and  Correspondence  of 
Sir.  John  Malcolm,"  that  we  proceed  to  deal  with  this 
part  of  his  volume  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  entering 
a  gentle  remonstrance  against  his  treatment  of  his 
subject.  The  whole  picture  of  Malcolm  which  he 
gives  is  one  overcharged  with  colors  existing  in  the 
biographer's  brain  rather  than  in  the  realities  of  his 
hero's  life.  The  Malcolm  of  Kaye  is  a  man  not  merely 
of  eminent  abilities  and  buoyant  spirits,  but  of  perfect 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES.  315 

purity  of  motives;  badly  rewarded  for  his  services,  yet 
unwilling  to  conceive  himself  ill-used  ;  exquisitely  sen 
sitive  to  disappointment,  yet  always  hopeful  and 
cheery ;  overflowing  with  kind  feelings  for  his  friends, 
and  seeking  promotion  and  honor  solely  to  glorify  a 
beloved  service.  This  just  man,  it  is  implied,  won  his 
way  slowly  up  to  fame  and  fortune  in  spite  of  official 
neglect,  infirmities  of  health,  and  personal  unwilling 
ness  to  remain  in  ungrateful  duties.  Of  course  this 
statement  is  not  put  into  so  many  words,  either  in  the 
"  Life  and  Correspondence"  or  in  the  works  before  us  ; 
but  such  is  the  general  effect  the  author  would,  per 
haps  unconsciously,  impress  on  his  readers.  The  tra 
ditional  view  of  Malcolm  in  India  is  a  very  different 
one,  and  one  which  Sir  J.  Kaye'sown  materials  appear 
fully  to  justify.  According  to  this,  his  hero  was  simply 
a  very  hard-headed,  pushing,  active  man,  with  a  fund 
of  remarkable  spirits  and  energy,  who  never  lost  any 
thing  for  want  of  asking  for  it,  and  had  the  good  luck 
to  start  early  in  life  in  as  fine  an  opening  as  young 
"  political"  ever  knew,  at  the  most  stirring  period  in 
the  whole  of  our  stormy  annals.  Let  us  look  a  little 
closely  at  his  early  progress  and  see  if  the  latter  opin 
ion  be  not  that  which  best  agrees  with  the  facts  as 
they  come  before  us. 

After  a  course  of  boyish  dissipation  and  indebted 
ness  we  find  Malcolm  carried  with  his  regiment  into 
the  field  at  the  age  of  twenty.  He  sees  service,  and, 
what  is  more  to  the  purpose,  observes  the  professional 
advantage  the  "  politicals,"  of  whom  there  are  several 
in  camp,  possess  over  the  mere  soldier.  Not  until  after 
this,  having  been  now  seven  years  in  Madras,  does  he 
begin  seriously  to  study,  and  in  the  next  year  we  find 


CORNWALLIS  AND 

him  applying  for  an  appointment  of  the  coveted   civil 
order.     In  Sir  J.  Kaye's  characteristic  words  : 

"  A  subordinate  post  was  vacant :  he  applied  for  it,  and 
was  just  half  an  hour  too  late.  It  had  been  bestowed  on 
another  young  officer.  His  disappointment  and  vexation  were 
great.  He  went  back  to  his  tent,  flung  himself  down  on  his 
couch,  and  gave  way  to  a  flood  of  tears.  But  he  lived,  as 
many  a  man  before  and  since  has  lived,  to  see  in  his  first 
crushing  miscarriage  the  crowning  mercy  of  his  life.  The 
officer  who  carried  off  the  prize  so  coveted  by  John  Malcolm 
went  straight  to  his  death.  On  his  first  appearance  at  the 
native  court  at  which  he  was  appointed  an  assistant  to  the 
Resident,  he  was  murdered.  This  made  a  deep  impression 
at  the  time  on  Malcolm's  mind,  and  was  afterwards  gratefully 
remembered." 

Disappointed  of  his  first  hopes,  he  was  willing  to 
put  up  with  an  interpretership  to  a  detachment.  He 
left  this  soon  to  go  home  on  sick  leave ;  and  here  was 
more  fortunate,  for  we  find  him  returning  to  Madras  as 
aide-de-camp  to  General  Clarke.  Clarke  went  on  later 
to  Bengal  to  command  there,  but  "  there  were  circum 
stances  which  prevented  him  from  appointing  John 
Malcolm  to  the  military  secretaryship  in  that  Presi 
dency."  In  plain  words,  General  Clarke  had  some  one 
whom  he  cared  more  to  serve  by  the  bestowal  of  a 
very  valuable  situation.  However,  Malcolm  had  now 
become  known  as  an  active  and  useful  man,  and  Harris 
who  succeeded  to  the  command  at  Madras,  kept  him 
on  his  own  staff  at  first,  and  from  this  put  him  tempo 
rarily  into  the  then  lucrative  post  of  town-major,  of 
which  he  wrote,  being  then  apparently  more  bent  on 
making  money  than  seeking  fame,  "  I  cherish  hopes 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES. 


317 


of  being  town-major  a  few  months  longer.  If  I  remain 
one  year  I  shall  have  a  little  foundation  on  which  to 
erect  a  goodly  castle." 

Lord  Wellesley  (then  Lord  Mornington)  now 
touched  at  Madras  on  his  way  to  Calcutta.  The  town- 
major  took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  call  on  the 
new  Viceroy  and  submit  some  reports  he  had  prepared 
on  our  relations  with  the  native  states,  and  soon  after 
wards  received  his  reward  in  the  appointment  of  assist 
ant  to  Kirkpatrick,  then  Resident  at  Mysore,  for  which 
he  had  made  instant  application  on  the  vacancy  occur 
ring.  He  was  twenty-nine  years  old  when  this  first 
step  in  the  desired  ladder  was  gained. 

He  reached  Hyderabad  just  as  the  French  trained 
levy  in  the  Nizam's  service  was  mutinying.  In  the 
dispersion  of  this  contingent  he  played  a  prominent 
part,  being  aided  partly  by  his  own  address  and  bold 
ness,  and  partly  by  his  being  recognized  by  some 
sepoys  of  a  French  battalion  as  an  old  officer  of  the 
regiment  they  had  once  served  in.  He  carried  the 
colors  of  the  extinct  corps  to  Calcutta,  and  received 
the  warm  thanks  of  the  Governor-General,  whose  pat 
ronage  he  had  now  fairly  earned.  When  the  Nizam's 
contingent  soon  after  joined  General  Harris's  force  for 
the  siege  of  Seringapatam,  Malcolm  accompanied  it 
officially.  On  the  fall  of  Tippoo,  Lord  Wellesley 
rewarded  him  for  his  share  by  appointing  him  to  a  spe 
cial  mission  to  Persia,  and  from  this  time  forward  his 
official  fortune  was  made.  He  wrote  hard,  worked 
hard,  and  did  excellent  service,  though  not  without 
some  strange  blunders  here  and  there,  as  when  he 
wrote  to  General  Lake  of  the  Mahrattas  that  "  one 
short  campaign"  would  for  ever  dissipate  their  power. 


2 1 8  CORN WA LLIS  A  ND 

Attached  to  the  force  of  Arthur  Wellesley  in  the  new 
war  at  its  opening,  sickness  took  him  from  the  camp 
before  Assaye  was  won,  and  his  absence,  in  his  biogra 
pher's  hardly  appropriate  phrase,  "  was  long  afterwards 
a  thorn  in  his  flesh." 

Regaining  his  health,  he  settled  into  his  appoint 
ment  as  Resident  of  Mysore.  He  declined  to  follow 
Lord  Wellesley  to  England,  in  order  to  defend  the 
policy  he  had  carried  out  for  his  patron,  and  prepared 
instead  to  assist  in  carrying  out  Cornwallis's  desire  "  to 
wind  up  the  Mahratta  war  with  all  possible  dispatch." 
There  was  much  in  the  pacific  policy  of  the  time  "  that 
was  distasteful  to  Malcolm,"  adds  the  biographer,  who 
takes  rather  unnecessary  credit  to  the  diplomatist  for 
cheerfully  carrying  out  the  orders  of  his  superiors, 
though  not  in  accordance  with  his  personal  views. 

Malcolm  was  now  thirty-seven  years  old.  He  had 
begun  his  political  life  but  eight  years  before,  and  had 
ever  since  enjoyed  employment  and  remuneration  as 
high  as  the  Government  of  India  could  give.  Yet  it 
appears  plainly  that  he  was  restless  and  dissatisfied 
because  he  had  received  no  special  mark  of  favor  from 
the  Crown.  "  I  have  been  rewarded,  I  admit,"  he 
writes,  "by  distinction  in  the  service  ;  but  if  a  man  is 
wished  to  go  on,  further  stimulus  must  be  found.  .  .  . 
I  have  determined,  on  the  most  serious  reflection,  to 
retire.  .  .  .  If  it  is  conceived  that  any  ability,  knowl 
edge,  or  experience  I  possess  can  be  usefully  directed 
to  the  promotion  of  the  public  interest,  I  must  be  stim 
ulated  to  exertion  by  a  fair  prospect  of  just  and  honor 
able  encouragement."  Could  any  man  put  a  higher 
estimate  on  his  own  services  than  the  still  young  officer 
who  thus  wrote  to  the  same  Lord  Wellesley  on  whom 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES. 


319 


not  ten  years  before,  he  had  been  thrusting  his  first 
essays  in  political  writing  with  a  view  to  a  subordinate 
post  ? 

Those  who  know  the  Malcolms  of  real  life  will  not 
be  surprised  that  he  did  not  carry  out  his  "  most  serious 
reflection  "  into  earnest,  and  retire.  On  the  contrary, 
he  stayed  and  carried  on  the  duties  of  his  Residency 
with  tact  and  ability  until  something  better  came. 
Sent  again  to  Persia  to  threaten,  and  to  obtain  the 
material  guarantee  of  an  island  in  the  Gulf,  his  mission 
was  suddenly  stopped  in  favor  of  a  more  pacific  one 
dispatched  from  England.  His  next  employment  was 
an  unfortunate  one,  being  to  quell  the  mutinous  spirit 
of  the  garrison  of  Masulipatam,  where  his  too  lenient 
management  brought  on  him  the  disapproval  of  his 
immediate  superior,  the  then  governor  of  Madras. 
From  this  he  was,  however,  soon  relieved  by  a  new  and 
genuine  appointment  as  Ambassador  to  Persia,  and  the 
varied  ability  he  displayed  there  increased  his  already 
high  reputation,  and  gave  him  the  fair  claim  he  enjoys 
to  literary  distinction.  Another  visit  to  England  sent 
him  back  to  a  further  course  of  honorable  service  in 
India,  where,  however,  he  appears  as  little  satisfied  as 
after  the  Mahratta  war.  The  government  of  Bombay 
was  vacant  and  sought  by  him,  but  conferred  on 
Elphinstone.  "  He  regarded  such  a  nomination  as  a 
supersession  of  his  rightful  claims."  Nor  was  he  less 
disappointed  when  Sir  Thomas  Munro  was  soon  after 
appointed  to  be  governor  of  Madras,  the  other  post  he 
desired.  Some  years  later,  however,  he  won  the  dignity 
he  had  long  sought,  and  was  appointed  to  the  govern 
ment  of  Bombay,  his  last  official  employment.  He 
soon  (1830),  in  his  biographer's  words,  "  was  eager  for 


320 


CORNWALLIS  AND 


England  and  for  rest,"  having  in  reality  the  vision  of  a 
seat  in  parliament  in  his  ever  active  brain.  He  gained 
it ;  but  only  to  lose  it  in  a  few  months  by  the  borough 
being  disfranchised  under  the  Reform  Bill,  where  his 
public  life  may  be  said  to  have  ended. 

Of  such  an  one,  to  assert  with  Sir  J.  Kaye  that  "  he 
was  a  man  sui  generis!'  seems  to  us  a  misconception. 
No  doubt  it  is  correctly  said  that  u  of  all  those  written 
of  in  these  volumes  he  had  the  most  perfect  physical 
organization  ;  "  and  this,  and  perhaps  the  high  value  he 
put  on  his  own   services,  are  his   distinguishing  marks, 
when  we  separate  the  man  from  the  special  opportuni 
ties  of  his  time.     Many  others  of  the  same  bustling  type, 
quick   with  the  pen,  and  ready  with  the  sword,  have 
succeeded   him,  and   to  their  conjoint   efforts  we  owe 
much  of  what  we  are  in  India.     Those  who  read  care 
fully  the  "  Life  of  Burnes,"  as  our  author  gives  it,  will 
discern  at  once  the  family  likeness ;  the  same  fondness 
for  writing,  the  same  love  for  stirring  work,  the  same 
discontent  too  if  his  reward  proved  anything  less  than 
his  highest  desires.     Indeed  there  are  several  of  whom 
Sir  J.  Kaye  has  written  who  have  shared  the  energy 
and  talent  which  carried  Malcolm  to  fame  and  fortune, 
and  shared  his  foibles  too.     But  in  Sir  Henry  Lawrence 
a  nobler  and   higher  model   is  offered  ;  for  he  was  one 
of    those   great    men   whose     unselfish    heroism    rose 
beyond  the  thought  of  his  own  desert  and  reward,  and 
who   throughout  life,  as   he   wrote  for  his  own  brief 
memorial,  "  tried  to   do  his  duty,"  rather  than  to  win 
fame.     Take  indeed  our  governing  classes  in  India  for 
all  in  all,  no  other  nation  administering  wide  conquests 
can  boast  of  servants  who,  amid  all  the  temptations  set 
before  those  who  rule  a  subject  race,  have  so  steadfastly 


THE  INDIAN  SERVICES. 


321 


sought  the  public  good,  and  even  in  their  very  ambi 
tion  advanced  the  prosperity  and  cared  for  the  welfare 
of  those  committed  to  their  charge. 

Or  for  mere  soldiership,  a  quality  hardly  less  neces 
sary,  take  from  the  records  before  us  the  story  of  Nich 
olson — name  ever  to  be  bound  up  in  history  with  the 
turning  point  of  the  great  Mutiny,  the  fall  of  Delhi — 
one  of  whom  it  is  impossible  for  even  so  eulogistic  a 
writer  as  Sir  J.  Kaye  to  speak  in  exaggerated  terms. 
Those  who  are  most  conversant  with  the  details  of  that 
season  of  trial  are  most  ardent  in  their  praise  of  the  lost 
hero.  While  the  gallant  little  band,  wasted  by  sick 
ness  and  by  sword,  held  with  unflinching  constancy 
their  post  in  view  of  the  rebellious  fortress,  awaiting  the 
reinforcements  preparing  in  the  Punjab,  it  was  the  arm 
of  Nicholson  which  first  quelled  each  attempt  to  spread 
disorder  in  that  province,  and  then  brought  them 
timely  succor.  From  that  day  the  British  forces,  no 
longer  struggling  for  their  own  existence,  became  in 
truth  a  besieging  army  instead  of  a  camp  beleaguered 
by  the  rebels.  They  went  to  their  hard  but  glorious 
work  with  confidence,  for  their  long  line  of  supply  was 
guarded  with  a  fierce  vigilance  that  mocked  the  enemy's 
attempts  to  break  it.  When  the  day  arrived  on  which 
their  hopes  were  to  be  crowned,  none  murmured  that 
the  post  of  honor  at  the  head  of  the  attack  was  given 
to  one  whose  name  seemed  a  pledge  of  victory.  And 
when  Nicholson  fell,  sacrificing  his  life  to  give  an 
example  to  reluctant  followers — although  the  breach 
was  won,  the  avenging  column  lodged  within  the  city, 
the  hopes  of  the  mutineers  broken  for  ever — the  joy  of 
the  victorious  army  and  their  sympathizing  countrymen 
was  dimmed  by  the  knowledge  of  the  hero's  fall.  His 
21 


322 


CORN  WALLIS  AND  THE  INDIAN  SER  VICE. 


late  chief,  Lord  Lawrence,  but  expressed  the  universal 
feeling  when  he  wrote,  "  his  loss  is  a  national  misfor 
tune."  "  Few  men,"  adds  Sir  J.  Kaye,  in  words  whichj 
we  borrow  with  pleasure,  "have  done  so  much  at  the 
early  age  of  thirty-five — few  men  thus  passing  away' 
from  the  scene  in  the  flower  of  their  manhood,  havei 
ever  left  behind  them  a  reputation  so  perfect  and 
complete." 

And  if  the  Indian  services  have  been  thus  honor 
ably   distinguished,  if  purity  has  gone  hand  in  hand| 
with  the  valor,  zeal,  and  energy  that  have  gained  and  con 
solidated  for  us  the  inheritance  of  the  Mogul,  it  is  due; 
far  more  than  to  any  other  personal  cause  to  the  far-see 
ing  judgment  and  wise  liberality   of  the  true  founder, 
the  great    and    good    Cornwallis.     From  the  time  he 
bequeathed  his  finished  work  to  others,  India  has  never 
lacked — our  severest  critics  admit  it — such  administra-i 
tors  and  defenders  as  subject  empire  never  knew  before,  j 
And  if  this  be  indeed  so  ;  if  men  like  Malcolm,  Law-' 
rence,  and    Nicholson   be   but   fair   specimens   of  the 
growth  which  Indian  responsibilities  and  Indian  work! 
can  nourish  from  the  British  stock ;  shall  we  lament  the' 
existence  of  our  Eastern  empire,  and  shrink  from  the 
duties  its  possession  devolves  upon  us?     Rather  let  us 
take  heart  for  the  work,  in  faith  that  the  same  honesty, 
courage,  and   sagacity   that   have   won  Hindostan  for 
Britain  will  be  found  ready  at  call  to  maintain  the  trust, 
and  make  the  mingling  of  their  races  a  blessing  to  far 
generations. 


A    CAROLINA   LOYALIST   IN   THE  REVOLU 
TIONARY  WAR. 

[The  following  memoir  is  strictly  authentic,  and  is  here  published 
nearly  as  left  by  the  narrator  for  the  information  of  his  children.  A 
family  interest  in  it  would  be  no  proper  excuse  for  the  introduction  of  it 
here.  But  it  paints  the  American  Revolutionary  War  in  the  Southern 
States,  where  Cornwallis  won  his  military  fame,  from  a  point  of  view 
that  has  been  hitherto  quite  unknown  to  English  readers  at  any  rate. 
And  to  mention  but  one  of  several  curious  parallelisms  in  the  two  strug 
gles  ;  in  the  account  of  the  chief  action  the  writer  shared  in,  the  fight  at 
King's  Mountain,  military  men  may  discover  the  birth  of  that  tactical 
use  of  mounted  infantry  with  which  Sheridan  won  the  battle  of  Five 
Forks,  and  ended  at  a  blow  the  greater  American  Civil  War  of  our  own 
day.] 

I  WAS  the  eldest  son  of  a  large  family  who  emigrated 
from  Ireland  at  the  advice  of  some  relatives  who  had 
been  settled  for  several  years  in  South  Carolina.  In 
1773  our  family  were  living  on  Packolet  River,  about 
twelve  miles  from  where  it  empties  itself  into  Broad 
River,  fifty  miles  below  where  the  line  of  the  Cherokee 
Indian  reserve  then  existing  crossed  that  river.  The 
plantation  was  about  200  miles  north-west  of  Charles 
ton.  We  were  established  in  our  new  residence,  and 
working  hard  at  the  usual  farming  occupations,  increas 
ing  stock,  and  clearing  additional  land,  when  in  1775 
resolutions  were  presented  for  signature  at  the  meet 
ing-house  by  the  Congress  Party,  and  I  opposed  them. 


324  A   CAROLINA  LOYALIST  IN 

When  war  broke  out  between  England  and  America, 
the  Congress  Party,  early  in  1775,  were  sending  a 
quantity  of  ammunition  and  clothing  as  presents  to 
the  Indians;  on  which  the  loyalists  who  had  not  joined 
them  assembled,  and  went  to  Fort  '96,  a  post  on  the 
Georgian  frontier  made  against  the  red  men,  and  after 
besieging  the  fort  for  several  days  took  it  and  the 
stores.  After  distributing  the  ammunition  among  the 
loyalists,  both  parties  agreed  to  a  cessation  of  arms  for 
some  weeks,  until  several  of  the  leading  men  could 
receive  directions  in  the  business  from  Lord  William 
Campbell,  the  governor  at  Charleston. 

Owing  to  the  assistance  I  early  afforded,  and  my 
activity  in  the  cause  of  my  king,  I  was  shortly  after 
made  a  prisoner  by  the  revolutionary  party,  my  house 
being  ransacked,  and  was  kept  a  prisoner  in  the  camp 
on  Reedy  River  for  about  a  week.  Colonel  Richard 
son  released  me ;  but  the  Congress  Party  wished  that  I 
should  be  tried  at  Richardson's  Camp,  or  be  forced  to 
join  the  rebel  army  ;  which  latter  alternative  I  should 
have  been  driven  to  choose,  in  order  to  save  my 
father's  family  from  threatened  ruin  ;  for  he  had  been 
made  prisoner  already  for  harboring  some  loyalists,  and 
his  life  was  in  danger.  But  the  first  disturbances  ended 
soon  after. 

I  returned  to  farming  in  June  1777,  when  I  pur 
chased  a  tract  of  land  on  Packolet  River,  where  I 
remained  a  short  time.  But  at  a  muster  soon  after 
wards,  when  the  Indians  rose,  taking  advantage  of  our 
divisions,  I  was  chosen  lieutenant  in  Captain  Bullock's 
company  of  militia  by  my  loyal  friends.  I  went  with 
a  party  to  Earlsfort,  on  the  Indian  line,  at  the  head  of 
Packolet  River,  about  fifty  miles  from  home,  and 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  325 

repaired  the  fort ;  continued  some  months  there,  and 
was  relieved  the  May  following  (1778)  by  the  white 
inhabitants  making  peace  with  the  Indians  at  Duet's 
Corner. 

It  was  firmly  believed  in  the  beginning  of  this  year 
that  Charleston  would  be  reduced  by  the  British,  which 
happened  accordingly,  on  May  twelfth  following ;  and 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  having  issued  a  proclamation  com 
manding  all  his  Majesty's  faithful  subjects  to  embody 
for  the  defence  of  his  government,  I  obeyed  it.  About 
the  middle  of  June,  being  embodied  with  the  militia 
as  lieutenant,  I  commanded  in  an  affair  at  Bullock's 
Creek,  when  the  rebel  party  was  defeated  in  attempt 
ing  to  cross  the  ford. 

I  then  joined  Colonel  Balfour,  and  was  in  an  affair 
at  Wood's  house,  above  the  Iron  Works  on  Packolet 
River.  Colonel  Balfour  then  returned  to  Fort  '96,  and 
Major  Ferguson,  who  had  raised  a  corps  of  loyalists 
known  as  Ferguson's  Sharp-shooters,  succeeded  to  the 
command,  under  the  title  of  Colonel  and  Inspector-Gen 
eral  of  Militia.  Shortly  afterwards  he  marched  to 
Thickety  Creek,  encamped,  and  requested  me  to  carry 
an  express  to  Captain  Moore,  then  Commandant  of 
Anderson's  Fort,  on  the  North  Carolina  side,  with  a 
private  message  to  hold  the  fort  till  the  last  minute. 
Before  I  could  return  the  army  had  moved,  about  mid 
night,  and  retreated  towards  Tiger  River,  where  I 
joined  them  ;  and  we  got  an  account  that  Colonel 
McDale  had,  without  opposition,  reduced  Anderson's 
Fort  and  made  the  garrison  all  prisoners,  Moore  hav 
ing  shamefully  surrendered  it.  This  disappointed 
Ferguson's  scheme  of  bringing  the  Americans  to  battle 
while  attacking  it.  Major  Gibbs  came  to  me  in  this 


326  A   CAROLINA  LOYALIST  IN 

situation  of  affairs,  showed  me  a  paper  containing 
instructions  to  go  to  McDale's  Congress  camp  at  the 
Cherokee  Ford,  on  Broad  River,  and  learn  their  com 
mander's  name,  what  carriages  they  had,  how  many 
horses  and  foot,  and  whenever  they  made  any  move 
ments  towards  Colonel  Ferguson.  I  was  to  return  and 
let  him  know,  and  he  added  that  there  would  be  a 
handsome  reward.  I  told  Major  Gibbs  that  what  ser 
vices  I  could  do  were  not  with  any  pecuniary  view,  and 
that  I  would  undertake  this  difficult  task  for  the  good 
of  his  Majesty's  service,  since  he  could  not  procure  a 
better  qualified  person  to  undertake  it.  I  set  out  imme 
diately  (August  eighth),  and  at  Packolet  got  a  man  to 
go  with  me  who  was  acquainted  with  the  North  Caro 
lina  people.  We  went  to  McDale's  camp  at  night, 
without  being  noticed,  and  found  who  were  their  lead 
ers,  and  that  500  horsemen  were  gone  over  to  attack 
Michell's  Fort.  With  this  news  I  returned,  and  found 
a  loyalist  in  whom  I  could  confide,  and  sent  him  off 
with  the  particulars  by  one  route  to  Colonel  Ferguson 
while  I  went  by  another,  and  the  colonel  got  intelli 
gence  in  time  enough  to  intercept  the  enemy  at  the 
Iron  Works  and  defeat  them.  In  returning  I  was  taken 
by  a  party  of  rebels,  who  took  from  me  a  rifle  borrowed 
of  my  brother-in-law ;  but  as  soon  as  they  set  out  for 
the  rebel  camp  I  made  my  escape,  joined  Colonel  Fer 
guson,  and  received  his  thanks  and  friendship. 

On  August  ninth  I  was  appointed  captain  and 
assistant  adjutant-general  to  the  different  battalions  now 
gathered  under  Colonel  Ferguson.  The  same  day  we 
attacked  the  enemy  at  the  Iron  Works,  and  defeated 
them  with  little  trouble  to  ourselves  and  a  good  deal 
of  loss  to  the  Americans,  in  whose  hands  I  found  some 


THE  RE  VOL  UTIONA  RY  WAR.  327 

of  our  men  prisoners,  whom  I  released.  Our  next 
route  was  down  towards  the  Fishdam  Ford,  on  Broad 
River,  where  there  was  a  fight  (August  twelfth)  near 
the  mouth  of  Brown's  Creek,  with  Neil's  militia,  where 
we  made  many  prisoners,  among  the  rest  Esau  Smith, 
one  of  those  who  had  taken  me  so  recently.  After  this 
we  crossed  that  river  and  formed  a  junction  with  the 
troops  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Turnbull  and 
the  militia  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Phillips,  and 
having  received  accounts  that  Sumter,  with  a  detach 
ment  of  General  Gates's  army,  had  cut  off  our  retreat  to 
Lord  Cornwallis's  camp  at  Camden,  we  had  it  in  con 
templation  to  cross  Broad  River  and  retreat  to  Charles 
ton.  At  this  time  the  half-way  men  (as  those  not 
hearty  in  the  cause  were  called)  left  us ;  we  then 
marched  to  an  estate  of  the  rebel  Colonel  Winn's  and 
encamped  there,  waiting  for  more  authentic  accounts. 
On  the  sixteenth  we  heard  a  heavy  firing  towards 
Camden,  which  kept  us  in  the  utmost  anxiety  until  the 
eighteenth,  when  a  letter  was  received  from  Captain 
Ross,  aide-de-camp  to  Lord  Cornwallis,  informing  us 
that  his  lordship  had  attacked  and  defeated  Gates's 
army,  and  killed  or  taken  2,200  men,  1 8  ammunition 
wagons  and  350  common  ones,  with  provisions  and 
other  stores.  But  the  next  night  we  received  an  ex 
press  that  the  rebels  had  defeated  Colonel  Ennis  at  the 
Enora.  This  occasioned  a  rapid  march  that  way.  The 
main  body  having  crossed  the  Enora,  I  was  left  behind 
in  command  of  the  rear-guard,  and  being  attacked  in 
that  situation,  we  maintained  our  ground  until  the 
main  body  recrossed  to  our  support.  The  Americans 
retreated  after  suffering  some  loss  (August  twenty-first). 
While  at  the  Iron  Works  shortly  afterwards  a  party 


228  A   CAROLINA  LOYALIST  IN 

of  loyalists  with  whom  I  was,  defeated  Colonel  Banner 
man's  party,  and  dispersed  them.  I  was  present  also 
at  a  small  affair  at  Fair  Forest,  the  particulars  of  which 
as  well  as  the  numerous  other  skirmishes,  have  escaped 
my  memory ;  scarcely  a  day,  however,  passed  without 
some  fighting. 

A  dissatisfaction  prevailed  at  this  time  among  the 
militia,  founded  on  General  Clinton's  proclamation, 
which  required  every  man  having  but  three  children, 
and  every  single  man,  to  do  four  months'  duty  out  of 
their  own  province  when  required.  This  appeared  like 
acting  under  compulsion,  instead  of  voluntarily,  as  they 
conceived  they  were  doing,  and  they  were  in  conse 
quence  ready  to  give  up  the  cause  ;  but,  owing  to  the 
exertions  of  their  officers  (and,  indeed,  I  believe  very 
greatly  through  my  instrumentality),  the  tumult  was 
happily  appeased,  and  the  same  night  we  marched  with 
all  the  horse  and  some  foot  past  Gilbertstown  against 
Colonel  Grimes,  who  was  raising  a  body  of  rebels  to 
oppose  us.  We  succeeded  in  dispersing  them  and 
taking  many  prisoners,  and  then  joined  the  force  at 
Gilbertstown,  and  encamped  there  for  some  time,  send 
ing  away  the  old  men  to  their  houses,  and  several  offi 
cers  to  raise  men  to  supply  their  places  and  strengthen 
us.  Colonel  Ferguson  soon  after  got  intelligence  that 
Colonel  McDale  was  encamped  on  Cain  and  Silver 
Creeks,  on  which  we  marched  towards  the  enemy, 
crossed  the  Winding  Creek  twenty-thre'e  times,  and 
found  the  rebel  party  strongly  posted  towards  the 
head  of  it  near  the  Blue  Mountains.  We  attacked 
them  instantly,  and  after  a  determined  resistance  de 
feated  them  and  made  many  prisoners.  The  rest  fled 
towards  Turkey  Cove,  in  order  to  cross  the  mountains 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


329 


and  get  to  Holstein.*  On  this  occasion  I  commanded 
a  division,  and  took  the  person  prisoner  who  was 
keeper  of  the  records  of  the  county. 

Our  spies  from  beyond  the  mountains  brought 
intelligence  in  October  that  the  rebels  were  embodying 
rapidly.  Other  spies  brought  in  word  that  Colonel 
Clarke,  with  a  corps  of  backwoodsmen  raised  in  the 
mountains  towards  the  Tennessee,  had  taken  Fort 
Augusta  with  its  stores.  This  proved  to  be  false,  for 
he  had  been  beaten  off  by  the  loyalists  there  after 
a  stout  fight.  However,  we  at  that  time  believed  it 
and  marched  towards  White  Oak  and  Green  River  to 
intercept  him  on  his  return  from  Georgia.  Colonel 
Ferguson  detached  the  horse  in  three  divisions,  one 
under  my  command,  with  orders  to  proceed  along  the 
Indian  line  until  I  could  make  out  Clarke's  route  and 
join  Captain  Taylor  at  Earl's  Fort.  I  proceeded  as 
far  as  Tiger  River,  and  there  learning  that  Clarke  was 
gone  up  the  Bushy  Fork  of  Saluda  River,  I  took  six 
of  the  best  mounted  men,  and  got  on  his  track  until  I 
overtook  the  main  body,  and  made  one  of  the  enemy 
prisoner  within  view  of  it.  I  carried  him  to  Colonel 
Ferguson,  who  then  obtained  the  required  information. 
Our  spies  from  Holstein,  as  well  as  some  left  at  the 
gap  of  the  mountains,  brought  us  word  that  the  rebel 
force  amounted  to  full  3,000  men ;  on  which  unex 
pected  news  we  retreated  along  the  north  side  of 
Broad  River,  and  sent  the  wagons  along  the  south  side 
as  far  as  Cherokee  Ford.  Here  they  joined  us,  and  we 
proceeded  to  King's  Mountain  with  the  view  of  ap- 

*  Now  known  as  the  Holston  Valley,  in  which  is  Knoxville,  success 
fully  defended  by  Burnside  against  Longstreet  at  the  crisis  of  the  Ameri 
can  Civil  War  in  1863. 


330 


A   CAROLINA  ROYALIST  IN 


preaching  Lord  Cornwallis's  army  and  receiving  support 
from  Charlottetown  or  from  some  of  the  detachments 
of  his  regulars.  By  Colonel  Ferguson's  order  I  sent 
expresses  to  the  militia  officers  to  join  us  here  ;  but 
we  were  attacked  (October  ninth)  before  any  support 
arrived  by  1,500  picked  men  from  Gilbertstown,  on  the 
Blue  Mountains  side,  under  the  command  of  Colonels 
Cleveland,  Selby,  and  Campbell,  all  of  whom  were 
armed  witJi  rifles,  and  being  well  mounted  could  move 
witk  the  utmost  celerity.  So  rapid  was  the  attack,  that 
I  was  in  the  act  of  dismounting  to  report  that  all  was 
quiet  when  we  heard  their  firing  about  half  a  mile  dis 
tant.  I  immediately  paraded  the  men  and  posted  the 
officers.  During  this  short  interval  I  received  a  wound, 
which,  however,  did  not  prevent  my  doing  my  duty, 
and  on  going  towards  my  horse  I  found  he  had  been 
killed. 

King's  mountain,*  from  its  height,  would  have 
enabled  us  to  oppose  a  superior  force  with  advantage, 
had  it  not  been  covered  with  wood,  which  sheltered 
the  Americans  and  enabled  them  to  fight  in  their  fa 
vorite  manner.  In  fact,  after  driving  in  our  pickets, 
they  were  enabled  to  advance  in  three  divisions,  under 
separate  leaders,  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  in  perfect  safety, 
until  they  took  post,  and  opened  an  irregular  but 
destructive  fire  from  behind  trees  and  other  cover. 
Colonel  Cleveland's  was  first  perceived,  and  repulsed 

*  It  is  a  far-outlying  spur  of  the  Blue  Mountains.  The  defeat  and 
death  of  P'erguson  here  crushed  the  royalist  cause  on  the  mountain  bor 
der  of  South  Carolina  entirely  and  decided  Cornwallis  to  retire  from 
Charlottetown  and  abandon  his  inland  operations  in  North  Carolina. 
The  reader  will  notice  that  the  victors  owed  their  surprise  of  and  success 
over  the  loyalist  militia  as  much  to  their  acting  as  mounted  riflemen  as 
to  superior  force. 


THE  RE  VOL  UTIONAR  Y  WAR. 


331 


by  a  charge  made  by  Colonel  Ferguson  ;  Colonel  Sel- 
by's  next,  and   met  a  similar  fate,  being  driven  down 
the  hill;  lastly,  the   detachment   under  Colonel  Camp 
bell,  and  by  desire   of  Colonel  Ferguson  I  presented  a 
new  front,  which  opposed  it  with  success.     By  this  time 
the    other   Americans   who    had    been    repulsed    had 
regained  their  former  stations,  and,  sheltered  behind 
trees,  poured  in   an  irregular,  destructive  fire.     In  this 
manner  the  engagement  was  maintained  near  an  hour, 
the  mountaineers  flying  when  there  was    danger   of 
being  charged  by  the  bayonet,  and  returning  again  so 
soon  as  the  British  detachment  had  faced  about  to  repel 
another  of  their  parties.     Colonel  Ferguson  was  at  last 
recognized  by  his  gallantry,   although  wearing  a  hunt 
ing-shirt,  and  fell  pierced  by  seven  balls  at  the  moment 
he  had  killed  the  American  Colonel  Williams  with  his 
left  hand,  the  right  being  useless.     I  had  just  relieved 
the  troops  a  second   time  by  Ferguson's  orders,  when 
Captain  de  Poyster  succeeded  to  the  command.     He 
soon  after  sent  out  a  flag  of  truce  ;  but  as  the  Ameri 
cans   renewed   their   fire    afterwards,    ours    was   also 
renewed  under  the   supposition  that  they   would  give 
no  quarter,  and  a  dreadful  havoc  took  place  until  the 
flag  was  sent   out  a  second   time;  then  the  work  of 
destruction    ceased.     The    Americans   surrounded    us 
with  double  lines,  and  we  grounded  arms  with  the  loss 
of  one-third  of  our  number. 

I  had  been  wounded  by  the  first  fire,  but  was  so 
much  occupied  that  I  scarcely  felt  it  until  the  action 
was  over.  We  passed  the  night  on  the  spot  where  we 
surrendered,  amid  the  dead  and  groans  of  the  dying, 
who  had  neither  surgical  aid  nor  water  to  quench  their 
thirst.  Early  next  morning  we  marched  at  a  rapid 


332 


A  CAROLINA  LO  YALIST  IN 


pace  towards    Gilbertstown,  between  double  lines  of 
mounted   Americans.     The    officers   in  the    rear  were 
obliged  to  carry  two  muskets  each,  which  was  my  case, 
although   wounded   and    stripped    of    my    shoes   (for 
the  silver  buckles)  in  an  inclement  season,  without  cov 
ering  or  provisions,  until  Monday  night,  when  an  ear  of 
Indian  corn  was  served  to   each.     At  Gilbertstown  a 
mock   trial   was    held   and    twenty-four  sentenced    to 
death  ;  ten  of  them  suffered  before  the  approach  of 
Tarleton's  loyalist  cavalry  force  obliged  our  captors  to 
move  towards  the   Yadkin,  cutting  and  striking  us  by 
road   in   a   savage   manner.     Colonel    Cleveland    then 
offered  to  enlarge  me  on  condition  that  I  would  teach 
his  regiment  for  one  month  the  exercise  practiced  by 
Colonel  Ferguson,  which  I  refused,  although  he  swore 
I  should   suffer  death  for  it  when  we  got  to   Moravian 
Town.     Happily,  his  threat  was  not  put  to  the  test,  as 
I  had  the  good  fortune  to  make  my  escape  one  evening 
when  close  to  that  place.     In  the  hurry  to  get  away  I 
took  the  wrong  road,  and  did  not   discover  my  error 
until  I   was    close   to  the   town.     I  then  retraced  my 
steps  until  close  to  the  pickets  I  had  left,  and  taking  a 
fresh    departure  I   crossed    the  Yadkin    River    before 
morning,  and  proceeded   through  the   woods  towards 
home.     John  Wedyman,  one  of  my  company,  had  sup 
plied  me  with  a  pair  of  shoes,  which  were  of  great  use 
on  this  occasion  ;  but  as  he  remained  a  prisoner,  I  never 
had  an  opportunity  of  making  him  a  return. 

The  first  night  I  slept  in  the  woods,  and  next  day 
I  was  supported  by  haws  and  grapes  as  I  could  find 
them. 

The  second  or  third  day,  in  pushing  through  the 
woods  to  get  to  a  ford,  I  heard  a  noise  of  some  people 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


333 


(whom  I  knew  to  be  Americans  by  white  paper  in  their 
hats),  on  which  I  lay  down,  and  was  so  close  to  them 
that  I  could  have  touched  one  of  their  horses  in  pass 
ing  ;  fortunately,  I  was  not  observed,  and  soon  after 
crossed  the  creek  after  them.  I  then  made  for  the 
mountains  in  order  to  be  guided  by  the  Apalachian 
range  (the  higher  part  of  the  Blue  Mountains),  and  get 
over  the  rivers  with  greater  facility.  After  crossing 
Broad  River,  I  met  one  Heron,  who  had  been  with  me 
in  King's  Mountain,  and  who  had,  with  some  others, 
taken  flight  early  in  the  action,  putting  white  paper  in 
their  hats,  by  which  disgraceful  stratagem  they  had  got 
through  the  American  lines.  I  passed  a  night  at 
Heron's  house,  and  one  at  another  man's  on  whom  I 
could  depend  ;  from  both  I  got  some  provisions :  all 
the  other  nights  I  slept  out,  amounting  to  about  twelve 
or  fourteen. 

I  reached  my  home  on  the  Packolet  on  October 
thirty-first,  and  found  the  Americans  had  left  me  little 
there.  But  not  knowing  where  to  find  any  British 
troops,  I  continued  for  some  time  about  the  place, 
during  which,  as  the  Americans  had  possession  of  the 
country,  I  was  obliged  to  conceal  myself  in  a  cave  dug 
in  the  branch  of  a  creek;  here,  with  two  of  my  cousins, 
we  remained,  although  there  was  not  room  to  sit 
upright.  My  cousin's  wife  brought  us  food  and  intelli 
gence  every  night.  After  learning  that  Colonel  Tarleton 
had  defeated  the  rebels  under  Sumter  at  Blackstock's 
Fort  on  Tiger  River,  and  so  revived  the  King's  cause, 
I  raised  with  great  difficulty  a  company,  and  joined  a 
strong  party  at  Colonel  Williams's  house  on  Little 
River,  where  there  was  a  force  under  General  Cun- 


334  A   CAROLINA  LOYALIST  IN 

ningham,  a  loyalist  colonel  who  had  just  been  appoint 
ed  brigadier  of  militia  by  Lord  Cornwallis. 

Major  Plumber  having  been  wounded  at  King's 
Mountain,  the  command  of  our  regiment  of  militia 
devolved  on  Major  First,  who  directed  me  to  assemble 
my  company  and  follow  him  to  an  appointed  place  on 
the  Enora.  On  coming  to  the  rendezvous,  I  found  to 
my  surprise  and  mortification  that  it  was  occupied  by 
Major  Roebuck,  an  American  officer.  His  detachment 
immediately  disarmed  us  and  marched  us  of.  Major 
First,  in  order  to  retrieve  the  blunder,  pursued  Roebuck, 
and  attacked  him  when  advantageously  posted.  First 
was  killed,  and  his  party  retreated.  Roebuck,  who 
was  formerly  acquainted  with  me,  parolled  me  to  Fort 
'96,  where  I  was  exchanged  for  a  Captain  Clarke.  I 
was  then  directed  to  assume  the  command  of  the  fort 
which  I  strengthened.  Soon  after  Colonel  Tarleton 
came  into  the  district  in  quest  of  General  Morgan,  who 
had  been  sent  that  way  with  a  brigade  by  Gates,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  rebels  in  this  country. 
Failing  to  get  intelligence  of  his  situation,  Tarleton 
sent  me  for  that  purpose,  as  well  as  to  compel  the  mills 
to  grind  for  the  army.  My  knowledge  of  the  country 
enabled  me  soon  to  discover  the  enemy ;  but  I  found 
that  his  party  had  destroyed  or  carried  away  every 
thing  from  my  own  house. 

On  January  seventeenth  1781,  Colonel  Tarleton 
attacked  the  enemy  near  the  Cowpens  on  Thicket  Creek. 
We  were  totally  discomfited.  The  Americans  were 
posted  behind  a  rivulet,  with  their  riflemen  in  front 
and  cavalry  in  the  rear.  Colonel  Tarleton  charged  at 
the  head  of  his  regiment  of  cavalry  called  the  British 
Legion,  which  had  been  completed  from  the  prisoners 


TUB  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


335 


taken  at  the  battle  of  Camden  by  Lord  Cornwallis. 
The  cavalry  were  supported  by  a  detachment  of  the 
/ist  Regiment  under  Major  McArthur.  The  enemy's 
riflemen  were  broken  without  difficulty,  but  the  late 
prisoners,  seeing  their  own  regiment  opposed  to  them 
beyond,  would  not  proceed  against  it,  and  broke ;  the 
remainder  charged,  but  were  repulsed  ;  this  gave  the 
front  line  of  the  enemy  time  to  rally  and  form  in  the 
rear  of  his  cavalry,  which  charged  the  /ist  (who  were 
then  unsupported),  making  many  prisoners.  The  rout 
was  almost  total.  I  was  with  Tarleton  in  the  charge, 
who  behaved  bravely  but  imprudently.  The  force  was 
dispersed  in  every  direction,  besides  losing  the  guns  and 
many  prisoners.* 

My  men  being  dispersed,  I  desired  them  to  meet 
me  at  General  Cunningham's,  and  proceeded  towards 
my  home,  now  despoiled  of  everything.  I  had  not 
even  a  blanket  left,  or  a  change  of  clothes  ;  added  to 
this,  I  had  no  money  and  no  pecuniary  resources. 
Being  unable  to  persuade  General  Cunningham  to  use 
any  exertions  towards  embodying  his  regiment  again,  I 
proceeded  to  Charleston,  where  unexpectedly  I  met 
several  British  officers  who  had  been  taken  at  King's 
Mountain.  These  aided  me  in  getting  remuneration 
for  some  cattle  and  provisions  I  had  supplied  Colonel 
Ferguson's  detachment  with,  and  superadded  the  kind- 

*  This  action  of  the  Cowpens,  fought  by  Lord  Cornwallis's  orders  to 
clear  his  rear  of  Morgan,  before  commencing  a  second  contemplated 
invasion  of  North  Carolina,  caused  him  to  abandon  his  design,  and  so 
gave  the  last  blow  to  the  loyal  interest  in  that  quarter.  Its  details  have 
never  before  been  fully  explained.  In  all  these  petty  affairs  defeat  to 
the  loyalists  proved  almost  annihilation,  says  a  local  historian — a  strong 
proof  of  the  unpopularity  of  their  cause.  The  "  rebels,"  when  beaten, 
soon  got  together  again,  as  they  found  shelter  and  friends  in  all  quarters. 


336  A   CAROLINA  LOYALIST  IN 

ness  of  introducing  me  to  Colonel  Balfour,  Comman 
ant  of  Charleston,  who,  hearing  from  them  of  n 
great  activity,  and  that  I  had  lost  my  all,  gave  me  ; 
order  to  Mr.  Cruden,  commissioner  of  sequestrat< 
estates,  to  accommodate  me  in  one  of  them  with  n 
family.  This  produced  an  order  to  Colonel  Balling; 
and  Mr.  Kinsay  at  Jacksonsborough,  who  ordered  n 
a  house  and  provisions,  with  the  use  of  three  negro 
to  attend  my  family.  Thus  was  I  at  once  introduc< 
to  a  new  set  of  loyalists ;  and  I  immediately  remove 
to  my  new  residence  near  Parker's  River  on  Pondpor 
River. 

The  rebels  however  increased  much  in  the  neig 
borhood  of  Pondpond,  and  a  general  rising  beir 
expected,  I  sent  an  express  to  Colonel  Balfour  : 
acquaint  him  with  it.  He  detached  100  men  to  brir 
off  the  militia  from  Pondpond.  By  his  desire  I  wei 
to  communicate  confidential  intelligence  to  Capta: 
Kime  at  Mott's  house,  near  Nelson's  ferry,  on  tl 
Santee  River,  which  journey  of  120  miles  I  performs 
in  twenty-four  hours.  I  then  returned  to  Charlesto 
and,  at  the  instance  of  Colonel  Balfour,  raised  a  troc 
of  horse,  and  was  stationed  at  Dorchester,  a  stron 
British  post,  and  moved  my  family  thither.  We  ha 
not  been  at  this  place  long  before  I  ascertained  th; 
Major  Snipe,  Colonel  Haynes,  and  Marion,  the  famoi 
rebel  cavalry  partisan,  had  returned,  crossed  Pom 
pond  River,  and  were  embodying  troops.  I  commun 
cated  this  to  Lord  Rawdon  (afterwards  Lord  Has 
ings),  who  had  served  in  the  first  Carolina  campaign  i 
brigadier  under  Cornwallis,  and  took  command  whe 
the  latter  general  went  northwards  to  Petersbur 
under  orders  to  make  a  junction  with  Clinton  in  Vi: 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


337 


ginia.  His  lordship  immediately  ordered  out  a  detach 
ment,  of  which  I  was  one.  We  crossed  Pondpond 
River  at  Parker's  ferry;  and  the  boats  having  been 
removed  to  impede  our  march,  I  swam  my  horse  over, 
accompanied  by  some  others,  and  procured  feather 
beds  to  transport  those  across  who  could  not  swim. 
We  then  proceeded  rapidly  and  reached  Snipe's  plan 
tation  by  daylight,  which  we  soon  cleared  of  him  and 
his  party,  driving  them  out  with  loss.  On  this  occa 
sion  I  was  wounded  in  the  thigh  with  a  spear  by  a 
man  concealed  in  a  ditch  while  in  the  act  of  leaping 
my  horse  over  it ;  but  I  took  him  prisoner,  and  con 
veyed  him  with  the  others  made  on  this  occasion  to 
Dorchester.  About  this  time  a  detachment  was  sent, 
and  succeeded  in  taking  Colonel  Haynes,  who  soon 
after  deservedly  suffered  for  treason,  as  it  was  dis 
covered  that  he  had  communicated  with  the  rebels 
while  acting  as  a  British  commissary.  At  this  period 
there  were  daily  skirmishes,  the  Americans  constantly 
contracting  our  posts  in  every  direction. 

In  the  beginning  of  July  I  joined  the  army  under 
Lord  Rawdon,-  then  marching  towards  Fort  '96  to 
relieve  the  place.  On  our  approach,  the  Americans 
who  were  besieging  it  broke  up,  crossed  Broad  River, 
and  proceeded  along  the  left  bank  towards  Charles 
ton.  This  was  our  last  movement  inland,  for  the 
loyalist  party  was  now  either  exterminated  or  forced 
to  hide  its  opinions.  Lord  Rawdon,  finding  that  the 
country  must  be  abandoned,  detached  his  light  troops 
towards  Longcanes  (a  branch  of  Savannah  River),  to 
bring  away  the  loyalists  and  their  families,  taking 
himself  with  the  main  body  the  route  of  Charleston 
as  far  as  Conquer.  Here  the  Americans  had  recrossed 
15 


333 


A  CAKOLIXA  LO  YALIST 


the  river,  and  made  a  fruitless  effort  to  oppose  his 
march  by  preventing  our  passage  across  the  creek. 
This  we  effected,  however,  without  difficulty,  and  pro 
ceeded  to  Orangeburgh,  where  we  expected  to  meet 
reinforcements  from  Charleston,  and  be  joined  by 
the  light  troops  and  loyalists.  But  we  were  disap 
pointed  in  both,  and  soon  after  surrounded  by  the 
Americans,  who  pressed  us  so  closely  that  we  had  at 
length  but  one  pound  of  wheat  in  the  straw  served  to 
each  man  in  ever}*  twenty-four  hours.  The  parties 
going  out  daily  to  forage  had  constant  skirmishes  with 
the  enemy.  On  one  occasion,  Lord  Edward  Fitzgerald 
having  broken  his  sword  on  the  back  of  an  American, 
I  supplied  him  with  another  to  continue  the  attack, 
for  which  he  expressed  himself  greatly  obliged. 

A  day  or  two  afterwards  Major  Doyle  came  to  me 
with  a  message  from  Lord  Rawdon,  to  know  if  I  could 
find  any  one  well  acquainted  with  the  road  to  Charles 
ton,  and  willing  to  go  thither  with  a  message  of  great 
importance,  for  all  the  expresses  sent  hitherto  had 
either  been  killed  or  taken  prisoners.  Being  perfectly 
acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the  neighboring  country, 
I  immediately  went  and  offered  my  services  to  his 
lordship,  which  were  readily  accepted.  I  was  offered 
any  horse  in  the  camp  I  might  think  better  than  my 
own,  but  conceiving  myself  the  best  mounted  officer 
present,  I  preferred  my  own.  I  found  before  many 
minutes,  use  for  every  muscle  of  the  good  animal  that 
carried  me.  I  set  out  instantly  for  Charleston,  and 
had  scarcely  passed  the  sentries  when  I  found  myself 
pursued  by  four  or  five  of  the  enemy,  two  of  whom 
kept  up  with  me  about  twenty  miles  through  the 
woods.  My  intention  was  to  come  into  the  Charles- 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


339 


ton  road  where  it  crosses  the  Cypress  Swamp  at  Cun 
ningham's  house,  two  miles  above  Dorchester,  but  I 
unintentionally  kept  too  much  to  the  right,  and  crossed 
the  swamp  by  another  path  a  little  lower  down  ;  and 
soon  after  I  saw  a  picket  of  the  enemy  on  the  Charles 
ton  side  of  the  swamp,  who  in  all  probability  must 
have  taken  or  killed  me  had  I  not  providentially  missed 
the  common  path,  which  they  were  carefully  guarding. 
I  passed  through  Dorchester  and  remained  there  while 
a  fresh  horse  could  be  saddled  and  I  could  give  Cap 
tain  Brereton  a  message  from  Lord  Rawdon  to  Colonel 
Cootes  (at  Monk's  Corner),  of  the  iQth  Regiment, 
desiring  him  to  be  on  the  alert,  as  the  Americans  had 
crossed  Broad  and  Santee  rivers  in  great  force.  This 
was  sent  express  to  the  colonel,  and  I  continued  my 
route  to  Charleston,  where  I  delivered  my  letter  to 
Colonel  Balfour  (the  commandant),  at  four  o'clock 
P.M.,  twelve  hours  after  I  received  it  from  Lord  Raw 
don,  at  Orangeburg — a  distance  of  eighty  miles.  The 
force  was  immediately  turned  out  and  marched  to 
relieve  Lord  Rawdon  from  his  uncomfortable  situation. 
On  reaching  Dorchester  I  found  to  my  grief  that  the 
American  cavalry  had  visited  that  place  during  my 
short  absence  and  taken  away  my  horse,  with  300 
others.  So  soon  as  we  joined  Lord  Rawdon,  he  found 
himself  strong  enough  to  force  his  way  through  the 
enemy,  which  he  did  immediately,  marching  towards 
Charleston,  and  encamped  without  opposition  near 
Monk's  Corner,  where  we  had  some  trifling  skirmish 
ing,  but  no  important  occurrence. 

In  October  the  Americans  by  degrees  got  posses 
sion  of  all  the  country  except  the  small  part  inside  the 
Quarter  House  where  I  was  .posted,  Lord  Rawdon 


340  A  CAROLINA  LOYALIST,  ETC.} 

having  then  moved  his  force  to  another  part  of  the 
country.  I  then  joined  a  force  of  three  companies 
raised  for  the  protection  of  sequestered  estates  by  the 
Commissioner,  Mr.  Cruden.  In  one  of  our  excursions 
up  Cooper's  River,  with  the  view  of  obtaining  a  supply 
of  rice,  the  schooner  upset  and  twelve  men  were 
drowned.  I  saved  myself  by  swimming,  as  did  six  or 
seven  others;  but  I  lost  my  watch,  sword,  and  other 
articles. 

Soon  after  this  period  (December  1781)  the  British 
were  obliged  to  abandon  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Quarter  House  and  confine  themselves  entirely  to 
Charleston  Neck.  Considerable  quantities  of  wood 
being  required  for  fuel,  I  was  appointed  to  superintend 
the  operation,  which  was  giving  employment  to  a  vast 
number  of  people.  I  selected  the  destitute  loyalists 
who  were  within  the  lines,  and  thus  afforded  them 
immediate  relief.  In  consequence,  however,  of  dan 
gerous  ill  health  and  affliction,  I  relinquished  the 
charge  to  Captain  McMahon  early  in  January  1782. 
My  illness  continued  without  much  hope  of  recovery, 
so  taking  my  passage  in  the  Lady  Susan  transport,  we 
sailed  for  Europe  on  April  fifth,  under  convoy  of  the 
Orestes  sloop-of-war,  commanded  by  Sir  Jacob 
Wheaton.  The  fleet  consisted  of  fifty-two  sail,  and  we 
had  a  pleasant  passage.  We  made  Mizen  Head,  on 
the  coast  of  Ireland,  May  nineteenth,  and  put  into 
Castle  Haven  next  day,  in  a  hard  gale  of  wind.  From 
thence  we  proceeded  to  Cork  by  land,  and  purchasing 
a  horse,  I  proceeded  to  Dublin,  accompanied  by 
Charles  Philip  Campbell  and  Solomon  Smyth,  both 
like  myself  from  Charleston.  From  this  time  for 
ward,  I  need  hardly  say,  I  saw  no  more  of  America. 


SIR   WILLIAM  GORDON  OF  GORDON'S  BAT 
TERY. 

(Originally  published  by  the  Institution  of  Civil  Engineers.) 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SIR  J.  WILLIAM  GORDON,  K.  C. 
B.,  was  the  eldest  son  of  Colonel  T.  Gordon,  of  Har- 
perfield,  in  Lanarkshire.  This  estate  came  to  him 
while  he  was  still  young,  at  his  father's  death ;  and 
through  his  mother,  Miss  Nisbet,  the  heiress  of  Carfin 
in  the  same  county,  niece  of  Andrew  last  Earl  of  Hyn- 
ford,  he  not  long  after  inherited  Carfin  and  Maudslie 
Castle,  formerly  part  of  the  Hyndford  property.  He 
was  therefore  born  to  such  good  prospects  as  wrould 
have  indisposed  most  young  men  to  steady  exertion ; 
but  of  his  own  choice  he  entered  a  hard-working  pro 
fession,  thenceforward  devoting  himself  wholly  to  it, 
and  throughout  life  he  literally  may  be  said  to  have 
treated  his  ample  means,  on  principle,  as  a  steward  for 
others  rather  than  an  owner.  From  a  private  school 
at  Bexley,  in  Kent,  he  passed  the  entrance  examina 
tion,  not  very  difficult  in  those  days  of  nomination, 
into  Woolwich  Academy.  During  his  cadet  life  he 
was  remarkable  chiefly  for  his  great  physical  powers, 
his  carelessness  of  danger,  and  his  steady  application  to 
work.  To  the  latter  almost  entirely — for  young  Gor 
don  had  not  been  gifted  by  nature  with  quickness  of 


342  SIR   WILLIAM  GORDON  OF 

parts — he  owed  the  prize  he  worked  for,  a  commission 
in  the  Royal  Engineers. 

The  times  were  those  of  the  most  profound  peace 
modern  Europe  has  known.  In  no  part  of  our  army 
did  mere  soldiership  promise  any  special  advantage, 
and  perhaps  least  of  all  in  the  Engineers,  whose  war 
duties  were  almost  ignored  from  the  day  that  each 
officer  left  the  school  of  instruction  established  for  his 
corps  at  Chatham.  Gordon  passed  from  his  first  home 
station  to  North  America,  undistinguished  from  other 
subalterns  ;  for  his  simple  habits  of  life,  which  were  to 
him  as  a  nature,  prevented  his  being  even  known 
generally  to  be  more  wealthy  than  his  fellows.  He 
left  Halifax  after  a  long  term  of  duty  there,  much 
regretted  by  a  few  friends  who  had  discovered  the 
sterling  worth  which  was  concealed  by  a  reserved 
exterior,  and  learnt  something  of  the  kind  deeds  which 
he  had  already  begun  to  practice  the  doing  of  in  secret. 
But  to  the  many  he  was  known  chiefly  by  his  great 
height  and  the  endurance  and  activity  which  he  dis 
played  in  the  moose-hunts  for  which  Nova  Scotia  was 
then  noted,  or  for  his  avowed  adherence  to  earnest 
and,  to  those  not  conversant  with  Scotch  Presbyte- 
rianism,  what  seemed  somewhat  gloomy  religious  con 
victions.  Promotion  was  of  course  in  those  days  very 
slow  in  a  seniority  corps,  and  Gordon  looked  a  middle- 
aged  man  when,  in  1845,  ne  was  raised,  after  sixteen 
years'  service,  to  the  rank  of  captain,  and  sent  to  Chat 
ham  to  take  charge  of  the  first  company  of  Engineers, 
or  Sappers  and  Miners  as  they  were  then  called. 

A  neglected  cold  at  this  time  brought  out  a  predis 
position  to  chest  disease,  and  to  those  about  him 
seemed  to  threaten  his  life;  but  his  company  was 


GORDON'S  BA  TTER  Y.  343 

under  orders  for  Bermuda,  and  the  change  to  that 
mild  climate  soon  restored  him  to  his  natural  vigor 
and  the  out-of-door  habits  in  which  he  always  delighted, 
though  never  allowing  them  to  interfere  with  the 
duties  of  the  desk.  During  the  next  five  years  he 
was  constantly  employed  on  the  large  works  which 
were  to  create  out  of  the  sand-hills  that  ages  have 
solidified  into  Bermuda  stone  the  Gibraltar  of  the  West. 
His  spare  time,  of  which  he  allowed  himself  but  little, 
was  devoted  wholly  to  the  manly  exercises  which  he 
looked  on  as  due  to  his  profession,  to  practice,  and  to 
the  good  works  which  formed  part  of  his  daily  life. 
Among  the  latter  was  a  night-school  kept  by  himself 
for  the  instruction  of  his  men,  and  which  he  never 
allowed  any  engagement  to  interfere  with.  Frugal 
and  temperate  in  his  own  habits,  his  ready  hospitality 
was  known  to  all  passers-by  who  visited  his  sta 
tion.  Sparing  in  expenditure  on  himself,  his  liberality 
towards  the  poor  near  him,  or  in  cases  made  known  from 
any  distance,  was  exhausttess.  He  not  only  gave  as  a 
matter  of  course  to  those  that  asked,  if  they  deserved 
it,  but  his  delight  was  to  send  help  to  those  who 
deserved  it  and  had  not  asked.  The  venerable  bishop 
of  the  diocese,  revealed  after  Gordon's  death  the  fact 
that  he  maintained  the  private  charities  which  he 
began  at  Bermuda  for  many  years  after  he  had  left  the 
island,  and  that  his  name  is  still  familiar  there  among 
those  who  have  heard  it  blessed  by  the  aged  and 
infirm  whose  special  wants  he  had  carefully  ministered 
to.  No  case  of  distress  or  difficulty  in  his  own  corps, 
however  far  from  him,  but  received  instant  attention 
when  brought  to  his  knowledge. 

But  it  was  not  so  much  for  his  large-hearted  chari- 


344  SIJt    WILLIAM  GORDON  OF 

ties  that  he  by  degrees  became  well  known  at  this  time 
as  for  his  marvellous  physical  powers  and  endurance. 
The  former  he  made  it  a  principle  to  conceal,  as 
though  practicing  literally  the  injunction  "  Let  not  thy 
left  hand  know  what  thy  right  hand  doeth  ;"  but  his 
feats  of  strength  and  swiftness,  done  on  water  and  on 
land  as  regularly  as  other  men  took  their  dai.ly  meals, 
could  not  be  hid,  and  the  report  of  them  spread  far 
beyond  the  little  world  of  his  garrison.  His  theory 
was,  that  a  soldier,  to  do  his  duty  properly  to  his 
country,  must  keep  his  body  in  the  highest  perfection 
of  its  powers.  Acting  stringently  up  to  this  idea,  he 
lived  constantly,  except  in  his  exceeding  temperance 
of  diet,  in  such  a  state  of  regular  training  as  few  men 
ever  reach,  even  for  a  special  purpose  and  a  brief  time. 
His  work  never  slackened  any  where  in  consequence  of 
this.  It  was  confessed  that  no  one  ever  saw  so  much 
labor  got  out  of  working  parties  of  soldiers  or  of  con 
victs  as  Gordon  did,  and  that  without  a  harsh  word. 
No  office  detail,  however  petty,  was  below  his  atten 
tion.  A  favorite  fancy  of  his  was  the  preparing  of 
working  drawings,  which  he  might  well  have  left  to  his 
subalterns,  but  for  his  passion  for  labor;  and  after 
returning  from  a  run  of  twelve  miles,  done  within  two 
hours,  he  would  go  straight  to  his  high  desk,  without  a 
moment's  intermission,  and  fall  to  work  with  a  steady 
hand  in  the  standing  attitude  which  he  invariably 
used. 

He  returned  to  England  about  the  time  of  the 
Great  Exhibition  of  1851,  which  was  designed  to  usher 
in  an  era  of  universal  peace.  His  reputation  for 
strength  and  fearlessness,  for  liberality  and  honesty  of 
purpose,  went  before  him ;  but  many  of  his  comrades 


GORDON'S  BATTERY.  34$ 

were  ready  to  laugh  at  his  favorite  theory  of  being 
ready  for  the  active  service  which  in  their  time  could 
never  come.  Two  years  afterwards  the  nation  was 
rushing  into  the  Crimean  war,  and  no  department 
which  had  the  choice  would  have  overlooked  such  a 
born  warrior  and  practical  engineer  as  the  subject  of 
this  memoir.  Gordon  was  at  once  put  under  orders 
for  the  Crimea,  being  then  a  captain  of  some  standing, 
and  fifth  in  seniority  of  the  Royal  Engineers  selected 
for  service  in  the  east.  But  \vhen  the  siege  of  Sebas- 
topol  was  a  month  old,  casualties  had  already  made  of 
the  captain  the  Commanding  Royal  Engineer  of  the 
army,  and  honors  and  rank  were  coming  thick  upon 
him.  Gordon  carried  on  his  duties  under  the  superin 
tendence  of  Sir  John  Burgoyne,  who  had  come  out  as 
adviser  to  Lord  Raglan;  and  he  acted  afterwards  as 
second  to  Sir  Harry  Jones,  when  government  sent  that 
officer  to  take  Sir  John's  place.  To  write,  it  may  truly 
be  said,  the  story  of  the  duties  of  Gordon  of  Gordon's 
battery,  and  how  they  were  performed,  would  be  to 
write  the  history  of  the  siege.  His  long-practiced 
endurance  now  enabled  him  to  do  without  difficulty 
far  more  than  any  other  man  would  have  attempted  in 
the  way  of  personal  supervision  of  the  works  as  they 
went  on  unceasingly;  and  during  one  bombardment  it 
is  reported  of  him  that  he  never  sat  down  to  take  a 
meal  for  three  days  and  three  nights,  and  at  its  close 
was  seen  still  walking  along  the  trenches,  sound  asleep 
though  refusing  himself  rest.  His  valor  was  not  so 
much  mere  courage  as  a  perfect  indifference  to  danger, 
which  became  a  proverb  in  the  lines.  It  won  for  him 
the  special  favor  of  the  Naval  Brigade,  whose  soubri 
quet  of  "Old  Fireworks"  expressed  their  keen  sense 


346 


SIR   WILLIAM  GO  K  DON  OF 


of  his  constant  readiness  to  give  the  example  of  facing 
the  enemy's  fire  whenever  personal  example  could  be 
of  use.  Nor  was  his  influence  felt  only  in  leading 
others  on  to  deeds  of  daring.  He  made  no  secret  to 
those  who  questioned  him  on  his  habits  of  his  never- 
failing  daily  study  of  his  Bible.  At  such  a  time  hearts 
were  easily  impressed  by  a  few  words  coming  from  one 
whose  heroic  character  and  unsparing  devotion  to  the 
work  in  hand  had  made  him  conspicuous  to  the  whole 
army.  And  the  great  siege,  more  than  any  other  part 
of  his  career  of  usefulness,  has  left  abundant  witness 
of  the  marvellous  influence  that  pure  life  had  on  others 
for  good. 

A  severe  wound  received  in  the  right  hand  and  arm  in 
the  great  March  sortie,  and  much  neglected  afterwards, 
broke  down  his  health  just  before  the  siege  closed,  and 
he  was  absent  when  the  strong  hold  was  surrendered 
which,  more  than  any  other  single  man,  he  had  contrib 
uted  to  make  our  prize.  In  the  following  year,  being 
still  regimentally  a  captain  of  engineers,  but  a  colonel  by 
brevet  and  aide-de-camp  to  the  Queen,  he  was  called 
suddenly  from  a  holiday  in  Scotland  to  be  practically 
the  military  head  of  his  corps  as  Deputy  Adjutant- 
General.  "  It's  a  splendid  appointment,"  he  said,  in 
answer  to  a  friend's  congratulations,  "  but  one  I  would 
rather  not  have,  for  the  principal  duty  lies  in  refusing 
different  men  different  things  they  want."  With  this 
somewhat  morbid  view  of  what  discipline  should  be, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  he  was  not  as  popular  at  the 
Horse  Guards  as  his  friends  could  have  desired  to  see 
him  ;  but  his  translation  to  the  important  charge  of  the 
great  fortifications  of  Portsmouth,  the  largest  engineer- 
command  then  in  the  world,  which  happened  not  long 


GORDON'S  BA  TTEL  V. 


347 


after,  gave  his  zeal  and  energy  and  his  natural  kindli 
ness  better  scope.  His  Sunday  evening  entertainments, 
a  custom  begun  by  him  when  first  in  charge  of  a  small 
detachment  long  before,  were  open  to  all  his  command 
weekly  without  special  invitation,  and  drew  his  young 
officers  together  once  more,  as  they  had  another  genera 
tion  of  young  officers  fifteen  years  before,  the  survivors 
of  whom  warmly  own  the  valuable  influence  these  genial 
meetings  had  on  them.  With  the  design  of  the  works  of 
the  Portsmouth  district  Sir  W.  Gordon  (who  received  his 
knighthood  while  employed  there)  was  not  concerned. 
His  duty  was  merely  executive,  and  as  an  executive 
officer  it  may  be  fairly  declared  that  he  has  never  been 
surpassed.  His  command  was  broken  by  a  temporary 
call  to  Canada  at  the  time  of  the  Trent  affair  ;  but  the 
alarm  over  he  returned  once  more  to  the  charge  of  the 
great  works  around  Spithead,of  the  execution  of  which 
his  old  opponent,  Todleben,  after  being  escorted  by 
him  round  them,  publicly  expressed  his  unalloyed 
admiration. 

As  Deputy  Adjutant-General  of  his  Corps  he  had 
become  an  Associate  of  the  Institution  of  Civil  Engi 
neers,  and  his  keen  sense  of  duty  to  his  profession  made 
him  a  constant  attendant  at  its  meetings  ;  but  with  his 
usual  extremely  retiring  habits  he  shrank  from  taking 
any  more  active  part  than  listening.  Not  many  weeks 
before  his  death,  however,  he  rose  to  return  thanks  for 
the  mention  made  of  his  corps  in  the  President's 
address,  which  pointedly  alluded  to  himself,  and  made  a 
short  speech  full  of  manly  feeling  and  of  sensible 
acknowledgement  of  what  the  education  of  Royal 
Engineers  owes  to  the  civil  branch  of  the  profession, 
"  their  intercourse  with  which  he  desired  to  express 


348 


SIR   WILLIAM  GORDON  OF 


his  warm  hopes  might  on  all  occasions  be  close  and 
friendly  as  it  had  been  heretofore."  He  had  then  not 
long  been  appointed  by  popular  wish,  as  it  were,  no 
less  than  by  royal  choice  to  the  revived  office  of  Inspec 
tor-General  of  Fortifications,  which  his  friends  thought 
to  see  him  fill  with  the  same  dignity  with  which  he  spoke 
that  night.  Alas,  a  secret  disease,  produced  by  the 
irritation  of  his  severe  Crimean  wounds  acting  on  the 
nervous  system,  was  even  then  preying  on  his  brain. 
The  pain  in  his  arm  had  gradually  increased,  and  lat 
terly  never  left  him.  His  very  efforts  to  suppress  out 
ward  signs  of  suffering  served  but  to  increase  the  mis 
chief  that  was  working  within.  Traces  of  aberration 
of  mind  had  been  observed  some  time  before  by 
watchful  and  anxious  friends,  and  a  few  weeks  later  he 
passed  from  among  us  by  the  saddest  end  a  gallant 
soldier  could  know.  In  strength  a  giant,  in  modesty  a 
maiden,  in  humility  a  child,  so  pure  and  noble  a  life 
never  came  to  a  more  painful  close  than  his,  when  his 
mind  losing  its  self-control,  he  suddenly  laid  violent 
hands  on  his  own  life. 

Left  by  his  parents  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  the 
care  of  a  younger  brother  and  sister,  he  had  discharged 
his  difficult  duties  as  though  he  had  been  the  most 
loving  and  thoughtful  of  fathers.  Of  his  practical 
goodness  let  this  one  trait  suffice  :  when  defrauded  of 
several  thousand  pounds  by  an  agent  he  had  implicitly 
trusted,  he  insisted  on  charging  his  own  want  of  super 
vision  as  chiefly  in  fault  by  the  temptation  it  had  offer 
ed,  and  absolutely  refused  to  prosecute  the  offender. 
More  than  this,  when  he  found  the  wretched  man 
afterwards  starving  (who  had  robbed  his  employer  only 
to  fall  into  deserved  penury),  he  himself,  having  long 


GORDON'S  BA  TTER  Y.  349 

since  forgiven  him,  and  having  sought  him  to  express 
his  forgiveness,  now  ministered  to  the  needs  of  the 
only  living  being  who  had  ever  done  him  serious  harm. 
The  sudden  loss  of  such  a  hero  may  well  have  cast  a 
gloom  over  the  service  which  was  proud  of  him,  even 
had  the  circumstances  been  less  painful.  It  had 
seemed  his  part  to  bring  visibly  before  their  eyes,  in  a 
hard  and  sceptical  age  that  loves  its  own  comfort  and 
doubts  of  others'  goodness,  all  the  pure  and  knightly 
qualities  of  the  ideal  "  chevalier  sans  peur  et  sans 
reproche."  To  his  personal  friends  their  bereavement 
would  have  been  most  bitter  in  any  case,  and  it 
was  doubly  hard  where  the  sad  consolation  lies  chiefly 
in  the  words  our  Laureate  has  addressed  to  such  suf 
ferers  : 

"  Friends,  this  frail  bark  of  ours 
May  wreck  itself  without  the  pilot's  guilt, 
Without  the  captain's  knowledge." 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND  THE  TAIPING 
REBELLION* 

"THE  Abyssinian  campaign,"  wrote  Sir  Francis 
Head  soon  after  the  fall  of  Magdala,  "  promoted  the 
corps  of  Royal  Engineers  from  darkness  to  daylight. 
For  in  the  London  War  Office  it  had  in  former  ages 
been  a  time-honored  axiom  that  a  practical  knowledge 
of  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortified  places,  of  the 
application  and  construction  of  field-works,  bridges, 
pontoons,  roads,  water-supply,  surveying,  sketching, 
and  signalling,  rendered  an  officer  of  Engineers  incom 
petent  to  command  an  army  in  the  field — for  the  very 
reason  expounded  by  Festus  when,  with  a  loud  voice, 
he  exclaimed,  '  Paul,  thou  art  beside  thyself;  too 
much  learning  hath  made  thee  mad!'  But  the  Abys 
sinian  campaign,  conducted  throughout  all  its  ramifica 
tions  by  an  Engineer,  has  indisputably  established  that 
in  that  competitive  examination  which  in  the  council 
of  statesmen  must  henceforth  guide  their  selection  of 
the  fittest  officer  to  command  an  expedition,  or  to 
defend  the  mother  country,  the  corps  of  Royal  Engi 
neers  can  no  longer  be  excluded." 

If  an  apology  were  needed  for  publishing  this  brief 
narrative  of  one  of  the  most  wondrous  series  of  suc- 

*  The  Ever-  Victorious  Army  ;  A  History  of  the  Chinese  Campaign 
under  Lieut.-Col  C.  G.  Gordon,  C.  B.,  R.  E.,  and  of  the  Suppression  of 
the  Taiping  Rebellion.  By  Andrew  Wilson. 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND  THE  T A  IP  ING  REBELLION.  35! 

cesses  that  military  annals  record,  it  would  be  found  in 
that  reticence  of  its  hero,  which  combined  with  other 
causes  to  keep  his  exploits  too  long  unknown  to  his 
countrymen  ;  so  unknown  indeed,  that  it  is  not  surpris 
ing  that  Sir  Francis  Head  should  have  shared  in  the 
popular  belief,  as  his  words  just  quoted  imply,  that  the 
Abyssinian  expedition  was  the  first  occasion  on  which 
a  British  engineer  had  held  a  soldier's  most  important 
trust,  the  command  of  an  army.  Yet  before  his  eulogy 
of  Napier  appeared,  a  work  was  written  which  from  its 
title,  recited  at  the  head  of  this  essay,  would  seem 
intended  to  make  known  an  earlier  campaign,  in  which 
an  engineer  was  the  sole  general :  a  campaign  where 
the  enemy  was  vastly  more  numerous,  the  powers  of 
the  commander  more  limited,  the  supplies  scantier,  the 
support  more  uncertain,  the  reward,  oh  !  how  infinitely 
less,  than  in  the  case  of  Abyssinia.  And  the  issues! 
Who  shall  compare  the  punishment  of  the  drunken 
tyrant  of  Magdala,  and  the  rescue  of  a  dozen  British 
captives  from  his  grasp;  or  even  the  assertion  of  the 
greatness  of  British  power,  of  the  reality  of  our  eastern 
resources,  and,  best  of  all,  of  our  moderation  ;  with  the 
accomplishment  of  a  task  which  restored  tranquillity  to 
an  empire  whose  population  outnumbers  that  of  Eu 
rope,  repaired  her  desolate  cities,  and  gave  her  toiling 
millions  of  peasantry  the  longed-for  peace,  waiting  for 
which  in  vain,  they  had  ceased  to  till  their  paternal 
lands,  lest  they  should  but  be  offering  fresh  tempta 
tions  to  the  spoiler?  And  in  accomplishing  this  great 
achievement  a  greater  still  was  wrought.  The  victories 
of  the  young  Engineer-General  of  China  shook  to  its 
fall  the  foul  fabric  of  a  blasphemous  religion,  which  at 
one  time  had  threatened  to  take  rank  in  importance 


352 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


with  those  of  Buddha  and  Brahma,  and  whose  head 
had  aspired  to  usurp  the  most  ancient  of  earthly 
thrones,  under  the  claim  of  a  pretended  revelation. 

But  in  truth  Mr.  Wilson's  work  has  buried  a  great 
epic  amid  heaps  of  mere  book-maker's  rubbish.  What 
he  intended  no  doubt  to  illustrate  he  has  but  obscured. 
That  which  should  have  been  the  main  subject  is  so 
overladen  by  details  often  little  relevant,  that  the 
reader  who  desires  to  know  the  story  of  Gordon's  cam 
paign  may  leave  the  volume  at  its  end  with  confused 
impressions  of  the  Chinese  system  of  philosophy,  the 
foreign  policy  of  Pekin,  the  ability  of  the  arch-impostor 
and  his  generals,  the  superiority,  in  a  sense,  of  Chinese 
officialdom  to  that  of  Europe,  and  a  dozen  other 
collateral  subjects,  but  without  having  thoroughly 
grasped  that  which  he  came  to  seek.  As  Mr.  Wilson 
most  truly  remarks  in  his  introduction,  the  book  should 
have  been  written  in  three  volumes  at  the  least.  We 
may  add  that  the  attempt  to  cram  all  the  intended 
matter  into  one  has  spoilt  the  whole  as  a  general  work 
of  reference,  while  it  has  confused  and  made  tame  his 
narrative  of  that  single  episode  of  recent  Chinese 
history  which,  in  the  first  page  of  his  introduction,  he 
declares  to  be  "  the  topic  of  this  book."  It  is  not  our 
business  or  wish  to  discuss  at  any  length,  what  the 
writer  has  intended  for  the  philosophic  accompaniment 
of  his  particular  task.  He  seems  to  us  to  have  said  a 
great  deal  too  much,  or  not  enough,  when  he  hints  that 
the  Chinese  empire  is  founded  on  principles  similar 
to  those  shadowed  in  "  Plato's  Republic  ;  "  or  declares 
that  the  ordinary  Chinaman  is  universally  so  educated 
as  to  take  an  intelligent  interest  in  the  theory  as  well 
as  the  practice  of  his  government  ;  or  states  the  para- 


THE   T A  IP  ING  REBELLION.  353 

dox  that  the  infanticide  of  China  "does  not  arise  from 
any  tendency  among  the  Chinese  to  destroy  infants  ;"  or 
finally  winds  up  his  book  with  the  alarming  but  some 
what  vague  declaration  that,  in  Great  Britain,  "  there 
must  be  a  return  to  some  connection  between  its 
higher  intelligence  and  the  wielding  of  its  power,  other 
wise  it  will  soon  share  the  fate  of  Carthage  and  Venice, 
of  Spain  and  Holland."  A  writer  who  is  capable  of 
putting  down  on  paper  such  nonsense  as  this,  uncon 
scious  that  he  is  merely  jumbling  historical  names  in 
pairs,  instead  of  drawing  historical  parallels,  is  not 
likely  to  be  a  very  safe  guide  through  a  survey  of  the 
forty  centuries  of  civilized  life  in  China,  or  of  the  phi 
losophy  by  which  its  government,  in  theory  at  least, 
subsists.  Not  to  dwell  on  these  longer,  we  are  con 
tent  with  total  dissent  from  the  hints  which  he,  though 
"  no  Mandarin  worshipper"  by  his  own  account,  scat 
ters  plentifully  through  his  pages,  that  modern  Eu 
rope  in  general,  and  England  in  particular,  are  vastly 
behind  the  Flowery  Land  in  civilization,  decency,  and 
religion.  Europe,  it  is  true,  has  known  evil  days  under 
the  hands  of  fierce  conquerors,  plundering  and  destroy 
ing  in  religion's  name  ;  but  its  annals  may  be  ransacked 
in  vain,  without  finding  any  parallel  to  the  miseries 
endured  in  those  provinces  of  China  over  which  "  The 
Heavenly  King,"  the  Taiping  prophet,  extended  his 
fell  sway  for  ten  sad  years. 

Hung  Sew-tsuen  (better  known  in  China  by  his 
assumed  title,  Tien  Wang)  must  be  a  character  with 
some  considerable  attractions  about  him  to  a  biogra 
pher,  for  Mr.  Wilson,  unintentionally  it  may  be,  seems 
disposed  to  make  him  his  hero,  forgetting  that  this 
was  not  the  purpose  of  the  book.  That  he  had  the 


354 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


talent  of  imposing  on  others  a  sense  of  his  divine  mis 
sion  is  undeniable ;  but  that  he  should  have  done  this 
with  such  ease  and  with  so  little  question  of  proof; 
should,  unlike  his  prototype,  Mahomet,  have  been  able 
to  dispense  personally  with  the  fighting  part  of  his 
mission,  and  found  others  ready  to  do  the  hard  work 
for  him;  should  never  have  attempted  to  create  a 
system  that  would  spread  and  maintain  itself  without 
an  army ;  and  should  have  been  allowed,  so  soon  as  he 
gained  his  temporary  throne  at  Nankin,  to  shut  him 
self  up  in  seclusion  and  devote  himself  to  foul  licen 
tiousness,  undisturbed,  save  once,  by  the  remonstrance 
of  one  chief  follower,  who  paid  the  penalty  of  his  rash 
ness  with  his  life  ;  proves  to  demonstration  the  degra 
dation  of  sense  and  manners  to  which  the  calm  Philoso 
phy  of  Harmony  our  writer  so  much  admires  had 
reduced  the  people  who  had  no  better  guide.  As  Mr. 
Wilson  so  often  strains  for  a  comparison  between 
Chinese  and  European  civilization,  we  will  offer  him  a 
special  one  ;  that  between  the  most  bloody  and  ruth 
less  government  of  modern  days  in  the  West,  and  the 
rule  of  the  Taipings.  Bad  as  the  triumvirate  of  1794 
at  Paris  and  their  proscriptions  were,  their  administra 
tion  was  mild  and  decent — nay,  honest  and  even  saint 
ly — when  compared  to  that  of  the  Heavenly  King  amid 
his  concubines  and  disciples  at  Nankin.  Such  as  he 
was,  however,  he  was  a  power  in  the  land,  and  one  to 
be  taken  much  into  account  in  considering  the  forces 
acting  in  Western  China  in  the  years  1860-63.  For 
he  was  aided  not  only  by  the  blind  superstition  of  his 
chief  followers,  but  by  two  powerful  extraneous  sup 
ports  which  seemed  often  ready  to  intervene  and  save 
him,  even  when  the  reviving  energy  of  the  Imperialists, 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION. 


355 


and  the  detestation  in  which  the  subjugated  people 
around  held  his  armies,  seemed  likely  to  turn  the 
balance  of  the  war  against  him. 

The  first  of  these  was  the  favor  or  indifferentism  of 
the  European  trading  communities,  who  were  now 
strongly  established  on  the  coast  at  various  points.  To 
many  of  these  gentry,  who  had  merely  come  to  China 
to  make  money  and  go  away  again,  it  was  a  perfect 
matter  of  indifference  which  party  succeeded  in  the 
contest  so  long  as  trade  went  on.  To  them  "  the 
Mandarins,"  the  politest  name  they  ever  gave  a  gov 
ernment  4,000  years  or  so  old,  and  the  arch-rebel  who 
had  brought  ruin  on  the  southern  provinces  of  China, 
were  regarded  on  equal  terms  as  contending  powers. 
There  is  abundant  evidence  of  this  in  the  work  of  Mr. 
Wilson,  who  knew  the  class  well;  and  that  the  Tai- 
pings  could  obtain  supplies  from  some  of  these  accom 
modating  merchants  as  freely  as  the  Emperor's  gov 
ernment,  is  a  patent  fact  in  the  whole  history  of  the 
war.  But  for  the  absolute  folly  of  the  rebels,  which  led 
them  unchallenged  to  threaten  the  Treaty  Ports  when 
they  found  themselves  in  their  vicinity,  it  would  have 
been  as  hard  apparently  to  get  the  cosmopolitan  soci 
ety  of  these  marts  to  declare  itself  against  their  pre 
tensions,  as  to  procure  a  decided  intervention  on  the 
part  of  the  British  Government.  This  local  feeling, 
nourished  too  often  by  personal  differences  with  the 
Mandarins,  in  which  the  foreign  traders  were  in  the 
wrong,  influenced  our  own  national  policy  to  some 
extent:  but  a  more  powerful  sentiment  than  even  that 
of  gain  held  Britain  back;  for  the  missionary  element 
among  her  people  had  taken  up  the  cause  of  the  Tai- 
pings  with  a  perversity  such  as  the  whole  History  of 


356 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


Human  Error,  should  it   ever  be  written,  will  find  it 
hard  to  match. 

In  condemning  that  monstrous  misuse  of  a  divine 
principle  which  made  heroes  of  the  Taiping  chiefs,  we 
desire  to  guard  ourselves  from  any  charge  of  deprecia 
ting  the  value  of  missionary  effort.  It  is  a  noble  boast 
of  Englishmen  that,  wherever  their  merchants  have 
penetrated  into  heathendom,  preachers  have  been 
found  willing,  without  hope  of  gain,  to  stand  by  their 
side.  But  the  Founder  of  Christianity  himself  taught 
its  first  missionaries  to  combine  the  wisdom  of  the 
serpent  with  the  harmlessness  of  the  dove;  and  some 
of  their  later  successors  have  ignored  this  part  of  their 
instructions  altogether.  Hence  those  noble  efforts  to 
Christianize  other  nations  which  in  their  spirit  adorn 
the  nation  and  the  age,  have  been  mingled  with  such 
effusions  of  folly  and  bigotry  as  have  tended,  with 
many  harsh-judging  minds,  to  throw  contempt  on  the 
whole  cause.  New  Zealand,  Africa,  Jamaica,  have 
each  their  complaint  to  make  on  this  score ;  but  never 
was  the  erratic  spirit  of  modern  missionary  enterprise 
so  wholly  thrown  away,  and  so  open  to  the  censure  of 
the  prudent,  as  when  a  powerful  party  at  home  took 
up  the  cause  of  the  Taipings,  misled  by  a  few  local 
writers,  whose  ignorance  of  Chinese  language  and 
customs  was  only  equalled  by  their  audacity.  Tien 
Wang  had  read  Christian  tracts,  had  learnt  from  a 
Christian  missionary ;  and  when  he  announced  publicly 
three  years  afterwards  that  part  of  his  mission  was  to 
destroy  the  temples  and  images,  and  showed  in  the 
jargon  of  his  pretended  visions  some  traces  of  his 
New  Testament  study,  the  conclusion  was  instantly 
seized  by  the  sanguine  minds  of  a  section  set  upon 


THE    TAiriXG  REBELLION. 


357 

evangelizing  the  East,  that  their  efforts  had  produced 
a  true  prophet,  fit  for  the  work.  Wredded  to  this 
phantasy,  they  rejected  as  the  inventions  of  the 
enemies  of  missions  the  tales  of  Taiping  cruelty  which 
soon  reached  Europe :  and  long  after  the  details  of  the 
impostor's  life  at  Nankin,  with  its  medley  of  visions, 
executions,  edicts,  and  harem  indulgence,  became 
notorious  to  the  world,  prayers  were  offered  for  his 
success  by  devotees  in  Great  Britain  as  bigoted  to  his 
cause  as  the  bloodiest  commander,  or  "  Wang,"  whom 
he  had  raised  from  the  ranks  of  his  followers  to  carry 
out  his  "  exterminating  decrees."  The  Taiping  cause 
was  lost  in  China  before  it  was  wholly  abandoned  by 
these  fanatics  in  England,  and  their  belief  in  its  excel 
lence  so  powerfully  reacted  on  our  policy,  that  it  might 
have  preserved  us  from  active  intervention  down  to 
the  present  time,  had  not  certain  Imperialist  successes 
elsewhere,  the  diminishing  means  of  their  wasted 
possessions,  and  the  rashness  of  their  own  chiefs, 
brought  the  Taiping  armies  into  direct  collision  with 
us.  And  with  the  occasion  there  was  happily  raised 
up  the  man  whose  prowess  was  to  scatter  their  blood- 
cemented  empire  to  pieces  far  more  speedily  than  it 
had  been  built  up. 

South  of  the  lower  portion  of  the  course  of  the 
Yangtsze  is  Kiangnan,  the  district  which  was  the  scene 
of  the  future  operations  of  Gordon  and  the  "  Ever- 
Victorious  Army."  It  lies  chiefly  between  the  river 
and  the  deep  and  narrow  bay  of  Hangchow.  The 
width  of  the  peninsula  they  form,  from  that  city  at  the 
head  of  the  bay  across  to  Nankin  on  the  Yangtsze,  is 
150  miles ;  its  Ungth  from  this  line  to  where  the  ocean 
bounds  it,  about  200.  The  great  treaty  port  of 


358  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

Shanghai  lies  near  the  extreme  western  point,  some 
twenty-five  miles  inland,  on  one  of  the  numerous  creeks 
which  are  the  main  features  of  the  country.  To  pic 
ture  to  ourselves  the  events  which  were  to  follow,  we 
must  conceive  first  the  general  features  of  the  district, 
as  Mr.  Wilson  describes  it,  before  being  devastated  by 
the  bloody  partisans  of  the  Heavenly  King.  Densely 
peopled,  it  is  generally  but  a  few  feet  above  the  level 
of  the  ocean,  and  in  some  places  below  that  level. 
Here  and  there  isolated  hills  rise  to  the  height  of  a  few 
hundred  feet ;  but  for  the  most  there  is  a  dead  level, 
rich  with  trees,  growing  various  kinds  of  cereals  in 
great  abundance,  thickly  studded  with  villages  and 
towns,  and  intersected  in  every  direction  by  rivers, 
creeks,  and  canals.  Look  across  any  portion  of  this 
vast  plain,  and  boats,  with  mat-sails  spread,  seem  to  be 
moving  in  every  direction  over  the  land.  In  some 
places,  and  especially  round  the  great  city  of  Soochow, 
the  waters  spread  out  into  lakes  of  considerable  size. 
Except  on  a  few  lines  there  is  no  convenient  land  tran 
sit  but  by  raised  foot-paths,  so  narrow  that  they  must 
usually  be  traversed  in  single  file  :  but  the  net-work  of 
waters  affords  vast  facilities  for  the  movements  of 
boats  and  small  steamers.  Upon  the  peaceful  people 
of  this  plain  the  Taipings  had  descended  in  a  desolat 
ing  swarm,  half  robbers,  half  fanatics. 

"We  must  conceive  them,"  [says  Mr.  Wilson]  "coming 
down  on  its  rich  towns  and  peaceful  villages,  moving  flags, 
beating  gongs,  destroying  images  and  temples,  seizing  valu 
ables,  occupying  houses,  dealing  with  all  disobedience  accord 
ing  to  the  exterminating  decree  of  heaven,  and  being  a  terror 
unto  young  women ;  but  still  not  at  first  destroying  the  crops 


THE   T A  IP  ING  REBELLION.  359 

or  many  of  the  houses,  or  slaying  many  of  the  males.  Then 
we  have  the  Allies  driving  them  back,  firing  into  their  masses 
of  men  with  long-range  rifles,  and  pounding  at  their  stockades 
with  heavy  guns  and  shells.  On  the  retirement  of  these  we 
have  the  rebels  again  advancing  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Shanghai,  but  this  time  in  an  infuriated  demoniac  state,  burn 
ing  and  destroying  everything  in  order  that  there  may  be  a 
waste  around  the  starving  city,  and  murdering  or  driving 
before  them  all  the  villagers.  Lastly,  the  Ever-Victorious 
Army  appears  on  the  scene — not  by  any  means  always  victo 
rious,  but  very  frequently  so — and  bringing  European  drill  and 
officers,  with  heavy  artillery,  to  bear  on  a  settlement  of  the 
question.  Let  this  be  embellished  (as  the  scene  appeared  to 
me  in  1860)  with  views  of  rich  fertile  plains,  where  the  crops 
are  trampled  down  or  consumed,  a  few  narrow  bridges  of  the 
willow-plate  pattern,  a  dilapidated  pagoda  or  two,  broken 
blackened  walls  of  village  houses,  the  deserted  streets  of 
towns,  innumerable  swollen  blackened  corpses  lying  on  the 
slimy  banks  of  the  muddy  streams,  or  rottening  underneath 
the  graceful  bamboos,  red  flames  at  night  flashing  up  against 
the  deep  dark  sky ;  let  us  imagine,  also,  the  Taipings  throw 
ing  themselves  into  all  sorts  of  postures  impossible  to  the 
European,  and  uttering  cries  scarcely  less  painful  or  hideous 
than  those  from  the  ravished  villages, 
conception  of  the  great  Chinese  tragc 

inKiangnan." 


Looking  at  this  country  in  a 
it  is  evident  that  warfare  carried  on  ir? 
atic  way  would  necessarily  have  peculiar  features  of 
its  own.  The  narrowness  of  the  roads,  and  the  abun 
dance  of  lateral  creeks,  would  compel  all  land  move 
ments  to  be  conducted  on  a  very  reduced  front  ;  while 
the  aid  of  a  flotilla  would  enable  an  attacking  force  not 


360  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

only  to  turn  the  opposing  enemy  undiscovered,  but  in 
many  cases  to  fall  upon  him  in  flank  and  cut  his  col 
umns  in  two.  The  walled  towns  situated  on  the  great 
roads  would  become  points  of  vast  importance  in  a 
strategical  view.  Furnished  with  high  walls,  huge 
stockades,  and  large  garrisons  of  fierce  but  rudely  armed 
Taiping  soldiers,  they  were  proof  almost  to  impregna 
bility  against  the  unscientific  assaults  of  the  Imperialist 
generals ;  but  were  ready  on  the  other  hand  to  open  to 
the  superior  powers  of  a  European  siege-train,  backed 
by  disciplined  and  properly  armed  troops.  As  several 
of  them,  Soochow  in  particular,  were  situated  partly  on 
great  sheets  of  water  crossed  by  causeways,  they  might 
be  completely  blockaded  by  a  force  of  resolute  men 
smaller  in  numbers  than  the  enclosed  garrison,  but  hold 
ing  the  vital  points  of  passage  out.  In  this  very  man 
ner,  and  for  the  same  reason  identically,  was  Napoleon 
able  to  enclose  Marshal  Wurmser's  corps  within  lake- 
girt  Mantua  in  1796  with  a  mere  detachment  of  his  own 
army,  while  with  the  bulk  of  it  he  met  and  beat  the 
relieving  force  of  Alvinzi.  Kiangnan  is  a  country  of 
Mantuas,  and  Soochow  the  chief  of  all,  as  we  shall  by- 
and-bye  discern.  Carrying  further  the  same  idea  of 
seizing  and  occupying  points  vital  to  the  enemy,  it  was 
evident  that  the  capture  of  a  few  well  chosen  towns  in 
succession  might  at  once  give  a  line  of  supply  to  the 
attacking  force  which  held  them ;  a  line  which  could 
he  held  for  it  by  inferior  troops,  and  would  thus  enable 
it  to  seize  successively  such  places  as  would  cut  the 
enemy's  communications  one  by  one,  until  his  armies 
should  be  divided  and  destroyed  in  detail,  or  compelled 
to  fly  the  province.  Of  course  to  do  this  any  com 
mander  must  have  a  fighting  force  morally  and  mate- 


THE  TA1PING  REBELLION. 


361 


rially  superior  at  the  actual  points  of  contact  to  those 
it  would  encounter.  Of  course  it  must  further  be  sup 
plied  with  locomotion  by  water  far  beyond  those  of  its 
opponents.  And  these  conditions  would  be  of  little 
avail,  if  it  had  not  for  its  chief  a  man  of  genius,  instinct 
ively  able  to  see  the  vital  points  in  the  theatre  of  war, 
and  of  daring  to  seize  them  at  all  risks.  Whether 
the  Ever-Victorous  Army  and  its  general  were  such  a 
force  and  such  a  chief,  let  our  after-story  tell,  to  which 
these  remarks  are  but  a  prelude,  indispensable  to  the 
understanding  of  what  follows. 

The  Taiping  rebellion  was  ten  years  old,  and  had 
from  a  rapid  series  of  conquests  become  a  vast  but 
desultory  struggle  with  the  regular  governments  of 
China,  before  its  force  came  into  collision  with  the  new 
power  from  without,  the  armed  civilization  of  Europe, 
represented  by  the  protected  settlements  on  the  sea 
board  of  the  empire.  The  rapid  growth  of  the  move 
ment  and  its  chief  successes  were  comprised  in  the 
period  between  1850,  when  Hung  Sew-tsuen,  the  self- 
styled  Heavenly  King,  proclaimed  his  mission,  and 
1853,  when,  at  the  head  of  large  armies,  he  established 
his  headquarters  at  Nankin,  the  second  city  of  China. 
But,  as  Mr.  Wilson's  work  almost  too  mildly  states  it, 
"  the  rebels  were  essentially  destroyers,  and  possessed 
no  capability  for  reconstruction."  The  very  extension 
of  their  conquests  limited  their  means  of  aggression 
by  reducing  the  productive  powers  of  the  unhappy  pro 
vinces  which  came  under  their  sword.  At  first,  indeed, 
they  were  not  everywhere  so  cruel  as  to  destroy  blindly 
their  own  means  of  subsistence  ;  but  large  contributions 
of  provisions,  of  rice  especially,  were  exacted  as  a  con 
dition  of  existence  from  the  country  districts;  an4 


362 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


when  the  delivery  of  these  became  uncertain,  owing  to 
the  approach  of  Imperialist  forces,  or  to  any  real  diffi 
culty  of  producing  the  necessary  quantity,  plunder, 
devastation,  and  murder  were  the  mild  means  em 
ployed  for  bringing  the  refractory  villages  to  submis 
sion.  Thus,  as  the  rebellion  became  checked  and  local 
ized  by  Imperial  successes,  its  cruelties  grew  more 
detestable,  until  the  provinces  that  it  had  held  became 
the  howling  wilderness  of  ruin  which  that  of  Kiangnan 
was,  as  described  by  Mr.  Wilson  in  the  latest  stage  of 
the  rebellion.  The  first  great  check  sustained  by  the 
Taipings  was  the  destruction  of  the  army  sent  by  the 
Heavenly  King  against  Pekin  soon  after  his  establish 
ment  at  Nankin.  Growing  ferocious  under  disaster, 
he  then  began  the  series  of  "  exterminating  decrees" 
by  which  his  government  was,  during  the  rest 
of  his  career,  mainly  carried  on.  Soon  afterwards, 
in  1856,  he  put  to  death,  in  a  fit  of  jealousy,  his  chief 
general,  the  true  author  of  early  Taiping  success,  known 
as  the  Eastern  King;  and  from  that  time  his  cause 
began  to  languish,  and  that  of  the  Imperialists,  sup 
ported  by  the  naturally  conservative  element  of  the 
Chinese  people,  made  head  against  it  even  under  the 
walls  of  Nankin.  In  1859-60  the  humiliation  of  the 
emperor's  government  by  the  French  and  English, 
which  followed  upon  the  reactionary  policy  of  the  Pekin 
government  and  its  useless  quarrel  with  the  Allies, 
once  more  gave  a  great  '.mpetus  to  the  rebellion  ;  and 
the  Faithful  King,  one  of  the  Hung  Sew-tsuen's  best 
commanders,  succeeded  in  raising  for  a  time  the  Impe 
rialist  blockade  of  Nankin,  driving  the  investing  armies 
down  towards  the  estuary  of  the  Yangtsze,  and  open 
ing  for  the  first  time  to  the  Taipings  the  rich  province 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION.  363 

of  Kiangnan.  Following  up  this  advantage,  he 
advanced  to  the  southwest,  defeating  and  almost  de 
stroying  the  first  Imperialist  army  which  encountered 
him.  Another  large  force  which  held  Soochow  was  so 
terrified  at  the  news  of  this  disaster,  that  its  comman 
der  committed  suicide  ;  and  the  wealthy  city,  the  cen 
tral  point  of  the  peninsula  before  described,  containing, 
according  to  not  extravagant  estimates,  two  millions  of 
inhabitants  and  the  chief  silk  manufactories  of  China, 
fell  unresistingly  into  the  spoilers'  hands.  Hangchow, 
which  is  only  inferior  in  importance  to  Soochow,  next 
was  occupied  ;  the  whole  district,  except  a  few  posts 
towards  the  mouth  of  the  Yangtsze  and  near  the  city  of 
Shanghai,  was  in  Taiping  hands  ;  and  the  rebellion  had 
reached  so  great  a  height  that,  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Wil 
son  (p.  57,)  "  had  it  not  been  for  the  assistance  given  by 
foreigners  towards  its  suppression,  it  might  possibly 
still  be  useless  by  devastating  the  country." 

We  have  quoted  these  words  the  more  particularly, 
before  proceeding  to  speak  of  the  intervention,  because 
they  directly  contradict  sundry  hints  of  the  same 
author's  that  the  liberation  of  China  from  the  scourge 
which  had  for  twelve  years  oppressed  it  was  not  due  to 
foreign  aid  in  general,  nor  to  that  of  Colonel  Gordon 
in  particular.  There  is  such  a  thing  as  damning  with 
faint  praise,  and  surely  it  is  little  better  to  quote  high 
panegyrics  of  the  commander  whose  deeds  one  records 
in  order  to  follow  them  with  a  page  of  such  remarks 
as  : 

"There  is  no  doubt  that  Gordon's  force  unaided  could 
not  have  cleared  the  province.  While  the  brunt  of  fighting 
fell  upon  him,  he  required  Imperialists  to  hold  the  places 


364 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


which  he  took,  and  their  forces  fought  along  with  him  so  as 
greatly  to  contribute  to  his  success.  ...  It  is  quite  clear, 
judging  by  the  situation  and  its  results,  that  the  Imperialists 
allowing  the  Taipings  to  advance  against  the  posts  was  no 
proof  whatever  of  their  being  unable  to  deal  with  the  rebellion 
effectually  in  their  own  slow  and  systematic  way." 

To  write  in  this  fashion  after  the  proofs  his  own 
work  furnishes  that  the  campaign  of  the  Ever-Victorious 
Army  found  the  rebellion  active  and  flourishing,  and 
left  it  crushed,  shows  that  if  Mr.  Wilson  can  tell  the 
story  of  Gordon's  successes,  he  is  wholly  incapable  of 
drawing  from  them  the  broad  and  obvious  conclusion. 
In  one  still  more  contradictory  passage  on  the  campaign, 
Mr.  Wilson  states  that  a  right  understanding  of  its  mil 
itary  results  and  political  relationship  "is  absolutely 
essential  to  correct  the  erroneous  supposition  that  the 
Chinese  wrere  in  any  very  great  need  of  an  assistance 
for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion."  So  far  from  cor 
recting  this  supposition,  we  are  certain  that  any  one 
who  carefully  weighs  Mr.  Wilson's  own  narrative  will 
come  to  the  very  conclusion  which  he  deprecates.  That 
he  himself  should  have  missed  it,  having  had  the  advan 
tage  of  perusing  the  original  documents  since  placed  in 
our  hands,  adds  but  another  proof  that  it  is  useless 
to  look  for  the  historian's  judgment  in  one  who  has 
been  trained  to  regard  the  current  events  around  him 
with  the  petty  view  of  a  local  politician.  But  it  is 
time  to  pass  entirely  away  from  the  criticism  of  Mr. 
Wilson's  work  to  the  story  which  he  has  undertaken  to 
tell. 

In  January   1862,  despite  the  warnings  previously 
given  by  Admiral  Hope,  the  Faithful  King,  now  chief- 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION. 


365 


commander  of  the  Taipings,  put  his  army  from  Soochow 
in  motion  for  the  second  time  against  Shanghai. 
According  to  the  theory  of  Mr.  Wilson — which  at  this 
point  we  beg  to  take  leave  of — he  moved  because 
pressed  by  the  Imperialists  that  way.  But  as  he  had, 
in  fact,  attacked  the  place  in  1860,  and  been  beaten  off 
by  the  French  and  British  garrisons,  when  he  was  at 
the  height  of  his  successes,  we  must  decline  to  believe 
that  this  aggressive  policy  was  the  result  of  certain 
reverses  of  1861.  Its  meaning  was  announced  plainly 
enough  by  the  invader's  proclamation,  "  We  must  take 
Shanghai  to  complete  our  dominions/'  as  the  manner 
of  warfare  by  which  this  was  to  be  accomplished,  by 
the  smoke  of  the  burning  villages  which  obscured  the 
city,  and  hid  the  surrounding  country  from  the  eyes  of 
its  terrified  inhabitants.  The  foreign  residents  formed 
themselves  into  volunteer  corps  ;  the  allied  admirals 
prepared  to  act  decisively  against  the  invaders.  General 
Staveley  resolved,  with  our  Minister's  countenance,  not 
merely  to  save  the  city,  but  to  maintain  a  clear  radius 
around  it  of  thirty  miles.  Finally  great  importance  was 
suddenly  attached  to  the  American  adventurer  Ward, 
who  with  about  a  thousand  half-disciplined  Chinese, 
held  Sung  Kiang,  a  place  eighteen  miles  above  Shang 
hai  on  the  Whampoa,  which  he  had  taken  from  the 
rebels  at  the  time  of  their  advance  in  1860,  being  com 
missioned  by  the  Chinese  governor  of  the  city,  and  paid 
for  his  services  from  means  furnished  by  some  of  its 
leading  merchants.  His  force  was  officered  by  such 
wandering  Europeans  and  Americans  as  he  could 
pick  up ;  and  on  the  first  repulse  of  the  rebels  (who 
had  occupied  some  places  to  the  south  of  the  city,  from 
which  Ward,  aided  by  the  admirals,  drove  them)  it 


366 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


received  from  Pekin  the  title  by  which  it  was  afterwards 
officially  known,  that  of  The  Ever-Victorious  Army. 

During  April  and  May  1862  the  Allies,  notwith 
standing  the  death  of  Admiral  Protet,  shot  dead  at 
Najou,  obtained  considerable  successes.  They  recov 
ered  several  walled  towns  in  succession  which  had 
been  too  easily  given  up  to  the  Taipings,  and  seemed 
likely  without  difficulty  to  maintain  the  clear  radius 
resolved  on.  No  better  thing  could  have  happened  to 
the  rebels,  as  afterwards  appeared :  but  at  this  time 
they  obtained  a  sudden  success  which  proved  ulti 
mately  of  most  disastrous  result  to  their  cause,  though 
favorable  to  it  for  the  moment.  The  Faithful  King 
learning  that  the  Imperialists  near  Shanghai,  embold 
ened  by  the  reverses  of  their  enemies,  had  resolved  to 
advance  against  Taitsan,  a  considerable  place  on  the 
direct  line  between  the  former  place  and  Soochow, 
marched  to  meet  them,  and  on  May  sixteenth  suc 
ceeded,  by  the  old  ruse  of  placing  among  them  a  body 
of  his  own  picked  men  under  the  guise  of  deserters,  in 
utterly  routing  them.  A  small  part  only  escaped  to 
Kading,  the  place  from  which  they  had  advanced. 
This  town  was  one  of  those  recently  recovered  by  the 
Allies  under  Staveley:  and  that  general,  growing  nat 
urally  anxious  about  the  advanced  positions  into  which 
he  had  thrown  his  detachments,  and  their  exposure  to 
overwhelming  masses  of  the  victorious  Taipings,  aban 
doned  these  new  acquisitions  and  withdrew  to  Shang 
hai,  a  step  not  taken  without  some  remonstrance  on 
the  part  of  his  staff. 

Staveley's  retreat  naturally  gave  an  impetus  to  the 
Taiping  advance.  The  Faithful  King  now  occupied 
the  towns  within  the  lately  protected  radius,  and  laid 


7  HE  TAIPING  REBELLION.  367 

waste  the  country  up  to  the  city's  walls.  Beyond  them 
there  was  nothing  free  from  the  marauding  parties  he 
sent  out,  but  the  ground  the  fire  of  the  Allies  could 
reach  and  the  two  small  towns  of  Singpo  and  Sung- 
kiang.  The  latter  place  had  been  the  headquarters 
of  Ward's  force  ever  since  it  was  raised  in  1860;  the 
other  was  one  of  those  lately  taken  by  Staveley,  and 
now  occupied  by  a  detachment  of  the  Ever-Victorious 
Army.  An  attack  was  made  on  Sungkiang,  but 
repulsed  by  Ward,  aided  by  a  party  from  the  fleet. 
Singpo,  on  the  contrary,  was  soon  so  closely  invested 
that  it  was  resolved  to  abandon  it,  and  great  loss  was 
suffered  in  the  attempt  of  the  garrison  to  escape  on 
June  eighteenth,  in  which  their  commander,  Forester, 
was  captured  by  the  Taipings.  The  Faithful  King, 
now  master  of  all  the  district  but  Shanghai  and  a  few 
miles  of  the  river,  was  for  pressing  his  successes  against 
"the  foreign  devils  ;"  the  rather  so  since  he  doubtless 
hoped  (as  he  had  endeavored  two  years  before)  to  gain 
an  entrance  into  the  city  by  treachery.  At  this  point, 
however,  he  was  recalled  by  his  master,  against  whose 
capital  at  Nankin  new  Imperial  armies  had  moved 
from  the  interior,  and  so  Shanghai  was  left  to  breathe 
freely  again.  The  interest  of  Chinese  affairs  concen 
trated  for  the  rest  of  the  year  1862  on  the  treaty 
port  of  Ningpo,  to  the  south  of  the  bay  of  Hangchow, 
which  the  Taipings  had  some  time  since  seized. 
Hither  Ward  repaired  with  part  of  his  force  to  aid  the 
operations  of  Colonel  Roderic  Dew,  of  the  navy.  This 
gallant  officer  (whose  achievements  are  worthy  of  far 
more  notice  than  we  can  give  them)  had  become 
entangled  in  the  conflict  of  the  Imperialists  and 
Taipings  for  the  possession  of  the  city,  and  after  a  vain 


368 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


attempt  at  armed  neutrality,  took  part  so  decisively 
with  the  former  as  to  recover  the  place  for  them,  and 
then,  following  up  his  success,  cleared  the  desired 
radius  of  thirty  miles  around  it.  The  barbarities  of 
the  defeated  Taipings  in  their  attempts  to  recover 
this  exceeded  all  description,  and  made  the  country 
people  their  determined  enemies ;  so  that,  in  spite  of 
the  death  of  Ward  in  one  of  many  affairs  in  which  he 
showed  great  gallantry,  the  district  near  Ningpo  was 
fairly  freed  from  the  Taipings  by  the  beginning  of 
1863. 

Ward's  skill  and  courage  in  action  caused  him  to 
be  much  lamented  ;  but  he  had  never  been  able  to 
restrain  the  marauding  propensities  of  his  force,  which 
the  Ningpo  successes  had  shown  in  their  worst  colors. 
His  successor,  Burgevine,  a  young  American  of  more 
activity  and  pretension  than  genius,  was  so  inflated  by 
his  sudden  elevation  as  at  once  to  become  almost  im 
mediately  involved  in  quarrels  with  the  Chinese  gov 
ernor  (or  Futai),  the  Imperialist  generals  near  him,  and 
the  bankers  who  supplied  the  means  of  payment  to  the 
force.  With  the  moral  support  of  General  Staveley  to 
back  him,  the  Futai  dismissed  Burgevine,  and  took 
officially  over  for  his  government  the  Ever-Victorious 
Army,  the  command  of  which  was  refused  by  its  next 
senior  officer.  At  the  Futai's  entreaty,  Staveley  gave 
it  in  temporary  charge  to  Captain  Holland,  one  of  his 
staff,  until  authority  should  be  obtained  from  Sir  F. 
Bruce  at  Pekin  to  attach  a  British  officer  permanently 
to  it  as  commander.  Holland,  unwilling  to  let  his 
force  grow  rusty,  advanced  forthwith  against  Taitsan, 
a  place  already  noted  for  Imperial  disasters,  but  only 
to  be  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  At  this  juncture  the 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION.  369 

reply  of  Sir  F.  Bruce  was  received,  and  under  his  sanc 
tion  the  command  was  conferred  on  Gordon,  a  young 
captain  of  Engineers,  just  breveted  major  for  his  ser 
vices  in  the  previous  operations. 

Gordon  had  first  seen  war  in  the  hard  school  of 
"  the  black  winter"  of  the  Crimean  war.  In  his  humble 
position  as  an  engineer  subaltern  he  had  attracted  the 
notice  of  his  superiors  not  merely  by  his  energy  and 
activity  (for  these  are  not,  it  may  be  asserted,  uncom 
mon  characteristics  of  his  class),  but  by  an  extraordi 
nary  aptitude  for  war,  developing  itself  amid  the  trench- 
work  before  Sebastopol  in  a  personal  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  movements  such  as  no  other  officer  attained. 
"  We  used  always  to  send  him  to  find  out  what  new 
move  the  Russians  were  making"  was  the  testimony 
given  years  since  to  his  genius  by  one  of  the  most  dis 
tinguished  of  the  officers  he  served  under  ;  and  the 
reputation  he  then  made  he  had  fully  sustained  during 
the  brief  services  he  had  lately  been  engaged  on  in 
China.  If  General  Staveley  had  made  any  mistake  in 
the  operations  he  personally  conducted  the  year  before 
(and  it  must  be  remembered  he  was  painfully  hamper 
ed  by  the  doubt  whether  active  intervention  would  be 
approved),  he  more  than  redeemed  it  by  the  excellence 
of  his  choice.  The  Ever-Victorious  Army  found  itself 
under  a  leader  whose  courage  it  had  constant  occasion 
to  admire,  whose  justice  it  honored,  whose  firmness 
availed  to  suppress  the  daily  quarrels  of  its  officers 
and  to  shield  the  men  from  abuse  of  their  power.  The 
private  plundering  which  disgraced  the  force  when  with 
Ward  disappeared  under  a  general  whose  eye  was  as 
keen  as  his  soul  was  free  from  the  love  of  lucre.  Stern 
against  iniquity  as  the  Baptist  himself  (for  Gordon  was 
24 


370 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


of  the  religious  type  of  soldier  which  England  has 
learnt  to  reverence  in  such  characters  as  Havelock  and 
Hedley  Vicars),  he  from  the  first  taught  his  force  to 
"  do  violence  to  no  man,  and  be  content  with  their 
wages ;  "  while  the  milder  side  of  the  gospel  by  which 
he  lived  was  displayed  to  the  defeated  Taipings ;  and 
the  humane  treatment  which  their  prisoners  met  with 
at  his  hands  did  almost  as  much,  after  the  first,  for  the 
cause  which  he  served  as  his  inborn  skill  in  the  art  of 
war.  Among  the  strange  medley  of  adventurers  who 
held  commissions  under  him  were  Englishmen,  Amer 
icans,  French,  Germans,  Spaniards.  Some  were  ex- 
mates  of  merchant  ships,  some  old  soldiers  of  good 
character,  some  refugees  of  no  character  at  all. 
Among  them  were  avowed  sympathizers  with  the  reb 
els,  and  avowed  defiers  of  Chinese  law  ;  but  all  classes 
soon  learnt  to  respect  a  general  in  whose  kindness, 
valor,  skill,  and  justice  they  found  cause  unhesitatingly 
to  confide  ;  who  never  spared  himself  personal  exposure 
when  danger  was  near  ;  and  beneath  whose  firm  touch 
sank  into  insignificance  the  furious  quarrels  and  per 
sonal  jealousies  which  had  hitherto  marred  the  useful 
ness  of  the  force.  The  influence  he  gained  over  their 
rude  minds,  arid  the  degree  of  education  that  qualified 
them,  may  be  illustrated  together  by  the  following 
pithy  note  addressed  to  him  by  an  excited  subaltern 
before  the  greatest  of  his  conquests,  and  after  some 
very  heavy  losses  of  officers  in  previous  assaults  : 

"  Camp  before  SOOCHOW  :  3rd  De  63. 
"  Sir,  i   wish  to  volunteer  my  Service  to  be  one  of  the 
Stormers. 

«  W.  H. ,  Lieut. Regt" 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION.  ^\ 

The  difficulties  that  beset  the  commander  in  enforc 
ing  the  most  necessary  discipline  before  the  enemy 
appear  from  the  characteristic  letter  following,  written 
by  an  officer  after  the  execution  of  a  deserter  at  one 
of  the  detachments,  during  a  long  series  of  desperate 
engagements  at  the  close  of  Gordon's  operations,  near 
Chanchufu.  (The  colonel  complained  of  for  his  sever 
ity  was  killed,  it  should  be  noted,  in  a  night  affair,  four 
days  later,  when  some  of  Gordon's  own  troops  fired  on 
his  party ;  and  it  has  been  shrewdly  doubted  whether 
the  firing  was  wholly  accidental.) 

April  21,  1864. 

"  Sir,  It  is  with  Great  Regret,  that  i  ame  forced  to  apply 
for  permission  to  retire  from  your  force  but  the  transaction 
of  this  afternoon  so  Disgusts  me  that  i  can  no  longer  serv  in 
So  Corruptible  a  force  i  hope  you  will  not  forget  an  officer 
whom  has  servd  at  Chingwan  and  at  those  hills  at  Whosun 
lately,  without  the  chance  of  any  Loot.  Sir  i  have  hardly  a 
farthing  i  leave  it  to  your  generosity  for  the  means  of  reach 
ing  Engeland  but  i  cannot  possibly  serv  in  this  force  after 
Col.— 's  act  of  this  afternoon.  Now  Sir  Some  men  who 
Deserted  from  Soochow  and  whom  you  ordered  to  be  Shot, 
were  Sheltered  and  husbanded  by  Col.— and  eventualy 
released,  a  Corpl  who  deserted  from  my  late  gunboat  i  was 
told  that  i  had  Ill-Treated  him,  by  Col.—,  for  why,  because 
he  was  one  of  his  old  croneys  i  could  tell  you  more  if  I  had 
a  private  Conference  with  you.  Sir  I  have  servd  in  the 
british  army  for  a  long  time  and  never  heard  of  a  man  being 
Shot,  for  desertion  (and  without  a  court  martial)  Sir  if  you 
cannot  give  me  the  means  of  returning  to  Engeland  i  hope 
you  will  Give  me  a  recommendation  that  i  may  obtain  a  Situa- 


372  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

tion  and  not    join  your  Enemies  the  Taping  rebils  Sir  it  is 
with  Sincere  regret  i  tender  this  resignation  from  3ist. 

"  I  remain  your  most  Humble  Servant. 

"  The  late  Capt.  Artillery." 

"  Sir  as  authority  for  a  Character  i  present  you  with  my 
discharge." 

"  Gen.  C.  GORDON." 

The  organization  of  Gordon's  army  we  have  not 
space  to  give  in  detail,  nor  is  this  essential  for  the 
purpose  of  our  story.  Its  numbers,  varying  from 
3,000  to  5,000  men,  under  about  150  officers,  were 
easily  maintained,  after  the  first  successes,  by  recruit 
ing  among  the  captured  Taipings.  The  infantry  were 
armed  mostly  with  the  smooth-bore  musket,  but  had 
plentiful  supplies  of  ammunition ;  and  some  picked 
men  had  rifles.  The  artillery  was  very  formidable, 
comprising  a  well-arranged  siege-train  for  the  attack 
of  walled  towns,  and  supplied  with  complete  boat  car 
riage  for  water  transport.  A  flotilla  of  armed  steamers 
and  gun-boats  served,  in  that  water-intersected  coun 
try,  both  to  cover  and  flank  all  movements,  and  also 
by  suddenly  transferring  the  force  from  one  point  to 
another  to  multiply  it  to  the  enemy's  imagination. 
A  light  pontoon  equipment  was  ready  for  the  passage 
of  the  numerous  creeks  to  be  crossed  on  every  march. 
Though  formidable  in  these  particulars,  the  value  of 
so  small  and  so  irregularly  formed  a  force,  acting 
against  masses  often  tenfold  its  own  numbers,  must 
needs  depend  greatly  on  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  the  powers  of  strategy  in  the  commander.  Of  the 
former  we  have  already  spoken :  the  latter's  operations 
we  have  now  briefly  to  recount. 


THE  TAIPING  REBELLION. 


373 


The  force  now  placed  under  Gordon,  and  the 
means  he  commanded  for  its  rapid  transport,  might 
be  employed  by  an  active  and  daring  commander  in 
two  different  ways.  The  one  would  be  to  carry  on 
connected  operations,  supported  by,  or  at  least  bear 
ing  on,  those  of  the  Imperialist  commanders  in  this  part 
of  China,  and  directed,  as  before  pointed  out,  against 
the  main  lines  by  which  the  Taiping  armies  communi 
cated  one  with  another.  A  more  obvious  and  appa 
rently  more  brilliant  course,  but  one  leading  to  less 
decisive  results,  would  be  to  transfer  the  Ever-Victori 
ous  Army  suddenly  from  one  point  to  another  in  the 
province,  so  as  to  strike  a  series  of  blows  at  isolated 
posts  of  the  enemy.  It  might  be  said,  indeed,  by  one 
reasoning  from  preceding  events,  that  neither  of  these, 
but  rather  a  purely  defensive  attitude  near  Shanghai, 
or  the  gradual  recovery  bit  by  bit  of  the  places  near 
that  city  which  had  been  lately  captured,  would  have 
been  the  natural  way  of  employing  the  force  at  first. 
But  the  new  commander's  instinctive  genius  told  him 
at  once  that  a  vigorous  aggressive  was,  in  a  case  like 
this,  certain  to  prove  the  best  defensive;  that  the 
Taipings  would  not  attempt  to  hold  the  vicinity  of 
Shanghai  when  they  found  an  active  enemy  in  their 
rear,  threatening  the  places  through  which  their 
retreat  would  lie ;  and  that  the  moral  superiority 
attaching  to  such  an  offensive  would  not  only  be  good 
for  his  own  men,  but  would  extend  its  advantages  to 
the  Imperialist  armies,  which  would  gain  heart  from  the 
moment  they  saw  the  common  enemy  reduced  from 
his  usual  threatening  attitude  to  one  of  defence.  The 
feebler  notion  of  protecting  Shanghai  by  operations 
confined  to  the  thirty-mile  radius  was  never  therefore 


374 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


entertained  by  Gordon  ;  yet  in  resolving  to  attack 
beyond  it,  in  order  to  completely  free  the  district  near 
the  city,  it  is  probable  that  he  could  not  foresee  wholly 
how  far  success  might  lead  him,  and  was  content  to 
leave  the  thorough  breaking  of  the  Taiping  power  as  a 
question  for  future  circumstances  to  decide.  But  for 
the  immediate  present,  before  his  entering  on  his  more 
regular  operations,  he  resolved  to  try  the  second 
mode  indicated,  and  to  strike  one  sudden  blow  at  a 
distant  point,  such  as  should  give  heart  and  cohesion 
to  his  followers,  and  inspire  them  with  confidence  in 
their  new  chief. 

About  seventy  miles  north-west  of  Shanghai,  and 
on  the  southern  shore  of  the  estuary  of  the  Yangtsze, 
lies  Fushan,  a  town  long  infamous  as  a  haunt  of  pirates, 
and  now  held  by  the  Taipings,  who  had  captured  it  in 
1862,  for  the  second  time,  after  it  had  once  deserted 
their  cause.  Their  garrison  not  only  held  this  place, 
but  shut  off  from  the  river  Chanzu,  a  town  ten  miles 
inland,  which  had  returned  to  its  allegiance  at  the  same 
time,  and  whose  governor,  closely  pressed  by  a  Taiping 
force,  had  now  great  difficulty  in  restraining  the  Impe 
rialist  garrison  from  surrender,  by  which  they  hoped  to 
avert  the  threatened  vengeance  of  the  rebel  commander. 
To  relieve  this  suffering  garrison  as  swiftly  as  possible 
was  the  first  task  to  which  Gordon  applied  himself 
after  taking  command  of  the  Ever- Victorious  Army ; 
and  not  many  days  after  he  was  on  his  way  thither, 
carrying  part  of  his  artillery,  and  as  many  of  the 
infantry  as  his  two  available  steamers  would  transport. 
Under  cover  of  an  Imperialist  force,  which  was 
intrenched  not  far  from  Fushan,  Gordon  landed  with 
out  opposition,  and  disregarding  a  large  body  of  Taip- 


THE   TA  IP  ING  RE  VOL  UTJON. 


37 


ings  which  kept  the  open  field  to  watch  his  proceed 
ings,  went  directly  to  the  attack  of  the  town.  1 
32-pounder  planted  cleverly  in  the  night  near  the  wa^ 
made  an  easy  breach  in  the  defences  next  mornin: 
(April  4th),  and  the  garrison,  losing  heart,  fled  at  th 
advance  of  the  assaulting  column,  and  gave  up  th 
place,  which  thus  fell  with  very  trifling  loss.  A  marc] 
to  Chanzu  relieved  the  faithful  governor  there  (faithfu 
probably  because,  as  once  having  been  a  Taipinj 
leader,  he  dared  not  risk  a  surrender),  and  showed  sue] 
traces  of  the  cruelty  of  the  rebels  as  might  well  hav 
hardened  any  heart  against  their  cause.  The  dreadfu 
sight  in  one  place  of  the  putrefying  corpses  of  thirty 
five  Imperialist  soldiers,  burned  partly  first,  and  thei 
crucified,  testified  that  the  tenacity  of  the  Chanzu  gov 
ernor  had  in  it  something  of  a  wise  discretion.  Hav 
ing  executed  his  purpose,  Gordon  returned  as  speedib 
as  he  had  come  to  his  headquarters  Sungkiang.  Hi 
success  had  confirmed  him  in  the  good  opinion  of  hi 
force  and  of  the  Chinese  authorities,  from  whom  he  wa 
now  able  without  difficulty  to  procure  the  necessan 
means  for  that  liberal  payment  of  his  officers  by  whicl 
he  superseded  the  loose  practice  of  special  rewards  fo 
their  captures  which  had  existed  under  Ward,  and  whicl 
had  supplemented  a  still  more  irregular  system  of  privat* 
plunder.  Firm  in  maintaining  his  own  authority  as  t< 
discipline,  he  affected  none  of  the  autocratic  airs  of  hi 
predecessors,  but  loyally  treated  the  Chinese  governo 
of  the  province,  Li  (the  same  who  had  got  rid  of 
Burgevine  by  Staveley's  aid),  with  the  respect  due  t( 
the  representative  of  the  government  he  served.  Ir 
vain  did  Burgevine  intrigue  at  Pekin  for  restoration  t( 
his  charge  ;  for  even  Burlingame,  the  American  minis 


376 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


ter,  was  not  in  his  countryman's  favor.  His  successor 
had  already,  both  in  the  field  and  in  quarters,  won 
golden  opinions  from  all  with  whom  he  had  to  do  ;  and 
Li,  when  appealed  to  from  Pekin,  wrote  of  him  pithily 
and  truly :  "  He  wishes  to  drill  our  troops  and  save  our 
money;  he  fully  comprehends  the  state  of  affairs,  and 
in  the  expedition  he  is  preparing  his  men  delightfully 
obey  him  and  preserve  the  proper  order."  For  Gor 
don  was  now  making  ready  for  the  campaign  which 
was  to  restore  Kiangnan  to  the  Imperial  arms,  and  by 
breaking  the  neck  of  the  rebellion,  lead  to  the  general 
pacification  of  China. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  great  city  of 
Soochovv  forms  both  a  natural  capital  and  central 
point  to  the  peninsula  which  was  to  be  the  theatre  of 
war.  About  thirty-five  miles  north-west  of  Shanghai 
lies  the  walled  town  of  Taitsan,  connected,  by  a  main 
road  running  onward  through  the  still  larger  town  of 
Quinsan,  with  Soochow.  Quinsan  was  a  place  of  the 
very  greatest  strategical  importance  ;  for  the  principal 
approaches  to  Soochow  on  the  eastern  side  met  there, 
and  it  served  also  as  the  arsenal  of  the  Taipings  in 
that  country,  they  having  established  in  it  a  manufac 
tory  for  shot  under  some  vagabond  Englishmen. 
Against  this  town  Gordon  was  making  his  advance  at 
the  end  of  April,  sure  of  the  after  fall  of  Taitsan,  which 
in  fact  depended  on  it,  when  he  was  called  aside  sud 
denly  to  the  latter  town  to  avenge  one  of  the  acts  of 
treachery  by  which  a  Chinese  civil  war,  beyond  that 
of  any  other  nation,  is  apt  to  be  defiled.  The  Taiping 
commander  at  that  place,  intimidated  apparently  by 
the  fall  of  Fushan,  which  left  him  exposed  to  an  attack 
on  that  side  or  from  Shanghai  (Taitsan  lies  halfway 


THE   T A  IP  ING  REBELLION. 


377 


between  the  two)  had  made  proposals  of  surrender  to 
Governor   Li.      Either   these   meant    nothing,    or   he 
changed  his  mind  after  the  first  negotiations,  for  the 
affair  only  ended   in  the  surprise  by  treachery  of  the 
first  part  of  an  Imperialist  column  which  was  marching 
in  by  agreement  to  occupy  the  place.     Three  hundred 
of  the  prisoners  were  slaughtered  and  beheaded,  their 
heads  being  sent  to  Quinsan  as  a  proof  of  the  fidelity 
of  the  Taiping  general ;  but  the  news  reaching  Gordon, 
he  turned  aside  at  once  and  moved  swiftly  to  avenge 
this  act  of  barbarity.      Reaching  the  south  side  of  the 
town  on  April  thirtieth,  he  worked  round  to  the  east 
of  it,   keeping   out   of  gunshot,  and   capturing  some 
small  forts  which  protected  the  Quinsan  road,  cut  it  off 
from  that  place.     His  heavy  guns,  protected  by  mant 
lets  (for  the   slow  process  of  trenchwork  was  seldom 
needed  against  the  imperfect  fire  to  be   met   in   these 
sieges),  opened   on  the   place   next   day,   and   on   the 
second   an   effective  breach  was   formed.     Never   did 
the  Taipings   fight  better  than  here.     They  had  not 
yet   been   discouraged   by  frequent   defeat,  and,  more 
over,  had  good  reason  to  distrust  the  mercy  of  their 
enemies.     They  mustered    ten   thousand   strong,  and 
had  among  them  to  work  their  guns  several  of  the  reck 
less    and     untameable    adventurers    whom     European 
merchant-ships  cast  out  in  the  course  of  their  distant 
trade,  and  whose  chief  aim  is  to  keep  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  civilized  law,  which  they  have  probably  too  good 
reason  to  dread.     But  all  defence  was  in  vain  against 
the  perseverance  and  energy  of  the  new  commander. 
On  the  first  repulse  of  his  attacking  column,  Gordon, 
imitating  Grahame  at  San  Sebastian,  caused  a  battery 
of  eight-inch  howitzers  to  play  over  his  stormer's  heads 


373 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


and  clear  the  breach.  On  the  second  essay  the 
defenders  gave  way  and  made  a  general  attempt  to 
escape.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  the  soldiers  of  the  Ever- 
Victorious  Army  that  they  spared  the  Chinese  pris 
oners  (seven  hundred  of  whom  were  soon  after  enlisted 
in  their  ranks),  while  the  foreign  adventurers  naturally 
met  with  little  mercy.  Seven  of  these  were  killed 
after  the  assault,  three  of  whom  proved  to  be  deserters. 
At  this  early  stage  of  the  campaign  it  is  curious  to 
observe  that  the  old  immoral  sympathy  for  the  Tai- 
pings  took  the  form  of  attacks  on  Gordon's  force,  who 
were  accused  by  anonymous  writers  in  the  press  of  the 
treaty  ports  of  acts  of "  the  most  refined  cruelty" 
towards  their  prisoners.  Such  letters  would  have 
been  of  but  little  importance,  had  not  the  Bishop  of 
Victoria  been  misled  by  them,  and  addressed  a 
dispatch  to  Lord  Russell  on  the  subject.  These 
charges  were  not  left  to  Gordon  only  to  refute,  though 
he  did  so  effectually  by  showing  the  confidence  with 
which  the  Taiping  prisoners  took  service  in  the  ranks 
of  the  accused  force.  They  were  rebutted  by  General 
Brown  (who  had  succeeded  Staveley  in  command  of 
the  regular  troops  about  Shanghai)  upon  the  most 
direct  and  detailed  evidence  ;  and  the  origin  of  the 
fiction  was  traced  to  its  source  in  the  execution  by  an 
ordinary  but  cruel  Chinese  official  mode,  "  the  igno 
minious  death,"  of  seven  of  the  runaways  of  the  late 
garrison  of  Taitsan,  who  fell  into  the  hands  of  an  inde 
pendent  Imperialist  force  which  lay  six  miles  from  the 
place  on  the  Shanghai  side. 

Taitsan  had  offered  considerable  temptation  to 
plunder,  and  Gordon  was  glad,  therefore,  to  withdraw 
the  Ever-Victorious  Army  from  its  new  conquest.  His 


THE   T A  IP  ING  REBELLION. 


379 


abolition  of  the  old  license  to  pillage,  and  other 
measures  taken  at  this  time  to  secure  the  necessary 
regularity  and  discipline,  were  not  carried  out  without 
much  resistance,  especially  from  the  European  element. 
At  one  time  all  the  commanding  officers  of  battalions 
sent  in  their  resignations  simultaneously  to  support  an 
extravagant  demand  ;  at  another  a  number  of  those 
below  them  became  still  more  mutinous,  and  their 
insubordination  threatened  to  spread  to  their  men. 
Gordon  quieted  the  seniors,  who  had  most  to  lose,  by  a 
firm  but  determined  refusal,  and  replaced  the  obstinate 
portion  of  the  others  by  volunteers  from  General 
Brown's  troops ;  so  that  before  the  end  of  May,  with 
order  restored,  a  complete  and  well-organized  commis 
sariat,  and  the  moral  advantage  of  recent  successes 
attaching  to  it,  the  Ever-Victorious  Army  was  moving 
onwards  to  new  achievements.  There  was  no  question 
now  of  remaining  on  the  defensive,  or  even  of  confin 
ing  the  operations  to  the  neighborhood  of  Shanghai 
The  capture  of  Taitsan  had  at  once  cleared  more  than 
the  necessary  ruins  around  the  city,  the  Taipings  near 
it  naturally  retiring  as  they  found  the  enemy  establish 
ed  between  themselves  and  Soochow.  The  Imperial 
forces  taking  advantage  of  this,  followed  them  up  west 
ward  to  the  neighborhood  of  Quinsan,  and  then 
intrenched  themselves  under  their  general  Ching,  wait 
ing  till  their  disciplined  ally  should  arrive  to  deliver 
the  place  into  their  hands. 

The  importance  of  Quinsan  in  a  strategical  view  has 
been  already  noticed  generally;  but  to  understand  it 
more  accurately  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  it 
was  the  key  to  all  further  operations  against  Soochow. 
It  lies  nearly  thirty  miles  eastward  of  that  city,  being 


3  So 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


connected  with  it  by  a  single  causeway  running  along  a 
canal,  to  both  the  north  and  south  of  which  the  creeks 
spread  out  into  large  lakes,  making  all  other  direct 
land  communication  from  that  side  impossible.  Close 
to  the  west  of  Soochow  lies  the  principal  of  all  the  nu 
merous  lakes  of  Kiangnan,  Taho,  a  sheet  of  water  nearly 
square-shaped,  and  forty  miles  long  and  broad.  Hence 
there  are  but  three  main  accesses  to  the  city,  two  run 
ning  north  and  south  along  the  eastern  side  of  the 
lake,  and  the  third  through  Quinsan,  thus  forming  with 
them  the  letter  H  ,  Soochow  being  at  the  cross,  Quinsan 
at  the  (proper)  foot,  and  the  Taho  lake  lying  along  the 
top  or  left-hand  side.  Quinsan  once  taken  would  sup 
ply  a  base  for  separate  operations  against  the  necks  of 
land  north  and  south  of  the  city  ;  and  these  once  occu 
pied  and  closed,  the  fall  of  the  place,  to  a  force  having 
command  of  the  water  communications,  would  be  but 
a  question  of  time.  A  right  understanding  of  these 
broad  features  of  the  case  will  make  clear  the  nature  of 
the  operations  that  followed. 

Gordon's  reconnoissances  and  reports  of  Quinsan 
told  him  that  the  place  was  strong.  The  ditch  around 
it  was  over  100  feet  wide  ;  the  various  approaches  were 
furnished  with  forts  inside  stockades  ;  the  garrison  was 
estimated  at  from  12,000  to  15,000  men.  But  if  strong 
in  itself  its  communication  with  the  rebel  headquarters 
at  Soochow  was  extremely  bad,  being,  as  before  stated, 
along  a  single  causeway,  narrow  in  places,  with  lengthy 
bridges  across  the  creeks,  and  easily  approached  at  any 
point  by  Gordon's  chief  armed  steamer  the  "  Hyson." 
This  causeway  then  was  the  weak  point  of  the  defence, 
and  against  it  Gordon  accordingly,  seizing  hold  of  the 
fact  with  the  clear  insight  of  genius,  led  his  attack  on 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION.  381 

May  thirtieth,  carrying  as  many  of  his  land  forces  as 
his  flotilla  would  convey,  under  the  protection  of  the 
Hyson.  This  steam-vessel,  a  small  iron  river  boat, 
mounting  a  32-pounder  gun  and  a  12-pound  howitzer, 
having  her  crew  and  gunners  protected  by  timber-proof 
breastworks,  and  for  her  commander  a  rough  but 
valiant  Yankee  named  Davidson,  did  extraordinary 
service  on  several  occasions,  but  never  so  much  as  on 
this  day,  a  memorable  one  in  the  annals  of  the  Taiping 
war.  The  point  where  Gordon's  flotilla  struck  the 
vicinity  of  the  causeway  on  its  south  side  was  Chunye, 
one-third  of  the  way  from  Quinsan  to  Soochow.  The 
approach  was  protected  by  piles  in  the  water,  and 
these  again  by  stockades  on  the  neighboring  land, 
within  which  was  a  strong  stone  fort.  Gordon  had 
intended  to  carry  the  land  defences,  if  necessary,  by 
assault,  and  thus  cut  the  enemy's  communication  at 
once  by  road  and  canal.  The  Taipings,  however,  saved 
him  all  trouble  on  this  occasion  ;  for  no  sooner  had  the 
piles  been  torn  up  and  the  steamer  appeared  making 
her  way  through,  than  a  panic  seized  the  defenders,  and 
stockades  and  forts  were  alike  abandoned,  their  late 
garrisons  flying  both  ways,  and  spreading  alarm  to  the 
gates  of  Quinsan  and  Soochow.  While  Gordon  landed 
his  troops,  the  Hyson  was  sent  down  the  canal  to 
follow  up  the  fugitives  towards  the  latter  place,  and 
fulfilled  her  task  completely,  clearing  the  causeway  the 
whole  way  to  within  sight  of  the  city,  and  occupying 
two  stone  forts  which  guarded  it  at  different  points. 
Towards  dusk  she  returned  to  Chunye,  and  not  too 
soon,  for  the  road  from  Quinsan  was  now  crowded 
with  a  dense  column  of  men,  at  the  head  of  which  Gor 
don's  troops  were  briskly  firing.  The  Taiping  garrison, 


382 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


finding  their  main  outlet  closed,  while  the  passages 
eastward  from  the  town  were  held  by  the  Imperialist 
general  Ching,  had  sallied  forth  at  evening,  determined 
apparently  by  mere  numbers  to  crush  Gordon's  small 
force  (one  battalion  of  infantry  and  some  guns  were  all 
that  had  been  brought  up),  and  make  their  way  out. 
The  fore-gun  of  the  steamer  was  at  once  brought  to 
bear,  and  her  32-pound  shells  soon  decided  the  engage 
ment,  driving  the  Taipings  in  a  shrieking  rout  of  fugi 
tives  back  on  the  beleaguered  town.  So  fearful  was 
their  loss  from  the  firing  and  their  own  panic  crowding 
(the  steamer  appearing  to  them,  no  doubt,  a  relentless 
and  invulnerable  monster,  which  could  neither  be 
escaped  from,  nor  injured,  nor  stayed  in  her  pursuit), 
that  no  thought  of  further  resistance  was  left  to  the 
disheartened  garrison,  and  the  Imperialists,  who  had 
been  on  the  watch  on  the  opposite  side,  entered  the 
town  unopposed  from  the  east  next  morning.  Of  the 
Taipings  many  thousands  dispersed  over  the  country ; 
but  the  villagers  here,  as  after  the  capture  of  Taitsan, 
revenged  abundantly  on  the  fugitives  the  oppression 
they  had  long  suffered  from,  and  but  few  of  the  number 
reached  Soochow,  or  any  other  place  of  safety.  Up  to 
this  time  Gordon's  actions  may  be  considered  as  having 
cost  the  rebels  not  less  than  25,000  men.  This  last 
extraordinary  success,  gained,  with  a  list  of  seven  cas 
ualties,  by  one  decided  and  well-planted  blow,  did  not 
occur  without  being  accompanied  by  some  fresh-  diffi 
culties.  General  Ching's  jealousy  of  his  ally's  achiev 
ing  with  a  handful  of  men  what  his  own  army  had  not 
dared  to  attempt,  broke  out  in  a  serious  form,  and  led 
to  some  of  his  gun-boats  firing  on  a  party  of  the  Ever- 
Victorious  troops,  whose  flag  they  pretended  to  ignore. 


THE  TA1PING  REBELLION. 


383 


Governor  Li,  however,  compelled  the  apology  which 
Gordon  found  it  necessary  to  insist  on,  lest  the  mistake 
should  be  repeated  ;  and  this  difference  was  settled  for 
the  time.  A  more  serious  matter  was  a  mutiny  of  the 
artillerymen,  who  disapproved  strongly  of  Gordon's 
intended  change  of  headquarters  from  Sungkiang  to 
Quinsan.  The  former  was  associated  in  their  minds 
with  the  easy  days  and  loose  discipline  of  Ward's  com 
mand,  and  they  openly  refused  to  obey  orders  when 
they  heard  of  the  proposed  transfer,  adding  threats  of 
destroying  their  officers  rather  than  submitting  to  it. 
It  was  not  until  Gordon,  drawing  the  revolver  which  he 
was  never  seen  but  on  this  single  occasion  to  display, 
had  dragged  from  the  ranks  the  foremost  man  of  the 
mutineers,  and  forced  him  to  embark  under  threat  of 
instant  death,  that  obedience  was  restored,  and  the 
rest  of  the  company,  in  the  words  of  an  eye-witness, 
"  obeyed  their  general's  formal  word  of  command  and 
embarked  without  hesitation  or  demur.  It  may  be 
said,"  continues  the  same  narrative,  "  that  any  other 
determined  officer  might  have  done  likewise,  and  with 
the  same  results.  Not  so.  It  was  generally  allowed 
by  the  officers,  when  the  event  became  known,  that 
the  success  in  this  instance  was  solely  due  to  the  awe 
and  respect  in  which  General  Gordon  was  held  by  the 
men  ;  and  that  such  was  the  spirit  of  the  force  at  the 
time,  that  had  any  other  but  he  attempted  what  he  did, 
the  company  would  have  broken  into  open  mutiny, 
shot  their  officers,  and  committed  the  wildest  excesses." 
But  this  act  of  energy  made  him  master  of  the  situation 
and  he  had  no  occasion  to  continue  or  repeat  his  sever 
ity  towards  his  Chinese  rank  and  file.  His  artillery 
officers  were  the  next  to  give  him  trouble.  They 


384  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

objected  to  a  new  commander  whom  he  had  given 
them  ;  and  it  was  not  until  he  actually  started  on  his 
next  expedition  without  them  that  they  returned  to 
their  allegiance  and  were  restored  to  their  posts  upon 
apology.  This  last  difficulty  overcome,  and  his  force 
considerably  augmented  by  largely  enlisting  from  his 
Taiping  prisoners,  he  moved,  towards  the  end  of  July, 
to  a  still  greater  achievement  than  those  he  had 
attempted — the  conquest  of  Soochow  itself. 

The  situation  of  this  city  has  already  been  described. 
Lt  should  be  added  that  the  Grand  Canal,  which 
crosses  the  peninsula  from  Hangchow  in  the  south  to 
Chinkiang  on  the  Yangtsze,  with  a  wide  semicircular 
bend  to  the  eastward,  passes  by  Soochow  on  its  eastern 
side.  Certain  branches  or  natural  openings  connect  the 
Grand  Canal  with  the  Taho  Lake,  cutting,  at  various 
points,  across  the  necks  of  land  which,  as  before  pointed 
out,  formed  the  only  accesses  to  the  city  when  Gor 
don's  force  held  Quinsan  to  the  east,  and  his  steamers 
commanded  the  lake  to  the  west.  These  points  became 
of  the  highest  strategical  importance  to  the  series  of 
operations  by  which  he  designed  to  thoroughly  invest 
the  place.  The  town  of  Wokong  stands  about  four 
teen  miles  to  the  south  of  the  city,  commanding  one 
of  these  points  ;  and  on  July  twenty-eighth  Gordon 
moved  against  it  so  rapidly  as  to  surprise  some  of  the 
stockades  outside  which  had  been  left  unguarded,  and 
to  carry  others  with  little  loss.  A  judicious  distribu 
tion  of  the  Ever-Victorious  troops  now  enabled  their 
commander  to  shut  in  the  garrison  with  ease,  and  the 
Taipings,  to  the  number  of  4,000,  soon  afterwards  sur 
rendered.  Here  occurred  the  first  of  certain  acts  of 
Imperialist  treachery  which  ultimately  caused  Gordon's 


THE   T A  IP  ING  REBELLION.  385 

retirement ;  for  General   Ching,  who  had  taken  charge 
of  part  of  the  prisoners,  under  promise  of  good  treat 
ment,  violated  his  word,  and  put  five  of  them  to  death. 
Indignant  at  this  causeless   breach    of  faith,    Gordon 
resolved  to  lay   down  his  command,  and  actually  left 
the   force   for    Shanghai.     But   he     arrived    there    on 
August  eighth  to  find  that  Burgevine  (who,  though  car 
rying  on  a  friendly  correspondence  with  him,  had  been 
long  in  vain  seeking  to  regain  his  lost  command  and 
replace  him)   had    suddenly   left  that  place  with  300 
Europeans,  to  join  the   Taipings  at  Soochow,  carrying 
off  also  a   small   steamer,  and  throwing  the  great  port 
into  a  new  fit  of  consternation.     To  abandon  the  Impe 
rialists  was  not  to  be  thought  of  now,  for  it  would  have 
left  his  own  troops  to  be  seduced  from  their  allegiance 
by  their  old    commander,  who  had  had    the    art    to 
attempt  to  make  them  believe  that  this  dismissal  was 
the    result   of  his  insisting    on    their    rights.     Gordon 
started  alone  for  Quinsan,  and  resuming  his  command, 
took  immediate  steps  to  counteract  the  intrigues  of  the 
American,  sending  his  siege  train  temporarily  back  to 
Taitsan  till    he   should   be   surer  of  his  being  able  to 
maintain    his    advanced    position.      His    troops    near 
Wakong  remained    on    the  defensive,  but  successfully 
resisted  the   attacks   directed    against  that  place  from 
Soochow  with  a  view  to  recover  the  southern  passage 
into  the   city ;    and    presently    their    general,    having 
received   some  reinforcements,   resumed  the   offensive, 
and  advancing  northward  along  the  strip  of  it,  carried 
Patachiao,  a  small  place  close  to  the  southern  defences 
of  the  place,  and  rested  there  purposely  for    awhile  to 
carry  on    negotiations    with    the  foreign  part    of  the 
defenders.     It  was  his  two-fold  object   to  bring  these 
25 


386  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

over,  in  order  to  weaken  the  Taipings  and  to  save 
European  lives ;  but  in  entering  into  the  private  pro 
posals  to  treat,  which  he  soon  received  from  them, 
Gordon  undertook  a  task  no  less  difficult  and  danger 
ous  than  the  most  vehement  assault  upon  the  place. 
Those  he  desired  to  win  would  inevitably  try  first  to 
seduce  his  own  men.  His  ally,  General  Ching,  was 
carrying  on  independent  operations  against  the  garri 
son.  Burgevine,  disgusted  with  his  new  service,  where 
he  found  himself  kept  by  the  chief  Wangs  in  an  infe 
rior  position,  had  new  plans  in  his  restless  brain,  and  had 
the  audacity  to  communicate  to  Gordon  one  of  them, 
which  involved  their  both  betraying  their  employers, 
and  seizing  Soochow  as  the  seat  of  a  new  Eastern  Em 
pire  for  themselves.  Over  all  these  and  other  difficulties 
Gordon's  coolness  and  skill,  as  conspicuous  in  diplo 
macy  as  in  war,  carried  him  triumphantly,  and  brought 
him  to  his  end  without  bloodshed.  Before  the  end  of 
October  the  chief  part  of  the  foreign  allies  deserted  the 
garrison,  under  pretence  of  the  sally :  and  soon  after 
wards  Burgevine,  by  dint  partly  of  Gordon's  personal 
entreaty  to  Moh  Wang,  the  Taiping  commander,  was 
allowed  to  follow  them  ;  so  that  the  great  obstacle  to 
the  fall  of  the  city  and  the  breaking  up  of  the  rebellion 
was  quietly  removed. 

Freed  from  this,  Gordon  resumed  his  operations 
against  the  place,  and  soon  worked  his  way  almost  up 
to  the  city  walls  on  the  south  side.  Abandoning  his 
posts  there  to  be  tenanted  by  his  Chinese  allies,  he 
transferred  his  force  round  the  west  side,  by  the  lake, 
to  the  northern,  the  only  remaining  outlet,  and  on 
November  first  carried  by  assault  Leeku,  a  place  not 
many  miles  from  the  city,  and  which  almost  shut  it  in. 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION. 


337 


On  the  tenth  and  nineteenth  of  November  further 
points  were  captured  and  occupied  which  completed 
the  investment.  In  vain  did  the  30,000  Taipings 
enclosed  seek  for  a  way  out.  In  vain  was  another 
army  planted  at  Wusieh,  twenty-five  miles  off  on  the 
Grand  Canal,  in  rear  of  Gordon's  posts,  while  the  Faith 
ful  King  (still  the  chief  general  of  the  arch-impostor) 
arriving  from  Nankin  with  another  force  of  equal 
amount,  intended  for  the  relief  of  Soochow,  took  up  a 
position  in  the  open  country  between  the  city  and 
Wusieh  in  the  vain  hope  of  making  Gordon  relax  his 
grasp.  Of  the  peculiar  strategy  of  this  campaign,  which 
neutralized  numbers  by  the  skilful  distribution  of  the 
better  provided  army,  no  higher  instance  can  be  found 
than  that  by  Gordon's  arrangements.  14,000  men  all 
told,  including  the  contingent  which  aided  him  under 
Ching,  sufficed  for  the  immediate  work  in  hand  of  hem 
ming  in  a  force  of  more  than  double  their  numbers, 
and  keeping  off  others  nearly  threefold  in  strength. 
Judging  the  Taipings  to  be  already  dispirited  by  their 
situation,  Gordon,  impatient  for  the  surrender  of  the 
place,  resolved  on  a  night  attack  on  a  portion  of  the 
walls.  It  was  made  on  November  twenty-seventh,  and 
despite  the  daring  self-exposure  which  seemed  both 
natural  to  the  man  and  necessary  as  an  example  to  this 
motley  army,  but  which  in  the  commander  of  a  more 
regular  force  would  have  been  a  vice,  Gordon  found 
himself  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  200  of  his  force.  This 
success  did  not  however  alter  the  condition  of  the  gar. 
rison,  who  were  now  losing  heart ;  and  two  days  later 
an  assault  undertaken  by  daylight,  after  a  heavy  fire, 
was  made  with  success  on  the  stockades  and  detached 
works  outside  the  east  gate.  Once  more  Gordon 


388 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


exposed  himself  in  front  of  his  own  storming  column, 
armed  as  was  his  wont  on  such  occasions,  with  no  visi 
ble  weapon  more  formidable  than  his  favorite  cane  : 
and  his  men,  nerved  by  his  example,  carried  the  points 
of  attack,  so  that  on  the  thirtieth  he  was  enabled  to 
issue  a  general  order,  congratulating  the  troops  on 
their  success,  which,  it  was  pointed  out,  "  had  made 
the  city  untenable  by  the  rebels."  Gordon  was  not 
too  sanguine  ;  for  a  day  or  two  later  dissensions  broke 
out  among  the  rebel  generals  within ;  Moh  Wang  was 
murdered  by  his  subordinates  at  the  council-table ;  and 
on  December  fifth  the  city  was  surrendered  to  the 
Imperialists.  Then  took  place  the  saddest  incident 
which  the  British  officer,  acting  with  semi-civilized  allies, 
can  have  to  endure.  Gordon  had  not  been  able  to 
guarantee  the  safety  of  the  Taiping  chiefs  ;  but  hear 
ing  from  Ching  that  the  highest  authority,  the  gover 
nor  (who  had  lately  arrived  on  the  scene),  had  promised 
them  mercy,  he  removed  his  own  force,  with  a  promise 
of  two  months'  pay,  from  the  approaching  scene  of 
plunder,  and  went  into  the  city  to  have  an  interview 
with  the  Wangs.  They  expressed  themselves  confi 
dent  in  Li's  word,  and  after  a  second  interview  left  the 
city  to  give  themselves  up,  Gordon  (whose  force  was 
already  on  the  march  to  Quinsan)  remaining  himself 
with  the  intention  of  protecting  those  inside  from  the 
Imperialist  soldiers  who  were  entering. 

It  was  at  this  time,  on  December  sixth,  when  the 
deliverer  of  the  provinces  was  surrounded  by  armed 
Taipings,  his  troops  removed  from  him,  and  the  great 
city,  which  had  so  long  been  the  object  of  the  campaign, 
incapable  of  further  resistance,  that  Li,  under  pretence 
or  on  account  of  a  difficulty  in  arranging  terms  with  the 


THE  TA1PING  REBELLION.  389 

Wangs,  caused  them  suddenly  to  be  seized  and  exe 
cuted,  and  ordered  the  city  to  be  given  up  to  plunder. 
Those  who  are  curious  in  Chinese  sentiment,  and 
wish  to  know  exactly  how  far  it  justified  Li's  actions, 
may  consult  the  work  of  Mr.  Wilson,  which  is  very  full 
on  this  point.  Unfortunately  Gordon  had  not  been 
brought  up  in  those  broad  principles  of  the  Doctrine 
of  Harmony  on  which,  we  are  assured,  the  Chinese 
fabric  rests,  but  in  the  narrower  philosophy  of  Christen 
dom.  It  is  not  surprising  therefore  that  his  grief  and 
indignation  burst  forth  at  the  sight  of  the  headless 
bodies  of  the  Wangs ;  that  he,  in  his  first  impulse, 
sought  Li  to  exact  personal  satisfaction  from  him  ;  and 
that,  failing  to  find  the  wily  governor  (who  with  good 
reason  kept  out  of  his  way),  he  departed  after  his  force 
to  Quinsan.  Here  he  remained  in  inaction  with  the 
Ever-Victorious  Army  for  the  next  two  months,  pend 
ing  the-  inquiry  which  had  been  instituted  at  Pekin  on 
his  demand  into  the  governor's  conduct,  and  refusing 
curtly  to  receive  the  reward  of  a  decoration  and  a  pres 
ent  of  3,5oo/.  transmitted  by  the  Imperial  Government 
for  himself  on  the  first  news  of  the  capture  of  Soo- 

chow. 

The    Ever-Victorious   Army   thus   withdrawn,  t 
rebellion  soon    appeared  likely  to  revive.     Foreigners 
once  more  began  to  join  the  Taipings.     The   province 
was  infested  by  lawless  Chinese   and  still  more  lawlesi 
foreigners  ;  and  the  Imperialist  forces,  despite  the  aid 
of   some    of   Gordon's  disciplined    artillery,  appeared 
'  unable  to  do   more  than   hold   their  own   against  the 
enemy.     Mr.  Hart,  who  had  lately  taken  charge  of  the 
Imperial  Customs,  now  strongly  urged  Gordon's  resum 
ing   the    field,    since    his    inaction    was    the    strongest 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

encouragement  to  the  disaffected,  and  pointed  out 
with  great  clearness  that,  as  he  had  nothing  more  to 
do  to  add  to  his  reputation  (since  Soochow  had  fallen) 
and  constant  personal  risk  to  undergo,  this  action  could 
only  be  ascribed  to  his  laying  aside  private  feeling  for 
the  welfare  of  the  province  he  had  delivered.  Urged 
by  this  and  the  like  opinions,  and  with  the  special  sanc 
tion  of  Sir  F.  Bruce,  who  wrote  that  he  had  obtained 
at  Pekin  "a  positive  promise  in  writing  from  this  gov 
ernment  that,  in  cases  of  capitulations,  where  you  are 
present,  nothing  is  to  be  done  without  your  consent," 
Gordon  retook  the  field  towards  the  end  of  February 
1864. 

To  understand  his  remaining  operations,  it  is  neces 
sary  to  remember  that  Soochow  is  at  the  central 
point  of  the  Kiangnan  peninsula,  and  Nankin  at  its 
north-west  corner,  100  miles  off;  that  the  Taipings 
were  now  confined  chiefly  to  the  western  side  of  the 
district,  and  that,  if  this  were  cut  through  by  a  line 
carried  across  from  Soochow  to  the  Imperialist  intrench- 
ments  near  Nankin,  their  armies  would  be  reduced  to 
acting  within  two  separate  strips  of  no  great  size,  and 
would  probably  be  unable  any  longer  to  exist.  Gor 
don's  plan,  therefore,  was  to  take  and  occupy  the  towns 
of  Yesing,  Liyang,  and  Kintang,  upon  this  line,  and 
thus  connecting  the  Imperialists  at  Soochow  with 
those  before  Nankin,  to  divide  their  enemies  com 
pletely.  Yesing,  being  on  the  Taho  Lake,  was  cap 
tured  without  much  difficulty  on  March  first,  and  Gor 
don  advancing  rapidly  on  Liyang,  and  offering  its  gar 
rison  easy  terms,  it  was  surrendered  without  resistance 
on  the  fourth.  The  district  around  was  found  to  be 
fearfully  wasted  by  the  Taipings,  who  had  held  it 


THE  TAIPING  REBELLION.  39! 

undisturbed  for  three  years,  and  exercised  a  rule  so 
exacting  as  fully  to  account  for  that  animosity  of  the 
country  people  which  has  been  already  noticed.  Gor 
don  proceeded  next  against  Kintang,  but  here  he  was 
forced  to  leave  his  steamers  behind  him,  and  some  part 
of  his  land  forces  had  naturally  remained  to  guard  his 
late  captures.  He  had  therefore  with  him  but  three 
of  his  infantry  regiments  and  his  guns,  when,  after 
some  days'  delay,  caused  partly  by  bad  weather,  but 
more  by  the  necessities  of  the  people  of  Liyang  (who 
had  been  plundered  of  their  last  stock  of  provisions  to 
fill  the  Taiping  stores  on  his  approach),  he  arrived 
before  the  place.  The  garrison  here  proved  obdurate 
to  his  offers,  and  the  heavy  guns  being  brought  up,  a 
breach  was  formed.  Before  this  had  been  done  a  press 
ing  dispatch  arrived  from  Governor  Li  for  aid  to  the 
Imperialist  forces.  The  latter  had  advanced  on  their 
own  account  against  Chanchufu,  a  place  about  forty 
miles  to  the  east  of  Kintang,  and  had  been  repulsed 
with  much  loss,  the  Taipings  threatening  in  conse 
quence  to  retake  the  offensive.  A  second  dispatch 
told  him  that  they  had  detached  a  force  down  the 
Yangtsze,  turning  the  Imperialists  by  the  north  and 
threatening  Fushan,  his  own  first  conquest.  This  was 
on  March  twenty-first,  but  Gordon's  guns  were  now 
brought  up,  and  he,  judging  it  too  late  to  retire  from 
Kintang,  resolved  to  assault.  Once  more  he  exposed 
himself  in  the  manner  that  for  a  year  past  had  given 
him  among  his  men  the  reputation  of  being  a  magician, 
bearing  a  charmed  life — but  not  again  to  escape,  a 
severe  wound  through  the  leg  compelling  him  to  be 
carried  off,  after  he  had  remained  giving  orders  and 
concealing  it  until  he  fainted  from  loss  of  blood.  The 


392  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

attack  then  failed,  and  next  day  the  wounded  com 
mander  withdrew  his  force  to  Liyang,  which  was  reached 
on  March  twenty-fourth.  The  weather  had  been  bad, 
and  the  men  required  rest  hardly  less  than  their 
wounded  general :  but  when  news  was  received  on 
arrival  at  Liyang  that  the  Taipings  had  taken  various 
places  on  the  way  southwards  towards  Quinsan,  and 
had  scattered  on  a  long  semi-circular  line  towards  that 
place  the  large  force  lately  held  about  Chanchufu,  he 
thought  the  opportunity  of  striking  at  their  flank  too 
good,  and  the  object  of  checking  their  advance  too 
important,  to  be  neglected.  On  the  twenty-fifth  he 
was  far  on  his  way  north-east  to  look  for  them,  taking 
with  him,  however,  only  two  regiments,  one  of  them 
composed  of  Taiping  recruits  just  enlisted  at  Liyang. 

Never,  surely,  did  commander  show  more  confidence 
in  his  own  resources  than  this  wounded  man,  pushing 
forward  along  the  creeks  in  his  flotilla  (for  he  was 
unable  to  walk  or  ride)  with  a  few  hundred  troops,  part 
of  whom  had  been  in  arms  against  him  a  few  days 
before,  into  the  heart  of  the  district  occupied  by 
unknown  thousands  of  the  Taipings.  On  the  twenty- 
sixth  parties  of  their  foragers  were  driven  off  from  their 
plunder,  and  a  proclamation  found  which  announced 
to  the  villagers  that  their  general  was  on  his  way  to 
Shanghai,  and  would  take  Soochow  on  his  way.  By 
the  thirtieth  it  was  ascertained  that  the  central  point 
of  the  Taiping  line  was  at  Waissoo,  where  they  had  a 
strongly  intrenched  position,  and  that  a  creek  con 
ducted  to  it,  up  which  the  artillery  and  commander 
might  be  carried  by  boat.  His  infantry — about  1,000 
strong — were  to  march  by  a  separate  route,  and  the 
combined  attack  was  fixed  for  next  day. 


THE   T A  IP  ING  REBELLION. 


393 


At  dawn  on  March  thirty-first  both  parties  moved 
but  the  flotilla  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Waissoo 
only  to  find  themselves  wholly  unsupported,  and  to 
escape  with  some  difficulty  (for  the  banks  were  high 
and  their  guns  useless)  from  a  somewhat  perilous  posi 
tion.  Gordon's  wound  and  his  adventurous  spirit  had 
here  combined  to  cost  his  force  rather  dear ;  for  the 
infantry  arriving  near  Waissoo,  had  been  surprised,  in 
the  absence  of  the  watchful  eye  of  their  commander, 
by  an  attack  in  flank,  and  had  been  routed  with  a  loss 
of  over  one-third  of  their  number,  including  seven 
officers.  All  of  these  had  perished,  of  course  ;  for  the 
Taipings,  who  had  remorselessly  murdered  the  vil 
lagers  by  hundreds,  in  the  country  about,  were  not 
likely  to  spare  such  of  their  enemies  as  fell  alive  into 
their  hands.  On  learning  these  particulars,  Gordon, 
who,  though  the  very  boldest  of  generals,  was  not  an 
imprudent  one,  fell  back  some  distance  from  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Waissoo,  and  remained  on  the  defensive 
until  he  had  brought  up  some  fresher  troops  of  his 
force  from  Liyang  to  augment  the  demoralized  regi 
ments  which  had  suffered,  and  had  partly  recovered 
from  his  own  wound. 

When  next  he  advanced,  on  April  eleventh,  to 
attack  Waissoo,  he  did  so  (to  quote  the  words  of  his 
own  journal)  "  with  the  greatest  caution,  for  the  men 
had  not  yet  got  over  their  fears."  Threatening  the 
position  by  a  feint  from  the  south,  on  which  side  the 
enemy  was  fully  prepared  for  an  attack,  he  quietly 
moved  round  undiscovered  with  a  regiment  and  two 
guns  to  the  north  of  the  place,  and  surprised  without 
loss  a  stockade  which  laid  bare  to  him  the  interior  of 
the  position.  The  result  of  this  successful  stratagem 


394 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND 


was  the  speedy  abandonment  of  their  lines  by  the 
Taipings.  They  were  vigorously  followed  up  by  6,000 
Imperialists  brought  up  by  the  governor  himself  (who 
had  waited,  as  usual  in  these  operations,  ready  to  profit 
by  the  expected  victory  of  their  ally),  and  were  driven 
across  the  country  they  had  lately  harried  without 
mercy.  "  Armed  with  every  sort  of  weapon,"  con 
tinues  the  journal,  "  the  peasantry  fell  upon  the  rebels, 
who  suffered  fearfully  among  the  creeks  that  abound 
there.  They  were  cut  up  in  every  direction."  The 
last  advance  of  the  rebellion  was  finally  checked. 
Three  days  later  the  Taipings  were  either  dispersed 
hopelessly  through  the  country,  or  shut  up  in  Chan- 
chufu,  whence  they  originally  had  started. 

Hither  Gordon  and  the  governor  had  followed 
them.  Once  having  enclosed  the  rebels,  the  former 
called  up  the  rest  of  his  force,  borrowed  1,000  of  the 
Imperialist  soldiers  for  his  trenchwork,  and  carried  on 
the  siege  in  due  form  ;  for  the  place  had  in  it  20,000 
Taipings,  was  stoutly  defended,  and  repulsed  his  first 
attack.  It  fell  on  May  eleventh  to  a  combined  assault 
Gordon  with  his  storming  column  effecting  their 
entrance  just  in  time  to  prevent  any  ill  consequences 
from  a  panic  which  had  seized  the  Imperialists  after 
they  obtained  a  lodgment  in  the  place.  And  well  it 
was  this  crowning  mercy  of  the  war  had  been  thus 
swiftly  won,  for  on  May  thirteenth  the  Ever-Victorious 
Army  was  on  its  way  back  to  Quinsan  to  be  paid  off. 
The  British  Government,  which  had  never  given  more 
than  a  half-hearted  and,  as  it  were,  tentative  support 
to  that  of  China,  had  become  intimidated  at  the  out 
cry  the  massacre  of  the  Soochow  Wangs  raised  among 
the  party  sympathizing  with  the  Taipings,  and  had 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION.  395 

withdrawn  the  permission  under  which  Gordon  served. 
Had  he  been  less  energetic  and  decisive  in  his  last 
operations,  the  rebels  would  have  taken  heart  at  his 
withdrawal,  and  the  struggle  might  have  been  prolong 
ed  for  years.  As  it  was,  their  cause  was  shattered 
beyond  all  revival.  The  southern  district  around 
Hangchow,  cut  off  from  that  near  Nankin  strategically 
as  before  explained,  by  Gordon's  advance  in  march  on 
Liyang,  had  succumbed  to  the  army  under  Ching. 
Notwithstanding  the  death  of  that  general  during  these 
operations,  his  successor,  aided  by  a  small  Franco- 
Chinese  contingent,  had  captured  Hangchow,  and 
driven  the  remnant  of  the  Taiping  force  into  a  deso 
late  mountain  district  beyond  its  borders.  In  the 
north  Nankin  itself  was  all  that  now  remained  to  the 
Heavenly  King  and  his  adherents.  The  Imperialists 
shut  him  in  more  and  more  closely.  Starvation  did 
its  slow  and  dreadful  work  on  the  bodies  of  the  invested 
garrison,  and  the  city  fell  finally  on  July  nineteenth, 
the  impostor  having  shortly  before  ended  his  vile  life 
by  the  most  fitting  death,  the  hand  of  the  despairing 
suicide. 

The  disbandment  of  so  peculiar  a  force  as  the 
Ever-Victorious  Army,  under  a  weak  administration 
like  that  of  China,  was  obviously  no  easy  task.  Its 
chief  handled  this,  his  last  duty  in  China,  with  the 
same  firm  yet  delicate  touch  which  had  brought  him 
through  so  many  difficulties  before,  and  let  us  add, 
with  an  admirable  disinterestedness  which  commanded 
respect  alike  from  the  force,  his  countrymen,  and  the 
Chinese  officials,  and  greatly  smoothed  his  immediate 
difficulties.  Refusing  absolutely  the  munificent  pecu 
niary  reward  pressed  upon  himself,  this  young  general, 


396  CHINESE  GORDON  AND 

who  had  lived  in  the  field  an  example  of  plainness  and 
economy,  and  spent  his  surplus  pay  in  supplying  the 
needs  of  his  force,  now  insisted  on  and  obtained  fair 
gratuities  for  his  officers  and  men,  but  especially  for 
those  that  had  been  wounded,  before  he  laid  his  com 
mission  aside. 

So  parted  the  Ever- Victorious  Army  from  its  gen 
eral,  and  its  brief  but  useful  existence  came  to  an  end. 
During  sixteen  months'  campaigning  under  his  guid 
ance,  it  had  taken  four  cities  and  a  dozen  minor  strong 
places,  fought  innumerable  combats,  put  hors  de  combat 
numbers  of  the  enemy  moderately  estimated  at  fifteen 
times  its  own,  and  finding  the  rebellion  vigorous, 
aggressive,  and  almost  threatening  the  unity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire,  had  left  it  at  its  last  gasp,  confined  to 
the  ruined  capital  of  the  usurper.  Leaving  his  late 
command  well  satisfied,  Gordon  himself  sailed  for 
England,  taking  with  him  no  more  substantial  treasure 
than  the  highest  military  title  of  China  (Titu,  equiva 
lent  to  commander-in-chief  of  an  army),  the  rare  Impe 
rial  decoration  of  the  Yellow  Jacket,  and  the  good-will 
and  respect  of  all  with  whom  he  had  to  do.  "  Not 
only,  wrote  the  Prince  of  Kung,  the  Chinese  Prime 
Minister,  to  Sir  F.  Bruce,  "  has  he  shown  himself 
throughout  brave  and  energetic,  but  his  thorough 
appreciation  of  that  important  question,  a  friendly 
understanding  between  China  and  foreign  nations,  is 
worthy  of  all  praise." 

Much  has  been  said,  and  fairly  said,  in  eulogy  of  the 
moderation  and  patriotism  of  those  volunteer  generals 
of  the  victorious  armies  of  the  Union  who,  at  the  close 
of  the  American  Civil  War,  laid  down  their  important 
charges  to  return  cheerfully  to  the  counting-house,  the 


THE   TAIPING  REBELLION. 


397 


factory,  or  even  to  the  humblest  appointment  in  the 
regular  service  on  the  frontier.  Englishmen  who 
bestowed  admiration  on  this  conduct  of  their  trans- 
Atlantic  kinsfolk,  should  certainly  yield  no  less  to  that 
of  their  own  countryman ;  since  he,  his  task  once 
accomplished,  sought  for  no  irregular  employment  in 
China,  asked  for  no  prolongation  in  any  form  of  his 
high  command,  but  laid  it  down  to  return  straightway 
to  the  ordinary  life  of  a  captain  of  Engineers  on  home 
duty,  his  highest  ambition  the  furtherance  of  some 
local  good  work,  his  daily  business  for  years  to  come 
the  building  obscure  forts  from  the  designs  of  others 
on  an  Essex  swamp.  The  very  papers  in  which  the 
record  of  his  services  was  inscribed  lay  thrust  out  of 
sight,  their  existence  forgotten  save  in  Mr.  Wilson's 
mention  of  them.  They  might  have  mouldered  for 
him  away  unread,  but  for  the  appeal,  made  almost  as 
a  demand,  of  certain  of  his  brother  officers,  awakening 
to  the  knowledge  that  out  of  their  own  corps  there 
were  few  who  were  aware  of  the  extent  and  bearing 
of  Gordon's  services,  and  the  importance  of  the  Chinese 
campaigns  of  1863-4. 

The  writer  is  far  from  being  one  of  those  who  would 
have  the  world  racked  with  war  in  order  that  we  may 
learn  what  generals  lie  hid  among  us  ;  but  he  cannot 
be  insensible  to  the  fact  that  England's  interests  are 
so  vast,  so  numerous,  so  complicated,  that  it  is  impos 
sible  to  predict  that  the  day  shall  ever  come  when  the 
hero's  arm  and  the  captain's  brain  shall  be  unnecessary 
to  her  greatness  or  her  safety.  Ever  and  anon,  too, 
there  comes  across  the  ocean  the  cry  of  some  one  of 
her  scattered  offspring,  abandoned  perhaps  by  a  vacil 
lating  policy  and  false  humanitarianism  (akin  to  those 


393 


CHINESE  GORDON  AND  THE  TAIPING  REBELLION. 


which  misguided  us  in  our  Chinese  dealings)  to  a  dis 
astrous  war.  Fitly,  therefore,  may  we  close  this  brief 
record  of  great  deeds  done  from  no  mere  love  of  glory 
or  of  gain,  with  words  suggested  long  since  by  one 
who,  himself  a  soldier  whose  name  has  become  a 
household  word  in  England,  had  been  among  the  first 
to  note  the  warlike  genius  of  young  Gordon  when 
together  they  bore  the  fire  of  Sebastopol: — "Another 
Colonial  war,  and  no  help  to  be  given !  If  we  can't 
spare  an  army,  if  we  can't  spare  a  staff,  let  us  at  least 
send  them  one  captain  of  Engineers.  If  there  is  a 
man  in  the  world  who  can  conduct  such  a  war  with 
honor,  thoroughness,  and  humanity,  and  bring  it  to  a 
satisfactory  close  without  needless  delay  or  expense, 
England  has  that  man  in  Chinese  Gordon." 


THE  END. 


NO' 


YB  403! 3 


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